PROFESSIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS: A CASE STUDY OF RUSSIAN PARTIES IN THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 2007

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ABSTRACT

The research analyzes professionalization of political campaigns of parties in the State Duma of the Russian Federation during the elections of 2007. By doing so it inquires whether the global techniques of professionalized campaigning are also extensively used by the Russian parties which function in the specific context of a ‘managed democracy’. Also the research study whether the internal factors of parties as ideology, internal structure and financial resource proposed by the party-centered theory of professionalized campaigning predetermine the level of parties’ adaptation to professional political campaigns in Russian context.

The argument of this paper is that political parties in Russia uses global techniques of professionalized campaigning despite the limited party competition and the party system of a ‘managed democracy’ with the high impact of the state on parties. Nevertheless, the professionalization of campaigning is not fully developed. Furthermore, I argue that internal factors of parties as ideology, internal structure and financial resource may explain the level of professionalization of Russian parties’ campaigning but only in some cases. In the Russian context, besides variables proposed by the theory, the availability of high administrative capital/administrative resources impacts the level of campaign professionalization by parties.
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Introduction

Political campaigns play a vital role in the elections. They allow voters to evaluate politicians proposing their programs and to make free choices. As Mancini and Swanson define it “symbolically, campaigns legitimate democratic government and political leaders, uniting voters and candidates in displays of civic piety and rituals of national renewal” (1996: 1). The manner, design and technologies of election campaigns have been rapidly changing over the last decade which are explained by a combination of broad and complicated processes as modernization, technological developments and changes in political cultures.

The modern trends in conducting political campaigns are not only worth studying as the consequences of broad changes in society and political realms. What is even more important for the political science is that modern campaigns have significant implications for other political institutions, particularly political parties. As the election campaigns are the central component of the life of political parties, the applications of professional campaigns impact the parties themselves (Farrel and Webb 2000, Mancini and Swanson 1996, Gibson and Rommele 2001 and 2009).

The evolution of modern campaign techniques is usually defined by one single concept – professionalization (Holtz-Bacha 2002 and 2004; Farrel 1996; Kavanagh 1995 Blumler, Kavanagh and Nossiter 1996). The term professionalization of political campaign includes many dimensions or campaign techniques. For instance, according to Kavanagh (1995) the features of professionalization of political campaigns are recruitment of technical experts and consultants from marketing agencies, media and advertising industries with the aim of campaign organization, the adaption of the campaign to the presumed format requirements of media, particularly TV (so called ‘mediatization’ of campaign), as well as use of opinion polls techniques and marketing techniques (see also Farrell 2006). The professionalization of
political campaigns and its implications to parties’ internal organization and external role of parties was intensively studied by many scholars: Swanson and Mancini, Farrel, Webb, Katz, Mair, Holtz-Bacha, Kavanagh, Plasser, Negrine and many others.

The studies of political campaigning and studies on Russian parties claim that Russian parties, despite the ‘managed’ party system, extensively developed ‘global’ techniques of professional campaigning as well (Hutcheson 2009, Plasser and Plasser 2002, Hale 2007). Nevertheless, while theoretical background in the field of the studies of evolution of professional political campaigns and its characteristics is rich, it is limited in systematic empirical studies of the adaptation of professional political campaigns by parties in Russia. The first question of the research is whether the global techniques of professionalized campaigning are also extensively used by Russian parties which function in the specific context of ‘managed democracy’. Therefore, the first aim of the present research is to measure empirically to what extent political campaigns of parties in Russia are professionalized.

The party-centered theory of professionalized political campaigning elaborated by Gibson and Rommele (2001), and which is based on other fundamental works in this field (Mancini and Swanson 1996, Farrel and Webb 2000, Norris 2000, Kavanagh 1995, Scammel 1995 and others) claim that the level of professionalization of political campaigning vary from country to country and from party to party in one single country and can be explained by internal party variables such as: ideology, party goal, internal structure and availability of financial resources. Nevertheless, there is lack of studies which analyze explanatory factors for professionalization of campaigns in Russia. The second question of the research is whether the party-centered theory of professionalized campaigning can explain the level and the variety of Russian parties’ professional campaigning, and if not what can be an additional
or alternative variable. Therefore, the second aim of the present research is to analyze ideology, internal structure and financial resources of the Russian parties and to test if these variables conform to the level of professionalization of their campaigning.

The research questions are based on the puzzle that on the one hand some scholars argue that Russian parties use the same professional techniques in their campaigns as other democratic countries (Hutcheson 2009, Plasser and Plasser 2002). On the other hand, some the professionalization of campaigning is under the question in the context of Russian ‘managed democracy’, where the state plays important role in party politics and organization (Gel’man 2008, Hale 2007).

The argument of this paper is that political parties in Russia uses global techniques of professionalized campaigning despite the limited party competition and the party system of a ‘managed democracy’ with the high impact of the state on parties. Nevertheless, the professionalization of campaigning is not fully developed as some previous studies argued (see, e.g. Hutcheson 2009). The second argument, and the main argument of the research, is that party-centered theory of professionalized campaigning may explain the level of professionalization of the Russian parties’ campaigning but only to a certain extent. In the Russian context, besides variables proposed by the theory, additional variable impact the level of campaign professionalization by some parties. The research argues that availability of high administrative capital/administrative resources may impact the low level of campaign professionalization by parties.

The administrative capital was first defined by Kitschelt as “a sort of capital as a stock of assets facilitating the provision of direct selective material or symbolic advantages to those individuals who demonstrably support the party’s candidates” (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 46-9).
The administrative resources were defined by Hutcheson as “the use and sometimes abuse of state offices or resources to influence the electoral process” (2009, 337).

The research findings show that parties which participated in the last Duma elections in 2007 applied professional campaigning to the very limited extent. However, parties vary in the level of their professionalized campaigning. The findings of the analysis of internal party variables proposed by the party-centered theory show that the theory holds true only in certain cases. The case of United Russia shows that additional variable – administrative capital/administrative resources can explain the low level of professionalized campaigning.

The present research is aimed at contributing to both fields of party studies and political communication studies. The empirical study of political campaigns professionalization by the Russian parties in elections 2007 would enlarge the field of political communication studies introducing new case with empirical insight. The analysis of internal variables of parties which may impact the level of professionalization of political campaigning will contribute to the field of studies on parties in Russia and help to understand certain organizational peculiarities of parties in Russia.

The units of analysis of the research are parties and their political campaigns in the State Duma of Russian Federation elections. The research will analyze five parties: United Russia (UR), Communist Party of Russian Federation (CPRF), Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and Just Russia. These are the biggest parties in Russia and the only parties that passed the thresholds in the last elections to the State Duma of Russian Federation in 2007. Also, Party Yabloko was included into the research. Yabloko did not pass the threshold in last elections but the party won seats in all previous elections in the Russian Parliament. The time frame of the research is year 2007 when the last Russian Duma elections took place.
The research applies qualitative methods. The dependent variable is professional campaigning by Russian parties. The professionalization of political campaigning is measured by the CAMPROF index proposed by Gibson and Rommele (2001). The index includes 10 dimensions which are based on key party activities and initiatives which are considered to be elements of professional campaigning. These activities and initiatives were elaborated by many studies of professional campaigning (Swanson and Mancini 1996, Kavanagh 1995, Farrel and Webb 2000, Holtz-Bacha 2004, Plasser and Plasser 2002). These dimensions include: use of telemarketing as campaigning tool, use of direct mail as campaigning tool, internal/intranet communication system, email-subscription newsletter, outside campaigning headquarters, continuous campaigning, PR/media consultants, computerized databases, opinion polling and opposition research. Each dimension is measured by the scale from 0 to 3 and then scores from all dimensions are combined in one index with the maximum score of 30 (Gibson and Rommele 2009). The CAMPROF index will be presented and adapted to the Russian context in Chapter 2. This index will show the level of professionalization of campaigning with the variety between parties.

The independent variables are based on the party-centered theory of professionalized campaigning. The first variable is the financial resource of parties. This variable is measured by the analysis of the overall party income in 2007. Also the research looks at the party expenditures on election campaign 2007. The second variable is internal organization and structure of parties. The research is interested in the centralized internal organization with hierarchical structure versus decentralized organization of parties. This variable is measured by analyzing the parties’ rules of the decision-making process, i.e. the parties’ rules which indicate how a variety of decisions are to be made. Particularly, the research will analyze to what extent parties allow their members and regional branches to take active part in choosing
party leaders and influencing the decision making process. The third variable is party ideology. The research will make analysis of the ideology of the parties of the study and classify them as a dichotomous variable with left-wing ideology or right-wing ideology.

The thesis contains introduction, three chapters and conclusion. The introduction sets research question and main argument. Chapter one is theoretical background presenting main theories, approaches and hypotheses in studying professionalization of political campaigns, particularly party-centered theory of professionalized campaigning. The second chapter in research will elaborate in details on the CAMPROF index and apply it for the measuring of the professionalization of political campaigns by parties in the State Duma of the Russian Federation elections in 2007. This Chapter will study each dimension of the professionalized campaigning scored by parties. The third Chapter will analyze each of the independent variables and present the result in the summarized table. The Chapter will discuss if the independent variables can explain the results derived from the CAMPROF index. The chapter will be concludes with the analysis of an additional variable – administrative capital/administrative resources.
Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework

The study of campaigns and their effects became a significant field of research in the last two decades. The study of campaigns coincides with three fields of political science: party studies, political communication studies and voting behavior studies. The last is mainly interested in the effects of modern campaigns on voting behavior and not important for the present research which is based on theories developed in the fields of party studies and political communication studies.

1.1 Conceptualizing professional political campaigns

Most scholars agree on the fact that current techniques used in political campaigns can be conceptualized in one single concept – professionalization (Holtz-Bacha 2004; Farrel 1996; Kavanagh 1995; Blumler, Kavanagh and Nossiter 1996). For instance, Panebianco (1988) used the term professionalization in claiming that modern parties in election campaigns rely more upon consultants, market research experts and paid workers rather than members and volunteers thus changing the campaign organization and strategies.

According to Kavanagh (1995) the features of professionalization of political campaigns are recruitment of technical experts and consultants from marketing agencies, media and advertising industries with the aim of campaign organization, the adaption of the campaign to the presumed format requirements of media, particularly TV (so called ‘mediatization’ of campaign), as well as use of opinion polls techniques and marketing techniques (see also Farrell 2006).

