THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND COALITION-BUILDING IN THE POST-COMMUNIST REGION: POST-REVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL DYNAMICS

By

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ABSTRACT

At the crossroads of XXI century post-communist region witnessed series of so-called “Colored revolutions”. These electoral revolutions became a part of what Michael McFaul calls “fourth wave” of democratization. Despite the electoral revolutions occurred in the countries with relatively similar socio-economic conditions, yet, they produced different outcomes across cases. Based on theoretical model proposed by McFaul for explaining regime change in the post-communist region, the present research proposes an actor-centric approach in the study of electoral revolutions. By using the comparative method and the process tracing the thesis seeks to understand why electoral revolutions in the post-communist space produced different “democratic” outcomes. The main findings of this thesis suggest that the regime type resulting from electoral mode of regime change is determined by the political opposition that is in place during an electoral revolution. The research also suggests that democratic breakthrough in a competitive authoritarian regime is possible if political opposition has managed to build a strong and united coalition by the time an electoral revolution starts.
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INTRODUCTION

At the crossroads of XXI century the post-communist region witnessed series of so-called “Colored revolutions”. These electoral revolutions became a part of what Michael McFaul calls “fourth wave” of democratization (2002). Electoral revolutions started from Eastern European countries such as Slovakia (1998), Croatia (1999), and Serbia (2000) (Bunce and Wolchik 2006b) and then spread to the republics of former Soviet Union Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005). Because colored revolutions possess many similarities and common features, many scholars identified them as links of one phenomenon. The opposition, protesters, and civic activists used similar strategies and symbols of nonviolent resistance against authoritarian incumbents. This imitation and emulation of the protest strategies by opposition and civic activists from previous successful protest events that took place in other countries is called by various scholars as ‘demonstrational effect’, ‘contagion’ (Whitehead 1996), ‘power of example’ (Beissinger 2007), ‘modularity’ (Tarrow 1998), and ‘international diffusion’ (Tarrow 2005).

An electoral revolution is a political phenomenon, which possesses some common features and repertoire. The similar tactics and strategies were used during different cases of electoral revolutions. Another common feature of electoral or colored revolution is that they all took place in competitive authoritarian regimes with relatively similar socio-economic conditions and with shared post-communist legacy. This implies that electoral revolutions that occurred in countries with similar socio-economic conditions and shared post-communist legacies would produce the same or similar outcomes. Yet, empirical evidence shows that the outcomes are divergent across cases of electoral revolutions.
Despite an electoral revolution is relatively a new phenomenon in the post-communist region, it has been widely discussed in scholarly accounts. I will provide a short overview of these accounts in the very first section of this thesis. In this section, I propose an actor-centric approach in the study of electoral revolutions that is based McFaul’s transitional framework. In his article, McFaul (2002) argues that successful regime transition is possible only in cases where democratic opposition imposes its decisive power on the incumbents. This is a core claim of McFaul’s noncooperative model. The current research refines McFaul’s arguments by dealing with particular mode of transitions in the post-communist countries – the electoral revolutions. The electoral revolution mode of the regime change is particularly interesting and can offer new insights on the problem of regime transitions. I will evaluate McFaul’s noncooperative model in more details in the first chapter.

The main findings of this thesis suggest that regime type resulting from electoral mode of regime change is determined by the political opposition that is in place during electoral revolution. The results of the current thesis research demonstrate that democratic breakthrough is possible if political opposition has been able to build a strong and united coalition by the time an electoral revolution starts. What matters is a strong degree of organizational cohesion of an opposition coalition. The more organizationally cohesive are various distinct groups in the opposition the more electoral competition takes place afterwards regime change. If such groups dominate in opposition coalition the new regime results in electoral democracy.

This paper seeks to understand why electoral revolution in post-communist space produced different democratic outcomes. More precisely, the research in this thesis concentrates on the question of how the type of political opposition, which is in place during electoral revolution, influences the level of electoral competitiveness, and consequently, a regime type resulting after revolution. Based on theoretical model proposed by McFaul for explaining regime
change in the post-communist region, we can propose some hunches for electoral mode of regime change. My preliminary empirical observations led me to the expectation that revolutionary change does not necessarily result in democratic breakthrough as McFaul argues (2002: 228-232). In addition, I am not convinced that the dominance of democrats in opposition does necessarily produce democracy as it is emphasized by McFaul (2002: 228).

The dominance of democrats in an opposition coalition is facilitating but not necessary condition. Numerous but weak and competing democratic forces are often not able to promote democratic institutions that support free and fair elections. Contrary to the expectations of McFaul’s model and many other scholars (Bunce and Wolchik 2006a; Kuzio 2008) I suggest that electoral democracy and free and fair electoral competition to a great extent result not from democratic commitments of the opposition but from distinct well-organized cohesive groups within a coalition of the opposition. These groups have prior experience of participation in political arena (competition between these groups after revolution). As comparative analysis conducted in this research suggests, the transition to electoral democracy can be driven by non-democrats. These findings are the main contribution to McFaul’s noncooperative model.

To avoid confusion in the rest of the thesis I would like to clarify the terms electoral revolution, colored revolution, and electoral turnover. I distinguish electoral or colored revolutions, which took place in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, from other electoral revolutions of the post-communist region. The colored revolutions are distinct from the electoral revolutions in Slovakia and Croatia by their more confrontational character of regime contestation by the oppositions that challenged dictator regimes through elections and mass mobilization. In other words, those electoral revolutions in Slovakia and Croatia can be counted as electoral turnovers. The opposition coalitions in these countries rallied voters in anticipation of an electoral fraud. The main goal of the opposition was to achieve a high electoral turnout and to
take more votes away from the incumbents. Forbrig and Demes characterize electoral campaigns in these two countries as “a broad effort of civil society groups to provide voters with information about the elections, to encourage their participation and to monitor the electoral process” (2007: 9). Basically, in these cases, the opposition was trying to prevent the incumbents from falsifying elections. Moreover, the Slovak and the Croat opposition coalitions succeeded in ousting illiberal incumbents from power through elections. In colored revolutions, the incumbents managed to falsify elections although the opposition forces with the assistance of international (western) community attempted to prevent an electoral fraud. Therefore, the opposition contested the falsified electoral results through mass protest demonstrations, blocking traffic, and storming government buildings (except Ukraine) (Way 2008) with consequent forced ousters of autocratic leaders from power (again except Ukraine).

However, this distinction does not imply the conceptual difference between a colored and an electoral revolution as the former can be considered a subtype of the latter. In the rest of the thesis, I use both terms interchangeably regarding the four cases under analysis. Moreover, I use the concept of the electoral mode of regime change in the same meaning as colored or electoral revolution. Thus, I distinguish the electoral mode of regime change as well as electoral revolution from the concepts of electoral turnover and regime change. The electoral turnover implies the change of top office holders on the ground of free and fair elections, usually in electoral and liberal democracies. The electoral mode of regime change occurs as a result of mass protests or/and preventive actions against an electoral fraud whereas a simply regime change may have various causes including reasons associated with an electoral process.

