EUROPEAN WAY OF DOING SECURITY – EU AS A ‘DISTINCT’ SECURITY ACTOR

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Abstract

Having equipped itself with Rapid Reaction Forces, Battle Groups and a European Defense Agency, the European Union has undertaken a gradual but stable process of evolution past the image of “an economic giant, but a political dwarf and military worm” Simultaneously, its ESDP missions continue to have a predominantly civilian character and to concentrate on the execution of a wide array of tasks ranging from policing, capacity-building, establishment of the rule of law, border control, monitoring and civilian and military crisis management. In the light of this development of the European way of doing security a peculiar question inevitable emerges – what kind of a security actor do we observe in the face of the EU?

Therefore, this thesis sets off to unravel the peculiar nature of the European Union way of doing security through the prism of realist and constructivist theoretical paradigms as to determine whether it has embarked a distinctive approach, radically different from the one espoused by a traditional great power such as the United States or whether it is evolving to resemble more and more American replica.

My hypothesis is that EU practices a distinct approach to security because it employs its resources and capabilities in a different manner than the traditional Westphalian powers like US do. In support of this claim, the present dissertation argues that this different implementation of its complex civil-military toolbox and material resources is rooted in its strong normative basis and unique identity of inherently peaceful integration project that do not have an equivalent.
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Chapter I: Introduction

Having emerged as an unprecedented integration peace project, the European Union quickly adopted the identity of a “normative power” disposing with great ideological force to change the norms in the international system\(^1\) and to serve as an example for the others. In addition, the union further embarked on a vision of being civilian international actor employing soft power instruments such as diplomacy, persuasion and conditionality on the basis of contractual relations as the proper means to promote security. However, realizing its inability to address severe conflicts as in the case of Yugoslavia, this tradition was bound to be reconsidered with the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy in 1999 to bring value added to EU security-making by equipping it with credible military forces as to be able to perform an array of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping, peacemaking and crisis management tasks. Putting a military armor with the acquisition of rapid reaction forces in 2003 and 15 battle groups deployable at all times in 2007, the EU enhanced its Petersburg tasks to include joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization. While undertaking a plethora of missions, ranging from capacity-building, monitoring and policing to border control and establishment of the rule of law, the union remained committed to improving its military capacity by setting up a European Defence Agency to further develop its defense capabilities and strengthen its technological and industrial base. This gradual but stable evolution of the European Union past the image of “an economic giant, but a political dwarf and military worm”\(^2\) inevitably raises the question – what kind of a security actor do we observe in the face of the EU?

Therefore, this thesis sets off to unravel the peculiar nature of the European Union way of doing security as to determine whether it has emerged as a distinctive approach, radically different from the

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\(^1\) Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: Contradiction in Terms”, *JCMS*, Volume 40, No.2, p.239

one practiced by a traditional great power such as the United States or whether it is evolving to resemble more and more its replica. Such a disclosure is noteworthy not only because it feeds back in the construction of the EU identity as a international security actor but also because it affects the nature and substance of the transatlantic relationship by creating incentives for further cooperation or greater rivalry. Hence, the research question of this dissertation is why the EU is considered a different security player practicing a distinct “European” approach to security since possess the basic characteristics of any other security actor – strategic culture, a set of civilian and military capabilities that is currently elaborating, a developing military-industrial complex and a number of security missions deployed abroad.

This brings to the fore of this academic work several researchable aspects: what kind of strategic culture has the EU espoused, what type of specific capabilities toolbox it privileges, what brand of military-industrial complex it has set off to develop, what distinguishes its security operations and why are those four parameters significantly different from the ones of the United States.

While the phenomenon of an increased European cooperation in the security and defence sphere has been researched through the prisms of various international relations theories, the traditional realist and the more contemporary constructivist paradigms seem to account best for its evolution as a specific security actor. Therefore, in approaching the conundrum of what kind of security does the European Union practice, this research embarks on the core premises of these two schools of thought. Justifying EU nature as a security actor with its quest for military power\(^3\) in order to be able to defend itself autonomously in an anarchical international system\(^4\) and to balance U.S. primacy as a hegemon\(^5\), realists concentrate predominantly on the development of military capabilities as revealing a possible EU and US strategic convergence. In contrast, constructivists like Clive Archer argue that a

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“focus on beliefs, identity and norms opens new pathways for analyzing the EU’s international capacity”, determining EU strong normative basis\(^6\), the social construction of its institutions\(^7\) and peculiar identity as prescribing it a normative way of doing security, different from the one espoused by the US due to their divergent identities. While both theories possess the potential to account for different characteristic features of EU approach to security, none of them constitutes a “perfect match” with the empirical evidences. Recognizing this as a pitfall in the academic knowledge, I believe that providing an analytical juxtaposition of realist and constructivist interpretations regarding EU strategic culture, security instrumentarium and engagement in promoting peace and security on the international scene, that is currently missing from the literature, would prove beneficial to accounting for EU peculiar nature of security actor.

While there is a substantial amount of literature concerned with exploring the sui generis nature of the European Union and identifying the role of international actor it has embraced, prescribing it a variety of labels ranging from normative power (Ian Manners, 2002), ethical power (Adrien Hyde-Price, 2008) and positive power (Sven Biscop, 2006) to humanitarian power (Christopher O. Meyer, 2006), the characterization of EU as a specific security player rarely goes beyond the trivial etiquettes of civilian power (Francois Duchene, 1973) or military power (Henry Bull, 1982). In addition, in researching the peculiar nature of EU approaches to security, scholars tend to focus predominantly on the power and influence of its contractual relations to bring peace and stability (Natalie Tocci, 2007), the potential of its integration process and various frameworks for partnerships to appease societies and establish security (Boyka Stefanova, 2005; F. Tassinari, 2005; A. Missiroli, 2004), or the impact of the so called Europeanization process to create incentives for peaceful resolution of border conflicts (Gergana Noutcheva, Natalie Tocci, Bruno Coppétières, Michael Emerson, et al, 2004; Nicu Popescu, 2004). Thus, leaving significantly underdeveloped the puzzle how EU strategic culture and development of competitive military-industrial complex mould its

\(^6\) Christoph O. Meyer, “The Quest for A European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the
method of doing security. A relatively smaller body of literature concentrates on unraveling the peculiar manner of establishing security through peace-building and policing, the ESDP missions practice (Michael Merlingen, Rasa Ostrauskaite, 2006), on determining how ESDP intergovernmental supranational mechanism determines the role its missions play (Xymena Kurowska, 2007) or investigates how their potential to bring security can be improved (Peter Jakobsen, 2006), but in general scholars tend to circumvent the question what does the characteristic features of ESDP operations disclose about the nature of EU overall approach to security. Furthermore, when delving deeply in the elements that constitute the EU as a security power, authors researching EU strategic culture occupy opposite camps and engage in a fruitless discursive battle of whether the EU has in fact developed a genuine strategic culture (Asle Toje, 2008, Christopher O. Meyer, 2006, Janne Matlary, 2006) or not (Sten Rynning, 2003), without considering what implications does this have for its particular way of doing security. Last, but not least while the thesis of EU being a different security actor have already been examined on the basis of a comparison with the United States, this rarely goes beyond accounting for the obvious divergence in available capabilities or predominantly incompatible ideological stances (Robert Kagan, 2002), which leaves other components like different strategic cultures and actual engagement in particular type operations as indicators of strategic divergence or convergence rather neglected.

Recognizing these considerable gaps in the existent body of literature, the principle objective of this work is to fill in those cracks by identifying why the EU adopts particular approaches to ensuring security on the grounds of a thorough examination of its strategic culture, capability toolbox, military-industrial complex and engagement on the ground and juxtaposing the values of these parameters against those of the US as to establish their strategic convergence or divergence in practicing security. The outcome is considered particularly important since it has the potential to increase EU and US cooperation in the security field and thus improve the transatlantic relationship.
or, on the contrary – to further exacerbate their strategic rivalry for power and influence as the two major actors on the international arena.

In the light of this fundamental goal, my hypothesis is that EU practices a distinct approach to security because it employs its resources and capabilities in a different manner than the traditional Westphalian powers like US do. In support of this claim, the present dissertation argues that this different implementation of its complex civil-military toolbox and material resources is rooted in its strong normative basis and unique identity of inherently peaceful integration project that do not have an equivalent.

In approaching the resolution of the outlined research puzzle, I designate as my dependent variable – European Union way of doing security. Undertaking the endeavor to determine its nature and to provide a consistent explanation of its value, the subsequent analysis is conveyed on the basis of four independent variables, perceived as defining the character of the examined one – strategic culture, capability toolkit, military-industrial complex and security missions. The core presumptions of the two theoretical paradigms employed in this research – realism and constructivism are further being organized under the form of several hypotheses in relation to the established four indicators. A brief comparative analysis of EU way of doing security established through an empirical research in terms of those four independent variables is to be conducted against an established baseline – United States approach to security as to identify their convergence or divergence. The answer of the posed research question whether the EU is in fact a distinct security actor or not and if it is, why so, is to be provided by the final evaluation of the realist and constructivist hypotheses. This framework is to be unfolded through an in-depth analysis of the EU and US security strategies, complemented by a thorough evaluation of official reports, policy briefs and statistical data regarding their capabilities, military-industrial complex and missions deployed. In addition, this study draws upon discourse

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analyses of speeches by political leaders and publicly available information regarding ESDP operations.