Farrel (1996), conceptualizing professionalization of political campaigns, emphasizes three main areas of development: technical, resources and thematic. Later, Farrel (2006) develops his conceptualization by analyzing evolution of the campaign processes through prism of organizational dynamics and communications strategy. Here he proposes certain
feature of current political campaigns: permanent campaigning; use of campaign headquarters; regular opinion poll plus focus groups and interactive websites; marketing orientations aimed at ‘product placement’; hierarchical relationships between leader and party; and usage of external consultants in political campaigns.

At the same moment, Lilleker and Negrine claim that use of the term professionalization for conceptualizing developments in political campaign in recent years is misleading – “the use of terms such as professionalization and professionalism often hinders attempts to explain how the political campaign and the nature of communication have changed in recent years” (2002, 101). They claim that there is need for multilayered approach in order to explain the processes that affect the campaigns not only on centralized level, but also on the local and individual level (Lilleker and Negrine 2002). This argument may be plausible due to the lack of clearly defined term of professionalization. At the same moment, Lilleker and Negrine do not propose any alternative term for conceptualization of modern trends in political campaign and argue for ‘more specific terms and more accurate phrases such as specialization of tasks, the increased use of experts and the management or centralization of the campaign’ (2002, 102). If we follow the proposed logic modern trends in political campaigning would be left without single conceptualized term and with many separately defined features and analysis of political campaigns would include many dimensions.

Nevertheless, for the purpose of the present research features or techniques used in modern political campaign could be described by one single term ‘professionalization’ embracing different aforementioned features proposed by scholars in political communication (Farrel 1996, Holtz-Bacha 2004, Kavanagh 1995 and others).

As a rich amount of studies of political campaigns points out, professional campaigns is a broad and multifaceted phenomenon, and may have different features in different countries
(Stromback 2007). Nevertheless, there are studies showing that professionalization of political campaigns have certain differences in different countries depending on local context (Plasser and Plasser 2002). But at the same time those studies show that political campaigns may be considered as a worldwide phenomenon with a set of similar features in all countries (Plasser and Plasser 2002, Johnson 2009, Sussman 2005).

The present research relies on the definition of professional campaigns proposed by Gibson and Rommele (2001) which includes ten key party initiatives and activities in campaign making that can be associated as professional campaign. These key activities will be used by the present research as a methodological tool for measuring professionalization of political campaigns. Gibson and Rommele (2009) categorize these key activities into four areas of party activity that show the professionalization of political campaigns which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter:

- the adoption of new tools and tactics (high-tech and computerized) and intensification of existing methods (opinion polls, focus groups);
- a shift in the overall style of campaigning to a more capital-intensive, aggressive or attack-oriented and continuous mode;
- a reorientation in the relationships with the electorate towards a more interactive and individualized engagement;
- and, finally, the restructuring of power relations within the party with an increasing centralization of power particularly in the person of the leader (2009, 268).

1.2 Theories of professionalized campaigning

The evolution of current trends and techniques used in political campaigns was one of the most studied issues in the field of political communication. The primary interest of scholars within the field is changes in political campaigns techniques, strategies and explanatory factors that drive changes. The huge amount of work done in this field is dedicated to studying evolution and changes in political campaigns (Esser and Pfetsch 2004, Farrel 1996, Kavanagh 1995, Holtz-Bacha 2004). But the studies that research explanatory factors driven campaign techniques are not so rich. Nevertheless, there are several theories and hypotheses in the field trying to explain modern campaigns.
The first theory which aimed to explain evolution of political campaign techniques was the ‘Americanization’ theory. In short, ‘Americanization’ theory tries to explain innovations in political campaigns by claiming that all modern/professional features of political campaigns were born in United States and then applied all over the world (Swanson and Mancini 1996). Swanson and Mancini’s argument is that ‘campaigning in democracies around the world is becoming more and more Americanized as candidates, political parties, and news media take cues from their counterparts in the United States’ (1996, 4). The logic is that all innovations used in political campaigns around the world (including such features as professionalization and mediatization) are born in United States. This theory stimulated a number of comparative researches of political campaign supporting or criticizing the theory (see Swanson and Mancini 1996, Farrell 1996, Negrine and Papathanassopoulos 1996 and others).

From one side the theory helps to examine the developments in the campaigning processes in comparative perspective, from the other side the theory has some limitations. First, there are scholars claiming that adaptation of political campaign techniques from United States practices can be on different scale with different implications for campaigns and parties (see Farrel 2006). It can be either partial or selective, just contributing general trends in professionalization of political campaign (Farrel 2006) or it can be full large-scale adoption bringing significant changes in party politics (Farrel 2002, Plasser and Plasser 2002). Second, the comparative trends based on ‘Americanization’ theory cannot be generalized due to the shortage of cases and cross national studies in the ‘Americanization theory’ (Farrel 2006).

The next limitation in the theory is that it does not take into consideration fundamental differences of party development in different continents or even countries. In this sense, parties in Western Europe differ greatly in origin, organization and environment from parties
in United States or other democracies. Furthermore, there are great difference in terms of history, culture and institutions resulting in different level of evolution of political campaigns and level of adaptation of ‘American’ innovations. All in all, despite its limitations ‘Americanization theory’ served as a starting point for further development in studies of political campaigns.

Another broad theory proposed for comparative studies of current trends in political campaigns is the modernization theory proposed by Swanson and Mancini (1996, see also Farrell 1996). Swanson and Mancini (1996) were the first who tried to analyze and conceptualize major features or elements of current political campaigns. They proposed five major elements of modernized political campaigns: 1) personalization of politics which shows growing role of party leaders and replace the traditional ideological relationships between voters and party; 2) ‘scientificization’ of politics with increasing role of technical experts taking functions which were previously fulfilled by party officials; 3) the detachment of parties from citizens with losing traditional relationships with grassroots activists due to reliance on marketing techniques like opinion tools; 4) the autonomous structures of communications with highly independent and power media having its own view and influencing the parties and political campaigns resulted in adaptation of political campaigns to media interest and emergence of never-ending election campaign; and 5) the so-called ‘from citizenship to spectators’ feature, with changing role of citizens from active participants in campaign processes to spectators and consumers (Swanson and Mancini 1996, 14-17).

The theory explains aforementioned trends in political campaigns as the result of broad social and institutional changes. The explanatory factors vary from changes in political cultures to impact of electoral system and system of party competition. The most important explanatory variable is the technological development of media system which results in
‘mediatization’ of electoral campaigns. The modernization theory is very broad and quite loose for studying political campaigns. Nevertheless, Swanson and Mancini laid theoretical framework by defining the most common features of modern political campaign which were lately developed by others.

It is also necessary to mention that interest in studying modern political campaigns led to emergence of another sub-field in political science – ‘political marketing’. Political marketing scholars study the use of marketing concepts and instruments in the political sphere, and particularly applications of marketing instruments in political campaigns (see Scammell 1999). This sub-field provides useful insights into studying marketing techniques used in political campaigns, but having a different focus on analyzing political campaigns (putting first ‘customers’ and focusing on ‘campaign message’) it cannot be used for the purpose of present research.

All the aforementioned theories in the field of political communication use the political campaigns as the dependent variable. They set a basis for analyzing current trends in political campaigns defined as professionalization, specialization or modernization. What is important for the present research is that the aforementioned theories define different features of modern political campaigns such as: the involvement of external experts and consultants from marketing agencies and media; usage of opinion polls; ‘permanent campaigning’; and others, which were then comprised by Gibson and Rommele (2009) in one methodological set and which will be used in this research for measuring professionalization of political campaigns by Russian parties. All these features can show to what extent political campaigns are professionalized, or as some scholars prefer, reached ‘modern’ and ‘post-modern’ level of campaign evolution (see Norris 2004, Farrel 2006).
As different theories in the field of political communication study political campaigns mainly as a dependent variable, field of party politics analyzes political campaigns mainly highlighting the consequences of modern political campaigns application on party organization and politics. Therefore, theories and hypothesis in this field consider political campaigns also as the independent variable influencing certain processes in party organization and politics.

Electoral campaigning is concerned as primary party goals, influencing transformations inside the parties. Some scholars claim that modern political campaigns can undermine the democratic institutions by “weakening political parties and declining standings of politicians” (Swanson and Mancini 1996, 274). For instance, Scammell claims that professionalization of electioneering and technological drive towards ‘scientificization’ of campaigns result in ‘the general weakening of the role of the party due to the decline in strong party attachments among voters’ (1997, 6). The idea is that professionalization of political campaigns stimulate further decline of classical mass parties due to the “shift in focus by the parties away from inward concerns with party members and activists towards more outward concerns to voters” (Farrell 2006, 122). These ideas were first raised more than thirty years ago by Michels (1962), who argued that usage of skilled campaign organizers and leaders in party campaigning lead to transformation of power making it more vertical than horizontal, and Otto Kirchheimer (1966), who claimed that increasing autonomy of the leadership from internal checks and balances and the reduction of ideology results in weakening links between society and parties.

These ideas closely relate to the ideas that were further developed into ideas of new model of party organization as electoral-professional party (Panebianco 1986) and cartel party (Katz and Mair 1995). Panebianco (1988) was among the first paying attention to
professionalization. He claimed that due to the evolution of campaign techniques and reliance on professionals like polling experts, media, marketing and advertisement experts, parties had become electoral professional organizations.

Moreover, Mair claims that a shift of power in decision making from leaders and to external media, marketing and public relations consultant results in significant changes in the internal power distribution within parties (Mair et al., 1999). Thus, Panebianco and Mair emphasized the shift in model of party due to new models of organization invoked by shift in party’s focus to voters from party members and evolution of campaign organization (see Panebianco 1988, Mair et al. 1999). Here the major idea for the present research is that internal changes in party organization, namely centralization of party decision-making power, staff and finance, are influenced by application of professional campaigns by parties. Also, it may be considered other way around, that centralized parties more easily adopt new professional campaign techniques in their campaigns.