As this research focuses on the assessment of outcomes of colored revolutions, there are only four cases available so far. Thus, the phenomenon of the colored revolution offers an independent set of countries that are appropriate for comparative analysis. Serbia, Georgia,
Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan offer a good opportunity for comparing and testing several competing alternative causal factors that can explain different outcomes of electoral revolutions. Indeed, the outcomes vary across cases. In Ukraine, the Orange Revolution resulted in democratic transition to competitive politics, while in Kyrgyzstan and in Georgia, the Tulip and the Rose revolutions led to transition from one authoritarian regime to another authoritarian one. The Serbian Bulldozer Revolution moved the country to electoral, but illiberal democracy. At the same time, Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan share many similarities such as common communist legacies and political institutions. In this sense, Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan are convenient cases for comparative analysis. Comparing the oppositions in the four relatively contrast cases can tell us much about why the same political phenomenon did not result in the same outcomes in different countries. As Arend Lijphart puts: “If such comparable cases can be found, they offer particularly good opportunities for the application of the comparative method because they allow the establishment of relationships among a few variables while many other variables are controlled” (1971: 687).

The research combines the comparative method with process tracing. The comparative method is utilized in the second and the third chapters. The Mill’s indirect method of difference is a valuable tool that enables to reduce number of competing explanations under causal complexity. I conduct this comparative method in the second chapter to test several competing causal variables for the electoral mode of regime change. These causal variables represent structural, diffusionist, cultural, and agency-based conditions. As Mill’s indirect method of difference requires failed cases along with successful cases, I introduced into comparative analysis the cases of attempted but failed electoral revolutions in Belarus and Azerbaijan. The cross tabulation of failed and successful cases allows to single out the variable with the strongest explanatory power. In similar way, I conduct this method in the third chapter to identify the
causal variable that possibly explains the success and failure of competitive politics in the post-revolutionary phase. I determined coding gradations “low/high” or “presence/absence” for the comparative tables on the basis of the content analysis of on-line newspapers, scholarly articles, and International Crisis Group’s analytical country reports.

Despite significant advantages of Mill’s indirect method of difference, it has some explanatory limitations. This method cannot identify causal mechanisms of explanatory factors, as all variables under analysis are dichotomous and do not fully represent qualitative characteristics of causal factors. To reduce these limitations, I introduce a case study of Kyrgyzstan in the last section of the thesis. Case studies can be “powerful tools to test and/or unpack an existing theory and come up with new, better arguments about causal mechanisms, especially when paired with one or more other cases in the right way” (Hancke 2009: 55). The case of the Tulip Revolution can illustrate causal links that led to the failure of competitive politics in Kyrgyzstan. For the current research, the process tracing method implemented in the case study of Kyrgyzstan can be especially useful, as it “can substantially reduce the limitations of Mill’s method and other method of comparison” (George and Bennett 2005: 262).

Probably the best accounts of how the process-tracing method can be implemented for theory development in a case study are given by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005). The process tracing that is employed in case study of Kyrgyzstan allows tracing causal mechanisms of independent variable. In this case, I evaluate the influence of coalition building on the outcome of the Tulip Revolution. As George and Bennett argue: “The process tracing attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal and chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of dependent variable” (2005: 206).
When process-tracing conducted in a case study is difficult to test underspecified theories, the method can be helpful for theory development (George and Bennett 2005: 209). For example, McFaul’s post-communist transitional framework does not specify enough its causal mechanisms. This method enables us to identify these causal mechanisms, which might be lacking or unclear in proposed theories. This is a part of theory development. As McFaul theoretical framework is underspecified, it is hard to test his theory by employing process-tracing. Fortunately, we can use theoretical accounts of scholarly works on electoral revolutions. McFaul’s Ukrainian case study on electoral revolution (2007) and his comparative study of five electoral revolutions in the post-communist region (2005), in which he utilizes his post-communist transitional framework, to some extent fill and clarify the explanatory gaps in his theory. The case studies might compensate lack of causal clarity and “they can play important role in development of theories” (George and Bennett 2005: 209).

The structure of the thesis proceeds as follows. In the first chapter, I provide the description of the main approaches in the study of electoral revolutions. These approaches represent structural, (international) diffusionist, and agency-based explanations for the electoral mode of regime change. I then critically discuss the accounts of the scholars who reflect the above approaches. In the second section of the same chapter, I present and then critically reflect on McFaul’s model of the post-communist transitions.

In the second chapter, utilizing Mill’s indirect method of difference I try to singled out one factor from several competing causal variables that explains regime change as a result of an electoral revolution. I then turn to explanation and interpretation of the results of the comparative analysis. On the ground of this comparative analysis, this research identifies opposition coalition building as the main explanatory variable for electoral mode of regime change.
In the third chapter, I operationalize cohesion of an opposition coalition by assessing mobilizational and organizational capacity of the oppositions in the four countries. On the ground of Mill’s indirect method of difference, I then identify, which of the coalitional dimensions has the direct impact on the level of electoral competitiveness in the post-revolutionary phase. The final section of this thesis provides descriptive analysis of coalition building in Kyrgyzstan and sheds light on the reasons of the democratic failure in the country.
CHAPTER I: Theoretical framework for the study of electoral mode of regime change

Agency and structure in the study of electoral mode of regime change

For the current thesis I use an actor-centered approach as I claim this approach best explains recent developments in the post-communist region. By underlining the significance of political actors in explaining the process of regime change and transition to democracy, I don’t deny the importance of structural or cultural factors for stability and consolidation of democracy. However, we have to distinguish between transition from authoritarianism/to democracy and consolidation of democracy. Transition to democracy and consolidation of democracy are two different stages of the democratization process. Dankwart Rustow identifies these two stages as “decision phase” and “habituation” phase respectively. As I propose throughout this paper, political actors are the main explanatory factor for regime transition while structural conditions are only supportive variable. As Michael McFaul argues:

Inert, invisible structures do not make democracies or dictatorships. People do. Structural factors such as economic development cultural influences, and historical institutional arrangements influence the formation of actors’ preferences and power, but ultimately these forces have causal significance only if translated into human action. Individuals and the decisions they make are especially important for explaining how divergent outcomes result from similar structural contexts. (2002: 214)

This chapter discusses agency based approach in the study of electoral mode of regime change as follows. First, I will outline the work of Dankwart Rustow that emphasizes actor-centric approach for explaining regime change. Second, I will make a short overview of main approaches that explain electoral mode of regime change. I will limit my overview by only few works that mainly represent structural conditions, international diffusion, and actor-based approaches in analysis of electoral revolutions. I then will critically reflect on the works of mentioned authors and approaches represented in their works.
In his seminal article “Transitions to democracy: toward a dynamic model” Dankwart Rustow (1970) puts forward actor centered approach in the study of transition. As Rustow notes, structural conditions are not to be confused with preconditions (1970: 342). It means that economic and social factors are requisites but not prerequisites of democracy. Political factors interact with social and economic ones. They are interdependent. Social and economic conditions can influence political factors and other way around. However, socio-economic requisites per se cannot substitute political factors in explaining and understanding transitions to democracy. Structural conditions have to seek for some special mechanisms, preferably political ones that can help to penetrate to democratic foreground.

Rustow’s one precondition for democratic transition is national unity. He does not deny the importance of structural and cultural factors; however, these factors play supportive role during what Rustow calls “preparatory phase”. In preparatory phase, which precedes democratization, political struggles begin as a result of newly emerged political elites. These elites represent various well-entrenched forces, usually social classes (Rustow 1970: 352).

Rustow’s work sets out an important argument on importance of political elites. As opposed to structural conditions literature, Rustow argues that democrats may emerge not only as a by-product of growing economic prosperity and of improving education but also as result of circumstances that “… may force, trick, lure, or cajole non-democrats into democratic behavior

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1 Reflections and refinements on Rustow’s work as well as the debate between proponents of actor-based and structural approaches are well represented in special issue of the journal “Comparative politics” dedicated to the memory of Dankwart Rustow. See Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3, Transitions to Democracy: A Special Issue in Memory of Dankwart A. Rustow. (Apr., 1997).