Undertaking the challenge to determine whether the EU has emerged as a distinct security actor or not, this dissertation follows three main lines of argumentation and concludes by presenting the final outcome. The first chapter establishes the baseline of comparison by defining what kind of security approach does the United States practice as a traditional security actor by delving into the ideological and historical basis of its strategic culture, examining its latest two security strategies and outlining the characteristic features of its security operations. The second chapter establishes the theoretical framework of analysis that introduces four variables on which the further evaluation of EU approach to security is conducted and later on compared to that of the US. The theoretical base draws upon the premises of realism and constructivism, from which seven hypothesis along the lines of the four indicators are derived. This sets the ground for the third chapter that aims at defining what does an EU way of doing security means by evaluating empirical evidence in relation to the established four variables and concludes by presenting a comprehensive picture of EU as a specific security actor. The general findings of this work are outlined in the concluding section where the EU and US approaches of security are juxtaposed following the logic of the realist and constructivist hypothesis as to determine which theory possesses greater explanatory power to account for the final outcome revealing the distinctiveness or ordinariness of the EU way of mastering security.
Chapter II. What kind of security actor? The United States approach to security

In order to unravel the puzzle whether the EU is doing security in a distinctive way, thus asserting itself as a specific non-traditional security actor on the international arena, it is necessary to juxtapose its strategy and approaches with the ones generally applied by traditional security actors. There is a consensus in the literature that the US can be characterized as such a traditional Westphalian security actor, since its strategic visions are deeply imbued with realist thinking, evident in the primacy it devotes to its national security interests and defense and the ultimate reliance on its own capabilities, applying predominantly military force to achieve them. However, being engaged in a variety of missions in different parts of the world during the last several years, raging from humanitarian and peace-keeping operations in Africa and Latin America to direct military interventions and aggressive democracy promotion in Iraq and Afghanistan, logically prompts the question – what kind of security actor does the US represents in reality?

This chapter attempts to provide an answer to this question by engaging in a profound analysis of the cultural and ideological background, that has informed the United States strategic culture, its fundamental security interests, threat perceptions and preferences for particular means to counter them, revealed through its security strategy and being projected on the international arena by the particular security operations it undertakes.

The significant impact of the United States’ national culture, ideological vision, self-identity perception and unique emergence as a liberal multicultural market-led democracy on shaping its way of doing security is demonstrated in the adoption of a characteristic strategic culture. It is namely these features inform US strategic decision-making, that prescribe it certain international roles and that determine the implementation of more “soft” or “hard power” approaches to ensuring security.

1. Identifying U.S. strategic culture
Experiencing the peace and prosperity that political freedoms and democratic governance have ensured them, recent American administrations have adopted Democratic Peace theory as a cornerstone philosophy of their strategic thinking thus identifying democracy promotion as a key principle of their security doctrines. Having adopted a neo-conservative vision, the US security policy makers have thus embarked on a “battle royal”\textsuperscript{8} against rogue states and despotic regimes, such as Iraq and Afghanistan as indispensible means to ensure peace and security, since “all tyrannies threaten the world’s interest in freedom expansion.”\textsuperscript{9}

In addition to establishing democracy promotion as an indispensible part of US approach to international security, its historical background has also propelled the centrality of exceptionalism and sense of missionary duty in the construction US strategic culture. The US has always perceived itself to be a “shining city on the hill”\textsuperscript{10} destined to distribute its model and inherent values to “civilize” and appease the “tyrannies” by shaping them to resemble its own replica. The spread of liberal democracy and the cornerstone American values of “equal liberty, equal justice and equal rights”\textsuperscript{11} are seen not only as benefiting the citizens of other countries but are also considered crucial means to guaranteeing US survival and security. In conformity with this, the 2008 “Framework for a 21st Century National Security Strategy” calls the US to “stand up to tyranny, inequality and injustice.”\textsuperscript{12} Namely, this conviction that the US is meant to “civilize” and democratize the world has propelled the adoption of interventionalist approach to international security concerned with the proliferation of its cornerstone democratic principles by fighting despotic regimes and executing an aggressive type of democracy promotion.

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid, 34
Emerging as being isolated from the rest of the world due to its geographical disposition, the US has developed the tradition of ensuring its security and defense relying on its own capabilities and expertise, thus embracing the principles of self-help and unilaterism as tenants of its security culture. This tendency towards unilateral actions plays a leading role in the US contemporary mode of doing security as demonstrated by President Clinton strategic vision for the US “to act with others when we can, but alone when we must.”

Besides in the United States historical past, its specific approach to security relies on strong ideological grounds characterized by the intertwinement of idealism and realism as guiding strategic paradigms. The initial enchantment of the American political leaders with the idealism and exceptionalism that inspired their strategic culture in the early American history has nowadays given way to traditional –offensive type realism and neo-conservatism as leading ideological principles. Having grounded its approach to security-making on the doctrinal realism of power politics, the US strategists and security policy-makers see the world through Hobbesian spectacles as an anarchy ruled by military power and coercion where international laws lose their value. In conformity with this realist ideology, the US strategic culture characterizes with preference for unilateral actions, since self-help is the only way to secure your survival in the anarchical international system, and “hard power” capabilities build-up as in such circumstances states always seek to increase their relative power. Therefore, Clinton’s and George Bush’s administrations concentrate on the objective to develop capabilities for “full spectrum threat dominance” to apply selectively but massively in whatever part of the world needed. A preference for “hard power” capabilities is also evident in 1997 Quadrennial Report that envisions the US to “remain engaged as a global leader and harness the unmatched capabilities of its armed forces”.

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15 Ibid.
Espousing such a realist strategic vision that prescribes little importance international law prescriptions, the US security doctrines have always relied on a more pragmatic approach to international norms. Obeying international law only when it does not contradict to US national security interests is a characteristic feature especially of George Bush administration that has undermined the primacy of international norms by withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and frequently opposing international regimes like the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, the doctrine of pre-emptive strikes and preventive war launched by George Bush as part of US self-defense strategy serves as a powerful example of this disregard of international law.

Having so far identified specific principles of US strategic thinking and approaches to security that have gradually been formed by its historical experience in a particular ideational and cultural context of foreign and security policy-making, the US strategic culture can briefly be described as a traditional Westphalian one of a great power. Disposing with substantial resources and significant military strength eager to demonstrate through extensive unilateral engagement in conflict zones in its attempts to solve problems and eliminate threats, the US strategic culture is proactive, result-oriented, privileging “state security” and national interests over a second-rank ideological agenda, as the rhetoric of democracy promotion and security enhancement in underdeveloped non-democratic areas closely interrelated to US own stability and security, demonstrates.

Its ideational base being informed by realist visions that in a Hobbesian anarchical world devoid of international laws, where relative power matters the most and military force overruns soft power means, the US strategic culture exemplifies predilection towards “military preference for high technology, an aversion to casualties, and a pragmatic approach to circumventing legal restraints on the use of force”¹⁶ as the most effective means to reach its political and security objectives. US strategic culture ideational ground is deeply rooted in its ideological self-confidence of being exceptional and as being accorded the missionary destiny of serving as “an international sheriff,

attempting to enforce peace and justice in a lawless world.”¹⁷ by spreading democracy even with the use of force when needed, thus leading wars as “crusades against evil”¹⁸ as the experience of fighting despotic regimes in Iraq and Yugoslavia demonstrates. Wary of the effectiveness of diplomacy and economic tools, US colossus demonstrates bias towards pre-emption, coercion, techno-centric warfare and unilateral military actions regardless of their conformity with international norms.

2. Fundamental interests, threat perceptions and means to counter them – an evaluation of U.S. security strategies

Two important events have exercised a fundamental impact on the radical shift in the United States approach to national and international security that have found reflection in the formulation of its recent security doctrines – the end of the Cold War and the unprecedented terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a way to deal with these new unconventional dangers the administration of George Bush adopted the rationales of unilateral action and preventive war as the basis of US security doctrines in the new millennium. Consequently, preventive measures and pre-emptive military actions against regional challengers seeking to acquire and utilize weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have emerged as main tenants of United States global security approach¹⁹. These radical shifts in US strategic thinking and methods of doing security reflected in its National Security Strategies from 2002 and 2006 reveal the characteristic features of the US as a global security actor in the new security environment which calls for a profound analysis of those strategic documents.

Informing US security policy by defining its fundamental national interests and areas of responsibility, assessing the threats and determining the means to counter them, the US grand


¹⁹ T.V. Paul, Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy, p.1
strategy disposes with the potential to reveal essential information about its particular approaches to security-making. The current analysis delves deeply into the substance of US NSS 2002 and NSS 2006 since the first symbolizes a dramatic shift in US security-making with the adoption of self-defense based on pre-emption and the second because it is the latest US grand strategy reaffirming to a great extend the guiding principles of its predecessor.

2.1 Fundamental interests and areas of responsibility

National interests of defending and securing the United States of America and its core values are naturally being dedicated the highest priority on US security agenda: “Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government.”\(^{20}\) In addition to that as the US “defend the peace, we will also take advantage of an historic opportunity to preserve the peace” by working actively “to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.”\(^{21}\) Having embraced the Democratic Peace Theory as its core ideology, the NSS 2002 defines democracy promotion and securing it’s primacy of a great military power as the key objectives on the way to fulfill its primary national interests - as the NSS affirms “we are ultimately fighting for our democratic values and way of life”\(^{22}\). Undertaking the task “to promote global security” the US embarks on a global area of engagement to “defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere.”\(^{23}\) Self-defense being the major fundamental interest of US NSS 2002 is to be ensured by following the rationales of pre-emptive strikes and preventive war because “We cannot let our enemies strike first.”

Outlining as its core objectives first and foremost “to protect the security of the American people” and to take advantage of “an unprecedented opportunity to lay the foundations for future peace” by spreading “the ideals that have inspired our history – freedom, democracy, and human

\(^{21}\) Ibid.
\(^{23}\) Ibid.
dignity”, the NSS 2006 reaffirms the fundamental national security interests highlighted in the content of its predecessor\(^24\). In this spirit, as its major tasks to accomplish, the US identifies the continuing efforts to bring to a successful end the “war on terror” and seeking to “extend freedom across the globe by leading an international effort to end tyranny and to promote effective democracy”\(^25\). Dedication to promoting and establishing effective democratic governance pervades as a cornerstone objective the whole NSS 2006 since “The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system” as “the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.”\(^26\)

2.2 Threat Assessment

Recognizing that the “new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists”\(^27\) and “the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us”\(^28\), the US identifies as it major adversaries “terrorists with global reach”, supplemented by “rogue states” and weapons of mass destruction\(^29\). Therefore, the US security doctrine is determined to “fighting a war against terrorists of global reach”\(^30\). Acknowledging the destructive potential of regional crises that “can strain our alliances, rekindle rivalries among the major powers, and create horrifying affronts to human dignity”\(^31\), the US is also dedicated to combat regional conflicts and poverty and to prevent a possible return of great power rivalries and arms races as factors further igniting the greatest dangers.