Here it is necessary to emphasize that centralization (or decentralization) of party organization in this sense and for the purpose of present research is understood as the distribution of control within the party organization or in other words the way in which power is distributed among the different levels of the party’s leadership (Duverger 1954, 52). Thus, a centralized party is defined as one which features the concentration of effective decision-making authority in the national party organs, with a premium placed on a smaller number of individuals participating in the decision (Janda 1980, 108).

It is also important to mention that there are also scholars claiming quite the opposite: that usage of modern campaigns may result in decentralization of party organization. For instance, Zittel and Gschwend, while analyzing constituency campaigns in German Elections, came to conclusion that individual constituency campaigns may result in a relative
independence of individual candidates from central party apparatus (2008). They argue that usage of modern campaigns can bring more independence to individual candidates thus decentralizing the party organization apparatus. However, the research is limited by scope only to German elections in 2005. Secondly, Zittel and Gschwend analyzed only individual constituency campaigning which can be decentralized on local level but still the resources would be concentrated in central national apparatus leaving the power of decision making on central level.

Kavanagh (2003) argued that political marketing (usage of external marketing consultants in political campaigns) undermine the internal party democracy. He stressed the role of political consultants in changing internal party structure – “the marketing men prefer a party that is centralized, leader-friendly, allows them direct access to the key decision-makers, including the leader, and grants much autonomy to the people they liaise with – usually the party’s communication directors” (2003, 2). Furthermore, Kavanagh claims that winning elections strategy of marketing professionals results in ‘a unitary command structure’ in party organization (2003, 3). What is key for the present paper is Kavanagh’s argument (2003) that modern political campaigns and active involvement of marketing consultants strengthen the party leadership in two ways. Firstly, by its given ability to decide upon the party’s central message and the increased power of party headquarters over the campaign, while the old style campaigning was ‘decentralized into several hundred constituencies’ (Kavanagh 2003, 3). Secondly, the adaptation of campaign strategies to media logic results in political personalization or increased focus on leaders, making leader even more powerful (Kavanagh 2003).

Norris (2004), analyzing the evolution of political campaign techniques, highlights the shift from labor-intensive campaign to more capital-intensive campaign. This means that due
to the increased usage of paid consultants, usage of opinion polls and ‘mediatization’ party members, volunteers and local branches are not so important in political campaigns and in party structure in general. This also can be understood as professional political campaigns rely more on finances than on party members and organization.

Farrel and Webb (2000) studied not only the role of parties in modern campaigns, but also the role of modern campaign affecting the organization of parties. Firstly, analyzing the stages of professionalization of political campaigns they come to the argument that adaptation by parties of new campaign style resulted in organizational adaptation by parties, namely professionalization and centralization of party organization (Farrell and Webb 2000). Farrell and Webb also emphasize that modern political campaigns ‘reflect a general shift in the internal power relations within parties, with the parliamentary face, and especially that part of it intimately associated with the party leadership, emerging as the main power house’ (2000, 19). The research, based on the data from nine Western European countries, shows that carefully coordinated campaign needs centralized resources which in turn give strategic autonomy to leadership (Farrel and Webb 2000). The dimensions used in Farrel and Webb’s researches lay potential basis for the further researches.

In sum, all aforementioned existing theories on professionalization of political campaigns consider political parties as the subjects or indicators of change but there are few theories which study role of parties that they play in the process of adapting new styles of campaigning. However, there is a theory in the field which considers drivers of the change in political campaigns within the parties themselves (Gibson and Rommele 2001). The party-centered theory proposed by Gibson and Rommele (2001) focuses more on the internal organizational dynamics and structure of parties to understand and to explain the process of professionalization of political campaigns, rather than more complex contextual and societal
determinants proposed by modernization theory. Gibson and Rommele (2001) identify six party factors that can influence the level of professionalization. First, the theory set four factors which considered as important for parties in their move to political campaign. Those factors are:

a. Vote-seeking as a primary goal of parties: The logic is that parties whose primary goal is to win elections are expected to be more easily adapt to professional techniques which make their changes to gain more voters bigger.

b. Right-wing ideology: Here, the argument is that left-wing or communist parties would less adaptive to professional campaign techniques as right-wing parties because of the ideology. Right-wing parties are considered more open to marketing technologies and to the use of external consultants then left-wing parties (Kavanagh 1995; Scammel 1995).

c. Centralization of internal structure: The logic of professional political campaign implies hierarchical structure of party organization, which makes the process of adaptation to new techniques easier, particularly usage of external expertise (Farrel and Web 2002, Norris 2002, Mair et al. 1999).

d. Resources: Usage of professional campaigning techniques assumes that parties need sufficiently large resources to be able to apply this type of capital intensive campaign (Gibson and Rommele 2009, 208)

1.3 Parties and campaigns in post-communist countries and Russia

The last theoretical field which is important for the present research is the study of parties in post-communist countries, and particularly studies of political campaigns and party organization in Russia. Studies of post-communist countries show that transition produced party model with weak organization, as most of the parties in post-communist countries lack
mass membership, a developed structure and highly depend on leaders (Mair 1997). At the same time, some scholars claim that the parties in post-communist countries can be considered as complex organizations (Enyedi 2006). Nevertheless, the common agreed fact among scholars is that post-communist transition did not produce mass parties (Enyedi 2006). What is even more important, the post-communist parties are characterized as centralized, bureaucratized and with the dominant position of party leaders (Enyedi 2006).

Studies of Russian parties confirm that parties in Russian are more adaptive to the professional campaigns due to the lack of strong established party organization without mass membership, with the dominant position of party leaders and centralized structure of decision-making process (Golosov 1998, Hutcheson 2003 and 2005a). Therefore, one can claim that parties in Russia use professional campaign activities to full extent. Hutcheson argue that in “the Putin era professional and well-resourced campaigns have become more important” (2009, 332). Furthermore, Hutcheson points at “multi-billion dollar indigenous industry” of political consultants and argues that political campaigning in Russia “mirrored the “Americanization” of worldwide political campaigning” (2009, 334). Fritz Plasser and Gunda Plasser (2002) in their study of global political marketing claim that professional campaigning is used by Russian parties in elections; particularly it concerns usage of external political consultants by the parties.

First, there is limited systematic comparative evidence confirming usage of professional campaigns in by Russian parties. Thus, the field lacks the empirical studies of political campaigns in Russia that will confirm the professionalization of political campaigns. Furthermore, existing studies researched only usage of external media, PR and marketing consultants by Russian parties in their campaigning but fully ignored other features of campaign professionalization mentioned above. Furthermore, there are no studies which tried
to measure the variety between parties in their professionalization of political campaigns. The last, but not the least, the field lacks empirical studies testing the party-centered theory of professionalized campaigning in Russia.

The question of this research is: how do the internal factors and the structure of parties in Russia impact the level of professionalization of their political campaigning? For this reason it is mainly based on the party-centered theory proposed by Gibson and Rommele (2001) and to different extent elaborated by other scholars (Farrel and Web 2000, Norris 2000, Kavanagh 1995) which claim for the consequences of professional campaign techniques development on internal party organization, and vice versa that party internal organization and dynamics impact the extent to which parties adapt to professional campaigns.

In the next Chapter I will study the level of professionalization of campaigning by parties which participated in State Duma of Russian Federation elections 2007. For this purpose, I will apply the CAMPROF index elaborated by Gibson and Rommele (2009), which measures the professionalization of political campaigns.
Chapter 2: Measuring the professionalization of parties campaigns in the State Duma of Russian Federation elections in 2007

2.1 CAMPROF index for measuring professionalization of campaigns

Before testing the hypothesis of the thesis the research needs to measure the professionalization of political campaigns of parties in Russian State Duma elections in 2007. Despite the well elaborated theory and conceptualization on professionalization of political campaigns presented above the field definitely lacks the developed standard methodology for measuring professionalization of political campaigns of parties within the country or in cross-national studies. The present research uses the methodology elaborated by Gibson and Rommele (2009).

Gibson and Rommele (2009) elaborated a methodological framework for measuring the professionalization of political campaigns by developing a multidimensional indicator. Namely, the authors developed an index CAMPROF (campaign professionalization) that is based on 10 dimensions of professional campaigning. Those dimensions are based on the elaborated theoretical framework mentioned in Chapter 1. The CAMPROF index includes 10 dimensions which are the key party activities in professional campaigning (Gibson and Rommele 2009). The more extensively a party engages in those activities the more professionalized its campaigning to be. To capture the variance between campaigns used by parties, each dimension is measured by the scale from 0 to 3. Generally, a score of 3 is assigned to the activity which is fully developed by the party in campaigning, a score of 2 is assigned to the activity which is extensively engaged by the party, score 1 indicates that the party partially engaged in the activity during campaigning and 0 means that the activity is not used by the party at all. Then all the scores are combined into one index having 10 dimensions and with the maximum score of 30 (Gibson and Rommele 2009).
The dimensions include: use of telemarketing both for contacting own members and outside target groups and use of direct mail for contacting own members and outside target groups; presence of an internal Internet communication system; email ‘sign-up’ or subscription list for regular news updates; outside campaign headquarters; continuous campaigning; use of outside public relations/media/marketing consultants; use of opinion polling; conducting opposition research (Gibson and Rommele 2009).

Gibson and Rommele (2009) divide these dimensions into objective and more subjective variables. For instance, use of telemarketing and direct mail, internal/intranet Communication System, email subscription newsletters, outside campaign headquarters and continuous campaigning are considered to be more objective, because the index is based on certainly more visible, verifiable and publicly accessible information. The use of outside PR/media consultants, computerized databases, opinion polling and conducting opposition research are considered as more subjective (Gibson and Rommele 2009).

The CAMPROF index is the only methodological tool for measuring the extent of professionalization of political campaigns which is aimed at showing the variance between parties. All previous attempts to measure the professionalization of campaigns involved just extensive qualitative research of the country or countries without studying the differences between the parties (Esser and Pfetsch 2004, Swanson and Mancini 1996 and others). Another advantage of the CAMPROF index is that it is based on the practical activities of parties which show the extent of involvement in professional campaigning by parties.

However, most of the dimensions of the CAMPROF index are very subjective and based on the individual judgment of the researcher (coder). As the application of the CAMPROF index requires judgment whether the activity of party is fully developed, extensively developed or partially developed. For instance, the difference between “fully
developed” and “extensively developed” scores are very difficult to judge. But reducing the scale in scope may potentially make the variance between parties less significant.