2 Rustow does not specify the degree of national unity sufficient for proceeding to democratic transition)

3 In his criticism to structural conditions or “functional” literature, Rustow refers to the works of Lipset and Cutright. See Seymour Martin Lipset. “Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy”, American Political Science Review, LIII (March 1959, and Philips Cutright. “National political development: measurement and analysis”, American Sociological Review, XVIII (April 1963)
and that their beliefs may adjust in due course by some process of rationalization and adaptation” (1970: 344-345).

In short, Rustow makes a clear distinction between factors that make a democracy stable and factors that cause democratic transition. As he puts it: “The factors that keep a democracy stable may not be the ones that brought it to existence: explanations of democracy must distinguish between function and genesis” (Rustow 1970: 346). Thus, transition to democracy or what Rustow calls “decision phase” is “a period in which determining structural and cultural factors are less important than choices, perceptions, preferences, and bargaining skills of individuals among the political elite” (Anderson 1997: 255).

Approaches that combine both structural and modular-diffusionist models of electoral mode of regime change are best represented in the works of Bunce and Wolchik (2006a) and of Beissinger (2007). Bunce and Wolchik assert that post-communist region is the best place for electoral revolutions. They identify set of favorable conditions for electoral mode of democratization in post-communist region that makes the region attractive for international democracy promoters. First and one of the important conditions is elections. Despite communist regimes impeded development of civil society, post-communist countries share long-experience with elections. Even if the elections were fraudulent during communist period, they taught citizens “to link regime legitimacy with the act of voting” (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006a: 8). The second condition is a high level of education. Education is one of the structural conditions, which facilitates democracy. Educated citizens have access to the information and they contribute to the development of civil society. They support promotion of political rights and civil liberties and they create political networks that tend to be independent of the state. Educated voters are

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4 For example, institutional design may offer the framework that gives institutionalist incentives for non-democrats to become democrats)
capable to identify their political interests and participate in complex electoral campaigns against authoritarian leaders. Finally, it is absence of politicized military.

The above conditions make democracy promotion efforts of international donor organizations fruitful, as outcomes of such activities is most likely to result in democratization in postcommunist region than in any other region. In addition, relative homogeneity of post-communist region facilitates international diffusion of democracy. Bunce and Wolchik conclude by arguing that although international democracy promotion and structural conditions are closely related to each other, yet international factor cannot succeed in the absence of domestic conditions. Furthermore, political capital accumulated by civil NGOs and democratic activists during anti-authoritarian campaigns has important impact on post-revolutionary political developments in a country. Thus, Slovakia with a strong civil society and well-developed network of NGOs proceeded to rapid democratization, whereas, Ukraine and Georgia due to their weaker civil societies and divided oppositions experienced difficulties in the paths to democracy. Outcomes of electoral revolutions in countries with less favorable structural conditions, less developed civil society and inexperienced opposition are likely to be more uncertain even if these countries enjoyed considerable international support.

Are the structural conditions the most crucial element in democratic transitions and regime change? Structural conditions were weak in the countries where color revolutions occurred, Beissinger argues (2007: 260). If taken individually, the structural conditions in each case were lacking potential for successful revolution. However, power of example can substitute some structural disadvantages. The actors were able to use power of example by emulating successful actions of previous campaigns. Thus, Beissinger’s approach is focused “on the tradeoffs between structural facilitation, the power of example, and institutional constraints” (2007: 260).
In turn, diffusion of similar strategies, repertoires, and mobilizational frames across cases was facilitated by analogues structural positions, institutional frameworks, histories, and modes of domination. Beissinger makes his analysis more sophisticated by introducing a tipping point model. International diffusion or modular phenomenon gradually increases power of example with each case unless it reaches a first tipping point. A first tipping point can be reached by cumulative weight of successful examples. Modular phenomenon first emerges in cases with stronger structural advantages, which might include such conditions as education enrollment rates, political rights, oil exports and repressive political context. With each new case structural requirements for successful action lowers. So, time and sequence of case matter. After second tipping point the power of example diminishes and eventually fades. Thus the structure and example interact. Structural conditions may shape modular action and diffusion.

Modular action between first and second tipping points demoralizes institutions leading to elite defection. However, after second tipping point incumbents impose additional institutional constraint to prevent spread of modular challenges to their regime. The eventual political outcome of the effect of modular phenomenon depends on institutional response of the regime. Beissinger’s conclusion is that political outcomes of modular phenomenon are not completely shaped by structural conditions and institutional responses. Innovations in modular actions may still override institutional constraints. Power of example has important facilitating impact on realization of electoral revolution in the countries, otherwise disadvantaged by structural conditions. However, structural conditions are necessary for establishing durable democracies, whereas modular phenomenon leads to the less stable democratic outcomes.

Finally, there is a third view that is based on actor-based institutionalist explanations. Henry Hale’s (2006) central argument is that colored revolutions were triggered by “lame-duck” syndrome. Hale gives an explanation of this syndrome as follows:
the incumbent becomes a kind of “lame duck”, someone who is increasingly seen as irrelevant to the political future and hence increasingly powerless to maintain the unity of his or her team since he or she won’t be around after the election to punish those who defect (2006: 308-309).

This syndrome is based on institutions that he calls “patronal presidentialism”. Patronal presidents unless entrenched in office have strategic power of rewarding or punishing political and business elites. In other words, presidents in post-Soviet Eurasia rely both on formal power and on informal authority based on patronage and machine politics. Hale identifies electoral revolutions with elite struggles for succession. This struggle is likely to emerge when elites identify a patronal president as a “lame duck”. Lame duck presidents as described by Hale become irrelevant because they are not anymore in position to secure interests of loyal elites as well as to or punish those elites, which are dissatisfied by their current stakes. The electoral revolutions can be explained more by succession struggles than by international democracy promotion. This cyclic process of lame-duck succession struggles is likely to continue unless institutions of patronal presidentialism will remain as the main feature in post-Soviet politics. Drawing examples from Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, Hale suggests that until now only Ukraine meets minimal requirements of a democratic state. Ukrainian opposition removed institutions of patronal presidentialism by significantly reducing presidential power and establishing institutional design with clearly defined system of checks and balances.

But perhaps the strongest accounts on the importance of political opposition (actor-based approach) in electoral mode of regime change come from the work of Marc Howard and Philip Roessler (2006). In their work on regime changes in competitive authoritarian regimes, Howard and Roessler study electoral breakthroughs, or what they call “liberalizing electoral outcomes” (LEO) that lead to democratization or/and liberalization of authoritarian regimes. To explain
which factors influence occurrence of LEO the authors use nested research design, which includes both cross-national statistical analysis and qualitative analysis of Kenyan case.

In their research, before going to statistical analysis Howard and Roessler disaggregate political regimes into five types based on various dimensions of democracy. Their typology of contemporary political regimes includes three authoritarian (closed, hegemonic, and competitive) and two democratic (electoral and liberal) regimes. This regime type disaggregation helps them to refine Levitsky and Way’s (2002) concept of “competitive authoritarianism”.

