TRANSLANTIC RELATIONS: THE UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE DEGREE MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EUROPEAN STUDIES

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EUROPEAN STUDIES DEPARTMENT

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BUDAPEST, HUNGARY

4 JUNE 2009

17,093 WORD
Abstract

The present thesis looks at the United States’ attitude formation towards the early creation and the later trajectories of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). It explains the shift in the US’ attitudes towards the ESDP from the initial skepticism before the 2000s towards strong support after the 2000s. The paper applies two competing theories, balance of power and balance of threat, in explaining this shift in the US policy-makers’ attitudes in relation to the ESDP. On the basis of the analysis of the American statesmanship’s speeches made before and after the 2000s, the thesis argues that balance of threat better explains the change in Washington’s attitudes. It crystallizes that a positive shift in Washington’s attitudes in relation to the ESDP was caused by the positive shift in its perceptions of this defense project’s intent. The thesis concludes that the US’ perceptions of European defense’s intent defined its response to the ESDP before and after the 2000s.
Acknowledgments

First of all, my deepest gratitude goes to my supervisor, Professor Michael Merlingen for his guidance and valuable comments on the topic throughout the writing process. Also, I would like to express my appreciation to my academic writing supervisor, Reka Futasz.

Special thanks to my family and friends for their strong support and encouragement given throughout my studies at CEU.
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INTRODUCTION

From end of the Cold War until the beginning of the 21st century the Euro-American security relations experienced increasing tensions, which became largely characterized by Europe’s mounting search for autonomy in defense and the United States’ skeptical and at times even hostile responses towards Europeans’ such ambitions. Europeans’ aspirations for establishing autonomous security and defense structures, which largely was facilitated by the US unipolarity and a big “military capability gap”\(^1\) that opened up between the EU and the US during the enduring violence that erupted first in Bosnia then in Kosovo, resulted in the creation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999. Indeed, America’s emergence as “the world’s only military superpower”\(^2\) after the Soviet Union’s fragmentation and the expression of the “capriciousness”\(^3\) of such unilateralism as Europe fell into inter-ethnic conflicts became a case for Europeans to build their own security structures.

However, no sooner did the ESDP project start then it “became a bone of contention with the US.”\(^4\) Indeed, as Washington got alarmed that such initiatives might “break NATO supremacy and thus its own strategic pre-eminence on the continent”\(^5\) as well as its well-established “hegemony”\(^6\), its response to the ESDP became dramatic. The US policy-makers’, e.g. Albright, Cohen and Talbott, attitudes towards the ESDP turned exceptionally critical and scornful. It became widely perceived in Washington that by establishing the ESDP “the EU

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5 Merlingen, *EU Security and Defense Policy*.
has moved into a policy realm that previously had been reserved for NATO.”

Hence, the following years of the decade became marked by the US’ efforts to “shape the development of the ESDP” so as to safeguard the US’ political influence over Europe’ security matters, expressed by belligerent and skeptical rhetoric.

However, with the turn of the century the US’ “attempts to mold the ESDP’s development have diminished” and as Europeans started discussing the ESDP’s institutional development and capabilities improvement, American statesmanship’s previously expressed ruthless skepticism towards this project became followed by rather strong and genuine support. The US policy-makers’ existing warnings for Europe not to undermine NATO primacy, and thus the US global leadership in the security field, steadily started loosing their tone, and moreover their welcoming calls to improve the ESDP’s military arm frequently started to be addressed in their rhetoric. Moreover, the shift in the US’ attitudes became apparent as the ESDP started undertaking cooperation with the US-led NATO in conducting peacekeeping tasks set out at the Petersberg Declaration of 1992. Thus, already in the 2000s European defense, which initially was met with Washington’s harsh skepticism, began receiving its sincere and strong support.

In sum, there was a shift in the US’ attitude formation towards the ESDP, and particularly the US’ attitudes in relation to this project shifted from high skepticism towards strong support. So, this shift in the US’ attitudes becomes a dilemma in the Euro-American security relations.

The existing literature in the field by applying two competing theories, which are balance of power and balance of threat, has extensively studied the creation of the ESDP. Particularly, the work of Barry Posen, by questioning the establishment of the ESDP, claims

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8 Bastian, Pushkina, and Mount, 395.

9 Ibidem.
that this policy was Europe’s balancing behavior not against “perceived imminent existential threat from the US”\textsuperscript{10} as balance of threat would argue, but rather against the US power and unipolarity, as the balance of power argues. Although studying the ESDP as a response to the US’ power, no literature has addressed the question of the US’ response towards Europe’s defense policy from the perspectives of these theories. Therefore, the aim of my research is to fill the gap and study the US’ attitudes towards the ESDP by applying balance of power and balance of threat theories. My objective is to demonstrate that not only can the ESDP’s response towards the US be studied from the perspective of balance of power and balance of threat theories, but also the US’ response towards the ESDP.

Hence, by studying the US’ attitude formation towards the ESDP from 1990s till present, my research evolves around the central puzzle, why did the US’ attitudes towards European defense shift from skepticism to strong support? In answering this question I argue that there was a shift in the US’ perceptions of intent of the ESDP, which caused the shift in its attitude formation towards this project. In other words, I claim that when the US policymakers perceived the ESDP’s intent as potentially threatening to their global leadership their response to it was accordingly skeptical and hostile. However, when Americans started perceiving the intentions of the ESDP as harmless and even beneficial to their leadership, their attitudes also became supportive of it.

To test the hypothesis, that the shift in the US’ attitudes towards the ESDP was caused by the shift in its perceptions, I suggest two steps. Firstly, to test that the US’ skepticism in relation to the ESDP was caused by its negative perceptions of this project’s intent, I make an assumption that the more the US officials perceived the intent of Europeans’ initiatives to build autonomous defense as potentially threatening to their global leadership, the more skeptical they turned to such ambitions. Secondly, to test that the shift in the Washington’s

attitudes was caused indeed, by the shift in its perceptions of intent I further propose three assumptions, all of which aim to show the change in the US’ perceptions. The first assumption is that the more institutional developments take place within the ESDP, which are aimed at improving its capabilities, the more supportive the US becomes to such institutional advances. The second assumption is that the better the general Euro-American political relations get, less worried the US gets about Europe’s defense trajectories. And my final assumption is that the more Europeans cooperate with the US-led NATO through the ESDP in the conduct of crisis management missions, the more the US becomes supportive to it. Thus, I will show that there is a directional relationship between the US’ perceptions of intent and its attitude formation in relation to European defense.

The units of my analysis are the US’ policy-makers’ official statements and public proclamations made during the timeline between the early 1990s until present. The dependent variables of my study are the attitudes and the independent variables are the perceptions of intent, discourses, quality of transatlantic political relations, cooperation in operation and capabilities. I will apply two competing theories, balance of power and balance of threat, in explaining the shift in the US’ attitudes towards the ESDP. By analyzing the results of the US policy-makers’ speeches made before and after the shift in their attitudes, I will argue that the balance of threat gives a more insightful explanation to my puzzle.

The thesis is structured as follows. In the first chapter I introduce two competing theories, balance of power vs. balance of threat, and then discuss their predictions for the US’ attitude formation. The second chapter gives the historical overview of the ‘transatlantic relations’11 in two time periods, during and after the Cold War, with a specific attention to tensions evolved between the US and Europe. The third chapter covers the period between 1991 and 2000, and discusses the US’ attitude formation in relation to the creation of the

11 By saying ‘transatlantic relations’ I refer only to ‘Euro-American relations’.
ESDP. The fourth chapter covers the period from 2000 until present and discusses the trajectories of the ESDP and the shift in the US’ attitude formation towards it. It will also provide theoretical implication of empirical findings. The conclusion will provide overall summary of the research.
CHAPTER I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: BALANCE OF POWER vs. BALANCE OF THREAT

1.1. The Balance of Power Theory

A “balance-of-power” theory is one of the core concepts in neorealist or structural realist school of international relations, and it presents a reformulated version of classical realism. The theory of balance-of-power for the first time was introduced in 1979 by Kenneth Waltz in his scholarly work called Theory of International Politics. The theory is characterized by its systematic approach in studying state behavior in the international scene. In order to better understand a balance-of-power and avoid any confusion, Waltz offers to study his theory from several standpoints. The first proposition is to understand that balance-of-power bases on theoretical assumptions and the second is that it “claims to explain the result of states’ actions”.

To start with the first proposition of the balance-of-power theory, balance-of-power emphasizes the centrality of “assumptions” for constructing the theory. By drawing an analogy to neoclassical economic theory, particularly to microeconomic model, Waltz sees international system as a market economy made by the “actions and interactions of its units” and where states’ behavior and motivations as those of firms’ ruled by the market, and thus assumed rather than realistically described. Balance-of-power says that since assumptions are not factual, it is legitimate to question not if assumptions are true or false but if they give useful explanations or not. Thus, the balance-of-power theory primarily starts with making “assumptions about states.”

The theory assumes that “states are unitary actors, who at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination.”

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13 Ibid., 118.
14 Ibidem.
Indeed, a balance-of-power believes that states are the only key actors in the international system. Like in the domestic economy there exist numbers of other smaller firms in the system, but since states are the largest of all firms, small firms such as nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations do not matter. The theory claims that only the states are the most powerful actors in the international scene, which have a capacity to establish rules.

Furthering its assumption about states, the balance-of-power theory believes that states attempt to use means “in more or less sensible ways” in order to achieve their ends. It is assumed that states at a minimum aim to preserve their survival in order to pursue and achieve other goals. The actual goals of states can be various and endless in their numbers; however, without their survival in the international system it would be impossible for states to pursue their higher ends. Thus, all states are assumed to act with “relative efficacy”\(^{15}\) to ensure their survival. The means with which states are assumed to meet their ends are categorized into “internal efforts” and “external efforts”\(^{16}\). Internal efforts consist of states’ actions to increase their offensive military and economic capabilities and develop necessary strategies that will enable them to reach their goals, while external efforts consist of actions directed at expanding or strengthening their alliances as well as of states’ attempts to weaken the conflicting alliance.

Moving from introducing basic assumptions of states, the balance-of-power theory discusses the conditions under which states act and interact with each other. In doing so, the theory emphasizes the importance of understanding the characteristic of the international system within which states operate. According to balance-of-power, “international structure acts as a constraint on the state behavior, so that only states whose outcomes fall within an expected range survive.”\(^{17}\) Indeed, Waltz believes that the international structure is highly anarchic, which implies both the absence of superior governing body and the presence of

\(^{15}\) Ibid., 93.
\(^{16}\) Ibid., 118.
\(^{17}\) Ibid., 120.
disorder and chaos, and bears an “ordering principle”. Due to the absence of a supreme authority over states, war is possible and always competitive. Moreover, anarchy creates a condition where states are uncertain about other states’ intentions and future actions and thus lack trust to each other and experience fear. These all produce a security dilemma and act as constraints, thus characterizing the very anarchy of the international system. Sheehan describes the anarchy in different terms by saying that the reality of international relations and the system is that “movement and change, not stasis” and that “power is never permanently balanced, rather states must be permanently engaged in the act of balancing power, of adjusting and refining it in response to the perpetual ebb and flow of power within the system.”