\(^{25}\) All the quotes are from the National Security Strategy, the White House, March 2006, Section II, available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/, (17 May 2009)
\(^{26}\) Ibid.
\(^{28}\) Ibid.
\(^{30}\) Ibid, Section III.
\(^{31}\) Ibid, Section V.
stemming from the “terrorism – tyrants – WMD triangle”\textsuperscript{32}. Declaring that “we make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them”\textsuperscript{33} Bush administration identifies “rogue states” as posing a major challenge to global security being perceived as the sources of terrorism.

The same mode of threat assessment is visible in US National Defense Strategy from 2005 that declares “America is a nation at war” that “faces a diverse set of security challenges.”\textsuperscript{34} Therefore National Security Strategy 2006 represents in its substance “a wartime national security strategy required by the grave challenge we face – the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder.”\textsuperscript{35} In this light, everything that might in any way fuel or foster the development of radical ideologies and terrorism activities is being assessed as posing an existential threat to world’s security. This is why since weapons of mass destruction “hold special appeal to rogue states and terrorists”, the proliferation of nuclear weapons is identified as posing “the greatest threat to our national security”\textsuperscript{36}. Following the same logic, regional conflicts and poverty are viewed as affecting US national interests, since if unaddressed their causes will lead to the same outcomes “failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists.”\textsuperscript{37}

\subsection*{2.3. Strategic Means}

Identifying as the best way to fight the greatest peril to world’s security – terrorism by stopping “rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies”\textsuperscript{38} George Bush administration embraces the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{35} All the quotes are from the National Security Strategy, the White House, March 2006, Introduction, available at \url{http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/}, (17 May 2009)
\bibitem{36} Ibid, Section V.
\bibitem{37} Ibid, Section IV.
\end{thebibliography}
doctrine of self-defense through pre-emption. Adopting the ideology of preventive war and pre-emptive strikes as means to counter the threat of terrorism, the US undoubtedly confronts the international regime of the International Court of Justice, thereby affirming the little importance it dedicates to international law. While calling for cooperative efforts to address the threats of terrorism, WMDs and regional conflicts in Sections III and V, the NSS 2002 explicitly declares the willingness and capability to resort to unilateral action “when our interest and unique responsibility require”\textsuperscript{39}. In regard to the specific instruments to be made use of in the “war against terrorism” the Bush doctrine affirms that “to defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal—military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing.”\textsuperscript{40}

While prioritizing such a “hard power” approach to security, NSS 2002 also previsions the implementation of a “soft power” toolkit, based on the promotion of political and economic liberalism as cornerstones of democratic governance since market economies and opening societies are perceived as “the best way to promote prosperity and reduce poverty.”\textsuperscript{41}

Democracy promotion features as top priority tool in NSS 2006 highlighting that “because democracies are the most responsible members of the international system, promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism; and extending peace and prosperity”\textsuperscript{42}. In addition to that, the Bush doctrine once again underlines that “in the cause of ending tyranny and promoting effective democracy, the US is prepared to “employ the full array of political, economic, diplomatic, and other tools at our disposal.”\textsuperscript{43} The dedication to pre-emption and preventive war as means to defeat terrorism remains privileged as visible in the US intent to

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid, Introduction.
“fight our enemies abroad instead of waiting for them to arrive in our country”. While recognizing the cooperation and multilateral actions are needed in order to defeat the global threats of our era, the US still adheres to the principle of being at the lead of joint operations while reserving its right to act unilateral when necessary.

3. Way of conducting security operations

Being a projection of certain strategic culture and security objectives, the engagement in particular types of international security operations has the potential to disclose significant information about an actor’s distinctive mode of practicing security. Although after the Cold War we have seen an upsurge in the deployment of peace-keeping and humanitarian missions in conformity with the US belief in its missionary role to disperse democratic values and bring peace and security worldwide by fighting tyrannies, there is a general tendency for military type operations, especially under the Bush administration, on the basis of its security doctrine of pre-emptive strikes and preventive war.

In executing its security objectives, the United States strategic action distinguishes with a preference for a direct approach to eliminating the threats and defeating the adversary combined with prompt decisive measures to reach the desired result. An outstanding characteristic feature of the American way of leading war is “the tendency to get close to the enemy and destroy it at the earliest opportunity” reaffirmed by the central role George Bush’s security doctrine devotes to pre-emptive strikes and preventive war. Namely, this strategic logic is being espoused in the US intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of waging the “long war against terrorism”. The prompt deployment of military troops in this region is guided by this same rationale to get close to the enemy and apply decisive “hard” military power to bring about its swift defeat. In addition, the United States overall

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military history also demonstrates this strategic preference for decisive battles and quest for swift
victory over a slow, step by step gradual elimination of the threat.

US war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan discloses other specific features of the American way
of doing war, namely its “aggressiveness at all levels of warfare” and the “desire to employ maximum
effort” in order to bring quick achievement of “the complete overthrow of the enemy, the destruction
of his military power, [as] the object of war.” Such an ideology of conducting security operations
preconditions the frequent resort to force and the lavish use of high-tech military warfare as the
appropriate means to bring quick resolution, leading to the adoption of a predominantly “hard
power” approach, since civilian instruments do not have the capacity to bring express outcomes.
Evidence for this can be found easily when taking a closer look at the US intervention in the
Yugoslav crisis, the US when high-intensity military power in the shape of bombings was applied to
bring hostilities to a rapid end. The same logic has later been espoused in Iraq and Afghanistan with
the deployment of a considerable number of military forces well-equipped with high-tech weaponry
given the “green light” to use as to achieve the established goals.

The United States’ approach to security is furthermore characterized as being firepower
intensive and as reliant on high-tech hard power capabilities for the conduct of predominantly
military operations as part of its war against terrorism and crisis management. Such strategic
orientations predetermine a rather industrial approach to security-making, based on lavish spending
on the military industry sector and a substantial part of budget finances being devoted to defense
expenditures. According to the Government Electronics and Information Technology Association
(GEIA) US has invested in defense expenditures 491 billion Euros in 2006, thus reaching the highest
numbers in its history. In addition to this, the American government allocates a considerable
amount of resources for research and development activities in the weaponry field. This has

46 Thomas G. Mahnken, “United States Strategic Culture”, p. 10
47 The View From Europe”, Military and Aerospace Electronics(December 2006), http://www.milaero.com
positioned the US as a top arms producer as the SIPRI year books confirms for a subsequent year. All these factors account for the orientation towards the “hard power” type approach to security-making and the focus on technology for conducting most of its security operations as its particular engagement in Iraq, former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan demonstrate.

Featuring as a cornerstone characteristic of the United States strategic culture, casualty aversion, raging from the emphasis on “Full Dimensional Protection” in joint military doctrine, to the political refusal to deploy U.S. ground troops in risky humanitarian interventions, as in the cases in Rwanda in 1994 and Kosovo in 1999, has undoubtedly affected the conduct and unfolding of its security operations abroad. In this respect, the US missions on the ground are characterized by overwhelming emphasis on the safety of their own troops while dedicating very little attention to the people on the ground.

Last, but not least, US missions bear another characteristic feature of its strategic culture, namely the pragmatic attitude towards the respect of international law, most obviously demonstrated under the security doctrine of the Bush administration. Operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia serve as powerful evidence for the latter, since in implementing their security objectives on the ground the Americans have demonstrated little restraint in the application of military force in comparison with their coalition partners.

Overall, all US security operations distinguish by being large in scope, reliant on a significant number of personnel and high-tech military weaponry to apply in high-intensity combats in severely insurgent conflict zones.


On the basis of an in depth analysis of US strategic documents and taking into account the impact of the historical legacy, national culture and identity on molding US methods of doing

international security, it can be concluded that in defending its national interests and promoting security worldwide, the US is practicing the assertive and aggressive security approach of a great power. As such its strategic vision and actions characterize it as pro-active, interventionalist and results oriented, always putting emphasis on reaching the ultimate objectives of threat elimination and complete adversary defeat. Engaged in a “long war against terrorism” and devoted to control over the proliferation of WMDs, the US has embarked on an aggressive democracy promotion and unlimited fight against tyrannies and despotic regimes, while engaging all means and resources available to reach the desired ends. A peculiar feature of the US as a global security actor is its tendency to act unliterary or to take on the leading position in cooperative operations. A hallmark of the US contemporary approach to security making is George Bush’s doctrine of active self-defense through preventive intervention and pre-emptive use of force stimulating the implementation of high-tech hard power capabilities and disregarding the postulates of international law when they contradict its security interests.

Having thus identified what kind of security actor we observe in the face of the United States, in order to provide an answer to the proposed research question of whether the European Union can be conceptualized as practicing a “distinctive” approach to security, it is necessary that their two ways of doing security are juxtaposed. Therefore, the next chapter seeks to establish the theoretical framework on the basis of which certain hypotheses about the strategic convergence or divergence of EU and US approaches to security-making will later be evaluated. Furthermore, it lays the grounds of this evaluation by identifying four independent variables as crucial to operationalizing a particular strategic vision and techniques of doing security.

Chapter III. Theoretical Framework - Realism’s and Constructivism’s stances on EU security approach

Having portrayed the characteristic features that define the US as a traditional security actor, pivotal to unraveling the puzzle of EU way of doing security, the current chapter proceeds with outlining the theoretical framework through which is to be determined whether we can speak of the EU as a “distinct” security actor or not. The principle argument of the current thesis is to be evaluated through the prisms of two core International Relations paradigms with significant potential to explain development and further evolution of an EU approach security - realism and constructivism.

As powerful devices for understanding the adoption of particular approaches to security-making, the current research identifies – an actor’s strategic culture explicit in the particular security strategy that it follows as a primary guideline, the capabilities it disposes with, the development and evolution of its military-industrial complex and lastly, the type of missions it engages with. Fundamentally, the convergence or divergence of EU and US ways of doing security are to be evaluated through the prism of realism’s and constructivism’s core hypothesis on these four dimensions.