In statistical analysis several competing factors are analyzed. The variables included in statistical analysis reflect importance of actors, particularly importance of strategic choices made by political opposition and its mobilizational capacities. Other variables reflect the variables that have explanatory value competing to actor-based approaches. More precisely, they reflect or substitute variables of regime change or/and democratization widely accepted in democratization literature, which are based on explanations such as importance of economic factors, political institutions, international factors, and prior liberalization. On the basis of cross-national statistical analysis of fifty elections conducted in competitive authoritarian regimes, Howard and Roessler come to conclusion that what matters for liberalizing electoral outcomes is strategic choices made by political opposition, although not in complete isolation of other factors (2006: 375). The results of statistical analysis suggest that LEO often occurs in countries with even poor economic and institutional conditions. Thus, the research’s main finding is that the opposition’s formation of coalition along with opposition mobilization has the strongest explanatory power in explaining the electoral mode of regime change.

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5 Such dimensions include presence or absence of rule of law, free and fair elections, contested elections, and existence of formal elections
While Howard and Roessler’s statistical analysis convincingly demonstrates that strategic oppositional coalitions influence and cause LEO, it does not show variation in outcomes of liberalizing elections. In other words, their analysis shows that at least for a short-term period, elections can liberalize political space in competitive authoritarian regimes. However, the extent of political openness or competitive politics might vary across cases. In some countries, political opposition uses liberalizing effects of elections for introducing democratic reforms. Democratic reforms, which often are embodied by constitutional reforms, allow transformation of short-term liberalizing electoral outcomes into long-term political consequences that is the emergence of democratic regime. In other countries, political opposition due to various reasons does not use favorable period after LEO for changing authoritarian environment toward more democratic and pluralistic regimes. Thus LEO produces different regimes.

The links between cases of electoral revolutions are obvious. They are easily identifiable as links of one political phenomenon. However, these interconnected links cannot prove causal relations between “colored” cases. One electoral revolution does not cause another one. Even proponents of the diffusionist model recognize that modularity or ‘power of example” (Beissinger 2007) itself cannot cause another electoral revolution. It is methods and strategies of nonviolent civic resistance employed by the opposition and regime opponents that are instrumental for the success of an electoral revolution. While these methods of resistance were undeniably important for the successful overthrow of authoritarian leaders of those countries, yet it is difficult to prove that implementation of these strategies are enough for eventually toppling the authoritarian leader. There must be political opposition, which has willingness and resources to employ these methods. Proximity to the West and the possibility to gain EU membership

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6 Most of the variables in this statistical analysis are dichotomous, and therefore, cannot take into consideration degrees and variation in outcomes
create strong incentives for democratization. Positive incentives are supplemented by negative incentives such as sanctions are likely to have strong impact on democratic choices of political elites. However, we can expect that international context will work in the long-run (McFaul 2002).

Structural conditions have valuable analytical power to explain where and probably when an electoral revolution is likely to occur. The reason of why structural conditions are less significant for explaining regime change regarding cases of colored revolutions might be that they cannot tell us why some countries with more favorable conditions remain in the camp of authoritarian countries whereas the countries with less supportive structural conditions follow the democratic path. It is not to deny that favorable conditions make democracy likely to emerge. Moreover, they increase chances of democracy remaining stable. The point is that actors can override structural disadvantages in the initial stages of regime change. This is a case in the colored revolutions. Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and especially Kyrgyzstan were considered as structurally disadvantaged countries (Beissinger 2007). In the early 1990s, some countries of Eastern Europe, the region with historical experience of independent statehood, were still authoritarian regimes (e.g. Slovakia and Romania), while countries like countries Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia were viewed among the first democratic regimes in the post-communist region. Since then Kyrgyzstan retreated from democracy. The civil society in Kyrgyzstan is weaker relatively to the ones in Ukraine, Georgia, and Serbia. However, the differences cannot explain us why Kyrgyzstan before 1994 was more democratic than the latter two countries. Moreover, if compared to civil societies of some other Central-Eastern European countries, Ukraine, Georgia, and Serbia along with Kyrgyzstan can be considered as overall weak.

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7 Beissinger places emphasis on modular phenomenon, which overrides structural disadvantages (2007).
If we admit that the structural gap between researched cases is not so significant, then other factors have to be taken into account. The question is whether the countries with less structural conditions have little or no chances for preserving democracy after democratic breakthroughs. My assumption is that like in initial stages of regime change, when structural disadvantages can be override by political actors, in the post-revolutionary phase new institutional design may create good opportunities for consolidation of democracy. In the long-term, institutional design conducive to democracy may nurture democratic traditions in a country’s political culture and offers incentives for development of strong civil society. In the short term, it imposes institutional constrains on incumbents who are tempted to abuse their power. Moreover, it provides institutional framework, which provides political actors with clear set of rules of political game. If these rules are clearly defined and expressed by democratic content, then the chances for democratic consolidation can be higher.

In sum, none of the above approaches contradicts to the actor-centric model proposed in my research. International support, modular phenomena, and diffusion are supportive for electoral mode of regime change but they are not the main variables and cannot cause regime change if other factors are absent. Lack of structural conditions can be substituted by political actors. Political actors come about during contestation of authoritarian regime. In this phase, even lack of structural conditions can be overcome by nonviolent but decisive actions of political opposition. In the second phase of electoral mode of regime change that is the post-revolution phase, unfavorable structural conditions might be compensated by constitutional reforms. New constitutional arrangements remove or modify institutions, which were discredited during authoritarian rule. Instead of old institutions new institutions conducive to democracy are to be introduced in the political arena. It is beyond a scope of this paper to discuss which institutions
are conducive to democracy\(^8\). In this paper, only the first, the regime contestation phase will be analyzed.

**McFaul's noncooperative model of regime transition**

The recent electoral revolutions in the post-communist region demonstrate a new wave of transitions in the Eastern European and Eurasian context. These transitions highlight growing significance of electoral mode of regime change. Starting from Slovakia in 1998, virtually all post-socialist countries where since 1998 regime change took place underwent through electoral revolutions. To understand electoral mode of regime change in post-communist context, this thesis research utilizes the theoretical framework proposed by Michael McFaul. This section outlines the main issues addressed in McFaul’s theoretical work. Then, it questions some of the author’s points and offers preliminary suggestions for refinement of the model.

In his article “The fourth wave of democracy and dictatorships”, Michael McFaul (2002) proposes the noncooperative model of post-communist transitions as opposed to the cooperative models of the third wave of democratization literature. Although McFaul’s model supports the actor-centric approaches, that have gained wide acceptance in the preceding literature on the third wave democratic transitions in Latin America and Southern Europe, “it also challenges some the central hypotheses of the earlier literature concerning the relationship between mode of transition and resulting regime type” (McFaul 2002: 213). In fact, McFaul builds his model of noncooperative transitions based on critique and reassessment of models offered by third wave democratization literature. Because the current research refines and builds on McFaul’s model of

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\(^8\) Hale (2006) provides his interpretation of how institutions may support democratization in post-revolutionary context.
noncooperative model, it is worth to outline the model’s main propositions in more details as well as the main issues in the scholarly debate on cooperative mode of regime change.

One of the central arguments of the third wave literature is that mode of regime change has its direct impact on the resulting regime type. According to third wave literature’s accounts if during transitions balance of power between authoritarian regime and its challengers is approximately equal and uncertain, then, it is likely that democracy will emerge. Equal balance of power and uncertainty encourage political elites from both sides to go to compromise. This is because neither side has enough power to impose its preferences on its opponents. In order to avoid violent political developments and radicalization of anti-regime movement moderates from both regime supporters and regime contenders opt for so-called “pacted transition”. Pacted transition is basically power-sharing arrangements resulted from negotiations between moderate elites.