Therefore, considering the anarchic nature of the international system, balance-of-power assumes states to behave in a particular way, which results in the formation of balance-of-power. The balance-of-power theory assumes that due to the absence of any higher authority that would come to aid weakening states or restrict other states’ from the use of whatsoever means in their offensive purposes, states are assumed to act in accordance with a logic of “self-help”, and thus pursue only their own interests, the least of which is survival. Indeed, in a self-help system states are the only actors who assist themselves and failing to do so will endanger their survival and prosperity and make them suffer. A “fear of such unwanted consequences” appears as stimulation for states to increase their power and capabilities. In fact, in the self-help system power is the means to reach the ends, and formation of balance is seen as an outcome of states’ actions. Power is always relative and when the power of one state improves, others are assumed to look to their own capabilities and respond because the increase in one’s power poses a threat to the survival of the other. However, the theory also

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20 Waltz, 118.
21 Ibidem.
assumes that not all the units in the system strive to increase their capabilities and balance the power of the other because then the system would not work. According to Waltz, only relatively stronger states balance each other and weaker states choose to “bandwagon”.  

The second proposition of balance-of-power is to explain the results of states’ actions. The theory attempts to draw a line between outcomes of states’ behavior and their motivations. Particularly, the balance-of-power theory says that the results or in other words the formation of a balance of power “may not accord with the intentions of any of the units whose actions combine to produce that result.” Maintaining a balance of power may or may not be in the motivations of states; however, the theory assumes that a balance of power tends to exist whether some states consciously attempt to preserve a balance or strive for “universal domination”. Nevertheless, Waltz claims that most of the statements in the balance-of-power theory show that most of the states’ balancing power behavior is driven by a purpose.

In sum, the balance-of-power theory, by placing at its core assumptions about states, says that due to anarchic and “ordering principle” of the international system states act by a logic of self-help and behave in a way to strengthen their internal and external efforts in order to preserve their sheer survival at a minimum. Thus, constraints of the anarchic system make states act in a way which results in their balancing power behavior.

### 1.1.1. Transatlantic Relations Through the Prism of Balance of Power Theory

One of the explanations to transatlantic relations, particularly to the Euro-American relations on the European Security and Defense Policy issue, derives from the theory of balance-of-power. According to the balance-of-power theory, the European Security and

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22 According to Seth, bandwagon is states’ strategy, in which states ally with a dominant power and try to obtain at least some of the spoils of war. In this strategy, states who bandwagon give up any hope for balancing the power of unipole and thus let the dominant states to increase its power at their expense.

23 Waltz, 119.

24 Ibidem.
Defense Policy (ESDP) emerged as a balancing behavior in response to the United States’ growing power. Indeed, the theory predicts that Europeans’ autonomous security and defense initiatives, which implied an increase in military capabilities, illustrate the beginning of Europeans’ hard balancing against the United States’ unipolarity expressed by its aggregate power.

To start with, according to Posen’s interpretation of balance-of-power, “structural realism predicts that the passing of bipolarity should be followed by a good deal of autonomy-seeking by consequential states.”\(^{25}\) The ESDP is one of such instances of Europeans’ not only autonomy seeking but also balancing behavior. However, the ESDP didn’t emerge immediately after the end of a bipolar system. This is because the EU or the CFSP, which emerged in 1992, could not allow Europeans to balance American power due to the infancy of their political institutions and lack of necessary military capabilities at the beginning of its inception. European states’ behavior, which previously was seen as bandwagoning with the US within NATO, emerged as balancing only in the second half of the 1990s.

According to the balance-of-power theory, unequal distribution of power in the system is a causal factor for states’ balancing behavior. Empirically, the United States’ hegemony, characterized by its growing power, was one of the push factors for Europeans to initiate their defense policy. Yet, the ESDP was not a balancing behavior to meet the existential threat caused by the US hegemony; rather it was an attempt of European states to autonomously handle Europe’s security concerns. Particularly, the EU’s dependence on the US’ military assistance during the Balkan crisis and eventual loss of trust in such assistance played their role in the establishment of autonomous security and defense policy by European states. Viewing the ESDP as a balancing behavior, Posen claims that, “though the search for

\(^{25}\) Posen, 159.
autonomy may not in the first instance be directed against the United States, it nevertheless is motivated by the great power of the United States.”

The European states’ balancing behavior becomes apparent when looking at internal developments within the ESDP, most obvious of which is capability development. To begin with, in 1999 the Helsinki European Council adopted a Headline Goal that called for the deployment, by 2003, of 50-60,000 military forces within 60 days and in 2004 outlined the “Battle Group” concept, which called for the deployment of 1500 military personal within 15 days. In addition to it, European space projects such as A400 strategic airlift aircraft, Skynet 5, a sophisticated military satellite communications system and Galileo navigation satellite demonstrate Europe’s attempts to increase their relative military power. Europeans’ attempt to increase their military assets, according to Posen, is a result of their intentions not just to limit themselves to peacemaking tasks, but also to conduct peacekeeping tasks beyond Europe’s borders.

Moreover, the balance-of-power theory assumes that in a unipolar system, when other states increase their relative power, the unipower is predicted to respond with objection because the improvement of others’ power position may potentially “reduce overall power advantage” of a hegemon. Therefore, based on structural realism’s assumption, the US is predicted to object to Europeans’ autonomous defense project in order to preserve its dominant position in the world’s security.

In general, the balance-of-power theory explains Europeans’ security and defense initiatives as a Europeans’ balancing behavior against the Americans’ superpower. Although, their balancing behavior was not aimed at meeting the existential threat caused by the US, still the establishment of the ESDP and subsequent increase in Europe’s military capabilities can be illustrated as a case of hard balancing behavior.

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26 Posen, 159.
27 Posen, 180.
28 Ibidem.
1.2. The Balance Of Threat Theory

The “balance of threat” theory, introduced by Stephen Walt in 1985 in his article titled “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power”, emerged as an important modification in the theory of balance of power, earlier developed by Kenneth Waltz. Diverging from the balance of power theory, balance of threat attempts to provide a multifaceted and more insightful explanation to the origins of states’ alliances. Particularly, by separating power from a threat, the theory predicts that states tend to balance not only against the growing power of another state, but against a growing power that emanates a direct external threat to them. According to Walt, hard power is not the only source of threat because other sources such as geographical proximity, offensive capabilities and aggressive intentions play significant role in explaining alliance formation. Thus, the balance of threat theory stresses the centrality of states’ perceptions, which are essential for one state in defining if a geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, aggressive intentions as well as aggregate power of another state pose it a potential threat or not, and if so, then to what level.

The balance of threat believes that there are four essential things to consider when studying the origins of alliances. Firstly, external threats are the most common origins of alliances that occur in the international system. Secondly, balancing behavior of states’ is a more common tendency than bandwagonning. Thirdly, balance of threat predicts that states “do not balance solely against power, they balance against threats.”29 Finally, the theory predicts that one states’ acquisition of offensive capabilities as well as intentions increases a possibility of others’ opposition against that threat. Therefore, the further discussion of the balance of threat theory evolves with the consideration of these four predictions about state alliances.

In contrast to the balance of power theory, balance of threat predicts that a threat, which is composed of four main sources, is the key independent variable in explaining a dependent variable, alliance formation. According to the balance of threat theory, material power is only one component of a threat. As Walt says, “although power is an important part of the equation, it is not the only one. It is more accurate to say that states tend to ally with or against the foreign power that poses the greatest threat.” Moreover, he predicts that, “the greater the threat, the greater the probability that the vulnerable state will seek an alliance.”

Thus, in a balance of power a threat originates from four main sources, which are aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions. Each of these factors influences the level of threat and therefore contributes to determining states’ behavior in the system.

To start with the first source, the balance of threat theory predicts an aggregate power as one of four sources of a threat. Indeed, by recognizing power as one of the factors of a threat, the balance of threat theory avoids a total rejection of the core principle of balance-of-power. However, balance of threat studies power not as it is but in a tight connection to a concept of threat. The theory, thus, claims that “all else being equal, the greater a states’ total resources (e.g., population, industrial and military capabilities, technological prowess), the greater a potential threat it can pose to others.” Indeed, it is predicted that unequal distribution of power together with perceptions is one factor that eliminates a threat. Since power can not only pose a threat but also be prized, the aggregate powers of one state can stimulate others either to balance or bandwagon. Thus, aggregate power can be viewed as one of the origins of a threat.

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30 Later referred as “aggregate power”
31 Walt, 21.
32 Ibid., 26.
33 Walt, 22.
34 According to Walt, states whose aggregate power is measured as great can either punish their enemies or reward their allies. Therefore, some states choose to bandwagon, although their expectations of being rewarded can not be guaranteed.
Geographical proximity is another factor that originates a threat. The balance of power theory predicts that when all other variables are taken as equal, states tend to form alliances as a reaction to those states who are geographically closer to them than those that are distant. Indeed, the theory says that proximate threats stimulate either balancing or bandwagoning behavior because “the ability to project power declines with distance, states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away.” 35 Thus, the geographical location of states plays another role in determining their behavior on the international scene.

The third source of threat in the balance of power theory is offensive power because according to the theory states that are big in their offensive capabilities are more likely to threaten others, thus motivating an alliance. Offensive power is closely related to aggregate power as well as geographical proximity; however, these variables are “not identical”. 36 The difference of offensive power from them is that, “offensive power is the ability to threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state at an acceptable cost.” 37 Thus, offensive power is determined by a build up of large and mobile military capabilities that can be utilized with the purpose of attacking. The immediacy of threat provoked by the offensive power of one state acts as a strong push factor for a balancing behavior of the others. However, offensive capabilities that “permit rapid conquest” provoke vulnerable states rather to bandwagon with the offensive power than to balance. “Balancing may seem unwise because one’s allies may not be able to provide assistance quickly enough” 38, predicts the theory of the balance of threat. Nevertheless, accumulation of offensive power is one source of a general allying behavior of states.