While some dimensions like direct mail and telemarketing can be assessed by quantitative numbers of population involved, others are based on the individual judgment of the researcher (Gibson and Rommele 2009). Also, the dimensions of the index are mostly relative than absolute. Furthermore, the CAMPROF index needs some adaptation or reinterpretation while applying to the specific country since, for instance, whether certain engagement of parties into opinion research or direct mail is to be considered fully developed or partially developed depends on the national context.

The CAMPROF index by Gibson and Rommele (2009) is applied in the present research for measuring the professionalization of political campaigns by parties in Russian State Duma elections in 2007 with a minimum adjustment for the Russian context. For instance, they measured telemarketing and direct mail variables by looking at the proportion of the population contacted by such means Gibson and Rommele (2009). The problem here is to decide which proportion of the population contacted by such means would be considered as the means were “fully developed”, “extensively developed” or “partially developed”. To solve this problem it was decided to make judgment if the activity is extensively developed by comparing it with the “traditional” means of campaigning. Below, I discuss in detail each dimension from the CAMPROF index by Gibson and Rommele (2009) and how they are measured.

**Employment of public relations/marketing/media consultants**

Measuring this activity it is not only important if the consultants were employed by parties prior and during elections, but also the role of consultants in decision-making process. If the party employs consultants and they are on the same level of power with party officials
the score is 3; if the consultants are employed frequently but have less power than the politicians of the party the score is 2; if the consultant are employed only from time to time with less power than politicians the score is 1 and if no use of outside consultants at all, the score is 0.

**Campaign Headquarters**

The theories on professionalization of political campaign imply the development of a separate campaign management team that organizes and manages the election campaign. The full development of this activity means a assigned department or team which is fully in charge for elaboration and realization of election campaigns and physically outsourced and the score is 3; if there is dedicated campaign team or unit working within the party headquarters with the clearly defined personal separation the score is 2. The established campaign team or department but less clear personnel separations to the rest of the party headquarter, score 1. In case of no clear separation between campaign team and other department score is 0.

**Use of telemarketing**

The more extensively a party engaged in this activity the more professionalized the campaign is to be. Score 3 is given to the party if the proportion of the population contacted by means of telemarketing is larger than the population contacted by the ‘traditional’ means of campaigning as ‘door to door campaign’ by local members and party supporters. Score 2 is given if telemarketing is equally applied as other ‘traditional’ means of campaigning. Score 1 is given if the party uses telemarketing, but this tool play lesser role in campaigning than other means. If the party is not using telemarketing at all it is assigned score 0.
**Direct Mail**

Here is the same measurement as for telemarketing. Score 3 is given to the party if the proportion of the population contacted by means of direct mail is larger than the population contacted by the ‘traditional’ means of campaigning as ‘door to door campaign’ by local members and party supporters. Score 2 is given if direct mail is equally applied as other ‘traditional’ means of campaigning. Score 1 is given if the party uses direct mail tool, but this tool play lesser role in campaigning than other means. If the party is not using telemarketing at all it is assigned score 0.

**Internal/Intranet Communication System**

Here the score depends on the extent to which this tool is used. If internal communication system included national and local staff and members the assigned score is 3. If the system included only national and local staff it is assigned score 2; if only national staff is included into system the score is 1; and the score is 0 if the system is not used in the party.

**E-mail Subscription Newsletter**

This dimension is measured based on the frequency of the party newsletter and if the newsletter is more targeted and individualized or general. The maximum score 3 is assigned to the party having both a generic newsletter and more targeted/individualized newsletters coming weekly; score 2 is assigned to the party having only generic weekly newsletters; score 1 if newsletters are not coming on regularly/weekly basis. If the party has no such tool of communication the score is 0.
**Computerized Databases**

This activity is measured by looking at whether the party have and make use of national and/or local database of voters. If the party used the database regularly at both national and local level for to identify and target potential voters, particularly for swing voters or those who must be more vulnerable to switching party, the score is 3. The score 2 is assigned if the party have and frequently use such database both on national and local level; the score 1 is assigned if the party have the database and occasionally use on national or local level; and the score is 0 if the party does not have or does not operate the database.

**Opinion Polling**

If the party has its own dedicated research team or unit for conducting opinion polls in relation to the election campaigns and results is used for campaign strategy, the score is 1; if the party frequently orders polls for the campaign purposes from the external polling institutes the score is 2; if the party uses opinion polls occasionally either on national or local level the score is 1; if the party does not use opinion polling in the campaigns the score is 0.

**Opposition Research**

Like with the opinion polls the opposition research is used for shaping the strategy in professional campaigning. If the party has its own dedicated research team or unit for conducting research on opposition parties before and during the election campaigns (and where the results then used for campaign strategy) the score is 3; if the party frequently uses opposition researches for the campaign purposes from the external polling institutes the score is 2; if the party orders opposition researches occasionally the score is 1; and if the party does not use opinion polling in the campaigns the score is 0.
Continuous Campaigning

This dimension is considered to be one of the most revealing features of the professional campaigns (Gibson and Rommele 2009, Swanson and Mancini 1996, Plasser and Plasser 2002). But also this dimension is the most difficult to measure due to the subjectivity of judgment and different country specific context and regulations. The best way to measure if a party is using continuous campaign is to look at the extent to which a party is applying professional campaign activities at a time well before the official campaign period. Gibson and Rommele (2009) propose usage of 6 month time period before the start of official or ‘hot’ campaign to measure ‘continuous campaign’ activities. Thus, for the purpose of this research, if the party deploys from seven up to nine professional campaign activities 6 months prior to the official campaign the score is 3; if the party deploys from four to six the score is 1; between one to three activities the score is 1; and if none of the activities is deployed 6 months before the election campaign period the score is 0.


In addition, the findings which will be described below are based on the interviews. The semi-structured interview were conducted with the representative of leading political
consulting company Nikkolo M and party officials who were in the parties’ campaign headquarters in the Russian State Duma elections in 2007. The interviews and were based on the variables of the CAMPROF index and score ranking system described above. However, the information received from interviewees was very limited due to the internal restrictions in the parties. Therefore, the findings combined interviews results and the thorough analysis of abovementioned analytical articles and reports.

2.2 Results of campaign professionalization measurement

Before presenting overall CAMPROF index results by the parties during last Russian State Duma elections in 2007 there is a need to describe in detail each of the dimensions of campaign professionalization on step by step basis.

Consultants

According to experts the market of political consultants specializing on electoral campaigns has developed into ‘multi-billion dollar indigenous industry’ (Hutcheson 2009). Furthermore, the usage of public relations and marketing consultants in election campaigns in Russia is considered to be fully developed and thus mirroring “Americanization” trend of global political campaigning (Plasser and Plasser 2002). But there is also a trend that Russian parties establish departments responsible for the so-called “permanent campaigning” within the party organization (Kynev 2004). Nevertheless, it does not mean that external consultants are not employed at all.

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1 The interviewees were - Director of analytical department in Nikkolo M Company Michail Afanas’ev, Head of informational-technological centre of CPRF Yaroslav Grekov, El’dar Yanbuhtin – Deputy of the head of the Central Election Committee of United Russia in 2007, Igor’ Yakovlev – Press Secretary of Yabloko Party, Victor Bykov – Head of Central Election Committee of Just Russia in 2007, Mitrofanov Alexey – Press Secretary of LDPR.
The findings show that indeed external consultants were widely employed by parties but their role in decision making process differs from party to party. The highest score 3 in this dimension is received by Yabloko. External individual consultants and the media company “Kross-media” were employed by the party and played equal role with the party responsible managers in deciding about the campaign strategies (Political Party “Russian United Democratic Party ‘YABLOKO’”). LDPR received 2 scores for this activity. The party involved external PR Company “Ada-Agency” on a daily basis (Political Party “Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia”). Nevertheless, the primary role in decision-making process was left to party officials. United Russia and Just Russia were assigned 1 score in this activity the party relied on its experienced and professional personnel and employed external consultants occasionally for special projects or tasks on tender basis. CPRF got 0 for this activity. The party relied primarily on its well developed internal structure and personnel and so-called in-house campaign expertise.

**Campaign Headquarters**

The findings show that this dimensions was well developed by parties. Each party had well established campaign management team or unit that organizes and manages the political campaign. Nevertheless, none of the parties had the campaign unit which was physically outside the party headquarters. Also, the separation between personnel working for the campaign unit was not clear in some parties. The same personnel may fulfill functions in campaign unit and in the party headquarters as well. Furthermore, the hierarchical structure of the campaign organization implies control from the leader of party headquarters over the campaign.

LDPR, Just Russia and Yabloko received 2 scores in this activity as interviewed party officials claimed that separate campaign unit with clearly defined personal separation was
established. KPRF and Untied Russia received 1 score. In both cases parties had very
developed campaign headquarter with designated personnel and strict hierarchical structure.
The problem is that headquarters were established on the basis of General Executive
Committee. Therefore, there was not clear separation between personnel in campaign unit and
the party headquarters. The staff employed as the campaign unit personnel for the time of
campaign period performed other functions for everyday work of party headquarters.

**Telemarketing and Direct Mail**

Telemarketing and direct mail was utilized to certain extent by all parties. But to
compare with the other traditional agitation tools such as meetings, door to door campaign,
public events, telemarketing and direct mail did not play important role in party campaigning.
Most parties spent huge amounts and efforts on networks of agitators and different kinds of
agitation printing production (Tihomirov and Boyarskiy 2007).

Yabloko, having no such human resources on local level as other parties, tried to compensate
for this by paying particular attention to telemarketing and direct mail. The party employed
Call-Centre Company “Infotel” which conducted telemarketing activity, reaching population
by means of direct phone calls. Also, Yabloko extensively used direct mail which was, along
with telemarketing, the main strategy in campaign. Yabloko got 3 scores for each of the
activities (Political Party ‘Russian United Democratic Party ‘YABLOKO’). Just Russia also
actively involved in direct mail and telemarketing during the campaign. For instance, Just
Russia spend 15% of their campaign budget on calling centers which conducted telemarketing
and direct mail agencies while other parties spent not more than 7% of their budgets (Kraynov
2008). Just Russia also received 3 scores for each of the activities.
CPRF used direct mail on local levels by local campaign units only. Also the method of delivering messages resembled more to “door to door campaign”, when activists of the party delivered letters with other agitation materials personally (Political Party “Communist Party of the Russian Federation”). Thus, the technique of direct mail is not applied by the party to full extent. The party got 1 score for direct mail. CPRF got 0 for telemarketing as this tool is not adopted by the party.