1. Introducing the independent variables

The operationalization of those particular indicators is backed by certain logic. Embracing Colin Gray’s definition of strategic culture as “that set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives”\(^{50}\), the current research identifies the application of this concept as fundamentally relevant since it prescribes the possible means to reach the desired ends.

Thus, it disposes with the ability to explain the resort to the use of force or the implementation of civilian capabilities as tools to achieve political goals.

Revealing how all the military, economic and political resources and instruments at the actor’s disposal are implemented in the execution of a specific foreign policy and security agenda, the concept of security strategy complements that of strategic culture. An in-depth analysis of an actor’s security strategy discloses information regarding the particular assessment of threats, the definition of fundamental interests and the means with which to pursue them, that inform us about the peculiarities of the actor’s strategic culture and helps us identify what kind of security actor we observe.

The independent variable “capabilities” is crucial to be examined since it disposes with the potential to disclose a preference towards the implementation of more “soft” or “hard” power toolkit, that on its turn implies a more civilian or on the contrary forceful method of promoting security.

As a third independent variable this research designates the functioning of an actor’s military-industrial complex since it provides intriguing disclosures concerning the pace of development of military capabilities and the importance the actors attribute to using high-tech military warfare in their security techniques. Consequently, it can indicate a preference for a more “soft” or “hard” approach to security-making.

Finally, the engagement of an international actor like the EU in a particular type of missions, employing certain capabilities unravels a significant part of the puzzle what kind of security actor we observe.

2. Interpreting the EU way of doing security through the lenses of realism and constructivism

The objective of the following paragraphs is to set up the necessary framework for analysis first by outlining the key premises of the theories to be applied and second by evaluating how realist and
constructivist philosophies of the international system and its main actors interpret EU’s integrated approach to peace-making and ensuring security around the world.

2.1. Axioms of Realism

I start off with establishing the guiding principles and understandings of the realist theory of international relations. Adrian Hyde-Price rightfully portrays realism as a “broad church, which emphasizes the constraints of human progress and the inherent tragedy of international politics.”\(^{51}\) That statement holds substantial grounds since we distinguish different branches of realism – from classical realism concerned with the inherently vicious human nature and “power politics” to neorealism that concentrates on the structure of the system; and from Waltz’s defensive realism to Mearsheimer’s offensive realism.\(^{52}\)

Drawing on the insights of several proponents of the realist paradigm, the theory outlined in this work aligns predominantly with the cornerstone premises of classical realism in works of Morgenthau, Machiavelli and Hobbes as well as Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism. All the former determine “the goal of power, the means of power and the uses of power as a central preoccupation of political activity.”\(^{53}\) Consequently, international politics is nothing more that “power politics” – an arena of constant rivalry and conflict over the defense of national interests regarding the security and survival of the states. This leads us to the core postulation of structural realism: “the world is a anarchy – a domain without sovereign”\(^{54}\), in which everyone’s security and existence depend solely on its own capabilities. Military power is the most efficient tool to ensure one’s survival, therefore the major concern of states is the possession of military capabilities as key to ensuring their physical and political survival. Unfolding in these circumstances world politics can be described as an integral

\(^{51}\) Adrian Hyde-Price, “European Security in the 21st century : The challenge of multipolarity”, p.29
\(^{52}\) Robert Jackson, Georg Sorensen, “Introduction to international relations: theories and approaches”, Oxford University Press 2007, p.60-87
\(^{53}\) Ibid., p.60
part of a self-help system “in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to danger”\textsuperscript{55}.

As an adequate strategic response to the anarchical character of the inter-state system, realists point out the balance of power. Balancing is further defined as “the creation or aggregation of military power through internal mobilization or the forging of alliances to prevent or deter the territorial occupation or political and military domination of the state by a foreign power or a coalition”\textsuperscript{56}. Recently scholars have recognized a new type of balancing strategy to be gaining speed after the end of the Cold War - “soft balancing”. Although balancing is always about “equalizing the odds in a contest between the strong and the weak”\textsuperscript{57} while “hard balancing” is associated with military capabilities build-up, modernization, creating powerful alliances and technology and financial transfers between allies, “soft balancing” relies predominantly on the “power of persuasion” and “soft power” capabilities\textsuperscript{58}, conveyed through the application of diplomatic tools and increased cooperation against the hegemon\textsuperscript{59}.

\textbf{2.2. European Union’s approach to security through the spectacles of the realist paradigm}

In the light of this brief review of the realist international relations theory, the development of the European Union’s security and defense structures and particular approaches towards crisis management and conflict prevention can be interpreted as a pursuit of a realist type agenda. Structural realism’s cornerstone arguments generate substantial predictions about the security strategy the European Union would follow as well as the subsequent development of “hard power”

\textsuperscript{58} Notions proposed by H. E. Carr, cited in Adrian Hyde-Price, “European Security in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century : The challenge of multipolarity”, p.49
capabilities to reach its specific first and second rank objectives as to balance the increasing power of the American hegemon.

With the collapse of the bipolar system and undertaking the “long war against terrorism” U.S. engagement with ensuring the security on the European continent gradually faded away. Facing such circumstances, the realists proponents argue, the European Union suddenly became aware of the compelling necessity to develop its own security and defense institutions. Realizing that in an international system of anarchy states “must rely on their own preparations to defend themselves” and actors will therefore always strive to increase their capacities, the union was expected to get engaged into a military capabilities built-up as to be able to adequately respond to the uncommon threats emerging in the post Cold War security environment. Evidence for following these realist predictions is visible in the development of EU military capabilities, namely in the construction of the EU Rapid Reaction Forces that in the view of Seth Jones increase its autonomy while decrease its dependence on the US since “aggregating power by building multilateral forces decreases reliance on the dominant state”.

As the leading rationale behind deployment of ARTEMIS – EU’s first independent military mission outside the Berlin framework, realist point out its strive for independence and preference for autonomous actions. They further elaborate that the reliance on a leading power for military capabilities would only jeopardize an actor’s security by placing the supply of such crucial capacities in the hands of somebody else. Consequently, the EU can be expected to concentrate on further developing its “hard power” potential as to emerge as an independent leading security actor on the international scene, thus acquiring more and more the image and the role of its major competitor – the United States. Realists point out as a proof for such predilection the substance of Headline Goal

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2010 which focuses on the EU necessity to have on its disposal effective military instruments for crisis management.

Furthermore, analyzing the emergence and development of the European Union way of doing security realists argue that its desire to evolve as a global security actor on the international scene, is motivated by the need to balance against the strengthening supremacy of the preponderant power – the US. However, they disregard the perception of threat to its member states’ sovereign existence as a stimulus behind this strategy. Rather, as T.V. Paul claims, what significantly disturbs the European Union is the U.S. aggressive and interventionalist approach to security often not in conformity with international law\textsuperscript{62}. Therefore, the European Union has initially chosen to counter the concentration of significant power in the hands of the American leaders by “soft” balancing. This is why, the union has concentrated on strengthening its economic power, visible in the efforts to reach the goals of its Lisbon Strategy to become “the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010”\textsuperscript{63} and in the development of a diverse set of civilian instruments. Nevertheless, facing the inability to alter the military dominance of the preponderant power by “soft” balancing, as realists argue, the European leaders have turned to more forceful measures under the form of “hard” balancing. Therefore, the EU has plunged into a long-term process of building up military power capabilities and focusing on their further development.

Having thus operationalized the realist theory as an analytical tool to explore the specific stimulus behind European union’s development of a particular approach towards security making, the presented outcomes give rise to the following hypotheses:

**Realist Hypotheses:**

1. **Realism would expect that since the EU has already undertaken the route of change by developing and putting into practice military capacities, its strategic culture would harden**

\textsuperscript{62} Motives for soft balancing outlined by T.V. Paul in his article “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy”, p.71
\textsuperscript{63} Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March Presidency Conclusion, accessible on http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm
as well, giving preference to the use of force and coercion rather than “soft power” means to reach the its particular objectives, thus resembling more and more that of the United States. That would lead us to expect that the Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy from 2008 and the official political discourses inside the EU will reflect this “hardening” of EU’s strategic culture.

2. Realists predict that the European Union would concentrate on improving the efficiency and efficacy of its security “toolkit” by further developing its “hard power” capacities for war-type operations engaging consequently into a considerable build-up of high-intensity and high-tech warfare suitable for waging war.

3. Realist theory would lead us to expect that the EU would develop a globally competitive military-industrial complex and would establish a common military market.

4. Realists claim that as the EU develops its military capabilities there will be a decline in its engagement with civilian missions and simultaneous rise in the deployment of military missions.

To sum up, realist proponents argue that the EU is in the process of a considerable change – it is slowly abandoning its predominantly civilian approach and normative strategic culture and it is becoming more and more militarized. In executing its crisis management and peace-building agenda it is reorienting itself from the implementation of predominantly “soft power” instruments to the usage of more “hard power” arsenal. The outcome, predicted by realists is a tendency for losing its security-making distinctiveness while become more and more like the US.

2.3. The constructivist challenge

Developing as a critique of the mainstream IR theories, constructivism focuses on the explanatory power of interests, values and ideas as better conceptualizing the changing international environment. The core element around which the constructivist vision of the international system is being developed is that “social reality does not fall from heaven” but it is constantly constructed and
reproduced through the everyday practices of the human agents\textsuperscript{64}. Jeffrey T. Checkel accurately identifies the two principle assumptions of the constructivist paradigm to be – first, the environment which human agents occupy is social as well as material and second, that namely this background molds their understandings and constitutes their interests\textsuperscript{65}. The emphasis is on the mutual constitutiveness of agents and the structures in which they function. The social setting in which we find ourselves defines who we are as human agents and informs our interests through discourses and social learning. A principle understanding of the constructivist theory is that in their actions actors are being lead by a particular kind of logic – the “logic of appropriateness” as defined by March and Olsen, according to which “human actors are imaged to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations”\textsuperscript{66}.

Conceptualizing norms as “collective expectations of proper behavior for a given identity”\textsuperscript{67} constructivists believe they prescribe particular behavior to already established identities.\textsuperscript{68} In the same manner, socially molded identities have significant impact on the agents’ interests, thus informing their behavior and the adoption of certain policies. Therefore, changes in states’ identities inevitably affect their security and defense policies\textsuperscript{69}.