35 Walt, 23.
36 Walt, 24.
37 Ibidem.
38 Walt, 25.
Finally, balance of threat predicts that “states that are viewed as aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them.”\(^{39}\) Indeed, the central argument that distinguishes balance of threat from balance of power is that power alone is not as much important as the intensions with which that power can be utilized by one state against the other. According to the theory, intensions and especially the perception of intensions play a crucial role in alliance formation. For instance, it predicts that “even states with rather modest capabilities may prompt others to balance if they are perceived as especially aggressive.”\(^{40}\) Walt further claims that “because power can be used either to threaten or to support other states, how states perceive the ways that others will use their power becomes paramount.”\(^{41}\) The role of perceptions of intent becomes more obvious when looking at those states that choose to bandwagon, because states’ readiness to bandwagon rather than to balance is to a great extent determined by its beliefs that the threatening power can be “appeased by an alliance”\(^{42}\) with it or not. Thus, Walt says, “intensions, not power, [are] crucial.”\(^{43}\)

In addition to this, the balance of threat theory predicts that a change in perceptions is to be followed by a change in states’ allying behavior. Particularly, the theory emphasizes this idea by saying that “as perceptions of intent change, either the direction or the intensity of balancing behavior should change as well.”\(^{44}\) Generally, an overall view of a balance of threat suggests that an alliance formation of one state is conditioned not only by a growing power of the other state, but also by its geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and aggressive intensions. Thus, a threat and not aggregate power becomes a central focus of a balancing behavior. Perceptions of intent in their turn play an enormous role in understanding if one state is seen as threatening or not to the other state.

\(^{39}\) Ibidem.
\(^{40}\) Ibidem.
\(^{41}\) Walt, 179.
\(^{42}\) Ibidem.
\(^{43}\) Ibid., 26.
\(^{44}\) Ibid., 168.
1.2.1. Transatlantic Relations Through the Prism of Balance of Threat Theory

The balance of threat theory, in contrast to a balance of power theory, provides an alternative explanation to Euro-American relations in the security field, namely, to the development of Europeans’ security and defense initiatives and the United States’ perception of it. The balance of threat theory would assume that the ESDP was not a balancing behavior of European states’ against the US’ power and unipolarity, and therefore an aggregate power did not play such a crucial role in the flow of Euro-American relations on the ESDP issue as it did a perception of intent. Therefore, the establishment of the ESDP was not European allies’ response to the imbalance of power between them and their American neighbors.

Rather stressing the importance of considering the centrality of perceptions of intent than hard power, balance of threat suggests the importance of examining the transatlantic dialogue, which evolved around Europeans’ aspirations for autonomous defense, as a result of American statesmanship’s particular perceptions of intent. To remind, in the balance of threat theory it is crucial to study how one state perceives the actions of the other. Hence, particularly in the transatlantic case, understanding the Americans’ perceptions of intent of Europeans’ actions, as that of the establishment of the ESDP, becomes the cornerstone in understanding the transatlantic discussion about Europeans’ autonomous defense. Clear understanding of the Americans’ perception of the ESDP’s intent makes it easy and comprehensive also to understand the US leaders’ attitude formation and specific responses towards their European neighbors’ security and defense policy. Since a threat is the focus of the theory, balance of power assumes that the US’ perceptions can be formed in a way that it sees the ESDP project as either posing a threat or potential threat or not. However, it is also essential to note that the US’ perceptions are subject to change thus their attitudes and responses towards the ESDP too. In sum, balance of threat suggests that in studying the Euro-American relations, evolved around the ESDP issue, it is necessary to focus on Americans’
perceptions of the ESDP’s intent, since perceptions influence the US’ attitude formation and the flow of the transatlantic dialogue, than on power itself.

Concluding this section, two competing theories have been introduced, the balance of power theory and the balance of threat theory, in discussing the transatlantic relations that evolved around the European Security and Defense Policy. According to the balance of power theory, the ESDP’s establishment can be viewed as Europeans’ balancing behavior against the unipolarity of the United States defined by its aggregate power. Rather emphasizing the centrality of intentions and perceptions of intent than power itself, balance of threat assumes that in order to understand the Euro-American relations on the ESDP issue it is important to understand the Americans’ perception of intent of the ESDP. This is because a clear comprehension of the US leaders’ perception of intent explains particularities of their attitudes and responses towards Europeans defense project.
CHAPTER II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS IN THE SECURITY AND DEFENSE FIELD

Euro-American relations in the field of security have always been central to understanding the very nature of transatlantic relations and to viewing a wider scope of transatlantic affairs. Stemmed and evolved within the framework of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the security relations between Europe and America have often times consisted of a “mix of cooption, coercion, mutual interest and compromise as well as conflict”\(^{45}\), thus adding vague nature to transatlantic partnership and often times raising frequent questions concerning the prospects of such partnership among most analysts. Indeed, many spectators observe the relationship between Europe and the United States as marked by ambivalence from the very start and that following the establishment of post war order the transatlantic alliance did not proceed without “breaks and inner conflicts”\(^{46}\).

Numerous factors have played their role in intensifying the ambiguous character of Euro-American affairs and in gradually entering the relationship between two parties into “enduring series of (patriarchal) family fights”\(^{47}\). However, to better understand the origins and the nature of transatlantic tensions, as most of the literature suggest, it is essential to study the development of Euro-American relations in two separate timelines, which are the Cold War and the Post-Cold War periods. Despite the fact that both periods represent the same phenomenon – fluctuating transatlantic relations - each timeline, to a certain level, illustrates different but equally important insights to comprehending this phenomenon of transatlantic relations.

\(^{45}\) Merlingen.
\(^{46}\) Werner Weidenfeld ed al., *From Alliance to Coalitions-Future of Transatlantic Relations*…
\(^{47}\) Merlingen.
2.1. Transatlantic Relations During the Cold War

During the Cold War, European defense was synonymous with Atlantic defense, and the Atlantic political order was driven by the basic interests of both actors involved.\textsuperscript{48} Indeed, the end of the Second World War, followed by the Cold War, signified the start of a new epoch in the relations of offshore neighbors, which became somewhat ambiguously intertwined, interchangeably consisting of cooperation and conflict. Indeed, the transatlantic relations during this timeline moved one step further and institutionalized its basis, which went as far as to resemble a “marriage” between two parties. However, the closer the United States and Western Europe became to each other, the more “family fights”\textsuperscript{49} seemingly started to take place. By the end of the Cold War the ties binding America and Europe started fraying and the transatlantic marriage, as most analysts have observed, was in a danger of heading for “divorce”.\textsuperscript{50}

Numerous factors, for instance, the changes in the overall international structure, facilitated the development of an ambiguous character of Euro-American relations. To start with (transatlantic cooperation), after the end of World War II and at the time of the emergence of a bipolar system both the United States and Western Europe saw an indispensable need for mutual cooperation. After the end of World War II, the United States stayed on European land in order to build a “wall of containment”\textsuperscript{51} against political, military and psychological threat posed by the communist doctrine of Stalin.\textsuperscript{52} In its turn, confronted by a perception of the same threat on its East, Western Europe was in a full support of the

\textsuperscript{48} Reichard, 27.
\textsuperscript{49} Merlingen.
\textsuperscript{50} Ivo H. Daalder, “Are the United States and Europe Heading to Divorce?,” \textit{International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)} 77, no. 3 (July 2001), http://www.jstor.org/stable/3095437 (accessed April 28, 2009).
\textsuperscript{52} Ibidem.
Cold War logic of containment. Eventually, the first attempts for transatlantic collaboration happened in the field of security and defense. Particularly, unachieved hopes of President Roosevelt to integrate communist Soviet Union into a Pax Americana\footnote{Merlingen.} played their role in negotiating a defense pact, the North Atlantic Treaty (April 1949), together with Western European states to suppress the threat of the Soviet Union. In later years North Atlantic Treaty grew into North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and for a foreseeable future became a solid institutional confine for transatlantic relations in the field of security and defense. Thus, during the course of the Cold War the existence of a common massive threat, as Reichard has put, it became glue that held Western powers together.\footnote{Reichard, 41.} In fact, for both parties that were confronted with common external threat of Soviet communism, NATO was a win-win approach. While the necessity for cooperation for Europe streamed from the United States’ military assistance for its territorial survival and “nuclear umbrella” through NATO, for America the European Community represented a “civilian institution for economic prosperity” through European economic integration.\footnote{Ibid., 2-3.} Thus, the postwar transatlantic relations took their start in the military domain, where the division of labor gradually started taking its shape within NATO framework.

Not surprisingly, the Cold War period was not only characterized by transatlantic cooperation but also crises consisting of growing hegemonic intentions of the United States and frequent critical approaches of some Western governments in their relations with America. The “Stunning success”\footnote{Ibidem.}\footnote{Ibidem.} of Euro-American cooperation became widely questioned as Washington started exercising its supremacy over NATO and largely diffusing its hegemony through various means. For the United States, NATO became a useful instrument that was aimed at not only building a coalition against perceived Soviet threat, but also
preventing the emergence of a “European pole”.

America’s leading role within NATO created a handy tool for the US to exercise its hegemonic intentions over its Western European allies, either by averting Franco-German axis or preventing any unification of its offshore neighbors. In fact, “the Cold War gave the US added hegemonic leverage at critical moments in the management of the Western order, forcing even friendly powers to consent to the ‘grand strategy’ of the US for building order within the Western World”. Moreover, America’s dominant role in European security was facilitated by further diffusion of its economic, political and cultural hegemony over Europe. The establishment of the transatlantic capitalist economy “centered on the American market and the organizing principle of Fordism” and particularly the support for European economic integration and promotion of European Recovery Program or so called Marshal Plan, marked the exercise of American doctrine over Europe. In other words, the US support for Western European integration has always been “conditioned on Europe being fitted into a wider Atlantic framework lead by Washington”. Thus, from the beginning hegemonic attitudes were characteristic for the United States’ behavior in transatlantic relations.

As a consequence, the long-lasting US dominance over Western Europe, including enduring debates about burden-sharing without any reference to responsibility sharing, started raising the issues of “European voice in security and defense” among leading governments of the West, with the exception of Atlantist Britain. Already in the second half of the 1950s debates about Suez Canal cast long shadows on the transatlantic relations. Washington’s forcing response towards joint invasion of Egypt by Britain and France taught London to

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57 Merlingen.
59 Weidenfeld, 8.
60 Merlingen.
61 Ibid.,
62 Bastian, Pushkina, and Mount, 388.
63 Reichard, 26-27.
64 Andrews, 12.
never rebel against the US and Paris to rely more on Europe.\textsuperscript{65} Furthering transatlantic debates, Europe’s opposition against American hegemony in the security field gained its strength during the 1960s in the form of France’s unilateral withdrawal from NATO integrated command and the establishment of nuclear force de frappe\textsuperscript{66}, as well as later emergence of the German government’s “change through the rapprochement” policy, i.e Ost-Politik. Thus, the 1950s and 1960s featured serious crisis in Euro-American relations.