United Russia used both telemarketing and direct mail to very limited extent while spending most of the resources on political advertisement on TV and press (All-Russian Political Party “United Russia”). United Russia got 1 score for telemarketing as the party commissioned services of Call-agency “Telecom Management” but the coverage of electorate was insignificant. The party also scored 1 for direct mail, as CPRF, United Russia used activists on local level for application of direct mail technique but to insignificant extent. LDPR got the same 1 score for each of the activity. As interviewed officials admitted the party used telemarketing and direct mail but with insignificant coverage of population.

**Internal/Intranet Communication System**

None of the Russian parties had internal/intranet communication system which included members along with the staff. Thus, this activity cannot be considered fully developed in Russian parties campaigning. Nevertheless, during the campaign period for the coordination of work between local branches and headquarters some parties had a system of internal communication. Yabloko had the one connecting national and local branches and which was actively used during campaign period for coordination of campaign activities on different levels (Political Party “Russian United Democratic Party ‘YABLOKO’”). The party got 2 scores for this activity. CPRF, United Russia and Just Russia used the system only on national
level. Thus, these parties got 1 score for this activity. Surprisingly, LDPR did not have the system, the score is 0.

**Email subscription newsletters**

None of the parties had a generic email subscription newsletter along with more targeted/individualized newsletters where you could choose what kind of information you were interested in. Just Russia, Yabloko and LDPR had a newsletter which can be subscribed both by members and non-members. The newsletter was distributed weekly with general information. Furthermore, the party had weblogs of party leaders and officials. Just Russia, Yabloko and LPDR got 2 scores for this activity. CPRF also had forum debates on its website and the latest news updates. Nevertheless, CPRF had general subscription newsletter not on weekly basis. Therefore, CPRF scores 1 on this activity. Although, United Russia had well developed website with news services with larger coverage and regular updates, the party did not use email subscription newsletters during elections. Therefore, United Russia got 0 for this activity.

**Computerized database**

Yabloko and LDPR frequently used the database of voters in the early stages of campaigning strategy both on national and local level. These parties got 3 scores for this activity. CPRF operated database by local branch in each constituency and used it for its campaign purposes to make the campaign more targeted. Nevertheless, there was not general database on national level; therefore, CPRF got 1 scores (Political Party “Communist Party of the Russian Federation”). United Russia also did not have computerized database of voters for shaping campaign strategy on national level. Nevertheless local campaign units used database on local
level, the score is also 1. Surprisingly, Just Russia did not use the computerized database of voters at all, the score is 0.

**Opinion polls**

United Russia did not have its own unit for conduction of opinion researches. Nevertheless, the party frequently commissioned opinion polls and focus groups from research companies like VTsIOM (All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion), FOM (The Public Opinion Foundation) and Perspectiva (All-Russian Political Party “United Russia”). Then the results were used by analytical department for shaping campaign strategies. United Russia got 2 scores for this activity. Just Russia also commissioned opinion polls from external company “Vardis” and actively used the results in campaign strategy, the score was 2 (Political Party “Just Russia”). LDPR also frequently commissioned opinion polls from external sources and scored 2 for this activity. CPRF got 1 score for opinion polls. The party commissioned opinion polls and focus groups from research companies but only occasionally. Yabloko used opinion polling occasionally and also commissioned it from external companies. The party got 1 score for this activity.

**Opposition research**

None of the parties dedicated a unit within its organization for conducting opposition research. Yabloko commissioned opposition researches from outside on regular basis for shaping its campaign strategy. This party got 2 scores for this campaign activity. Just Russia and LDPR used opposition research commissioned from external company only on the early stages of its campaign strategy and got 1 score for this activity. CPRF and United Russia did not use opposition research for directly or indirectly guiding their strategy. Both parties got 0 for these score.
Continuous Campaigning

This activity also was not fully developed by Russian parties. Before the official campaigning period, which was 3 months, parties have conducted only a few professional campaign activities. Just Russia operated three professional campaigning activities before the start of official campaigning period. The party actively used consultants, opinion polls and opposition research. United Russia was involved in two activities – opinion polling and internal communication system. Yabloko and LDPR used two activities before official campaign – newsletters and internal communication system. In general, all parties got just 1 score for this activity, which means that parties were just partially engaged in this activity.

The total results scored by parties in the CAMPROF index are presented below in Table 1. Surprisingly, the general results show that none of the parties is even close to the maximum score. The highest result of Yabloko is 21 scores and the lowest scores 8 and 7 scored by United Russia and CPRF accordingly. Generally, the findings show the low level of professional campaigning by Russian parties in the State Duma of Russia in 2007. For instance, Social Democrats (SPD) and Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), two leading parties in Germany, scored 27 and 24 accordingly in the research of German federal election 2005 by Gibson and Rommele where the same CAMPROF index was applied (Gibson and Rommele 2009). The findings also show that parties are extensively use only some dimensions of professional campaigning like opinion polls, email subscription newsletters and, to some extent, political consultants. Analysis of party campaigns show that parties in Russia still rely mainly on TV, advertisement and agitation materials. Nevertheless, there is a variance in results between parties. In next Chapter, I will analyze if party internal factors proposed by the party-centered theory of professionalized campaigning (Gibson and Rommele 2001) can
be explanatory variables for the level of professionalized campaigns produced by parties in State Duma Elections in 2007.

Table 1. Results of parties’ professionalized campaigning measured by the CAMPROF index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign dimension</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
<th>Just Russia</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>United Russia</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultants</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Headquarters</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telemarketing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct mail</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intranet Communications System</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-mail Subscription Newsletter</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computerized Database</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion polling</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Research</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous Campaigning</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 3 Testing Party-Centered Theory

As was mentioned in Chapter 1, Gibson and Rommele (2001) in their party-centered theory identified four internal factors of parties that determine move to professionalized political campaigning: vote-seeking as a primary goal, right-wing ideology, internal centralization and high level of resources. In this Chapter I will analyze three ‘priming’ internal factors of Russian parties and test the party-centered theory of professional campaigning by comparing results received by CAMPROF index and analysis of three ‘priming’ factors.

I will not analyze the fourth factor which is vote-seeking as a primary goal. The reason is that in the ‘clientelist’ party system of Russia with the hierarchical system of competition all parties’ primary goal can be seen as vote-maximization (S. White 2007, Gel’man 2008). Hale (2007) argues that party strategy in Russia is defined by party type which in turn is defined by parties’ political capital. He identifies four party types in Russia: programmatic, ideational, minor and clientelist (Hale 2007). Nevertheless, by analyzing the strategies of all four types it can be perceived that their primary goal is vote-seeking, even in case of ideational parties (Hale 2007). As it is difficult to classify parties in Russia as vote-seekers or not vote-seekers, this study does not include that variable into analysis.

3.1 Level of financial resources

Gibson and Rommele (2001) in their party-centered theory argue that level of resources of parties is an explanatory (‘priming’) factor for adaptation of professional political campaign. Namely, high level of financial resources is factor promoting professionalization of political campaigns by parties.

The high level of resources available for parties was measured by overall party income and expenditures in a given year. Also, parties’ expenditures on political campaign 2007 were
analyzed (see Table 2). The analysis of parties’ income and expenditures in the year of
elections shows that United Russia, Just Russia and LDPR had the largest financial resources
for the implementation of campaigns. The analysis also shows that Yabloko had the lowest
budgets (eleven times smaller than the budget of United Russia).

Table 2 Overall Parties Income in 2007 (in Russian roubles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United Russia</th>
<th>Just Russia</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>2,094,288,660</td>
<td>564,506,913</td>
<td>547,230,901</td>
<td>462,111,808</td>
<td>189,189,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditures</td>
<td>1,985,766,479</td>
<td>521,364,187</td>
<td>533,284,774</td>
<td>433,787,890</td>
<td>185,420,088</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statements of account of the parties for 2007. Available at Central Election
Commission of Russian Federation at http://www.cikrf.ru/politparty/finance/svodn_ochet.jsp

Table 2 shows the availability of resources of parties. But even more precise
information can be obtained by analyzing financial reports of parties’ election funds in
Russian State Duma elections in 2007 (see Table 3). These financial reports gives information
on exact amount of parties spent on election campaign.

Table 3 Expenditures of Russian parties in election campaign 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United Russia</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>Just Russia</th>
<th>KPRF</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Total
expenditures | 398,350,397   | 391,573,350 | 327,036,570 | 172,053,109 | 132,690,660   |
| expenditures
without
election
deposit       | -             | -         | -           | -          | 72,690,660    |

Source: financial reports of election funds of Russian parties for participation in Russian State
Duma election campaign in 2007. Available at Central Election Commission of Russian
Federation at http://www.cikrf.ru/elect_duma/finans/index.jsp

Again these findings show that parties United Russia, LDPR and Just Russia spent the
largest amounts of funds on election campaigning. KPRF looks modest comparing with
United Russia, LDPR and Just Russia having almost twice lesser funds spent on election campaigns.

Also, it is important to mention that according to Russian electoral legislation parties which receive 4% have their election deposit reimbursed by Central Election Commission. Yabloko got less than 4% in elections 2007 the expenditures on election campaign included also 60 000 000 roubles of election deposit, while expenses of other parties are presented in the table without amount of election deposit, because they passed the required threshold. Thus, “pure” expenses on elections 2007 of Yabloko are four times less than election expenses of United Russia, LDPR and Fair Russia.

However, detail analysis of parties’ expenditures in elections 2007 shows most expenditure were spent on paid advertisement on TV, paid articles and advertisement in press, and production of printed materials. For instance, CPRF spent 45 549 271 on TV and radio advertisement, 10 735 893 on press advertisement and 100 347 058 on printed agitation materials which is together almost 90% out of all expenses on election campaign (Political Party “Communist Party of the Russian Federation”). The same situation is in United Russia, LDPR and Just Russia where about 90% of expenses spent on TV and press advertisement and printed agitation materials (Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation). At the same time, there is a little bit different situation with Yabloko. The party spent about 70% of its total expenses on activities mentioned above (Political Party “Russian United Democratic Party ‘YABLOKO’”).
3.2 Internal Structure of Parties

3.2.1 Institutional environment for parties’ organization in Russia

Before discussing parties’ internal structure that can influence the level of campaign professionalization, I will briefly analyze legislation on parties and how it can impact party organization structure and political campaign as well.