The constructivist proponents define the international system as a set of ideas, a system of norms, that have been arranged by certain people at a particular place and time.\textsuperscript{70} In contrast to realists they claim that “Anarchy is what states make out of it”\textsuperscript{71} and does not necessarily leads to


\textsuperscript{65} Jeffrey T. Checkel, Social Construction and Integration, University of Oslo ARENA Working Papers, WP 98/14, 1999


\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., p.54

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{70} Robert Jackson, Georg Sorensen, “Introduction to international relations: theories and approaches”, Oxford University Press 2007, pp. 162-176

self-help and power politics. This outcome is to be determined through the intersubjective interactions between states. Constructivists do not oppose the primacy of security and survival as states’ interests but insist that the security policy they would implement is to be defined by their particular identities formed in the processes of interaction.

Having outlined the main tenants of the constructivist theory, I believe that privileging constructivist approach has the potential to reveal intriguing disclosures about EU’s particular approach to establishing peace and security since “focus on beliefs, identity and norms opens new pathways for analyzing the EU’s international capacity.”

2.4. Unraveling the puzzle of EU security making through the prism of constructivism

In contrast to realists’ point of view that the EU way of doing security does not in fact diverge significantly from the traditional approaches of other major international actors and while they are expecting it to converge more and more in the future with the “hard power” oriented strategy of the US, constructivists passionately defend the thesis of EU “distinct” manner of ensuring security.

Emphasizing the power of norms in shaping actors’ interests and identities and furthermore prescribing certain modes of behavior on the international arena, constructivists argue that European Union’s external actions and approach to security making are considerably influenced by the norms embedded in its founding treaties. Guided by its core liberal-democratic principles of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms as defined in Article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union, the EU has embraced as its major international role – the promotion and distribution around the world of these universal values.

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72 Ibid.
73 Ibid. p.394
EU way of doing security, constructivists argue is strongly influenced by the respect of international law and the norms of the United Nations, which it recognizes as core guideline of its security-making approach. Adopting the “responsibility to protect”75 the European Union has embraced as its genuine mission the prevention of violent conflict and the promotion of peace and stability in its backyard and beyond. The norms organizing its institutional structure and informing its strategies prescribe it a predominantly civilian type approach to crisis management dependent on policing missions and strengthening the rule of law. The impact of norms on EU’s strategic preferences and security policies is particularly visible in the content of its Security Strategy, according to which the union is strongly “committed to upholding and developing international law” and accepts as a cornerstone of its external actions and international relations the fundamental framework of the United Nations Charter 76.

Striving to design a distinctive image of a global security actor on the international scene that corresponds to its sui generis nature and identity of an inherently peaceful integration project, constructivist proponents argue that the EU has set off to develop a unique way to crisis management and peace-building. Therefore, it concentrates on the further development and implementation of a distinctive set of instruments raging from diplomatic practices and economic means to contractual relations and military capabilities. Through the spectacles of constructivists, concentration on the predominant application of military power would sabotage such an EU endeavor and turn it into just another copy of already existing “hard power” international organizations such as NATO or into an imitation of traditional Westphalian power like the USA.

Constructivists benchmark philosophies about the crucial role norms and identities play in defining security interests and consequently the policies through which to satisfy them, would lead us to expect that the EU’s approach to security will continue in the future to diverge significantly from

75 A recently developed by the United Nations concept which relates to the international community’s responsibility in case a state fails to fulfill its responsibilities towards its population.

76 A Secure Europe in a Better World”, European Security Strategy 2003, p.9
the traditional “hard power” one of the United States. Thus, operationalizing the postulates of constructivist theory in relation to three out of the four independent variables that have been identified as affecting the character of security approaches to be adopted by an actor, the following hypotheses regarding the distinctiveness of EU way of doing security can be formulated.

**Constructivist hypotheses:**

1. Constructivists claim that since EU identity as a normative power, based on specific European values and norms, remains strong, its strategic culture will not “harden” but remain the same. They predict that the Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy from 2008 and the official political discourses inside the EU will continue to emphasize the same normative, “soft power” EU identity.

2. Constructivists predict that in conformity with its normative power identity, the European Union would continue to privilege a more “soft” power approach to security thus focusing on further developing of its civilian capabilities.

3. Constructivists would expect that the European Union will continue to privilege civilian type missions that would strongly dominate over the military ones.

In contrast to realists, constructivist proponents argue against the possibility of the European Union to develop a competitive military-industrial complex, convinced that in accordance with its identity of being a “force for good in the world”, the EU will continue to embark on its unique security “toolkit” of predominantly soft power capabilities. Therefore, constructivist theory do not offer a hypothesis regarding the possible evolution of a military-industrial base of the European union.

Summarizing the discussion of realist and constructivist presumptions concerning the particular methods of security making, the European Union has embarked on, this paper argues that while both theories provide alternative explanations about the specific features of EU approach to security, they both have the potential to account for certain peculiar characteristics and developments. However, which of the two theories can offer a more consistent explanation of the emergence and specific path
of evolution that the EU method of security-making undertakes and remains to be tested in the next chapter.

The further analysis is to be conducted on the basis of an empirical study of EU’s strategic culture, capabilities, missions and military-industrial complex as providing the material basis for EU defense. Testing the competing causal claims of the realist and constructivist paradigms on the grounds of those indicators, the next chapter seeks to provide more evidence as to facilitate determine whether the EU has in reality embarked on a distinctive security-making approach.
Chapter IV. “Unpacking” EU Way of Doing Security?

Having established the theoretical framework of our analysis and outlined the core hypotheses that could provide an answer to the present research conundrum of whether we observe a “distinct” approach to security-making practiced by the European Union or not, this chapter aims at unraveling the puzzle by a thorough examination of four independent variables that are perceived as having a detrimental impact on determining the nature of the explored dependent variable. Based on the following key researchable aspects: a detailed evaluation of EU strategic culture, a disclosure of its civilian and military capacity, an investigation of the emergence and functioning of its military-industrial complex and finally a synopsis of its engagements on the ground, this chapter aims at conveying the peculiar nature of the European union method of doing security.

1. European Union strategic culture – what kind of phenomenon?

Sharing Sven Biscop’s understanding that the European Security Strategy represents a codification of the EU strategic culture as developed to that moment\(^\text{77}\), the objective of the following paragraphs is to reveal the particular characteristics of this phenomenon and to demonstrate how it has evolved over the past five years. Following the tripartite nature of a security strategy based on fundamental interests or areas of responsibility, threat assessment and means to counter the latter and achieve the former, this subchapter shall proceed with an in-depth analysis of the strategic document from 2003 and the report on its implementation from 2008, perceived as an embodiments of the particular characteristic features of EU’s strategic culture.

The EU first strategic document in the sphere of foreign and security policy accurately represents the normative identity of a global actor that the union has embarked on in his approach to ESDP. The normative character of EU strategic culture stems from the realms of responsibility it defines for itself as being “inevitably a global player”\textsuperscript{78}. In addition to defending its security and promoting its values, the union “should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world”\textsuperscript{79} as the title of the strategy itself discloses. Outlining as its fundamental interests the security and prosperity of its member states, the EU further embraces as its main objective “the development of a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order”\textsuperscript{80}. Complementary to the pursuit of normative goals EU strategic culture puts emphasis on the necessity of effective multilateral cooperation for their achievement.

Acknowledging security as a precondition of development and focusing on poverty, diseases and malnutrition as sources of insecurity\textsuperscript{81}, the union embraces the human security paradigm as an indispensable characteristic of its normative approach to security.

The peculiar nature of EU strategic culture is embedded in the perception and assessment of existent threats to its security and stability. Claiming that “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure, so free”, Solana document does not recognize an imminent threat to EU’s territorial integrity or existence, which has lead it to develop a “post-national security policy” based on underlying “European” values in contrast to traditional security policies based on territorial interests and state-to-state conflicts\textsuperscript{82}. Furthermore, the lack of existential threats explains the absence of political enthusiasm to allocate resources to the development of high-intensity military warfare as well as the unwillingness to make use of high-tech military capabilities since there is no actual need for them to protect the EU territory from direct attack. However, while “large scale aggression against any

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid, Section I, p.2
member state is now improbable”, the EU confronts new “more diverse, less visible and less predictable” threats, which compel it to “bring together the different instruments and capabilities”.

EU strategic culture embarks on the implementation of a “mixture of instruments” to reach its security objectives recognizing that none of the new unconventional threats can “be tackled by purely military means”. While acknowledging that military instruments might be needed to restore order in failed states, the implementation of “hard-power” capabilities is considered a last resort and preference is given to a set of soft power instruments based on economic pressures, intelligence, police and judicial means. Recognizing “spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and the abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights” as the “best means of strengthening the international order” and security, the EU grand strategy promotes negotiation, diplomacy, conditionality through contractual ties, persuasion, multilateralism and democracy promotion as core elements of its security toolbox.

Realizing that the new threats shift the first line of defense abroad, the EU positions conflict and threat prevention at the core of its security doctrine. Emphasizing the intend to make use of political, diplomatic, military, civilian, trade and development activities as effective tools for crisis management and conflict prevention, ESS 2003 outlines a strategic culture based on a holistic approach privileging soft power measures.

Lastly, the first European security strategy reaffirms EU as a “law and norm-based international actor” by highlighting its commitment to “upholding and developing International Law”. Recognizing the United Nations Security Council as having “the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”, the EU strategic culture distinguishes with

84 Ibid.
85 Ibid, Section III, p.13
86 Ibid, p.7
87 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Janne Haaland Matlary, “When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU strategic culture possible?”, p.113
exclusive reliance on UN mandate and international law recognition to legitimize the use of force in its missions.

Whether the EU strategic culture has evolved into privileging a more “hard power” approach to security or whether it has remained focused on the same normative soft power attitude to it, can easily be evaluated through a close analysis of the substance of the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy issued five years later.