Although both parties enjoyed relative ease and détente during the first half of the 1970s, the tensions in transatlantic relations continued during the second half of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s. Meanwhile, the “emotional distance” between the transatlantic partners increased, and the debates about European allies’ future in world affairs had began.\textsuperscript{67} Europe’s aspirations to create “European identity” and “play an active role in world affairs and defend their interests on the international scene”\textsuperscript{68} resulted in creation of European Political Cooperation (EPC). For one thing, the EPC, especially the Copenhagen Declaration of 1973 as well Europe’s stance in Yom-Kippur-War did not make Washington happy, thus making US statesmen believe that their European allies are building up countervailing power.\textsuperscript{69} Numerous pre-emptive speeches of the US leaders as that of Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, in his “Year of Europe” initiative, which assigned Europe a lower role by claiming, “The United States gas global interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have regional interests”\textsuperscript{70} only furthered Euro-American tensions in already laming transatlantic relations.

Thus, the Cold War period was characterized by an early stage of transatlantic ambiguity in the face of cooperation and conflict. Approaching the last decade of the 20\textsuperscript{th}

\textsuperscript{65} Andrews, 12-13.  
\textsuperscript{66} In the 1966 France developed and tested its nuclear capabilities, thus freeing itself from nuclear umbrella of the United States  
\textsuperscript{67} Weidenfeld, 19.  
\textsuperscript{68} Merlingen,  
\textsuperscript{69} Dembinski and Gerke, 106.  
\textsuperscript{70} Merlingen.
century, characterized by drastic changes in the international system with the end of the Cold War, both Europe and America were on the doorsteps of the new epoch of transatlantic relations.

2.2. Transatlantic Relations After the Cold War

No matter how many solemn reaffirmations emerge from the endless parade of NATO summits, the high-water mark of transatlantic co-operation is past… a powerful set of domestic and international forces is pulling the transatlantic alliance apart. The process may be delayed by adroit statesmanship and bureaucratic inertia, but a gradual parting of the ways is virtually inevitable.\textsuperscript{71}

The last decade of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century brought significant changes into Euro-American relations, where both the United States and Europe saw themselves as “emerging victorious”\textsuperscript{72} after the end of the Cold War and entered a new decade of transatlantic ambiguity. With the collapse of the communist Soviet Union America emerged as the world’s only unipolar power, while Europe became increasingly interested in drawing its eastern neighborhood to its sphere of influence. Unbound by previously existing common threat, the interests of the parties were drifting apart, thus having serious consequences for the transatlantic relations. In addition, the enduring conflicts that erupted in the former Yugoslavia tightened transatlantic strains and deepened existing ambiguities in Euro-American partnership. This was the period when numerous gaps between two parties became more apparent, starting with military capability gap and not limited to value and perception gaps. Moreover, incompatibilities and value differences between the United States and Europe grew, leading Western powers to disagree on solutions to essential international security problems\textsuperscript{73} and “become increasingly irrelevant to each other”.\textsuperscript{74} All of these changes, which occurred in the 1990s, had serious

\textsuperscript{71} Reichard, 21.
\textsuperscript{72} Merlingen.
\textsuperscript{73} Reichard, 4.
\textsuperscript{74} Merlingen.
implications for the security concerns of European powers, which facilitated the
intensifications of transatlantic tensions.

To start with, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 signified the peak of the United
States’ unipolarity, where America emerged as the world’s only military superpower.
Although unipolarity has always been part of Washington’s foreign policy, this time it gained
ever more strength and escalated Euro-American tensions.\textsuperscript{75} On the other hand, with the end
of the Cold War European powers, particularly France saw new sets of opportunities to
increase their role in European security and America’s dominance became a push factor in
Europe’s numerous objections against Washington’s unilateralism. One such instance was
French government’s criticism towards America’s prominence in NATO and Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR). Such criticisms of Europeans were growing into their
request for more autonomy in the security field. Europe’s goals for more autonomous
European security in NATO eventually resulted in the creation of Europe’s project of
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), adopted by the initiative of Paris and Bonn in
the Maastricht Treaty. In the wake of new rounds of burden-sharing debates Washington once
more demonstrated its ambiguous approach towards Europeans’ security initiatives; one the
one hand, favoring Europe to take more responsibilities of Europe’s security on its own
hands, and on the other hand, expressing threatening rhetoric not to undermine NATO’s, thus
America’s, supremacy in European security.\textsuperscript{76} A consensus among both parties was reached,
which pointed rather to the Western European Union (WEU) as a core military structure in
European security than CFSP. Thus, the WEU was to “elaborate and implement decisions
and actions of the Union which ha[d] defense implications.”\textsuperscript{77}

The eruption of ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia during the first half of the 1990s
escalated the tensions in the transatlantic relations. The military superiority of the United

\textsuperscript{75} Andrews, 16-19.
\textsuperscript{76} Merlingen.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibidem.
States, which sharply contrasted with Europe’s incapability, particularly during the Bosnian conflict, opened up serious “military capability gaps” between the parties and facilitated “perception and value gaps”. During the Balkan crisis Europe’s foreign and security project, CFSP, together with the WEU as a whole was thrown into a deep crisis and Europe’s trust in Washington was lost. Bosnia, according to Dembrinski and Gerke, became an “agony” and the “most severe crisis in transatlantic relations since the Suez Crisis”, which partly illustrated a function of the imbalance of power between the US and Europe. More specifically, during the Bosnian conflicts the European Community (EC)/ EU failed, firstly, to recognize early signs of coming violent conflicts that broke-up former Yugoslavia, then, when inter-ethnic conflicts took place, it failed to stop conflicts on its own by agreeing on collective military action or to bring necessary actors to end the violence. The violent clashes in Bosnia then later in Kosovo revealed the serious inability of Europe to conduct high-intensity warfare due to the lack of necessary capabilities and institutional vacuum. Lacking any network-centric warfare, based on information technology comprised of satellite-based intelligence and precision-guided munitions, Europe was too weak to stop the violence. Ultimately, Europe vulnerably came to rely on the United State’s military assistance, which “watched from the sideline as ill-prepared Europeans failed in their efforts to broker peace”.

Most spectators have observed that during the events of 1991-5 the United States gave Europe the “first shot at dealing with the conflict”, but Europeans “botched the job” and again America returned to “save Europe from itself”. Eventually, after some delays Washington got engaged brokering interstate conflicts in the Balkans and NATO airpower halted the war. The Dayton Agreements, signed on the December 21 of 1995, finalized the violence.

However, during the course of Bosnian conflicts serious discussions between the US and Europe occurred concerning the deployment of ground troops and lifting arms embargo.

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78 Reichard, 50-59.
79 Merlingen.
80 Dembinski and Gerke, 87.
In addition to refusing to send US troops to the ground, Clinton’s administration released a military strategy, “lift-and-strike”\textsuperscript{81}, to lift the UN embargo to stop the massacres, though lifting embargo endangered the EU troops on the ground. After the peace negotiations were settled between the conflicting parties, new debates on whether to maintain Implementation Force’s mandate upon its expiration, and later Stabilization Force’s (SFOR) mandate emerged. In both cases European powers, France, Britain and Germany, “insisted that their troops would not remain in Bosnia a day longer than the Americans.”\textsuperscript{82} This was formalized as the European government’s “in together, out together”\textsuperscript{83} policy.

Thus, the course of the Balkan wars as became another serious crisis in Euro-American relations. As if it was not enough, overconfident rhetoric of American statesmanship as that of the US State Department official, Richard Holbrooke, expressed following the conflicts in the region as,

\begin{quote}
We [Americans] have emerged from this century with our self-confidence intact […]. Our historical credibility is intact. We can move in the Balkans in a way no one else can move. [The Albanians, Macedonians, Bosnians and Serbs] all trust us […]. We are not the main diplomatic factor in the Balkans. This was not planned - nobody in this [State Department] building would have believed it two years ago\textsuperscript{84}.
\end{quote}

facilitated the distrust of Europeans in relation to their American partners. Indeed, such rhetoric intensified European allies’ concerns about Washington’s reliability as a security guarantor. Consequently, in addition to the capability gaps, “perception”\textsuperscript{85} and “value gaps”\textsuperscript{86} opened up.

\textsuperscript{82} Dembinski and Gerke, 79.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 86.
\textsuperscript{85} Reichard, 31-32.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibidem.
During the Balkan wars, significant institutional developments in European defense took place. During the NATO summit of 1994 in Brussels Europeans received Washington’s support to develop European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO. ESDI was aimed at creating a “European pillar” of NATO. According to Washington’s decision the “WEU was granted an access to alliance assets to enable it to carry out military operations for the EU.” The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) became an instrument through which NATO forces and assets could be mobilized in European-led operations by both NATO and non-NATO members (such as members of Partnership for Peace project), for the later was based on the concept of the “coalition of willing.” At the Berlin Plus Summit of 1996 the development of the conceptual framework of the ESDI was finalized.

However, since the WEU was accountable to the North Atlantic Council (NAC), European powers again found themselves under the influence of the US-led NATO. Europeans were not happy about America’s continuing pre-eminence in European security. Reinforcement of European identity through common defense policy, which previously was thought during the development of CFSP, regained its strength. EU’s dependency on Washington’s approval in conducting Petersberg tasks, adopted in 1992, strengthened Europeans aspirations to develop security policies under fully EU’s compatibilities. European powers started seeking more autonomy from American-led NATO and a better niche on the international scene. Gradually, the EU was on its way to develop European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) under CFSP, which would allow Europeans to lead Petersberg tasks under fully EU’s auspices. European allies’ initiatives to develop autonomous security and defense policy have only furthered Washington’s ambiguity throughout coming years.

87 Merlingen.
88 Ibidem.
89 Reichard, 50.
CHAPTER III. THE CREATION OF THE ESDP AND THE US’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS IT

The Euro-American security relations during the last decade of the 20th century to a great extent were characterized by increasing ambivalences and tensions, which evolved around Europeans’ growing aspirations towards autonomous security and defense domain and the United States’ skeptical and at times hostile responses to such initiatives. In fact, Europeans’ quest for more autonomous security structures, which partly was facilitated by the fragmentation of the Soviet Union and the drastic crisis erupted in the Balkans, was mostly met by Washington’s skepticism and only in some cases with a conditioning support. According to Hamilton, “the US political leaders have expressed support, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, for a more cohesive Europe. Yet when Europeans actually have moved to establish truly “common’ foreign security and defense policies, they have often been faced with American concerns.”90 Indeed, starting from as early as Dumas-Genscher proposal in 1991 until and including the creation of the ESDP in 1999, Washington began to express more alert and opposing attitudes towards its European allies’ autonomous defense project. Such attitudes often became supported by the US worries that Europeans’ autonomy in defense may become “inward-looking”91, and thus “weaken the primacy of the NATO Alliance or impede US leadership and freedom of maneuver.”92 Thus, the last decade of the 20th century became characterized by Washington’s increasing skepticism and antagonism against Europeans’ newly emerging initiatives in the field of security and defense. However, with the turn of the century there was big shift in the US’ attitudes towards European defense

90 Brimmer, 147.
91 Ibidem.
92 Ibidem.
and the American policy-makers’ previous skepticism and opposition became replaced by their strong support.