In 2001-2003 there were changes in Russian election legislation bearing significant implications for institutional environment and internal organization of parties. Officially, the changes were aimed at stabilizing, centralizing and consolidating party system in Russia by shrinking the party competition, which in long perspective would strengthen parliamentarianism (Stykow 2007). For instance, the electoral threshold for parties to pass to the State Duma and also for regional legislatures increased from 5% to 7% (Gel’man 2008).

What is more important for the present research is that new legislation on political parties in Russia influenced changes in organizational structure of parties, by toughening many organizational and memberships requirements. First of all, according to new legislation, Russian election system shifted from a mixed electoral system that combined voting in single-mandate and party lists to a strictly proportional electoral system where deputies are elected solely on the basis of party lists (“O politicheskih partiyah” 2001). Therefore, every candidate for a parliamentary seat has to compete on a party list and it is not possible to compete as an independent anymore. As a result, party organizations in Russia becoming more important now and the candidates are becoming more dependent on the party apparatuses (Stykow 2007).

Furthermore, according to new legislation parties are required to have at least 50,000 members along with branches with not less than 500 members in not less than half of the constituent regions of the Russian Federation (Hutcheson 2005b). Also, new legislation from
2005 prohibits pre-election party coalitions (blocs) (Wilson 2005). Another important amendment is that parties are now eligible for the state financial assistance in proportion to their electoral support if they obtain at least 3% of the vote (Gelman 2008).

The first result of the new legislation was that the survival of small party entities became almost impossible. For instance, the number of registered parties reduced to 15 parties in 2007, comparing with 139 parties and political organizations in 1999, eliminating small and unstable parties (Stykow 2007). Second, the requirement on memberships and local branches forces parties to maintain and develop strong organizational structure. For instance, United Russia has now about 1 500 000 members and branches in all constituent subjects of Russian Federation (All-Russian Political Party “United Russia”). Third, some experts claim that federal law on parties increases the parties discipline due to elimination of the possibility to compete as independent (Smyth 2006, Gel’man 2008). Many experts claim that now there are no more places for ‘empty vessel’ parties but only for parties with the strong organizational structure (Hanov 2007). While it is not clear yet if the organizational structure of parties in Russia would change significantly due to new legislation, the statistics of membership and number of local branches show that parties are developing their organizational structure.

### 3.2.2 Centralized versus decentralized structure of decision-making process in Russian parties

However, the present research is interested in the question if the centralized internal structure can be a factor influencing the level of professionalization of political campaigns by Russian parties. Therefore, first, the research will look at the parties’ staff and expenditures as variables which show if the internal structure of parties centralized (see Gibson and Rommele 2001, Farrel and Webb 2000). The research will look at central spending versus transfers to sub national units and the proportion of paid staff on three different levels of party organization: central level party, sub-national party and the parliamentary party.
It is impossible to locate precise information on parties’ staff separation on central, sub-national and parliamentary levels. But the level of funding that parties enjoy allowed them to employ a substantial full-time staff (White 2007). The analysis conducted by White (2007) showed that it is difficult to distinguish between paid officials, volunteers who worked on a full-time basis, the assistance that work on the members of the Duma and employees who became members of the campaigns staff. For instance, the Communist party claimed their cost of its central apparatus was low because most of the staff worked on unpaid basis (White 2007). Also, staff considerably changes when elections are in progress and then decrease again (White 2007). Moreover, it is practically impossible to differentiate between the staff employed by extra-parliamentary organization vis-à-vis the parliamentary organization due to the hierarchical structure. Therefore, information about the staff would not give any plausible judgment about internal structure of party organization.

However, there is information available for analysis of parties’ expenditures. Table 4 shows parties expenditures on central headquarters versus sub-national units in 2007.

Table 4. Parties expenditures on central governing bodies versus sub-national units in 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United Russia</th>
<th>Just Russia</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expenditures on central body</td>
<td>228,769,800</td>
<td>158,960,084</td>
<td>1,104,388</td>
<td>17,032,379</td>
<td>16,720,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expenditures on local branches</td>
<td>1,044,000,509</td>
<td>146,925,760</td>
<td>11,516,370</td>
<td>89,710,529</td>
<td>76,876,750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The findings on party expenditure show that except Just Russia, where expenditures on central governing body are larger than on local branches, expenditures on central governing
body are significantly lower than expenditures on local branches. However, it does not mean that Russian parties have decentralized structure. The findings can be explained by the organizational requirements set in legislation on political parties in Russia mentioned above. Parties are obliged to have local branches in not less than in half constituent subjects of the Russian Federation. Therefore, parties have to spend huge amounts of funds on local branches. United Russia is a clear example here. Since United Russia has local branches in each constituent subject of the Federation unlike other parties which barely fulfill the requirement set by the legislation, the party spent on local branches the amount larger than the budgets of all other parties taken together. However, it does not mean that United Russia has decentralized organizational structure.

In order to see if the parties’ internal organization is centralized or not, it is necessary to analyze parties’ rules of the decision making process, i.e. the parties’ rules which indicate how a variety of decisions are to be made. Particularly, it is important to look to what extent parties allow their members and regional branches to take active part in choosing party leaders and influencing the decision making process. There are a number of analyses of parties’ programs and statues (Komarovsky 2004, Volokhov 2003, Popov 2003, and D. White 2006). The general conclusion of all analyses is that parties in Russia have very hierarchical structure and allow their members to participate in decision-making process to very limited extent (S. White 2007, Komarovski 2004). For instance, almost all parties have indirect elections of party leaders (S. White 2007). Party leaders are elected, for instance, by Central Committee like in CPRF. However, there are considerable variations between different parties in the internal hierarchical structure.

United Russia’s party organization is considered to be highly centralized with hierarchical structure (S. White 2007). The first reason is the party formation. The party was
formed by “Kremlin-base ‘external governance’” (Gel’man 2006, 553). ‘External governance’ was to such extent that even party leaders and officials were merely in charge of everyday routing management and Kremlin officials controlled strategic decision-making (Gel’man 2008). Gel’man in his analysis of party organization of United Russia compares the party organization with “a firm whose assets are owned not by its management but by a large multi-sectoral holding company, which hired its management and personnel and could easy replace them from time to time” (2008, 9). According to Gel’man this ‘external governance’ was the primary reason for the establishment of party with a highly disciplined and centralizes organization: “no internal dissent or factionalism is tolerated, and even discussion within the party is strictly regulated by the Kremlin” (2008, 9).

According to the amended Article 7 of the Charter of United Russia, the Chairman of the Party is the Chairman of the Part’s Supreme Council at the same moment (All-Russian Political Party “United Russia”). This position can be introduced by the suggestion of the Supreme Council and its chairman (All-Russian Political Party “United Russia”). The Supreme Council decides upon the strategy of the party development and its policies, thus having the key role in decision making process (All-Russian Political Party “United Russia”). For instance, central party leaders intervene into the process of drawing up candidate lists by imposing their own choice on regional party list candidates (Reuter and Remington 2008).

The analysis of internal party rules of United Russia shows that members of the party are responsible for paying dues, taking part in the work of a party branch, implement the decision of party governing body and undergo party instruction (Komarovski 2004). The rights of party members include receiving information about the party, appealing against the decision of governing bodies, and expressing their views freely and to address questions to party organs at any level (All-Russian Political Party “United Russia”). Furthermore, members of
the party are responsible for taking part in elections campaigns on the party’s behalf and must join the party fraction and act in accordance with the party’s instructions (All-Russian Political Party “United Russia”). In general, experts argue that the party’s members have very low influence on party strategy and program and little influence on decision-making process (White 2007).

The role of party’s local branches and members in decision making process is also insignificant in LDPR. The hierarchical structure of party governance resembles the structure of United Russia. The difference is that in case of LDPR hierarchy is based on extraordinary charismatic politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who has unlimited power and control over the party (Hale 2007). The structure of local branch is set up on the basis of tough discipline (Hale 2007). For instance, local branches are required to fill detailed forms reporting their activity and to submit to the central governing body (Hale 2007). Furthermore, local branches are strictly obliged to implement any decisions going directly from Zhirinovsky (Hale 2007).

Although, the highest governing body according to party’s Charter is National Congress, most power in decision making process is in hand of the Supreme Council which even decides when to gather the Congress itself (Political Party “Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia”). According to the study of the members’ engagement into their party organization on local level, the LDPR were the least receptive to the opinions of its members comparing with other major Russian parties (Hutcheson 2003). Again, like in United Russia members and regional bodies have no influence on decision-making process.

Just Russia declared itself as a leftist party with the aim to be a counter balance to United Russia in a two-party system (Gel’man 2008). The party was established by the merger of the three satellite parties – the Motherland party, the Party of Pensioners and the Party of life. The formation of Just Russia was perceived by experts as Kremlin intention
towards the establishment of ‘left leg’ party, while Untied Russia would be ‘right leg’ in a ‘managed’ two-party system (Gel’man 2008, 923). Therefore, Just Russia is considered as a satellite party and according to this logic should resemble organization structure of United Russia and LDPR. Nevertheless, analysis of the party’s Charter and other documents shows that Just Russia has no so strict hierarchical structure as United Russia and LDPR. Just Russia has a more complex and decentralized structure.

For instance, the party governing body is the Central Council with 200 members from different branches elected by National Congress. However, the Central Council is led by the Presidium of Central Council which includes 40 party leaders. Furthermore, there is also Bureau of the Presidium including 12 party leaders. Besides, party has 12 Party Councils on the different issues. According to the Charter, the Councils are considered to be collective working bodies of the party (Political Party “Just Russia”). These councils are involved in the elaboration of party’s programs, charters and policies. Furthermore, they are responsible for realization of party programs and policies (Political Party “Just Russia”). Any party member can be elected and participate in elections for the party governing bodies (Political Party “Just Russia”). Therefore, despite a complicated structure the party decision-making process perceived to be more decentralized than, for instance, in LDPR and giving more opportunities for ordinary members to impact on decision-making process. Nevertheless, experts skeptically perceive the decentralized decision-making process in Just Russia, pointing out that this is a satellite party of Kremlin (Gel’man 2008).