Based on the works of O’Donnell and Schmitter, Karl, Huntington, and Przeworski, McFaul distinguishes a pacted transition model, in which four sets of actors are identifiable: “soft-liners and hard-liners within the ruling elite of the ancien regime, and moderates and radicals among the challengers to ancien regime” (2002: 216). From the third wave literature, McFaul also identifies three modes of transition that result from strategic interaction of these political actors. First, it is transition by imposition, in which moderate supporters of the incumbent authoritarian regime sets the rules of transition. The second mode is pacted transition. As McFaul defines key components of democracy-enhancing transition pacts as: “Limiting the agenda of change, dividing the benefits proportionally, and marginalizing and radicals and the masses…” (2002: 218). Third mode is revolutionary transition. In the revolutionary mode of

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9 In discussion of the third wave of democratization literature’s propositions, I will mainly rely on McFaul’s accounts
regime change, democratic transition is most likely to fail because of confrontational and violent nature of transition.

Summarizing scholarly accounts on third-wave democratic transitions McFaul argues:

This set of arguments has a close affinity with positivist accounts of institutionalism that have emerged from cooperative game theory. The crafting of new democratic institutions is framed as a positive-sum game, in which both sides in the negotiation may not obtain their most preferred outcome but settle for second-best outcomes that nonetheless represent an improvement over the status quo for both sides. Uncertainty during the crafting of rules plays a positive role in producing efficient or liberal institutions. These approaches to institutional emergence also emphasize the importance of shared benefits that result from new institutional arrangements. Above all else, institutions emerge from a bargain that provides gains for everyone (2002: 220).

McFaul calls post-communist transitions in the 1990s “fourth wave” as opposed to “third wave” transitions in 1970s and 1980s. Despite both “third-wave” theorists and McFaul propose actor-centric approaches in the study of regime changes, there are considerable differences between them. According to McFaul, the crucial distinction between ‘third” and “fourth” waves of democratization rests on regional differences. The article argues that since theoretical accounts of the ‘third-wave” of democratization draw empirical evidence from the Latin American and Southern European democratic transitions, their models cannot be automatically extended to the post-communist region. In contrast to transitions of Latin American and the Southern European region, post-communist democratic transitions were based not on cooperative pacts but on revolutionary movements from below.

The noncooperative model of transition proposed by McFaul identifies three causal paths in post-communist transitions. According to noncooperative model, all three transitional paths have reversed outcomes as compared with third wave transitions. First, the imposition from below suggests the revolutionary change. While in cooperative models of the third wave democratization literature the revolutionary mode of regime change is most likely to produce nondemocratic outcomes, in the post-communist region, “hegemonic democrats” generally
nonviolently but forcibly overthrow communist dictatorships. The revolutionary mode of regime change is not elite affair. Mass mobilization and its confrontational attitudes were considered as force destructive for democracy in earlier transitions. However, in Eastern Europe such uncooperative tactics of mobilized masses promoted democracy because when “elections or street demonstrations proved that the balance of power was in the opposition’s favor they imposed their will on antidemocratic elites” (McFaul 2002: 223).

A second causal path is transition imposed by ruling communist regime. Transitions imposed by communist leaders are likely to cause dictatorships rather than democracies as opposed to the democratic transitions of the South. In this transitional path, the former communist leaders who enjoy distribution of power in their favor impose institutions and rules that support autocratic rule. This authoritarian path is distinct feature for all Central Asian states as well as Belarus.

Finally, it is the mode of transition in which distribution of power between incumbents and regime contenders is approximately equal and uncertain. According to the noncooperative model, in the post-communist region such stalemates produce uncertain results. Even or uncertain balance of power between ancien regime and political opposition led to democracy in Moldova and Mongolia, partial democracy in Russia and Ukraine, and civil war in Tajikistan.

In all three transitional paths, it is democrats who matter. If democrats dominate in balance of power then democracy results and on the contrary, if communist regime predominates over democrats then former communist leaders establish autocratic rule. Moreover, this actor-centric approach designates insignificant explanatory power to such variable as institutional design. Democracy can work under any type of institutional design if rules and institutions were

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10 by South I regard to the regions of Latin America and Southern Europe
crafted by democrats. As McFaul argues: “What matters most is that the powerful are committed to the democratic project” (2002: 225).

Our next task is to refine the current model so as we could build the analysis of electoral mode of regime change, which is central to this thesis research, on McFaul’s noncooperative model. While agree with most of the arguments and with the model itself, I will question and challenge some of the points in the discussed model.

Before going to the application of McFaul’s model to the electoral mode of regime change, few corrective remarks should be said regarding data used in regime typology scheme. McFaul’s typology of regime types is not always accurate. It is not clear the source of his typological measurement. In other words, what criteria for the typology were used? It is also not clear what is starting point of regime change or transitions in the model are examined. As transitions in most post-communist countries started from 1989-1991, we should expect that typological analysis has to evaluate countries’ democracy scores beginning from the period when actual transitions began. However, the typology provided by McFaul casts doubt on location of some countries in democratic and authoritarian cells of the typological table.

For example, Kyrgyzstan in the early 1990s by democracy indices was not worse of such countries as Croatia, Armenia, or Azerbaijan, which are defined by McFaul as full-fledged democracy in case of Croatia and partial democracies in case of Armenia and Azerbaijan. First, it is hard to imagine Tudjman’s regime, which was amongst those responsible for wars in former Yugoslavia, as a democratic regime and Tudjman as committed democrat. It was only after 1999 electoral revolution that Croatia shifted to electoral democracy. Second, throughout 1990s, Kyrgyzstan’s Freedom House scores for political rights and civil liberties were on average “4”. Freedom House assigned approximately the same scores to Croatia and Armenia. As for Azerbaijan, it had the results much worse than Kyrgyzstan. Still Azerbaijan is placed as “partial
democracy” in McFaul’s typological scheme. These small inconsistencies cannot serve as major flaws in given typological scheme but they can question the reliability of the data used for typological analysis.

The model does not specify how exactly distribution of power determines the type of resulting regime. From the model, we cannot infer how exactly balance of power in favor of democrats results in democratic regime. Nor does the author conceptualize democrats. Does McFaul refer to the individuals with democratic commitments or to the individuals that frame themselves as democrats? From examples in the article, it can be interpreted that all challengers to communist regime might be considered as democrats. The discussion of the concept of democratic opposition is important because democrats play a key role in McFaul’s noncooperative mode of transition.

Dominance of democrats in oppositional coalitions is facilitating but not sufficient and not determinative condition for producing democratic outcomes of electoral revolution. It is not democrats that matter for explaining successful transition/regime change after electoral revolution but the political opposition able to build highly organized, well-disciplined, and an ideologically pragmatic coalition. This is not to deny importance of democrats in building opposition coalitions. Nevertheless, we don’t believe as McFaul does in actors’ ideal commitment to democracy. Instead, I would argue that political actors are self-maximizers (Weingast 2006; Sato 2007).

We can identify democrats in authoritarian regimes based on their commitments to liberal reforms, for example. At the same time, to put it simply, democrats were not born as democrats. Democrats became democrats or they are considered as democrats by political opponents and external observers. Political identities, beliefs, and preferences are not fixed. They can shift across time or under particular circumstances. The circumstances can force democracy oriented
political actors to change their liberal views, at least temporarily. First, unfavorable political environment, repressions, or temptation to abuse personal, office, and state power may provide incentives for democrats to backslide from democratic positions. Instructive examples of such backsliding can be drawn from Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. In both countries, liberal and enlightened rulers Shevarnadze and Akaev started their presidency as committed democrats. Over time, unconstrained nature of their personal power induced both leaders to abuse presidential authorities at the expense of their initial democratic commitments. Eventually, both presidents ended up as dictators in regimes that backslid to authoritarianism. Second, non-democrats can be turned into democrats through, for example, institutional or international incentives. As Rustow suggests that non-democrats can be forced to behave democratically and that “their beliefs may adjust in due course by some process of rationalization and adaptation” (1970: 345).