Thus, in order to better explain this shift in the US’ attitudes towards European defense, which will be extensively addressed in chapter 4, in the present chapter I aim to study the factors that caused the US policy-makers’ negative attitude formation towards Europeans’ autonomous security and defense initiatives. Particularly, the main question raised in this section is why Americans formed negative attitudes in relation to Europeans’ early defense aspirations. Since, my thesis hypothesis predicts that the shift in the US policy-makers’ attitudes towards European defense was caused by the shift in their perceptions of its intent, in this chapter I predict that Americans’ skepticism was caused by their negative perceptions of Europeans’ defense initiatives’ intent. Particularly, I make an assumption that the more the US officials perceived Europeans’ aspirations to build autonomous defense as potentially threatening to their global leadership, the more skeptical they turned to such ambitions.

3.1. Capabilities vs. Intentions

According to the findings my research, European states’ early initiatives on building autonomous defense structures indeed were negatively met by Washington due to the US statesmanship’s perceptions of such proposals as potentially threatening to NATO, and their global leadership in the world security which they exercised through this organization. Particularly the Franco-German Joint Initiative on Establishing a Common European Foreign and Security Policy, presented to the EC’s foreign ministers by Dumas and Genscher in the February of 1991, received Washington’s harsh criticism. The proposal called for creating a common security policy with gradual development of common European defense and “giving a new role to the Western European Union (WEU); to turn WEU to the EU’s defense
component by clearly subordinating the WEU to the EU."\textsuperscript{93} Since the WEU was under the US-led NATO’s competencies, such initiatives on subordinating the WEU to the EU was perceived by the US as bearing a negative intent to undermine the US’ role in Europe’s security. In fact, “[NATO] after all, was the institution through which America maintained it’s pre-eminence in European security.”\textsuperscript{94} Thus, Washington saw Dumas-Genscher proposal as a direct attempt to “freeze out the Americans from security talks at which they think they are entitled to be present.”\textsuperscript{95}

Washington’s warning telegram, which later became known as the “Bartholomew Memorandum”\textsuperscript{96}, signed by Under Secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew and sent to twelve capitals of the EC on February 22 of 1991 became a visible expression of the Americans’ perception of the earlier proposal as exceptionally harmful to NATO. Indeed, “the strongly worded Bartholomew demarche”\textsuperscript{97}, which warned allies “against creating a European caucus in NATO and worse, a separate European security organization in competition with NATO”\textsuperscript{98}, illustrated the enormous fears and anger that Europeans’ defense aspirations caused to the US government. Washington, indeed, was not happy about how Europeans excluded it from a major decision-making process while it was fighting in Iraq against Saddam Hussein for their common interests.\textsuperscript{99} In the following month the Secretary of State James Baker sent a more official version of the memorandum, expressing the primacy of NATO as a common security organization of allies and thus preventing the exclusion of NATO members or particularly the US from the European security dialogue. However, even

\begin{small}
\begin{itemize}
  \item Ozen Cinar, “ESDP-NATO Relations: Considerations on the Future of European Security Architecture,” The Turkish Yearbook, 33: 234.
  \item Merlingen.
  \item Jorge, “NATO vs. the Euro Force”.
  \item Hutchings, 277.
  \item Jorge, “NATO vs. the Euro Force”.
\end{itemize}
\end{small}
in Baker’s memorandum, which somewhat had an improved tone, the presence of US’ previous fears and negative views of Franco-German initiative were vivid.

In the wake of numerous European defense initiatives, such as the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1992 and the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) in 1994, Washington’s fears and worries about Europe’s autonomous defense started being transferred into American officials’ conditioning public statements, which demonstrated the US’ aim to tightly bind European states’ security activities to NATO’s framework. For instance, in June 1993 William H. Taft, the US representative to NATO, expressed Americans’ strict condition in relation to Europeans’ articulation and development of their defense institutions by saying that such initiatives are acceptable “so far as NATO remains the principal venue for consultations and the forum for decision making on policies affecting the security and defense commitments of its members under the North Atlantic Treaty.”

Such attempts to build European defense as NATO’s component facilitated the establishment of the ESDI as “European pillar within NATO” in 1994. Washington’s conditioning rhetoric continued during the years following the 1994. On February 5, 1995, for instance, William Perry’, Secretary of Defense, candidly stated the Americans’ warnings to Europeans’ to “keep in mind the principle of separable, but not separate forces…” while drawing on NATO’s assets and procedures to conduct the ‘Petersberg tasks’. With the approach of 1998s the Americans’ worries were to grow into actual skepticism and at times hostility towards Europeans’ defense due to their negative perceptions of European states’

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103 The Petersberg Declaration, adopted on June 19 of 1992, consisted of ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and the tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’.
emerging initiatives to establish European Security and Defense Policy under full competencies of the European Union.

Indeed, the Franco-Britain “groundbreaking agreement”104 during the St Malo Summit on the 3-4 December of 1998 became a syndrome which shook all leading US policy-makers and raised their fears of autonomous European defense. Indeed, the Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defense, which articulated that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”105, by laying the first cornerstone to the ESDP, evoked ever more fears of Washington and thus causing Americans’ increasing opposition towards their defense project.

The creation of the ESDP was facilitated by the EU’s numerous shortcomings, such as a lack of cohesion and political will in its foreign policy, weak military capabilities as well as deficiencies in decision-making, which were revealed first in the Bosnian crisis and later in the Kosovo war. Violent conflicts of former Yugoslavia conveyed Europe as an “economic giant, but political dwarf”106. Indeed, the EU’s recognition of the necessity of collective capabilities in maintaining stability on their land as well as strives for “an adequate voice in world affairs”107 became reflected in the ESDP project, which was aimed at taking the EU “out of its economic box”108.

Washington’s response to the St Malo Declaration was candidly critical and the emergence of autonomous ESDP as Otte put it, “became at first a bone of contention with the US., where the vision of a European security and defense identity was still seen as embedded

108 Brimmer, 39.
In fact, Washington feared that this project will loosen the transatlantic solidarity and weaken NATO. Particularly, then the US Secretary of State Madeline Albright’s speech, later known as 3 D’s of NATO, became an explicit illustration of the US’ fearful perceptions of the ESDP. Expressing Washington’s alarm Albright stated that

As Europeans look at the best way to organize their foreign and security co-operation the key is to make sure that any institutional change is consistent with the key principles that served the Atlantic partnership for fifty years. This means avoiding what I would call the Three D’s: decoupling, duplication and discrimination. First, we want to avoid decoupling: NATO is the expression of the indispensable transatlantic link. It should remain an organization of sovereign allies, where European decision-making is not unhooked from broader alliance decision-making. Second, we want to avoid duplication: defense resources are too scarce for allies to conduct force planning, operate command structures, and make procurement decision twice - once at NATO and once more at the EU. And third, we want to avoid any discrimination against NATO members who are not EU members.

The US’ such attempts to frame a more cohesive and responsive European foreign policy, which would not weaken its leading role in NATO, were predictable because as Reichard describes the St Malo Declaration significantly changed the language of addressing European security. If the previous documents described NATO’s role in European security as “vital”, “fundamental” or “central”, then the St Malo Declaration showed “tendency towards relativising the position of NATO which had hitherto been completely unchallenged.” This shows that the more America perceived the European defense initiatives as potentially challenging to its leadership in NATO, the more skepticism it expressed to such developments.

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109 Brimmer, 39.
110 Ibidem.
111 Lindley-French, 74.
112 Reichard, 151.
Later at the Cologne European Council in June 1999 fifteen EU members states “embarked on historical journey”\textsuperscript{113} by officially adopting the ESDP project, which raised cautious perceptions of the US policy-makers’ about the ESDP’ intentions. Although the Presidential Conclusion modified the previous text “the EU must have the capacity for autonomous action”\textsuperscript{114} by adding “without prejudice to actions by NATO”\textsuperscript{115}, yet it inferred that “only full EU members would enjoy participation ‘fully and on an equal footing’”\textsuperscript{116} while other NATO members were inferred to participate “to the fullest extent possible”\textsuperscript{117}. Strobe Talbott put the US government’ alarm as, “We and our Canadian neighbors will be watching closely to see how the EU defines its security relationship with other six Allies who do not happen to be the EU members...”\textsuperscript{118} Moreover, the conclusion’s weak address of NATO’s “right of first refusal” policy facilitated Washington’s concrete measures such as the US Senate’s straight warded resolution of October 1999, which stated that

On matters of trans-Atlantic concern the European Union should make it clear that it would undertake an autonomous mission through its European Security and Defense Identity only \textit{after} the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had been offered the opportunity to undertake that mission but had referred it to the European Union for action;…\textsuperscript{119}

The Senate’s Resolution, indeed, became a strong back up to Talbott’s speech earlier that month that, “we would not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO, but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO.”\textsuperscript{120} In general, all these statements in addition to Robertson’s later reformulation of Albright’s 3 D’s in 3 I’s, “improvement of European defense capabilities, inclusiveness and transparency for all Allies
and the indivisibility of the Trans-Atlantic security, based on shared values”¹²¹, visibly illustrate how an increase in Americans’ perception of the ESDP as potentially challenging to their leadership in NATO directly facilitates their negative attitude formation towards it.

As Americans’ fearful perceptions of the ESDP’s intent grew, in the years following its establishment, their critical responses towards it became even hostile and became frequently expressed in their public claim of this project as Europeans’ direct attempt to challenge Americans’ leadership. John Bolton’s, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, statement that, “the aim to align the foreign and defense policies of the EU’s members...is, at times, motivated either by a desire to distance themselves from US influence, or, in some cases, by openly anti-American intentions”¹²² probably was one of the most belligerent speeches reflecting the US concerns. Indeed, Bolton’s later claim during a hearing before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives that, “the real threat now comes from a European identity that sees itself, defines itself, in large measure as something different than the United States”¹²³ crystallized the Americans’ fearful perceptions of the Europe’s defense initiatives’ intent. Peter Rodman’s claim made later that “the EU’s motivation for CFSP is clear and frequently stated. It is to make Europe more of an “equal” to the United States, a “counterweight” to the United States and to enhance Europe’s autonomy from the United States, to make Europe more independent of the United States”¹²⁴ further demonstrated the worry with which Americans perceived the ESDP that was established under the CFSP.