In the case of CPRF, the rules of the party organization and decision making process were formed on the basis of the rules of its predecessor Communist Party of Soviet Union (March 2002, Gel’man 2008, S. White 2007). The organization structure is based on ‘democratic centralism’ or ‘organization discipline’ with the continuities in organization divisions of
labour and leadership (March 2002, 133). The principle of ‘democratic centralism’ means: election of all governing bodies on the principle of ‘bottom-up’, accountability of all governing bodies and its personal before party’s members, collective nature and transparence in decision making process of governing bodies and regional structures, and independence of local branches in the decision making process concerning internal issues (Political Party “Communist Party of the Russian Federation”). Furthermore, the Charter of the party says that it also provides the right of criticism, and rights for minority to present their views and have them considered in the taking of a decision (Political Party “Communist Party of the Russian Federation”).

Another important feature that provides place for more members to involve in decision making process is the rule of ‘constant renewal’ which to be observed in party elections (S. White 2007). The rule says that not less than a fifth of all elected bodies should be replaced in each election (Political Party “Communist Party of the Russian Federation”). Furthermore, according to the study of members’ engagement into their party organization on local level, the Communist Party was the most open to internal debate and the party that most directly encouraged their members to contribute into discussion of party decision making process (Hutcheson 2003).

Nevertheless, CPRF is traditionally considered as a party with structural and organizational cohesion (March 2002, S. White 2007). In order to make organizational structure of the party coherent the party’s rules set the obligations of lower party bodies to carry out any decisions of those above them and strict party discipline by all branches, any fractions within the parties are prohibited (Political Party “Communist Party of the Russian Federation”). Also, members cannot directly elect party leader, but the Central Committee elects the party leadership (Political Party “Communist Party of the Russian Federation”).
Yabloko shares some organizational principles with LDPR. For instance, the party has the binding character of higher-level party decisions and the indirect nature of the leader’s election, although before the choice of party leader there is a preliminary all-party vote (Political Party “Russian United Democratic Party ‘YABLOKO’”). The centralized structure of the party was justified by the lack of regional organizational structures and low level of resources (D. White 2006). Nevertheless, then the party was forced by new legislation to strengthen and develop its regional organization and to boost nationwide membership (D. White 2006). Furthermore, like in LDPR, the party was under full control of its charismatic leader Gregorii Yavlinskii, but as the party developed his control declined: “previously Yavlinkii’s opinion was the opinion of Yabloko. Today Mr. Yavlinkii has to ask its Yabloko members about their opinions too and discuss his political ideas with other members of the Party” (D. White 2006, 151).

The governing structure of Yabloko is complex consisting of National Congress as the highest governing body, Political Committee, Federal Council (60-70 members with majority of regional representatives) and Bureau of the Party ( Political Party “Russian United Democratic Party ‘YABLOKO’”). In this complex structure any important decision cannot be made without pre-election in National Congress giving opportunity to members to take an active part in decision making process (Political Party “Russian United Democratic Party ‘YABLOKO’”). Also, the party has Party Arbitrage which in case of any internal disputes and conflicts would decide (Political Party “Russian United Democratic Party ‘YABLOKO’”). Besides ordinary members Yabloko has ‘supporters’ who support the party but do not obliged to the rights and duties of formal membership (Political Party “Russian United Democratic Party ‘YABLOKO’”). Regarding the membership engagement in party business on the local level the research conducted by Hutcheson (2003) place the party between LDPR and CPRF.
All in all, it is possible to classify parties under the study on the level of centralization of their internal organizational structure based on qualitative findings from parties’ Charters and extensive studies conducted by Hutcheson (2003), S. White (2007), D. White (2006), Gel’man (2008) and others. United Russia and LDPR are considered to be highly centralized with a strong hierarchical structure. Just Russia and Yabloko also have centralized internal structure but with more possibilities for local branches and members to take active part in decision making process. These parties are considered as fairly centralized. CPRF looked as least centralized party among other parties where governing bodies do not depend on leadership, with more accountable system and collective nature of decision making process.

3.3 Ideology of parties

In the party-centered theory Gibson and Rommele (2001) argue that right-wing ideology is a ‘priming’ factor for adaptation of professional political campaigns by parties. The argument is that parties with right wing ideology can easier adapt to professional campaigning and left-wing parties or parties with socialist agendas are less adaptive due to the ideology which may impeded the adaptation of ‘business-type’ techniques (Gibson and Rommele 2001, Kavanagh 1995, Scammell 1995). In order to see if ideology is an internal factor of parties’ professionalization of campaigning in Russia we need to classify parties under the study on parties with left-wing and right-wing ideology.

United Russia as a ‘party of power’ is classified by some experts as a party with no ideology (Gel’man 2008, Hutcheson 2005b, Hale 2007). The lack of ideology is explained by party’s genesis with a ‘top-down’ party building and party re-building process (Stykow 2007). According to Gel’man (2008), it is difficult to make judgment on party’s ideology principles from its programs and manifestos since they present support to political regime and “Putin’s plan” but major position of party on different policy issues remain unclear (Gel’man 2008).
The strategy of non-ideology gives to United Russia room for political maneuvers. According to Gel’man (2008) United Russia locates “near the zero point on the left-right continuum between pro-statist and pro-market parties”, as well as for any other axis of issue dimension (Gel’man 2008, 921). Nevertheless, in a ‘managed’ party system United Russia is considered to be the right-centre party while Just Russia as left-centre party (Stykow 2007).

After its formation Just Russia announced a leftist policy position and employed extensive socialist rhetoric (Gel’man 2008). Nevertheless, taking into account that Just Russia, as a satellite party, fully supports Putin’s policies it is considered more left-centre party than left-wing party (Gel’man 2008).

Liberal Democratic Party of Russia is considered a party with right-wing ideology according to its official program. Nevertheless, some experts consider LDPR as a fake liberal party also used as satellite party by Kremlin (Gel’man 2008, Hutcheson 2005b, Rose and Munro 2002). Furthermore, LDPR’s name is considered misleading as LDPR does not advocate liberalism, but rather imperialism and nationalism (Hutcheson 2005b). At the same time the party manages to combine both nationalist and populist rhetoric, being at the same time loyal to Kremlin (Gel’man 2008). However, if to set up strict dichotomy on left-wing and right-wing ideology, LDPR is considered as the right-wing.

Despite some moves ‘rightwards’ in the course of its development, CPRF continues its strong commitment in its ideological values and principles towards Leninism (March 2002). The party’s appeal to voter, like ‘back in USSR’ and its policy positions still remains as in the 1990s (March 2002, Volokhov 2003). This party attachment to Leninism’s politics helps it to keep coherence and unity of its party organization (Gel’man 2008). Generally, the Communist Party of Russia is referred as a left-wing party on ideological dichotomy (March 2002, Gel’man 2004, S. White 2007).
Yabloko is seen as a right-wing in its ideological orientation by many scholars (D. White 2006, Gel’man 2008, Lowenhardt 1998, Golosov 2004). The party is considered as the main liberal party, although it used leftist rhetoric in some of its political campaigns (Gel’man 2008). Furthermore, Yabloko is perceived as, the major, if not the only, democratic opposition party in Russia (D. White 2006). Thus, the party is placed as right-wing on the ideological dichotomy.

3.4 Discussion of the findings

Table 5 presents summarized information on priming variables for professionalized campaigns of Russian parties in election for State Duma of Russian Federation in 2007. Applying these findings we can see that there is a significant variance even among this small sample of parties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United Russia</th>
<th>Just Russia</th>
<th>LDPR</th>
<th>CPRF</th>
<th>Yabloko</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High level of party resources*</td>
<td>2,094,288,660</td>
<td>564,506,913</td>
<td>547,230,901</td>
<td>462,111,808</td>
<td>189,189,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralized and hierarchical internal structure**</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right wing ideology***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Measured by overall party income in 2007

** The measurement is based on the scale where 2 means highly centralized structure, 1 fairly centralized and 0 as least centralized with significant involvement of members and local branches in decision-making process

*** Measured by the dichotomous variable with 0 = left-wing or left-centrist and 1 = right-wing or right-centrist
The case of CPRF seems the case that support the party-centered theory of professionalized campaigning (Gibson and Rommele 2001). The CPRF, as a predecessor of the Communist Party of Soviet Union, despite some changes, retains its leftist ideology. The leftist ideology can be an impediment to professionalization of campaigning, particularly to the application of marketing technologies and the buying of external expertise (Kavanagh 1995, Farrel and Webb 2000, Scammel 1995). There is a faith among official and members of the party that CPRF’s election campaigns should be labor intensive, low-cost and low-tech (Colton and McFaul 2003).

Also, the party spent on campaigning less than United Russia, LDPR and Just Russia. CPRF primary relied on its significant number of members and volunteer activists which conducted “door-to-door” campaigns. Furthermore, the party is seen as the least centralized party in the sample, which can be also an impediment to professionalized campaigns which require strict hierarchical structure.

If we analyze the findings on priming internal variables of United Russia it is expected that United Russia would have the best score in the CAMPROF index of professionalized campaigning. United Russia is significantly ahead of all other parties in terms of availability of resources. Professional campaigning, as a capital intensive campaigning, requires significant financial resources (Farrel and Web 2000). Nevertheless, United Russia, having the highest amount of financial resources, which is about four times larger of resources of Just Russia (which is second in the list), got the last score in the CAMPROF index showing the level of involvement in professionalized campaigning.

Furthermore, United Russia is classified as the party with centralized internal structure and strict hierarchical structure of decision making process. According to the theories presented in Chapter 1 (Norris 2000, Farrel and Webb 2000, Mair et al. 1999), parties with
‘top-down’ internal organization and hierarchical structure are more easily adapt professional campaigns, as professionalization requires some structural changes. However, again United Russia despite being centralized did not adapt professional campaigning to full extent. The same with ideology, United Russia is not a left-wing party which can be an impediment to adaptation of professional campaigns.