Starting off with highlighting the European Union’s “greater responsibilities than in any time in its history” continuing to serve as an “anchor of stability”\textsuperscript{91}, in the same spirit as ESS the 2008 Report underlines the permanent normative character of EU strategic culture. While the affirmation of Europe feeling secure is missing and while complex challenges continue to stand in front of ESDP, an imminent existential threat is still absent so as a provision regarding the deployment of high-intensity combat warfare. Human security remains at the core of EU strategic culture as the “need to continue mainstreaming human rights issues in all activities,... including ESDP missions, through a people-based approach coherent with the concept of human security”\textsuperscript{92} undoubtedly demonstrates. The further elaboration of the security and development nexus and the concern over the compelling need to eradicate poverty, treat pandemics and ensure the respect of human rights, confirm that the ideological basis of EU strategic culture continues to be the “freedom from fear, freedom from want”\textsuperscript{93} paradigm of human security.

Reaffirming the cornerstone strategy of its security doctrine to be “preventing threats from becoming sources of conflict”\textsuperscript{94}, the EU attaches continuing importance to the coherent use of a plethora of instruments – “political, diplomatic, development, humanitarian, crisis response, economic and trade cooperation, and civilian and military crisis management”\textsuperscript{95} for conflict prevention. This spectrum of


\textsuperscript{92} Ibid, p.10

\textsuperscript{93} A definition proposed in Mary Kaldor, Mary Martin and Sabine Selchow, “Human security: a new strategic narrative for Europe”, \textit{International Affairs} 83: 2, 2007, p.273

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid, p.9

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.
tools undoubtedly demonstrates the EU continuing strategic trend to privilege civilian type capabilities over more forceful ones, positioning the resort to military action last at this chain. While a compelling need to develop high-tech military warfare is overall missing, the call for improvement of its “soft power” low-intensity capabilities, such as early warning and analysis is pervading the whole report. Thus, overall EU strategic culture remains concentrated on civilian type measures and soft use of the available military capabilities for policing, border control, training and intervention in low-intensity crisis management operations in less hostile environments.

The 2008 report continues to stress the vital importance of international law for EU intervention and its commitment to the fundamental principles of the UN Charter, reaffirming that the UN continues to “stand at the apex of the international system”\(^96\).

To sum up, a major finding of the conducted analysis of the two strategic documents is that EU strategic culture continues to bear the normative footprint of its embryonic security identity. Designating at the core of EU security doctrine the concepts of conflict prevention, crisis management and civil–military instruments coordination, embracing the “responsibility to protect” and promoting effective multilateralism and human development as crucial to establishing sustainable peace, the documents underline the deep embeddedness of EU strategic culture in the paradigm of human security indicating no signs of a possible shift in the near future. As the analysis spells out, the EU continues to rely on a holistic security approach, making use of its “full range of instruments, through partnerships and multilateral institutions, for a permanent policy of prevention and stabilization”\(^97\). This reveals that the EU “soft power model of hard power”\(^98\) not only has not evolved into a more forceful one, but also does not seem likely to in the future. European Union’s skepticism towards the use of high-intensity military power as a security instrument to bring peace has a clear historical imperative behind it. Experiencing the destructiveness of the unlimited use of

\(^96\) Ibid, p.2  
\(^97\) Ibid.  
\(^98\) Janne Haaland Matlary, “When Soft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU strategic culture possible?”, p.110
force during two World Wars, EU member states have embarked on a strategic culture imbued with reluctance to apply hard power instruments unless as a last resort, representing “a conscious rejection of the European past”\textsuperscript{99}.

The significant effect of EU liberal democratic values and normative identity on the formulation of its peculiar strategic culture pervades in the words of Romano Prodi who argues that the European Union “has a role to play in world’s governance, …replicating the European experience of ensuring peace through integration and the rule of law on a global scale”\textsuperscript{100}. The ideological force of EU normative strategic culture also stems from the speeches of EU HR Javier Solana who sees EU as “A force for good around the world. A promoter of effective multilateralism, international law and justice”\textsuperscript{101}.

In addition to its liberal rationales, however as Asle Toje accurately points out EU strategic thinking remains inclined towards choosing “most feasible” policy over the “best” policy due to the persistent “lowest common denominator” nature of its security and defense policies “allowing for extensive deliberation rather than acting quickly”\textsuperscript{102}.

2. The EU security-making “toolkit”

The analysis of EU way of doing security will not be completed without a brief historical overview of the process of equipping the union with civilian arms and military muscles and without a profound examination of the core strategic documents guiding the union in further developing its security toolkit. This would demonstrate the general trend the EU follows in improving its complex array of crisis management instruments and would serve as a powerful indicator of the preference for a more “soft” or forceful approach to security.

The fact that the quest for autonomous military capacity was debated earlier than the necessity to build up an effective civilian arsenal for crisis management (the Saint Malo Summit, 1998, the Cologne Council 1999) and the predominant rhetoric over the vitality of establishing EU military force, gives the impression that the general emphasis is on creating a military power Europe. However, facts demonstrate that ESDP acquisition of civilian and military capabilities is in fact following the same rhythm and pace. While the European Council in Helsinki 1999 proclaims the need to “develop more effective military capabilities”\textsuperscript{103} and launches the Helsinki Headline Goal of constructing rapid reaction forces until 2003, it also introduces the concept of "non-military crisis management of the European Union"\textsuperscript{104} and sets up an Action Plan to further develop it. In order to boost EU’s potential to conduct effective civilian crisis management operations, at the Feira Council in June 2000 the Member states pledged to provide by 2003 5,000 police officers for international police missions and to establish a rapid reaction capability of 1,000 policemen deployable in 30 days\textsuperscript{105}. Overall, the processes of building both civilian and military capabilities embark on similar methods of establishing concrete quantitative targets in each area with a major focus on developing rapid reaction response capacities, followed by pledging conferences in which Member States voluntarily commit specific quantity of resources\textsuperscript{106}. In the same spirit, the Goteborg Council in 2001 adopts a new set of quantitative aims in the rule of law area – 282 experts for crisis management operations, 60 of which to be dispatched in 30 days and in the sphere of civil protection - 2-3 assessment and/or coordination teams of 10 experts and intervention teams of 2,000 for rapid deployment\textsuperscript{107}.

\textsuperscript{102} Asle Toje, “America, the EU and Strategic Culture: Renegotiating the Transatlantic Bargain”, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxton, 2008, p.147
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107} Renata Dwan, “Civilian tasks and capabilities in EU operations”, (SIPRI), p.8
Achieving those objectives and reaching operational capability across the full range of Petersburg tasks in 2003, the EU embarked on further enhancing its capacities and improving their effectiveness by drafting up in 2004 two strategic documents – Headline Goal 2010 and Civilian Headline Goal 2008.

Headline Goal 2010 puts the qualitative and quantitative improvement of EU military toolkit at the center of its substance. The major accents are on the establishment of the European Defense Agency, the launch of a Civil –Military Planning Cell and the development of “military effective, credible and coherent” force packages at high readiness “based on the Battlegroups concept” by 2007\textsuperscript{108}. Concentrating on the necessity to add value to the interoperability, deployability and sustainability of its military assets, the Headline Goal 2010 demonstrates very little attention to equipping ESDP with capabilities for high-intensity combat situations. The focus is predominantly on the acquisition of low-intensity hardware and strategic airlift capacities confirmed by the nature of tasks this panoply of military instruments are supposed to fulfill the full spectrum of Petersburg tasks plus “joint disarmament operations, the support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform”\textsuperscript{109} added by ESS 2003.

The establishment of European Defence Agency in 2004 marks a considerable progress in EU’s determination to bring additional value to its military capabilities toolbox by filling in the compelling need to unite member states’ efforts in procurement and armament cooperation under the EU framework. In addition, its principles tasks include developing defense capabilities, encouraging Defence Research and Technology, increasing defense spending of EU governments, the creation of a European Defense Equipment Market and strengthening of European Defense, Technological and Industrial Base\textsuperscript{110}. Undertaking as its major responsibilities the harmonization of military requirements for defense equipment development and procurement, the establishment of collaborative armaments programmes and advancing the production of EU defense capabilities under

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid, p.8
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid, p.1
the Capability Development Plan, EDA has the potential to “bring its defence planning, military capability objectives and armaments coordination in line with the urgent tasks it faces on the ground”\textsuperscript{111}.

The member states determination to “to make Europe more military capable”\textsuperscript{112} continues with the drafting of Capability Development Plan and the “Declaration of strengthening capabilities” from December 2008. The former underlines on one hand, EU dedication to the development of low-intensity and defensive capabilities, such as military human intelligence and language training, while on the other demonstrates a re-orientation towards more high-tech equipment such as “the construction of intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance architecture, network enabled capability and increased availability of helicopters”\textsuperscript{113}. The “Declaration of strengthening capabilities” indicates the same trend towards high-tech capabilities, highlighting as ESDP objectives the establishment of a European air transport fleet and European airlift command, the creation of A400M aircraft and “preparation of new generation of observation satellites (MUSIS)”\textsuperscript{114}. The low-intensity component remains on the agenda as the call for the establishment of a tactical training programme demonstrates.

Along with the various initiatives aiming at clothing ESDP in military armor, the European Union remains committed to applying a “systematic approach in the development of the necessary civilian capabilities” as highlighted in the Civilian Headline Goals 2008, thus proving that EU does not intend to substitute its soft power with a hard one but rather sustain as a distinctive blend of both. In order to further advance its civilian toolbox, EU outlines as its core objective the ability to “deploy integrated civilian crisis management

\textsuperscript{110} \url{http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Background&id=122} accessed on 20 May 2009
\textsuperscript{111} Jolyon Howorth, “Security and Defence Policy in the European Union” p.110
\textsuperscript{112} Background Note: Capability Development Plan, European Defence Agency, Brussels, p.3 available at \url{http://www.army.cz/assets/files/11639/CDP_Press_Background_brief_.pdf}
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{114} DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES, 2008, p.3
packages which respond to the specific needs on the ground”\textsuperscript{115}. In the same spirit as in the streamlining of its military capacity, the ESDP civilian capabilities should be capable of deployment at a short notice, some even with 30 days of the decision to launch the mission\textsuperscript{116}. In addition, the EU should reach the ability to conduct concurrent civilian missions at different levels of engagement and improve considerably the sustainability and quality of its personnel by providing adequate training programs. Finally, a core objective of the member states remains the necessity to establish synergy between EU civilian and military instruments by ensuring close cooperation and coordination on the ground.