Washington continued to view a potential threat in the European defense initiative until the end of 1999, where in December of 1999 the Helsinki Presidential Conclusion was adopted, which assured the US government that “the ESDP had been realigned with the

¹²¹ Reichard, 151.
¹²² Peters, 393-394.
¹²³ Shepherd, 7.
¹²⁴ Peters, 394.
language of the ESDI adopted at the Washington Summit in April 1999.”125 The document stressed the NATO primacy and stated that NATO remained “the foundation of the collective defense of its members [and] would continue to have an important role in crisis management.”126 This event became a major change in Americans’ perceptions of intent and attitudes about the European defense, as Talbott’s speech showed that “We welcome Helsinki’s focus on improving European military capabilities, its recognition of NATO’s central role in collective defense…”127

In sum, as these findings show, the United States’ skeptical and at times hostile attitudes towards Europeans’ autonomous security and defense during 1990s were caused by their perceptions of the intent of this project as potentially challenging to their leadership in NATO. Indeed, leading US officials’ public statements and actual policy adoption in relation to European security prove that the more they perceived the ESDP as posing a potential threat to NATO, the more skeptical their attitudes became towards this project. Thus, it becomes clear that the US’ skepticism towards European defense was caused by its perceptions of such autonomous project’s intent.

3.2. Theoretical Implications of Findings

In the theoretical section of my work I proposed two theories, balance of power and balance of threat, to study the US policy-makers’ attitude formation towards European states’ aspirations for autonomous European security and defense. In the present chapter I addressed the question why the US government formed skeptical attitudes towards Europeans’ early defense initiatives. The application of the balance of power theory would suggest that Washington became critical towards the European defense because the ESDP was a balancing

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125 Bastian, Pushkina, and Mount, 390.
126 Reichard, 150.
behavior of the EU against its power. The balance of threat theory, on the other hand, suggests that Americans’ skepticism was caused rather by American statesmanship’s perception of Europeans’ defense project’s intent as threatening to their global leadership and not because it saw Europeans activities as balancing power behavior. Aligning with balance of threat, I hypothesized that the US’ skepticism towards European defense was caused by its negative perceptions of this project’s intent.

The actual findings of my research suggest that indeed, the Americans’ perceptions of the intent of Europeans’ defense aspirations caused their attitude formation towards such initiatives. Indeed, the assessment of US officials’, such as Albright, Bolton, Talbott and etc., statements made in relation to European defense initiatives during 1990s as well as actual policy adoption such as NATO’s “right of first refusal” make it explicit that the more they perceived Europeans’ intentions for autonomous defense as attempting to undermine the NATO, and thus the US, primacy in Europe’s security affairs the more belligerent and hostile their approach became. As Bolton has expressed the US fears, “the real threat now comes from the European Identity”, first the ESDI then the ESDP were seen from Americans’ perspective as Europeans’ intent to establish security actorness which may potentially turn into direct threat to well-established America’s position in world security affairs. In fact, Washington new that the ESDP did not pose an immediate threat to its leadership; however, it perceived this project as challenging to its leadership in the future, on the face of insurgent France. Thus, the US officials’ speeches illustrate that for the US it obviously was rational and less troublesome to prevent such potential competition of the ESDP with NATO during its very inception, by drawing red lines, then to cope with it later when it grows into contestant.

128 Shepherd, 7.
Moreover, the findings suggest that balance of power does not explain the US’ adoption of critical approach towards the ESDP. Balance of power says that when other states’ increase their aggregate power the unipolar is expected to respond with objection. However, the findings do not prove such an assumption, because during the US’ increasing skepticism towards the ESDP European states did not possess any hard capabilities so to balance the American power. Since we see in the findings that despite the absence of Europe’s hard power the US’ criticism was still there. Then this means that Washington saw in the ESDP project something more than aggregate power, which is a potential threat as the balance of threat theory suggests. Therefore, balance of power fails to explain the US attitude formation.

In sum, basing on the analysis of my findings in the present chapter I argued that the balance of threat theory better explains the US policy-makers’ attitude formation towards Europeans’ defense initiatives. Particularly, I have claimed that since perceptions of intent shape attitudes, Americans’ skepticism towards autonomous security and defense was caused by their perceptions of such project’s intent as potentially threatening to their leadership in the security field. In the thesis hypothesis I have predicted that the shift in the US’ attitudes, from criticism to support, towards Europeans defense was caused by an according shift in Washington’s perceptions of its intent. The assumptions of the present chapter were proved that the Washington’s skepticism was caused by its negative perceptions of the intent of Europe’s defense initiatives. If indeed, the perceptions caused the shift in attitudes, then I expect the findings of the next chapter to show the positive shift in the US’ perceptions.

The Euro-American relations in the years following the establishment of the ESDP and the adoption of the European Headline Goal in 1999 became characterized by many observers as taking a new course, where the US government “adopted a more positive stance with regard to the ESDP”\footnote{Bastian, Pushkina, and Mount, 390.} and where after 2000 Europe was “whole and free”\footnote{Reichard, 22.} to develop necessary tools to act as a security actor. Indeed, as Europe’s security and defense domain started improving with the beginning of a new century by undertaking significant initiatives on the development of defense institutions and military capabilities to enable it to conduct both military and civilian missions in and beyond Europe, Washington’s previous “attempts to mold the ESDP’s development have diminished”\footnote{Bastian, Pushkina, and Mount, 395.} and its response towards it became increasingly supportive. The change in the US’ attitudes towards the ESDP became apparent in leading US policy-makers’ official statements, which expressively and sincerely started calling their European allies to strengthen their ESDP project by backing it up with essential military arms and defense institutions. The US governments’ encouraging stance in Europeans’ Capabilities Commitment Conference is one such illustrative instance. Although some concerns about the ESDP were raised in Washington during 2003, generally, such worries did not have much influence on Americans’ already changed attitudes towards Europeans’ defense project.\footnote{Ibidem.} Hence, with the change of the century, the Americans’ attitudes towards Europeans’ autonomous defense project has also changed, thus taking a welcoming and ever more supportive form.
What happened? Why have the US’ attitudes towards Europeans’ autonomous defense shifted from skepticism and hostility towards greater support? Why did the previous worries of Washington about Europeans’ attempts to strengthen their military power start being replaced with welcoming calls? This is the core puzzle of this thesis. Its solution requires a clear identification of the factors which caused the shift in the United States’ attitudes towards the ESDP from skepticism to strong support. I propose two competing theories, balance of power and balance of threat, in studying the shift in the US’ attitudes. In solving this puzzle I align with the balance threat theory, which in contrast to balance of power stresses the centrality of perceptions of intent, and argue that there was a change in the US’ perceptions of intent of the ESDP and that is why there was a change in its attitudes towards this project. In other words, I claim that when the US policy-makers perceived the ESDP as potentially threatening to their global leadership their response to it was accordingly skeptical and hostile. However, when Americans start to perceive the ESDP as harmless and even beneficial to their leadership, their attitudes became supportive of it.

The previous chapter has demonstrated that indeed, Washington’s skepticism towards the ESDP was caused by its negative perceptions of this policy’s intent and thus there is a directional relationship between the US’ perceptions and its attitudes in relation to European defense. If it was the case, then in this chapter I predict that the positive shift in Washington’s attitudes towards the ESDP after 2000 was caused by the positive shift in its perceptions of the ESDP’s intent. To test this hypothesis, I propose three assumptions. The first assumption is that the more institutional developments take place within the ESDP which are aimed at improving its capabilities, the more supportive the US becomes to such institutional advances. The second assumption is that the better the general Euro-American political relations get, the less worried the US gets about Europe’s defense trajectories. And my final assumption is that the more Europeans cooperate with the US-led NATO through the ESDP in the conduct of
crisis management missions, the more the US becomes supportive to it. All these assumptions aim to test if there is a directional relationship between Americans’ perceptions and their attitudes in relation to European defense.

4.1. High-Intensity Capabilities vs. Defense Institutions

The first assumption I make in studying the US’ responses towards the ESDP’s development is that the more institutional developments take place within the ESDP which are aimed at improving its capabilities, the more supportive the United States becomes to it. I argue that the US’ such support would be due to its perceptions of Europeans’ intent with which they build up their defense institutions and develop capabilities within the ESDP, not just as harmless to its leadership in the world security, but also beneficial in sharing the financial burden of the EU’s security, through handing Europe’s security and defense matters to Europeans’ own hands.

According to my findings, the more Europeans started putting their collective efforts to build up their common security and defense institutions and accumulate military as well as civilian capabilities the more the US started welcoming such developments. Indeed, according to a literature\(^{133}\), following the Helsinki Presidential Conclusion, which successfully addressed Washington’s previous concerns about Europeans’ autonomous defense by assuring the US that the project will be consistent with NATO, the US policy-makers’ skepticism towards Europeans autonomous defense steadily started turning into more welcoming and supportive attitudes.\(^{134}\) The shift in Washington’s attitudes in relation to the ESDP became apparent in the American policy-makers’ official statements, which called their European allies to spend more on their defense in order to improve their military capabilities.

\(^{133}\) Bastian, Pushkina, and Mount, 390.
\(^{134}\) Ibid., 390-391.
and establish Europe as a stronger partner to America, already in the early 2000s. For instance, US Secretary of State Madeline Albright and Secretary of Defense, William Cohen’s article published in 2000 explicitly expressed Washington’s positive response towards Europeans’ early institutional arrangements, made at Helsinki European Council, which schemed the development plan of ESDP’s military troops for conducting the Pertesberg tasks, by saying that, “We welcome the commitment made at Helsinki by our European allies... Europe needs more military capability [and]...to improve the deployability and mobility of their forces, and ensure that they are able to survive, communicate, preserve and succeed in future engagements.”

Moreover, Albright and Cohen’s text assured the readiness of the US to endorse the ESDP in achieving these military improvements by implying that, “And for our part, the U.S. is seeing if we can help by reviewing our export control policies.” Later in the same year at the Western European’s Transatlantic Forum, Cohen has repeatedly articulated Washington’s positive stance in Europeans’ goals to accumulate common military forces by saying that, “We support the creation of a 50,000 or 60,000-person force that can be deployable by 2003. That, to us, is something we can strongly favor”. Thus, the Americans’ such statements in contrast to their earlier skepticisms as those expressed in the “Bartholomew message” or Albright’s 3 D’s started making the US’ changing attitudes towards European defense project very clear.