In sum, if democratic forces are not organized and united then their capacity to influence the outcomes of regime change is very limited. Personal democratic commitments of individuals matter but they cannot guarantee cumulative effect on aggregate level. In other words, dispersed, competing, and/or not well organized various democratic forces cannot ensure existence of strong democratic opposition. Quality of democratic opposition implies unity and ideological and organizational cohesion.

There is one more but not directly relevant observation regarding our discussion of the noncooperative model. In electoral revolutions, opposition coalitions usually include moderate opponents of incumbent regime. In this model only moderate actors are present. Radicals are excluded from oppositional coalitions because violent actions may trigger violent response from authoritarian incumbents. Incumbents are “forced” to be moderate because, in all cases, electoral revolutions occurred in competitive authoritarian regimes. For various reasons such as
international pressure or weakness of a given regime, but often all these reasons combined together, authoritarian incumbents are constrained in their repressive actions.

These practical observations are to some extent in opposition to what McFaul argues. In fact, my proposition that emphasizes importance of building cohesive opposition coalition with strong organizational and mobilizational networks and intra-coalitional discipline rather than democratic nature of political opposition might be in more coincidence with earlier literature on third wave of democratization. The aforesaid has theoretical implications for McFaul’s theoretical framework. The theoretical discussion provides a starting point for the empirical application of McFaul’s model to electoral mode of regime change. In the next chapter, I will proceed to the comparative analysis of competing causal factors for electoral mode of regime change.
CHAPTER II: Identification and assessment of causal factors for electoral mode of regime change.

This chapter tackles the question of who or what is the main driving force in electoral mode of regime change. The first section examines possible competing causal factors for regime change in four countries and seeks to find out the main explanatory factor through the method of comparative analysis. The second section assesses the results of case oriented comparative analysis conducted in the second section.

Electoral mode of regime change

As I discussed earlier in the first chapter, the scholarship on electoral revolutions puts forward several alternative explanations for the success of electoral mode of regime change. These explanations vary across cases, but some of the factors are common for all instances of colored revolutions. The causal factors that can be identified in various works on the colored revolutions represent a set of cultural, structural, international and/or diffusionist, and actor based explanations. The most extensive lists of factors were presented in the works of McFaul (2007), Kuzio (2008), and Beissinger (2007).

In this section, I will identify a key factor that most likely led to the successful regime change. Since neither of the abovementioned authors made a clear distinction of which of the listed factors exerted the most crucial contribution to the electoral mode of regime change, my task is to find out the most probable explanation. I will conduct comparative analysis of alternative causal factors based on the lists of explanatory variables provided by McFaul, Kuzio, and Beissinger. I will conduct the comparative analysis that rests on Mill’s indirect method of difference. Despite some of its limitations, this method offers us an opportunity to eliminate the causal factors that have less explanatory power and to concentrate on the key factors.
Identification of the key factors that led to successful regime changes in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan is essential for our understanding of outcomes of the colored revolutions.

Michael McFaul’s work (2007) on Orange Revolution extends his noncooperative model to a single case study - Ukraine. He comes up with wide-range list of factors that might have contributed to the success of Orange Revolution. The most identifiable of them are a semi-authoritarian regime; an unpopular leader and regime; a united opposition; a perception of a falsified election; some degree of independent media; ability of the opposition to mobilize; and divisions in the security forces (McFaul 2005: 7; Kuzio 2008: 98-99).

Building on McFaul, Taras Kuzio (2008) distinguishes nine factors that contributed to the democratic breakthroughs in five electoral revolutions in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine. These causal factors represent facilitating space for democratic opposition offered by competitive authoritarian regimes. The factors include such dimensions as: “return to Europe” civic nationalism that assists in mobilizing civil society; a preceding political crisis that weakened the regime’s legitimacy; a pro-democratic capital city; unpopular ruling elites; a charismatic candidate; a united opposition; mobilized youths; and regionalism and foreign intervention (Russia or the EU)” (Kuzio, 2008: 98). According to Kuzio, the absence or lack of most of these factors will result in the failure of revolution and democratic breakthrough.

Independently from McFaul and Kuzio, Mark Beissinger (2007) in an attempt to assess colored revolutions and to predict forthcoming electoral opportunities for modular revolution identified list of structural advantages that facilitate modular democratic revolution. The list of structural advantages includes such variables as: past use of extensive electoral fraud; political opportunity structure (political rights); significant representation of opposition in legislature; large/growing enrollment in higher education; recent tradition of large-scale protest; strong
regional divisions within dominant cultural group; opposition control over local government; weakened ties between regime and police/military; penetration by transnational democracy-promotion NGOs; and absence of energy export economy (Beissinger 2007: 272). On the basis of positive or negative outcomes of these variables Beissinger counted up cumulative number of present conditions for prior revolutions and forthcoming elections. The higher cumulative number of structural modular conditions the more likely revolution will occur.

While all these factors cited in the articles of the three authors sound plausible, they represent a broad range of variables that belong to various political and social phenomena. In terms of explanatory power, each of the abovementioned factors has varying weight and value. These variables can be attributed to the factors that are based on structural, cultural, international, and agency-based explanations. There is little doubt that each of these variables contributed to the success of electoral revolution; however, I derive from the assumption that some of them have only supportive and/or additional explanatory power. In fact, the presence of all these factors in each case of successful revolution make them look overdetermined (D’Anieri 2006: 338).

I constructed comparative table in order to reduce the number of variables and to eliminate factors that had insignificant influence on the success of electoral revolution. The comparative table includes nine variables that possibly contributed to the overthrow of unpopular leader and regime. I placed each variable in the table only if it appears at least in the two lists of the three abovementioned authors. So, the factors that are present in the list of only one author are not included in the analysis. Although mentioned by all three authors, I did not include “falsified elections” variable in the table because electoral protests by definition start as response to electoral fraud. Otherwise, electoral revolutions would not be called “electoral”. This variable is constant.
Such factors that can be aggregated into one factor were included as only one variable. For instance, there is no significant difference between such factors as “unpopular leader” and “unpopular elites” or even “unpopular regime”. An unpopular leader in a semi-authoritarian state relies on the support of elites. High-ranking political elites in office are tightly connected to the president through distributional and informal networks. Through these networks authoritarian president distribute rewards to his cronies and loyal elites in exchange for political support. All together they represent a regime. Regime is unpopular because president and incumbent elites are unpopular as well. Next example is such variables as “significant representation of opposition in legislature”; “opposition control over local government”; “a charismatic candidate”; “a united opposition”; “mobilized youths”; and “ability of the opposition to mobilize”. While representing various dimensions they represent one political phenomenon – political opposition. In the table 1 these variables appear as “opposition coalition building”. In the next section, I will utilize most of these variables for measuring the quality of political opposition. Finally, I regard “foreign intervention” and “penetration by transnational democracy-promotion NGOs” as international diffusion.