LDPR and Just Russia scored relatively well in the CAMPROF index. Both parties have high level of resources which enabled them to utilize professional campaign techniques. LDPR have centralized organization with hierarchical structure of decision making process. Also LDPR officially announce itself as liberal and democratic party. Thus, the party was expected to score well in the index of campaign professionalization. In case of Just Russia ideology and not strictly centralized internal organization might be the impediments for further adaptation of professional campaigning. Nevertheless, the party actively used some of professional campaigning dimensions.

Surprisingly, Yabloko has the highest score in the CAMPROF index. As was mentioned above, Yabloko is the right-wing party. Therefore, the ideology cannot be impediment for the party to use professional campaigning. Also, party is considered fairly centralized having charismatic leader. Nevertheless, the party had the lowest budget among the other parties of the sample, but it did not impede the professionalization of political campaign.

All in all, the case of CPRF fully conformed to the theory of party-centered professionalized campaigning. The internal priming factors of the party – left-wing ideology, low level of financial resources and decentralized internal structure may be the explanatory variables for the low level of professionalized campaigning showed by the CAMPROF index. Cases of LDPR, Just Russia and Yabloko also conformed to the theory, but to limited extent. However, the case of United Russia seems to be confronting to the theory of party-centered
professionalized campaigning. In the final part of this chapter, I will present alternative variable which can impact the level of professionalized campaigning by parties.

3.5 Alternative variable: administrative capital and resources

Present research argues that administrative capital (or administrative resources) can be the priming variable for the explanation of low level of professionalized campaign. Thus, parties which have significant administrative resources are not interesting in developing professional campaigning.

Administrative capital was first defined by Kitschelt as “a sort of capital as a stock of assets facilitating the provision of direct selective material or symbolic advantages to those individuals who demonstrably support the party’s candidates” (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 46-9). Most Russian parties are seen as clientelistic parties that primarily rely on administrative capital in their party organization and what is more important, in their campaigning (Hale 2007). Hutcheson defined administrative capital and administrative resources as “the use and sometimes abuse of state offices or resources to influence the electoral process” (2009, 337).

In Russia administrative capital mainly took the form of ‘administrative resources’, which can be of many forms. In Russian ‘managed democracy’, administrative resources appear to have become crucial to electoral success in recent years (Hutcheson 2009, 341). There are a number of studies claiming that United Russia as “dominant party” or “party of power” enjoyed unprecedented administrative capital in its election campaign (Hale 2007, Hutcheson 2009, Gel’man 2008, Reuter and Remington 2008).

First of all, United Russia has its own significant organizational-administrative capital. The party worked quickly to expand and deepen its national and regional party structures (Hale 2007). The party has a self-reported mass membership over 1.5 million with over 53,000 regional, local, and primary branches (Reuter and Remington 2008). The availability of such
developed organizational-administrative resources allows party to conduct successful “door-to-door” campaigns and other forms of agitation by members and party supporters on local level. For instance, for the campaign in 2007 the party spent on publishing agitation materials about 140 000 000 million Russian roubles which is almost 4 times more than spent Yabloko (All-Russian Political Party “United Russia”). Availability of such organizational resources allows United Russia to conduct successful campaigns without usage of professional and marketing campaign techniques (Yanbuhtin 2007, Buzin 2007).

Another form of administrative support is the support of incumbency. For instance, in 2007 United Russia controlled a majority of seats in all regional legislatures, and 78 of 83 regional administrations were headed by party members (Reuter and Remington 2008). The official representatives of the party in the provinces helped to coordinate its district candidacies and to direct financial and other support to them (Hale 2007). Moreover, the incumbents provided organizational support for the campaigns on local level (Hutcheson 2009).

Also, the association with popular incumbents can be used to advantage the campaign. For instance, Vladimir Putin chose to run at the top of the party list of United Russia in the State Duma of Russian Federation elections even without being a party member (Reuter and Remington 2008). Electoral legislation in Russia allows candidates to refuse seats without costing their party seats in the parliament (Hutcheson 2007). Therefore, parties can use so-called “locomotive candidates”, when famous politicians run for a party at the top of its list and then reject the seat after the elections. United Russia used this form of administrative resource to full extent in elections 2007. Out of 315 seats won by United Russia 104 deputies, including Putin and the leading candidates on sixty-four of the party’s eighty-three regional lists, rejected their places and were replaced by other party members (Hutcheson 2009).
The next form of effective administrative resources is the state and municipally owned media. All three major television networks and a number of municipally media gave favorable coverage to United Russia in election campaign 2007 (Hale 2007, Hutcheson 2009). As monitoring has shown United Russia got disproportionately large coverage in the state news programs. The party has received 19.2 % on the First Channel, 20.2 % on the “Russia” channel and 32.2% of coverage on TV-Centre Channel, while no more that 4% was devoted to any other party in these channels (Hutcheson 2009).

All in all, although it is almost impossible to measure the impact of administrative capital/administrative resources on success of election campaign, the findings show that these resources were actively used by the United Russia in State Duma of Russian Federation elections of 2007. Also, the finding show that United Russia despite having all priming factors for professionalized campaigning used professional techniques to very limited extent in election 2007. At the same time, the party used unprecedented level of administrative resources in campaign 2007. Thus, the use of administrative capital and administrative resources which provide great success of in elections may explain the low level of professionalized campaigning by United Russia, since the party having such administrative capital is not interested in developing of its professional campaigning.
Conclusion

The purpose of the present research was to measure the professionalization of political campaigning of parties in the State Duma of Russian Federation in 2007, and then to analyze if internal priming factors of parties as ideology, internal structure and financial resource predetermine the level of parties’ adaptation to professional political campaigns. The research argued that political parties in their election campaigns in 2007 used some activities which define the campaign as professionalized, but to limited extent which confronted the arguments of some scholars about the professionalization of political campaigning in Russia (Hutcheson 2009). However, the findings showed that there is significant variety between the levels of professionalization of campaigning among parties. Furthermore, the research showed that internal priming factors for professionalized campaigning proposed by party-centered theory can explain the low or high level of adaptation of professional campaign techniques, but only in some cases. The research also proposed that an additional variable which is availability of high administrative capital/administrative resources may explain the low level of adaptation of professionalized campaigning in certain cases.

In the first part of the research I presented numerous theories and hypothesis elaborated in the fields of party studies and studies of political communication which researched modern trends in political campaigning. Based on these numerous theories I tried to set up theoretical framework which will enable the study of professional campaigns by Russian parties and make it possible to explain the variety between the parties. The research concluded that the only theory which tried to explain the variety in the level of professionalized campaigning between parties was the party-centered theory of professionalized campaigning (Gibson and Rommele 2001). The theory argued that there is priming internal party factors that predetermine the professionalization of campaigning.
The next step in research was to operationalize the concept of professional campaigning and to set up the methodological tool which would measure the level of professionalized campaigning by parties. For measuring the professionalization of campaigning in Russian elections 2007 the research adapted and used the CAMPROF index. The index is based on 10 key party’s activities which are defined by the theoretical framework as dimensions of professional campaigning. The CAMPROF index enabled the research not only to look at the general level of professionalization of campaigning but also to see the disparity between parties.

The findings showed that the general level of professionalized campaigning by parties in elections 2007 was low. The findings demonstrated that parties were extensively using only some dimensions of professional campaigning like opinion polls, email subscription newsletters and, to some extent, political consultants. The analysis proved that parties in Russia mainly relied on TV, advertisement and agitation materials. Nevertheless, the CAMPROF index showed the variety in results scored by parties. Surprisingly, the ‘dominant’ party United Russia got very low score in professionalized campaigning.

The next step in research was to study the independent variables proposed by party-centered theory of professionalized campaigning: internal structure, level of financial resources and ideology. The fourth variable proposed by the theory which is the party primary goal as vote-maximization was not studied. Since, it was assumed that the primary goal in any party in the Russian system of party is vote-maximization according to the theories of Russian parties (S. White 2008, Hale 2007). It was assumed by the theory that if the party has centralized and hierarchical internal structure, high level of financial resources and right-wing ideology it would adapt professionalized campaigning.
Nevertheless, the results of analysis showed that the party-centered theory of professionalized campaigning is true only in some cases. The clear example which supported the theory was the case of CPRF. The party had all contra factors which could impede professionalization of campaigning by the party. CPRF was defined as a party with left-wing ideology, decentralized internal structure and modest level of financial resources comparing with other parties. The CAMPROF index supported the theory as the party got the lowest score in professionalized campaigning.

However, cases of LDPR, Yabloko and Just Russia supported the theory only to limited extent. But the case of United Russia completely confronted the party-centered theory. United Russia having the most centralized and hierarchical structure of decision-making process, the highest level of resources and right-wing ideology received very low score in the CAMPROF index which was close to CPRF.

Then, the research studied the additional variable which is administrative capital and administrative resources. The findings showed that United Russia possessed high level of administrative capital and used administrative resources in its campaigning for State Duma of Russian Federation elections in 2007. Based on what was discussed in the main body of research and based on received findings it is possible to claim deductively that availability of high administrative capital may influence the low level of professionalized campaigning as a party which has advantage of administrative capital does not need to adapt to professional campaigning.

The findings of the research show that the internal factors of parties proposed by party-centered theory of professionalized campaigning – high level of resources, party structure of decision-making and ideology may not be enough to explain the disparity in the extent of parties’ professionalized campaigning. In some cases the disparity in the level of parties’
professionalized campaigning requires additional variables depending on the context. The study the modern trends in political campaigning and looking at internal party factors, which predetermine or explain the development of professional, campaigning, will help to find out additional factors which will enlarge the theories not only of political communication, but also of party studies as new additional variables would shed light on internal process of party organization and politics.

The findings of the research may be used for further studies of political campaigning in Russia, as well as in studies of politics and organization of Russian parties. The argument of the research may also be used in the studies of other post-Soviet countries which have ‘dominant’ parties or where there are parties having huge administrative capital and administrative resources. There is also a need for further researches on this issue. First of all, further research would possibly find and analyze more independent variables, i.e. internal party factors, which can explain the level of professionalization. There is also definitely a need for further research which will study the influence of wider systematic factors on the professionalization of political campaigning in Russia: national political culture, societal modernization, institutional environment and legislation on elections and parties.
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