This change in the US officials’ attitudes in relation to the European defense was facilitated by the change in their perceptions of the ESDP’s intent. Particularly, I argue that Washington’s previous perceptions about the ESDP’s intent as potentially threatening to its leadership in the security field have shifted towards it’s formation of new perceptions that the

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135 Bastian, Pushkina, and Mount, 390.
136 Ibidem.
ESDP is harmless and even beneficial in sharing Europe’s security burden that previously was laid on America.

My actual findings, indeed, suggest that the US’ support for ESDP’s institutional developments has a direct relationship with its positive perceptions of the project. Leading US politicians’ speeches about the European defense delivered after 2000 show that the less America started perceiving the this project as challenging to its global leadership the more support the US started showing to Europeans’ attempts to strengthen their defense. William Cohen’s speech made at the WEU’s Transatlantic Forum,

You will read in the American press, and I suspect in the European press, that somehow what the Europeans are embarked on is going to be destructive to NATO. I listened to certain parliamentarians in Europe suggest that a strong EU necessarily means a weak NATO. We should be clear on this as far as the US is concerned. We support [a stronger Europe on defense matters], whether it is currently called ESDI or the ESDP.138

is one such instances of the diminishment of Americans’ preceding fears that a stronger European defense would undermine NATO, the security organization through which America exercised its supremacy over Europe and about whose primacy the US previously was worried about. The Helsinki Presidential Conclusion, which centralized NATO’s primacy, was one of strong factors that enabled Americans to get the ESDP’s intentions right and thus change their perceptions about this policy. Thus, this illustrates how the gradual shift in Washington’s perceptions of the ESDP’s intent was facilitated a gradual shift in its attitudes towards Europeans’ security and defense structures.

Indeed, if before 2000 the US officials such as Bolton and Rodman would view Europeans’ autonomous defense aspirations as bearing “anti-American intentions”139 and thus as directly threatening to its ascendancy, as Talbott has claimed, then now they started seeing

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139 Peters, 393-394.
the EU’s longings towards capabilities improvement not just as undisruptive to its position but largely helpful in sharing the burden of the Europe’s security. For instance, Albright and Cohen drawing an example from military capability gaps, which opened up between the US and Europe during the war in Kosovo claimed that, “greater European military capabilities will make the Alliance stronger, lift of the burden US now carries in having to act in every crisis.”

Moreover, calling Europe to develop military capabilities “most relevant to modern warfare” they added that, “Europe needs more military capability. This will require spending more on defense, and spending smarter.” These statements suggest that the US’ perceptions shifted from viewing the European defense as a counterweight to its leadership in NATO, to perceiving the ESDP as potentially helpful project if it develops necessary military arms to shoulder Europe’s security burden. Indeed, it became evident that the US’ attitudes shifted in a way that stronger Europe became viewed as a better partner to America. Thus, the change in Americans’ perception of the ESDP’s intent became an important factor that changed Americans attitudes about Europeans’ defense and facilitated their supporting attitudes towards its institutional development in coming years.

The United States’ attitudes towards the later developments of European defense became marked with earnest support and welcoming attitudes. During the summer of 2000s the US’ support for the ESDP through NATO became extended from rhetoric to actual assistance. Indeed, in July of 2000 a joint EU-NATO “Ad hoc working group”, aimed at collective capabilities, started operating. This project enabled the EU experts working on the establishment of a catalogue of forces and capabilities for the Headline Goal Task Force, to receive military as well as technical guidance from NATO experts. This opened the way to the next institutional initiatives, the Capabilities Commitment Conference, of the ESDP. In

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141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Reichard, 229.
November 2000 the Capabilities Commitment Conference, which called the EU members to pull out the rapid reaction forces (RRF) of 10,000 persons, 400 combat aircrafts and 100 ships, was launched as one of the important continuations following the Helsinki Presidential Conclusions. Issues concerning the availability, deployability, sustainability and interoperability of these forces were also considered during the course of the conference.

While Europeans started preparing for actual capabilities commitment, their initiatives were met with sincere support from Washington. Addressing the upcoming Capabilities Commitment Conference the Secretary of Defense Cohen said that, “we want to see the Headline Goal to produce additional European capabilities that can meet the challenge. This is why we will be watching closely the Capabilities Commitment Conference and doing what we can do to lend our support, where appropriate, to encourage its success.”

Moreover, by stating that the increase in the EU military capabilities is a “right and natural” continuation of the “integrated Europe [that] seeks to develop is own Security and Defense Policy”, Cohen frankly demonstrated the change in Washington’s attitudes towards the ESDP by adding that, “let me be clear on American position: we agree with [the European Security and Defense Policy] – not grudgingly, not with resignation, but with wholehearted conviction.”

Cohen’s statements made during the conference illustrate Americans’ genuine support towards the establishment of stronger European defense and therefore the change in Washington’s previous perceptions that the improvement in European defense structures may potentially undermine NATO primacy and thus America’s global leadership in security affairs.

Following the Capabilities Commitment Conference, numerous other institutional developments took place within the framework of the ESDP, all of which added more strength to the project. To start with, at the Nice Summit of the December 2000, the three interim bodies, iPSC, iEUMC and iEUMS, were formalized. Later, at the Capabilities

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144 Brimmer, 3.
146 Ibid.
Improvement Conference of November 2001 Europeans Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) identified means to deal with important inadequacies and confirmed the ESDP to conduct all listed tasks of the Petersberg Declaration. Thus, the Feira European Council of June 2000, where member states agreed to make available up to 5,000 police officers by 2003, became significant in enabling the ESDP to conduct civilian missions. Indeed, according to Brimmer, identification of civilian tasks was an important development in the ESDP, since by encompassing civilian tasks (police mission, reconstruction and generally, “nation-building”), in addition to economic and military instruments, the EU in general was soon to offer a “one-stop shopping”. Yet, the most important developments happened at Laeken and Copenhagen European Councils. At the Laeken Council of the December 2001 a “Declaration of the Operational Capability of ESDP” was adopted and the EU became “capable of conducting some crisis management operations.” Later, at Copenhagen European Council of the December 2002, according to EU-NATO Berlin Plus agreement, “the way was opened for the first EU crisis-management operations in 2003.” In the February of 2003 the Headline Goal 2010 was negotiated and in the February of the next year the “Battle Group” idea was set, which provisioned 1500 personnel deployable within 15 days.

Although most of the institutional arrangements until 2003 were met with the US positive stance, some developments that happened in the European defense during 2003 received Washington’s cautiousness. For instance, in April 2003 Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg’s proposal on establishing autonomous EU military planning cell caused US officials’ fears. It was later agreed by US policy-makers that a planning cell limited in size will be located in Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). In addition to it,

147 Brimmer, 170.
148 Ibid., 8.
149 Reichard, 69.
150 Ibidem.
151 Ibid., 219-230.
152 Bastian, Pushkina, and Mount, 392-393.
the French-led mission Artemis in the DRC, conducted without resources to the Berlin-Plus agreement caused another set of American officials’ concerns. Washington’s attitudes towards these developments became negative and it was due to its perceptions of Europeans’ such plans as Nicholas Burns has put, “the most significant threat to NATO’s future.”153 However, Americans’ military campaign conducted in Iraq during this year shows that, despite showing certain concerns about the ESDP still Americans perceived greater and the most imminent threat from Iraq than from Europe. Moreover, the European Security Strategy adopted in December 2003 was “clearly perceived to be positive from a US point of view.”154 Thus, this suggests how Washington’s attitudes were defined by its perceptions.

In sum, the findings of my research illustrate that indeed, the more Europeans developed their defense institutions and strived for accumulating military power, the more supportive the US turned to such initiatives. This happened due to the shift in the US’ perceptions, according to which the stronger Europe was seen as a better partner to America.

4.2. High-Intensity Capabilities vs. Transatlantic Alliance

The second assumption I make is that the better the general Euro-American political relations get, the less worried the US gets about Europe’s defense trajectories. According to my research findings, in fact, the improvements in overall quality of Euro-American political relations led to the decrease of the US worries about Europeans’ security and defense policy, thus changing its previous skepticism towards more positive attitude formation. Numerous developments such as the terrorist attacks on 9/11, adoption of the European Security Strategy and the change of the leadership in France and Germany facilitated the improvement of

153 Bastian, Pushkina, and Mount, 393.
154 Ibidem.
overall Euro-American relations and thus the Americans’ attitudes towards Europeans
security and defense policy.

To begin with, the terrorist attacks launched on American soil on September 11, 2001
became a major event that enabled Americans to reconsider their approach towards
Europeans. First of all, the change in the US’ attitudes was characterized by its “benign-
neglect”\textsuperscript{155} in relation to Europe in general. The horrors of terrorist attacks on the 9/11 shifted
the US’ strategic interest from Europe to the Middle East and the US’ fears of the CSDP’s
potential competition with its global leadership have weakened.\textsuperscript{156} Thus, preoccupied with the
“nexus between international terrorism, rogue nations, and weapons of mass destruction”\textsuperscript{157},
the European defense obviously became not “upmost on the mind of American policy-
makers.”\textsuperscript{158}

Moreover, Europeans’ expression of “genuine solidarity”, which went beyond their
rhetoric, with Americans’ tragedy facilitated the improvement of Euro-American relations and
furthered Americans’ positive perceptions about Europeans\textsuperscript{159}. Two daily editorials of Italy
and France that appeared on September 12, 2001 with similarly highlighted font-page “We
Are All Americans”\textsuperscript{160} was one of the instances of Europeans’ solidarity. The expression of
such sympathy did not cause any hesitation in Washington, since sooner it became pursued by
actual measures, aimed at supporting the US as it launched the war in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{161} For
instance, NATO’s deployment of five airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) from
its base located in Germany to America, the EU’s release of American peacekeeping troops in
the Balkans and the Europeans’ contributions for the US’ military operations in Afghanistan
\textsuperscript{155} Bastian, Pushkina, and Mount, 391.
\textsuperscript{156} Merlingen.
\textsuperscript{157} Bastian, Pushkina, and Mount, 392.
\textsuperscript{158} Merlingen.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{160} Dell’Orto, G, “We Are All Americans’: A Historical Perceptive on the Evolution of Discourses of America in
Western European Newspapers Before and After September 11, 2001,” (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of
the International Communication Association, CA, San Diego)
\textsuperscript{161} Reichard, 186-191.
and later in Iraq through the “coalition of the willing” concept, contributed to convincing Americans on Europeans’ sincerity and further facilitated its positive perceptions and attitudes towards its European allies. In addition to it, Europeans’ help in bringing post-war stabilization and democratization in Afghanistan and Iraq significantly contributed improving the transatlantic relations.