As I made clear earlier, justification of the causal factors that are included in the analysis is based on the literature on colored revolutions. Below, I will stress justifiability of nine variables placed under analysis. First, for McFaul, unpopular regime is a necessary condition for democratic breakthrough (2007: 55). In all four countries of colored revolutions, presidents Milosevic, Shevarnadze, Kuchma, and Akaev lost their popularity due to corruption, military defeat, and territorial concessions. In regime in which its leaders are still popular it is difficult to mobilize people against dictatorship. In Russia, Putin’s regime would probably still be able to gain a majority of votes even without electoral fraud.
Second, significance of *coalescing opposition* for toppling authoritarian regime is emphasized by most analysts engaged in the study of revolutions. Divided and disorganized opposition is easy for government’s manipulation. Various competing and fragile groups within opposition damage its credibility in both domestic and international arena. International donors are reluctant to invest resources in weak and unreliable opposition. Divided opposition was one of the major obstacles for effectiveness of preceding political protests against autocrats in Ukraine and Serbia.

Third, *democratic capital city* provides strong logistical support for opposition during protest events. It can be transformed into power base for regime challengers. Kuzio underlines the fact that leader of Georgian opposition and current president Saakashvili became mayor of Tbilisi just one year prior to Rose revolution. Mayor of Kyiv helped Ukrainian opposition to sustain one month-long street protests throughout cold December, 2004. This is in very contrast with anti-democratic environment in Minsk, Moscow, and Baku and “therefore creates insurmountable difficulties for the democratic opposition in launching sustained street protests” (Kuzio 2008: 102).

Fourth, prior political crisis might undermine legitimacy of the ancien regime and, at the same time, accelerate and strengthen opposition. Fifth, as Kuzio argues: “*regionalism*”\(^{11}\) can simultaneously help and inhibit democratic breakthrough and revolutions” (Kuzio 2008: 106). If incumbents conduct imbalanced regional policy, the regional grievances may result. These grievances can be used by regime challengers. Sixth, *international diffusion* is significant causal factor for the reasons discussed in chapter I. Seventh, elite divisions, especially among military forces and police, undermine regime’s coercive capacity (McFaul 2007: 56) and open up political opportunities for mass mobilization (D’Anieri 2006). Eighth, mass mobilization raises costs for

\(^{11}\) emphasis is mine
repressive actions of coercive apparatus. The final causal factor is large or growing enrollment in higher education. Highly educated persons are less susceptible to government’s propaganda exposure. As Beissinger suggests: “political controls over higher education and attempts to rein in the independence of universities in the midst of an expansion of higher education provided the immediate impetus for the organization of radical youth movements” (2007: 266). Referring to the works of Lipset and Goldstone, Beissinger connects an expansion of higher education to the emergence of new elites and revolution (2007: 266). High level of education makes the country attractive for democracy promoters. Educated citizens are capable to identify their political preferences and to participate in complex electoral campaigns (Bunce and Wolchik 2006a: 10).

In addition to the cases of successful revolutions I introduced two more cases of attempted but failed revolutions in Azerbaijan and Belarus. By introducing these two cases of failed revolutions I will try to identify the effect of each variable. The condition/factor that is absent in failed cases and that is present in all four successful cases will be considered as potential cause of electoral revolution. Identification of possible factors that might have had significant impact on electoral revolution, based on causal conditions offered by McFaul, Kuzio, and Beissinger, represents simple intellectual exercise. This exercise allows us to narrow down the number of variables and to concentrate only on particular variables.

It is worth mentioning that this method, which is based on Mill’s indirect method of difference, has some potential explanatory limitations. This method rests on correlation and cross-tabulation that give us imperfect and probabilistic relationships (Ragin 1987: 40). The indirect method of difference can be flawed and inconclusive. The method’s reliance on negative cases to reject competing explanations leads, in some situations of multiple causation, to the fact that researcher cannot neither accept nor reject some causal explanations (Ragin 1987: 41). However Charles Ragin argues that this method “uses negative cases to reinforce conclusions
drawn from positive cases … The examination of negative cases presupposes a theory allowing the investigator to identify the set of observations that embraces possible instances of the phenomenon of interest” (1987: 41). The second limitation is that despite the variables included in analysis represent various dimensions of structural, cultural, international, and elite-based factors, these dimensions cannot serve as full-fledged representatives of abovementioned factors. As factors under analysis are dichotomous variables, they cannot explain us the degree of causal effect. I accept the results of this analysis not as final and absolutely correct conclusions but as an opportunity that enables me to focus on narrow set of causal variables and test them based on empirical evidence.

Table 1. Comparative analysis of causal factors for electoral mode of regime change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Unpopular leader</th>
<th>Coalition building</th>
<th>Prior political crisis</th>
<th>Democratic capital</th>
<th>Regionalism</th>
<th>International diffusion</th>
<th>Elite division</th>
<th>Mass mobilization</th>
<th>Large enrollment in higher education</th>
<th>Cumulative number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let us start from the simplest. Cumulative number of present/positive conditions is higher in cases of successful revolutions. Cumulative numbers of present conditions confirm three authors’ expectations that successful cases will feature higher number of positive conditions than cases in which revolutions failed.

Next, from the comparative table we can infer that the most probable explanations for success of revolution are opposition coalition building and elite division. These conditions are present in all positive cases and absent in both negative cases. “Mass mobilization” is absent in both negative cases, and present in positive cases, except Kyrgyzstan. Other conditions are rejected as they have present or absent instances in both positive and negative cases. Unpopular
leader, elites, and regime facilitated emergence of electoral protests in colored revolutions and Azerbaijan. However, this was not enough to overthrow Aliev’s regime. In Belarus, the opposition attempted electoral revolution despite Lukashenka received more valid votes than any of the opposition leaders (Silitsky 2006:146) and his regime like Putin’s regime in Russia is popular in the domestic arena (Kuzio 2008:102). Unpopular leader/regime does not trigger electoral protests in other post-Soviet countries as well. Thus, unpopular leader and regime are not sufficient condition for popular protest mobilization. Prior political crisis might contribute to delegitimization of illiberal regime. It might also work other way around. Yeltsin consolidated his regime after violently cracking down on the opposition parliament in 1993. Logistical support for long-sustained street protests as well as participation of residents of capital city is important for challenging regime. However, it is not necessary condition. People can come from outside of capital. Demonstrators marched to Belgrade from regions.

International diffusion is one of the most important components in electoral revolutions. However, the degree and effect of international diffusion varies across cases. For example, Belarus was highly exposed to international diffusion but results were minimal. Belarusian civic activists emulated strategies and techniques of street protests from their Ukrainian counterparts. The Belarusian opposition enjoyed considerable diplomatic support from the EU and the US. In the absence other factors international diffusion was not effective in this case. Finally, “growing enrollment in higher education” is also eliminated on the basis of indirect method of difference. This variable does not need to be crucial factor for explanation of regime change. Geddes and Zaller (1989) suggest that educated people can be susceptible to governmental exposure of political propaganda. Based on their study of Brazil, they come to conclusion that political awareness is curvilinear. While highly educated people can resist to propaganda, middle-range
educated people are likely to be the most exposed to government-dominated media, and therefore, to serve as the main source of political support for authoritarian government.

The results of this comparative analysis show that such variables as “elite defections” and “opposition coalition building” have the most likely strong causal power for explaining electoral mode of regime change. These findings do not contradict to my argument on political opposition coalition building as a crucial variable in determination of resulting regime type. Although elite defection appears in the comparative analysis as independent variable and competing explanation for regime change to the factor of opposition coalition building, in fact, it only endorses and contributes to my expectations that highlight a key role of opposition coalition building for regime change and consequently, its influence on the degree of electoral competitiveness in post-revolutionary period. I will specifically deal with the questions of elite defection and opposition coalition building in the following section of this chapter.