EU’s commitment to improving ESDP civilian element continues with the drafting of a new Civilian Headline Goal 2010, which highlights the necessity to “deploy civilian crisis management capabilities of high quality, with the support functions and equipment required in a short time-span and in sufficient quantity”\textsuperscript{117}.

Based on the conducted analysis, the general conclusion is that the processes of improving EU civilian and military toolkits progress accordingly. While more attention and initiatives might be devoted to the development of the “hard power” component of EU security making as demonstrated by the current boom of projects on enhancing high-tech and airlift military capabilities under the auspices of EDA, the regular drafting of civilian action plans, headline goals and annual civilian capability committee meetings prove that the EU “soft power” not only is not declining but instead is evolving.. In addition, in building up considerable military capabilities, the EU has focused not on high-intensity military warfare suitable for high-risk combat situations, but on rather low-intensity peace support operations instrumentarium. Moreover, the sole acquisition of military instruments does not necessarily mean hard power approach to security, as we observe in the case of the EU since the major objective of its military component remains the ability to perform the core Petersberg


\textsuperscript{116} Ibid, p. 3

tasks of low-intensity. In other words, the European Union is clothing its ESDP in military garments but its normative nature and strategic culture compel it to remain guided by the same rationale of soft use of hard power capabilities.

3. The quest for European Military-Industry Complex

EU’s quest for enriching its military and civilian capabilities “toolbox” is indispensively linked with the development of its military-industrial complex and more precisely with the establishment and functioning of an integrated European Defense Industry and Market. Examining the progress of this integral component of EU security-making potential would shed a light on the challenging conundrum of EU’s recent plunge in a transformation of its defense capabilities and would facilitate determine the peculiar nature of its approach to promoting peace and security.

Acknowledging the danger of being dependable on US defense industry to ensure their military equipment and the supply of basic ingredients for their defense firms, the major European arms-producing states embarked on a “substantial increase in intra-European codevelopment and coproduction weapons projects” as to soft-balance the American preponderance. The consequent rise in mergers and acquisitions among the leading European defense firms during the 1990s lead to a favorable decrease in the fragmented structure of the European defense industry and market. The establishment of the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company and MBDA - Europe’s major missile developer and manufacturer marked this turn to an increased intra-European defence collaboration and market consolidation. Undertaking this path, several EU member states embarked on the development of two joint high-tech capabilities projects – the creation of the Galileo navigation system and the A400M strategic lift. Complementary to these developments, the formation of a consolidated European military-industry complex is further given impetus by several institutional developments. The first one is the establishment of the so called Letter of Intent, aimed

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at facilitating the transformation of European defense industry by pledging for a harmonization of the military requirements for the formation of armed forces. The second is the creation of OCCAR charged with the management of a number of important intra-European weapons programs, such as Boxer armored utility vehicle and ROLAND surface-to-air missile.

In line with these efforts to streamline the development of an European defense industry and market, Headline Goal 2010 propels the creation of the European Defense Agency. The primary objectives of EDA’s Industry and Market Directorate are the establishment of an “internationally competitive European Defense Equipment Market” and “the restructuring and strengthening of the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base”. The first objective is of detrimental importance since it would ensure a structural link between the equipment needs of European armed forces and their economically efficient delivery. This has been fundamentally blocked by the unfavorable conditions of the European defense sector, which remained for a long time disintegrated in state monopolies and protected national markets since Article 296 of the EC Treaty provides the possibility to “exclude defensive procurement from the normal competitive procurement rules of the single market”. Progress in this respect has been achieved with the launch of a voluntary, more transparent “intergovernmental regime of defense procurement” on 1 July 2006 with the aim to “broaden the business opportunities for defense contractors and strengthen the global competitiveness of Europe’s defense industry”. In addition to improving the competitiveness and transparency of the developing European Defense market, EDA has embarked on a landmark initiative to create a strong European Defense Technological and Industrial Base by promoting and further elaborating a European defense-relevant Research and Technology.

120 Frank Slijper, “The emerging EU Military-Industrial Complex: Arms industry lobbying in Brussels”, Transnational Institute Briefing Series, 2005/1, p.27
In the light of this brief overview of EU efforts to develop an integrated military equipment market and a functioning European defense industry, it can be concluded that the European Union has embarked on a complex initiative to increase its military and defense potential not only by equipping ESDP with hard power capabilities but also by establishing a globally competitive military-industrial complex. However, the continuing political barriers to further develop a consolidated EU defense sector, the persistent fragmentation of the military industries market and the continuing need of more investment for research and procurement, prove that the union is still not mature enough for such a development and has a long way to go in order to achieve the status of globally competitive. Nevertheless, the current developments undoubtedly demonstrate that the EU has seriously undertaken the challenge to become a fully-fledged security actor disposing with a transparent and competitive defense equipment market to ensure the necessary military-industrial base for conducting an array of crisis management tasks.

4. ESDP Missions

Having addressed the conundrum of EU quest for greater capability and globally competitive military-industrial complex, the following paragraphs undertake the challenge to evaluate how is EU potential instrumentalized for the implementation of its strategic security agenda and what does this reveals about its character of a global security actor. Besides being a major vehicle for realizing European Union security policy as well as projecting its power and influence abroad, ESDP operations serve a broader aim of demonstrating the kind of security approach the European Union has embarked upon.

Developing a complex set of civilian and military tools capable of carrying out the full range of Petersburg tasks since 2003 until June 2009 the European Union has undertaken 27 missions on three continents, 13 of which already completed and 14 still on-going\textsuperscript{125}. Depending on their functional characteristics, mission objectives and mandates, these can be organized under four
general categories – capacity-building operations, military missions, rule of law and monitoring missions. The first category stands out with an array of operations that can be classified as capacity-building mainly concentrated however on providing assistance in conducting security sector reforms associated with building-up capable and efficient national police forces or various civilian and military personnel training programs. The fundamental drawbacks of assessing EU operations under the structural division of purely civilian or military ones have several times been emphasized as EU HR Javier Solana frequently reaffirms that generally ESDP missions involve both types of capabilities\textsuperscript{126}, whose comprehensive joint implementation namely signifies the brand European. A strong civilian-military synergy is vital, since a substantial number of civilian missions require military assistance or equipment, while military missions are almost in every scenario backed up by post-conflict civil reconstruction and development or assistance programs on the behalf of the Commission.

While recognizing that a detailed overview of the characteristic features regarding the nature and the implementation on the ground of all 27 EU missions would undoubtedly prove beneficial to the present research, due to its constrained character, this dissertation offers as an annex a chart providing information about all EU operations conducted so far. According to this chart, the EU remains predominantly engaged with an array of civilian type missions ranging from providing assistance and strategic guidance to building a civilian policing capacity as in the case of AMIS II, monitoring, mentoring and advising country’s police in support of local ownership improvement of policing – EUPOL Kinshasa, EUPOL Proxima (FYROM), EUPOL RD Congo, EUPM BiH, EUPOL Afghanistan, EUPOL COPPS Palestine; supporting the country in reforming their judicial system and establish rule of law – EUJUSTLEX Iraq, EUJUST THEMIS (Georgia) and EULEX Kosovo; assist in improving border managing in EUSR BST Georgia, EUBAM Ukraine/ Moldova and EU BAM Rafah and lastly, monitoring the implementation of peace agreements and

\textsuperscript{125} Chart and table of ESDP and EU missions, ISIS Europe, May 2009, www.isis-europe.org
\textsuperscript{126} Jolyon Howorth, “Security and Defence Policy in the European Union”, p.213
demobilization in ACEH, EUMM Georgia and EUMM Western Balkans. In contrast, only 6 purely military missions have been deployed under EU flag. Overall, all operations distinguish with being small scale ones, dedicating small amount of personnel and material resources.

The synopsis of ESDP operations’ records is particularly revealing, since it indicates several characteristic features of EU external security making. First of all, it can easily be concluded that in very few cases military capabilities – personnel and equipment have actually been used in genuine military operations. As the deployment of EUSEC in Congo, EU Support Amis II in Darfur and EU BAM RAFAH in Palestine have clearly demonstrated military capabilities are applied to perform a variety of civilian functions, from policing, security sector reforms, establishment of the rule of law, training of police and army personnel or border control. Second, even the small number of operations bearing the mandate – military have not been accorded the performance of purely military tasks, quite on the contrary – as in the case of EUFOR CONGO, where the mission had the limited remit of supporting MONUC in securing the election process or in the case of EUFOR CHAD RCA, where EU military personnel was in charge of facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and protection of civilians, EU troops are in fact engaged with the conduct of civilian type objectives. Third, with the exception of the case of ARTEMIS, a characteristic feature of detrimental importance of EU implementation of military capabilities is its engagement in predominantly pre-crisis or post-conflict areas as the deployment of ESDP missions in Indonesia, Congo, Bosnia and, conceivably, Kosovo demonstrate. Overall, the EU seems reluctant to engage in high-intensity battles or severely hostile wartime environments, thus simply “washing the dishes” by performing monitoring or post-conflict capacity-building and reconstruction after NATO or US have already “cooked the dinner” by taking over the heat of the battle. Forth significant observation that can be made is the importance to UN mandate and international law the EU dedicates in the taking a

127 Asle Toje, “America, the EU and Strategic Culture: Renegotiating the Transatlantic Bargain”, p.146
decision to deploy an operation in general and especially when it comes down to the legitimacy of the use of force. A very little number of EU missions and only purely civilian ones are conducted without an explicit UN mandate. The fifth remark concerns the predominantly reactive nature of ESDP operations. EU barely takes the initiative to engage in a mission without being explicitly addressed by an international organization like UN or by a country in need like in the case of FYROM Macedonia or Georgia to undertake actions to bring peace and stability. Furthermore, most of EU crisis management and peace-keeping activities always represent a form of follow up from the significant efforts invested already in appeasing those regions by UN, NATO or US. Last, but not least, EU acts in line with its Security Strategy by promoting effective multilateralism visible in its cooperation with other international actors in conducting crisis management like the countries of ASEAN in the case of the ACEH mission or in Amis II, where it supported the African Union Mission or UN and NATO in its recent engagement in the coast of Somalia.