Europeans’ adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003 became another factor that contributed to the improvement of Euro-American relations and thus furthered Americans’ positive attitude formation in relation European defense. According to Merlingen, the ESS “was greeted with almost universal applause” by the US government as its assessment of threats and strategic planning was similar with those identified in Americans’ National Security Strategy (NSS) adopted in 2002. Indeed, similar to the NSS assessment, the ESS identified terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and failed states as the ‘key threats’ of the new century. Moreover, the document emphasized the importance of Euro-American cooperation in coping with these threats by stating that, “acting together, the European Union and the United States can be formidable force for good in the world.” Hence, with its “almost Rumsfeldian security warnings” the ESS became another development that contributed to the improvement of transatlantic relations.

The change of the leadership in Germany and France became another factor that facilitated to the improvement of Euro-American political relations. As the most Atlanticist leaders of Germany Chancellor Angela Merkel and President of France Nikolas came to the power they “adopted pro-American policies and took pains to distance themselves from the

162 Merlingen.
163 Merlingen.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
166 The NSS formulates it as rogue states
168 Ibid., 13.
169 Merlingen.
policies of their predecessors, which had been perceived in Washington as balancing American power.” For instance, after more than 40 years of separation France under Sarkozy’s administration decided to rejoin the NATO again. Numerous observers have seen it as a decisive step towards the improvement of transatlantic relations.

In sum, the findings suggest that the improvements in Euro-American relations that were largely facilitated by 9/11, the adoption of the ESS and the leadership change in Germany and France caused the US’ positive attitude formation towards Europeans’ defense. Thus, it suggests that my second hypothesis has been proved.

4.3. High-Intensity Capabilities vs. Cooperation in Operation

The final assumption I make is that the more Europeans cooperate with the US-led NATO through the ESDP in the conduct of crisis management missions, the more the US becomes supportive to it. I predict that this is because the cooperation in operation of the ESDP with NATO fosters the United States’ perception of this defense project rather helpful than threatening to its global leadership and demonstrates the direct relationship between the US’ perceptions of intent and attitude formation towards European defense.

Indeed, the ESDP’s takeover of NATO-led military missions in countries such as Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina illustrates that the more the ESDP supports the NATO in achieving peacekeeping tasks in these regions the more positively Washington views it. In early 2003 the ESDP for the first time took over NATO-led military mission, Allied Harmony deployed in Macedonia, under a code-name EUFOR Concordia. This peacekeeping mission replaced NATO’s 3500 lightly armed military forces and “assumed increased responsibility

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170 Merlingen.
for the stabilization in the country" 171 by ensuring the implementation of Ohrid Framework agreement signed on August 13, 2001 between Slav and Albanian population. 172 To conduct this operation the ESDP had to make use of NATO assets and capabilities as well as NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (D-SAUCER) as Operation Commander. The ESDP’s takeover of NATO’s mission was “well coordinated and occurred without major problems.” 173 According to Jorgensen, Concordia operation became the ESDP’s “success and signaled advancement of the EU-NATO relationship into a practical realm.” 174

Later on December 2, 2004, the ESDP took over NATO’s peacekeeping operation Stabilization Force (SFOR), an extension of Implementation Force (IFOR), in Bosnia-Herzegovina under a code-name EUFOR Althea. Althea started operating on the basis of legal mandate of the Dayton Peace Agreement and its objectives are to “provide deterrence and contribute to a safe and secure environment” 175 of the region. At its start, the Althea replaced 7000 military forces of the NATO and in 2007 it was reduced to 2200. 176 Althea’s Operation Commander and the EU Operation Headquarters are located at SHAPE. The ESDP’s takeover of this mission visibly represented how Europeans started taking responsibility of their own security. 177 Moreover, it symbolized “good working relationship” 178 of the ESDP with NATO.

In addition to Concordia and Althea, the ESDP-NATO cooperation within EULEX Kosovo and ISEF (International Security Assistance Force), where in the former American personal served under an EU Operation Commander and in the later the EU assisted in a

172 Reichard, 247.
173 Merlingen.
175 Reichard, 256. (accessed May 5, 2009).
177 Reichard, 262.
NATO-led operation in Afghanistan,\textsuperscript{179} becomes illustrative of strengthening transatlantic relation and most importantly the United States’ willingness to make cooperation in operations with its European allies. In fact, Bush’s speech delivered at the NATO Summit in Bucharest on April 3, 2008 that,

Building a strong NATO Alliance also requires a strong European defense capacity. So at this summit I will encourage our European partners to increase their defense investments to support both NATO and EU operations. America believes if Europe invests more on their defense, they will also be strong and more capable when we deploy together\textsuperscript{180}

is a vivid instance of the Americans’ seek for a stronger partner in Europeans in conducting joint military actions as in the case of Afghanistan or elsewhere.

In general, the findings confirm my assumption that the ESDP’s cooperation in operation with NATO has a direct relationship with the US’ attitudes. Indeed, the ESDP’s takeover of missions from NATO as that in Macedonia, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Kosovo illustrates that the more the EU cooperates with the US-led NATO the better it is perceived and the stronger support it gets from Washington.

\textbf{4.4. Theoretical Implication of Findings}

The findings of my research show that from earlier proposed two theories, balance of power and balance of threat, the balance of threat theory, which centralizes perceptions of intent and not merely aggregate power in defining a states’ behavior, better explains the shift in the US’ attitudes towards European defense. Indeed, the comparative analysis of the US policy-makers’ speeches made before and after 2000 reveal that both their earlier skepticism and later support towards Europeans’ autonomous defense aspirations were caused by the way they perceived the intentions of such initiatives. The findings demonstrate that the perceptions of intent and not the aggregate power was the central factor that shaped Americans’ attitudes

\textsuperscript{179} Merlingen.
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.
towards the ESDP. Indeed, all three assumptions proposed to test my thesis hypothesis show that the shift in the US’ approach towards the ESDP happened because of the shift in its perceptions of the ESDP’s intent.

Firstly, the US’ statesmanship’s speeches made before 2000 reveal that their skepticism was caused by their fearful perceptions that autonomous ESDP will potentially become a competitor to the US-led NATO and thus threaten the Americans’ global leadership in a long-term run. However, Americans’ supportive statements made already after 2000 in relation to the ESDP show their now changed perceptions of this project as beneficial in shouldering the security burden that previously was laid on the US. Thus, the US’ support for Europeans’ capabilities improvement activities as those provisioned in Headline Goal were the result of their changed perception of ESDP’s intent and not a response to Europeans’ growing aggregate power. Indeed, if power was the cause of Americans’ skepticism expressed in response to St.Malo declaration for instance, then we would expect their increasing opposition as Europeans adopted the Headline Goal and later started negotiating the actual capabilities commitment. However, the findings show the opposite, where Europe’s efforts to increase the ESDP power were met with the US’ strong support.

Secondly, the US’ positive stance in European defense after 9/11, adoption of the ESS by the EU and the emergence of Atlanticist leadership of Merkel and Sarkozy, shows that overall Euro-American political relations also define how American officials’ form their attitudes towards European defense. Indeed, the finings show that the better the political relations between Washington and Brussels get the better the Americans’ attitudes get towards Europeans’ security and defense structures, even in the presence of Europeans’ well-built military power. This demonstrates in the presence of stable transatlantic relations power was did not play a defining role in the US’ attitude formation towards the ESDP.
Finally, the ESDP’s cooperation with the US-led NATO in the conduct of military operations such as EUFOR Concordia, EUFOR Althea as well as ISEF and EULEX Kosovo illustrates that Washington’s support towards the ESDP was furthered due to their practical cooperation in crisis management tasks.

In sum, basing on these empirics I conclude that the shift of the US’ attitudes in relation to European defense was due to the shift American policy-makers’ perceptions of this project’s intent. Indeed, the balance of threat theory claims that “as perceptions of intent change the behavior should change as well”\textsuperscript{181} and therefore the balance of threat theory becomes an insightful explanation to my puzzle, why did the US’ attitudes towards the ESDP shift from skepticism to strong support.

\textsuperscript{181} Walt, \textit{The Origins of Alliances}, 186.
CONCLUSION

The overview of Euro-American security relations from early 1990s until the present suggests that there was a shift in the US’ attitude formation towards the ESDP. Particularly, the literature suggests that the US’ attitudes in relation to this project shifted from high skepticism towards strong support. In my thesis I addressed the question of why there was a shift in the US policy-makers’ attitudes. I hypothesized that the US policy-makers’ perceptions of the ESDP’s intent caused their attitude towards this project and applied two competing theories, balance of power and balance of threat, in order to theoretically assess the findings of my research.

According to the findings of my thesis, the shift in the US leaders’ attitudes in relation to European Security and Defense Policy from criticism towards strong support was caused by the shift in their perceptions of this projects intent. Indeed, the comparative analysis of American policy-makers’ speeches and public proclamations made during their increasing skepticism as well as strong endorsement for European defense visibly illustrates that as Americans started departing from their preceding perceptions of the ESDP’s intent as potentially challenging to their global leadership, embedded and exercised through NATO, their attitudes towards this project also started taking a supportive form. Particularly, the comparison of the US leaders’ critical rhetoric made during the ESDP’s early creation, not to undermine NATO primacy with their later strongly supportive calls for Europe to spend more defense and improve its military arms in order to shoulder the burden of Europe’ security crystallizes that Americans’ attitudes were formed according to their perceptions of ESDP’ intent and not by their thoughts of its power. Indeed, if Washington’s attitudes were to be formed in a response to Europe’s power as balance of power would suggest, then we would see its growing hostility towards the ESDP after the 2000s as the European states started
actual capabilities commitment and accumulation of military as well as civilian power. However, the empirics show the opposite, where during the improvement of the ESDP’ institutions and capabilities the US’ rhetorical endorsement was enormous.

Moreover, the positivism of Americans’ approach to European defense during improved transatlantic political relations, such as those during the leadership of Atlanticist politicians in European governments, makes it evident that the more Washington is convinced that its European allies’ intentions are harmless, less worried it becomes about their security and defense domain. And finally, cooperation in operation of the US-led NATO with the ESDP, such as the handover of its peacekeeping missions EUFOR Althea to the ESDP, shows the US’ perception of the ESDP as a helpful project if needed. In sum, the US’ officials’ speeches, the literature on transatlantic political relations during from 2000s till present and on the ESDP-NATO cooperation prove that indeed, the shift in the US’ attitudes from towards the ESDP was caused by the way it perceived the intentions of this project. Since perceptions of intent shaped attitudes, balance of threat gives more insightful explanation in understanding the shift in the US attitudes. Thus, coming back to the initial puzzle, I conclude that it was the shift in the US’ perceptions of the ESDP’s intent that shifted its attitudes from initial skepticism to strong support.

In conclusion, the present thesis’ contribution to the field is its demonstration that not only can the ESDP’s response towards the US be studied from the perspective of balance of power and balance of threat theories, but also the US’ response towards the ESDP.
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