5. EU as a specific security actor

Set against this in-depth analysis of European union strategic culture, diverse set of capabilities, the development of its military-industrial complex and the missions, through which it employs this triad in its external actions, it is now time to define as what kind of security actor the EU has emerged. While scholars position the European Union at the crossroads of being a civilian, normative, military or humanitarian power\(^{129}\), on the basis of the conducted research, the present academic piece defends the claim of EU HR Javier Solana that EU is in fact a “new form of power”\(^{130}\) combining characteristic features from all of the above. As such the European Union has emerged not only as a sui generis integration project, but moreover as a sui generis global security actor practicing a sui generis way of doing security.

\(^{129}\) Authors previously stated in the introduction.

\(^{130}\) “Sound of Europe Conference, speech by European Union Higher Representative Javier Solana”
Having embraced a broad ideological agenda and embarking on a distinctive identity of being an unprecedented inherently peaceful integration project disposing with unique normative power and acting as a “force for good in the world” the European union has developed a post-national security policy. In contrast to the traditional security policy based on territorial interests and state-to-state conflicts practiced by the United States, the EU post-Westphalian security doctrine is based on the promotion of the core “European” values of democratic governance, rule of law and respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In conformity with this, the EU has adopted a normative strategic culture, privileging “soft” security-making based on a holistic approach of panoply of civil-military instruments on the grounds of a human security rationale and respect of international law. Adopting a rather reactive approach to security, the European Union designates crisis management and conflict prevention as core elements of its security doctrine. As the conducted analysis of ESS 2003 and the report on it from 2008 undoubtedly demonstrate these salient features of EU strategic culture have remained a stable hallmark of its security-making.

Having adopted a human security narrative in accordance with its main principles of “protection of individuals and communities” and the expansion of the rule of law, while “squeezing the arena of war” since it is not about war-fighting”\textsuperscript{131}, the EU remains concentrated on predominantly civilian intervention and soft power implementation of its military capabilities in low-intensity operations in less hostile environments as the experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina discloses. While developing a “hard power” set of capabilities, the EU remains committed to predominantly peace support operations regarding the use of force as a last resort and faithful to the need of UN mandate or international law recognition as legitimizing its implementation. Promoting

\textsuperscript{131} Mary Kaldor, Mary Martin and Sabine Selchow, “Human security: a new strategic narrative for Europe”, p.273
operations that “uphold human rights and act in support of law and order”\textsuperscript{132}, the EU has emerged as a distinct security actor being a “peacemaker”, a “force for good in the world” not a warrior.

\textsuperscript{132} A definition proposed in Mary Kaldor, Mary Martin and Sabine Selchow, “Human security: a new strategic narrative for Europe”, p.274
Chapter V: Final Outcome and Concluding Remarks

Having established in the previous chapters what kind of security do the EU and United States practice on the international arena being the two leading world powers, no analysis will be complete without juxtaposing them in order to establish which theoretical paradigm accounts better for their convergence or divergence. Such a comparative analysis on the basis of their characteristic strategic cultures and type of security toolkits they privilege in unfolding particular operations in different conflict areas around the globe, is the key to resolving the examined research puzzle of the peculiar nature of the EU way of security-making.

First and foremost, as established in the thesis, realists view EU quest for more military power as leading to a hardening of its strategic culture as to privilege the use of force and coercion as the most effective security means, thus resembling more that of the United States. The constructivists ardently refute such an understanding arguing that EU strong identity and normative basis would compel it to foster a “soft” strategic culture giving preference to a civilian toolbox significantly divergent from that of the US. As the current analysis have demonstrated, EU normative strategic culture has not changed considerably after the acquisition of more military capabilities. Moreover it remains based on the primacy of international law, human security rationale and soft utilization of a complex security toolkit, that excludes the use of force as a last resort and promotes effective multilaterism in doing conflict prevention and crisis management. In contrast, embarking on a doctrine of preventive wars and pre-emptive strikes, the United States fosters an interventionalist strategic culture of a traditional Westphalian great power with a predilection to high-intensity weaponry and unilateral military actions regardless of their conformity with international norms. This radical divergence of EU relatively stable normative strategic culture from the great power one of the US signifies the greater explanatory power of the constructivist paradigm in this respect, thus adding a valuable proof of EU distinctiveness as a security actor.
Secondly, while realists believe in a radical shift in EU capabilities preferences visible in efforts to equip itself with high-tech warfare suitable for high-intensity operations that would align it with the US as a security actor, constructivists contradict their stance arguing for the further development of EU “distinctive” civilian instrumentarium. As outlined in the thesis, in reality since the establishment of ESDP, the EU has been engaged in a significant build-up of both civilian and military capabilities. However, while prevailing attention might have been given to the improvement of its military capacity, only recently there have been indications of efforts to develop a more high-tech weaponry, while the major focus is still on low-intensity peace support toolkit. Thus, although the EU slowly tiptoes behind the US in militarizing itself with more wartime hardware, there are no visible prospects of reaching the US unmatched military capacity in the near future. Such an observation leaves both the realist and constructivist hypothesis hanging in the air, since none of them can accurately explain EU capability building strategy. Nevertheless, the realist paradigm possesses more potential to account for the recent quest for a more militarized EU that brings it closer to US way of doing security.

Thirdly, in terms of the development of a globally competitive EU military-industrial complex compatible with the leading position of that of the United States, thus resembling even more its replica, realists proponents gain more credit. Embarking on a period of defense firms mergers and the institutionalization of a European Defense Agency charged with the establishment of a viable European Defence Equipment Market and an adequate European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, the EU demonstrates strong determination to developing a well-functioning military-industrial complex as to strengthen its military capacity. Although, as the facts undoubtedly indicate, the process is slow and encounters the substantial hindrances of the defense market fragmentation, insufficient investment and problematic procurement, as realists predict it is under way, thus indicating a possible inclination on the side of EU to follow the US model of security-making.

Finally, whereas realists argue that emerging out of the image of a “military pilgrim” by improving its hard power potential, the EU develops a predilection towards deploying predominantly
military missions implementing high-intensity warfare in severely hostile environments, constructivists defend EU’s preference for civilian type operations in pre- and post conflict situations, that distinguishes it from the pre-emptive war-fighting engagement of the United States. In contrast to the United States predilection to launch large scale military missions in extremely insurgent areas that privilege the use of high-tech military weaponry without taking into account the postulates of international law, the EU engages predominantly in civilian type missions in low-intensity pre or post-conflict zones since only 6 of total 27 ESDP missions have been accorded the mandate of strictly military operations. Although military capabilities have been utilized in a variety of civilian missions, they are always in conformity with intentional law, relying on a UN mandate and performing panoply of civilian tasks raging from policing, capacity-building, establishing the rule of law, monitoring, border control or personnel training. EU reluctance to launch military missions in high-intensity battlefields and practice of soft application of hard power confirms the explanatory power of the constructivist hypothesis and provides a powerful evidence for EU’s distinctive way of doing security.

In conclusion, while neither the realist nor the constructivist set of hypotheses is fully confirmed by the empirical evidence, the conducted analysis attaches greater value to the constructivist paradigm as offering a more consistent explanation of the observed developments in EU approach towards security. Nevertheless, the realist premises cannot be disregarded completely since they manage to account for EU’s visible transition to a more militarized security “toolkit” and recent endeavor to equip itself with a more high-tech weaponry that preconditions its gradual evolution past the image of a “military pilgrim”. Despite this, the EU continues to espouse a normative approach to security based on its characteristic soft power intrumentarium of conditionality, persuasion, diplomacy and civilian capabilities, radically divergent from the coercive, unilateral and interventionalist method of security-making cherished by the U.S. Constructivists rightfully account
that EU identity as an unprecedented peaceful project and “force for good in the world”\textsuperscript{133} and its solid normative base are so strong that compel it to continue to practice a distinct “soft power model of hard power” approach to security in conformity with international law that distinguishes it from any other global security actor.

Finally, EU’s implementation of a unique method of doing security is of fundamental importance as it affects the nature of its transatlantic relationship with the United States and creates incentives for security cooperation or strategic rivalry. In the light of this observation, the EU distinct approach to security bounds the transatlantic collaboration in managing conflicts and promoting peace to continue the current practice of division of labor – US does the dirty work of war fighting, while the EU cleans after it by conducting post-conflict reconstruction. Meanwhile, the present tension in EU-US relations competing for the status of the ultimate international security player, might be improved when the two parties realize that EU being a global peacekeeper and US – a global warrior can in fact share the prize being the two sides of the same coin of crisis management.

**Table 1 – Completed missions:** There will be 13 completed ESDP and EU missions as at mid-May 2009 (see below and chart for further details Future updates available from www.isis-europe.org/index.php?page=responding). The EU has also undertaken several election observer missions – not under ESDP.

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<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Civil-Military assistance / Military coord. support</th>
<th>Civil Police</th>
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<th>Civil-Military SSR</th>
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<td>Africa</td>
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<td>Balkans/Caucasus/East Europe</td>
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**Table 2 – Ongoing missions:** As at mid-May 2009, there will be 14 active ESDP and EU missions (six in the Western Balkans, Caucasus and Eastern Europe; three in the Middle East; one in Central Asia; four in Africa) see below. Total of completed and ongoing missions now reaches 27.

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5) “The View From Europe”, Military and Aerospace Electronics(December 2006), http://www.milaero.com
19) DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES, 2008, p.3
21) Dwan, Renata “Civilian tasks and capabilities in EU operations”, (SIPRI)
27) Howorth, Jolyon “Security and Defence Policy in the European Union”
International affaira 84.1 (2008): 29-44
44) Manners, Ian “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered”, October 2004, p.1
48) Motives for soft balancing outlined by T.V. Paul in his article “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy”, p.71
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