**Elite defections and opposition coalition building**

Under causal complexity, Mill’s indirect method of difference is a useful tool for rejecting competing explanations. At the same time, case oriented methods including Mill’s indirect method of difference “are flexible in their approach to the evidence” and they “stimulate a rich dialogue between ideas and evidence” (Ragin 1987: 52). As Charles Ragin argues about the case-oriented methods: “They do not force investigators to view causal conditions as opponents in the struggle to explain variation. Rather, they provide basis for explaining how conditions combine in different ways and in different contexts to produce different outcomes” (1987: 52). In other words, in previous section, my task was to establish patterns of causal invariance. The idea is not to completely reject all competing variables except one, but rather, to simplify causal complexity by rejecting causal factors with less explanatory power.
Nevertheless, despite all the described advantages of the indirect method of difference, it does not go beyond establishing patterns of causal invariance. To identify causal mechanisms of main factors that led to the variation in outcomes of colored revolutions, we should go into more detailed analysis. Moreover, the results of comparative analysis based on indirect method of difference present two independent variables that either independently from or in combination with each other invoked regime change and different outcomes of colored revolutions. In this section, I will analyze two causal factors: elite defection and opposition coalition building. On the basis of this analysis, I will argue that elite defection is negative independent variable that mainly explains the failure of attempted electoral revolutions and opposition coalition building is positive independent variable that explains both the success and failure of attempted cases. In addition, coalition building has decisive implications for determining outcomes in regime type variation. The two variables are not necessarily mutually exclusive hypotheses but rather, they can mutually reinforce each other. Below, I will shortly explain how elite defection during regime contestation phase contributes and enhances opposition coalition building.

The logic of protest dynamics suggests that elite defection may facilitate popular protest against authoritarian leader and eventually contribute to the downfall of a regime. A non-defection that is, if incumbent elites remain loyal to the regime, can lead to the violent crack down on mass protests and eventually to the defeat of anti-regime movement. By the same token, we can assume that loyal incumbent elites crack down on mass protests but do not succeed in defeating anti-regime mass movement. In this case, a violent course of protests is likely. Violent crack down can lead to radicalization of movement and to an armed conflict. History provides us with multiple examples when permanent violent suppression of political opposition results in a violent response. The evidence can be drawn from many countries of Latin America, Africa, Middle East, and South and South-East Asia. And finally, by itself, elite defection cannot cause a
regime change. For this, you need an agent in the shape of political opposition, popular mass movement, rebellion, insurgency, or at least guerrillas. In short, elites need some substance where they can defect. Of course, the arguments of those who highlight a key role of elites and elite defection in explaining regime change are not as straightforward as I have assumed. I will provide their more complex accounts later in this section. Nevertheless, what I propose is that elite defection does not completely determine the success or failure of electoral revolution but rather it significantly contributes to its relatively peaceful and nonviolent outcome/course.

Elite defection is one of the key explanations for regime change but it is not the main one. It is rather negative variable. It implies that elite defection is more suitable for explanation of the failure of electoral revolution rather than for explaining its success. However, when this factor combined with other key causal factor in our analysis such as opposition coalition building, a positive variable, it presents strong explanatory power for understanding the outcomes of electoral revolutions.

The factor of elite divisions is Paul D’Anieri’s (2006) central argument in explaining the success or failure of post-communist electoral revolution. By contrasting and comparing successful and failed attempts to topple authoritarian leaders in Serbia and Ukraine, D’Anieri underlines the crucial role of elites in explaining variation in outcomes. Utilizing the threshold model, he claims that the most important question in his analysis is whether protests reach a tipping point, a critical number of protesting people. According to his threshold model, protest mobilization has to reach a particular tipping point in order to grow to the level of large-scale protests. Once it reaches a tipping point, the snowball effect follows. People start to join protests because “individual’s perception of costs and benefits are dependent upon the number of people already participating” (D’Anieri 2006:333).
Whether protests reach a tipping point depends on political and economic elites’ attitudes. These attitudes create political opportunity structure and mobilization capacity. D’Anieri identifies four crucial components that create favorable political opportunity structure and eventually lead to the success. These components include unity of opposition elites, defection of pro-regime elites, well-organized protests movements, and security services (D’Anieri 2006:346-347). Security services can prevent mobilization by pre-emptive measures like early repressions or arrests of leaders of protest organizations before mobilization reaches a tipping point. Highly organized and well-funded political opposition is able to control, operate, and sustain mass mobilization through long period of time. The opposition guides mass mobilization in direction that can pose effective challenge to an incumbent regime. Businesspersons financially contribute to political opposition and media tycoons provide coverage in favor of street protests. In short, elite’s behavior determines outcomes of mass protests. For D’Anieri, the factor of divisions among regime’s elites encompasses other McFaul’s main variables such as organization of the opposition, ability to expose electoral fraud, independent media, and popular mobilization (D’Anieri 2006:336).

This dynamic approach with focus on the process of elite defection and threshold model of mass mobilization creates realistic and plausible accounts for understanding the electoral mode of regime change. While many of these accounts coincide with arguments of my thesis, few of them can be debatable. For example, one of the author’s central assumptions is that security forces can intervene in coalition building process. They can disrupt links between protesters and opposition groups, by targeting relational contacts between coalition groups. That is a plausible explanation, however, it becomes increasingly harder to disrupt such contacts in the age of internet and mobile phones. For instance, transnational terrorism has proved successful in developing ties between various terrorist groups and at the same time feels relatively secure from
security forces’ intervention. If protest groups are highly organized, they possess the techniques that allow them to reduce to the minimum direct relational contacts with other members of an opposition coalition. Thus, they can avoid security services’ interference. This kind of high level cooperation requires special training and probably previous experience of mass mobilization.

The second debatable question is whether security forces defect because they support the opposition or because it becomes obvious that the incumbent regime will fall. In many cases, security forces defect only when it becomes costly to repress protests. In such a case, intervention of security forces is dependent variable rather than independent one. Often, security forces and incumbent elites support political opposition, but after mass mobilization has reached its tipping point. To be fair to D’Anieri, he interprets this as if elites cooperatively allow reaching mass mobilization its tipping point.

Although D’Anieri asserts that elite defection is a key factor for the success of electoral revolution, in fact, the logic of his accounts demonstrates resemblance with the process of opposition coalition building. Indeed, elite defection is part of coalition building. Elites previously associated with incumbent regime start to defect in order to join opposition coalition. Most of them are late comers. Their main goal is to secure their economic or political positions after revolution as they anticipate that balance of power is in favor of opposition coalition. If strong figures or groups in the opposition refuse to join opposition coalition, then it seriously undermines the strength of political opposition in general. The unwillingness of some elites including the major opposition figures like Kostunica and Yushenko to join the opposition coalition in previous years of protests undermined its strength and legitimacy. As D’Anieri puts: “Because Yushenko had so much authority, his decision to support Kuchma in 2001 fatally

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12 see Kuzio 2005; 2008, Thompson and Kuntz 2004
undermined the Ukrainian opposition, just as Vuk Draskovic’s defection undermined the Serbian opposition in 1997” (2006: 346).

In sum, elite defection is an integral part of regime erosion and of regime change. The question is not whether elite defection opens up political opportunities for regime change or whether it is political opposition that makes incumbent elite to defect. Both options can work. As I argue throughout this discussion, these two factors do not contradict each other and in fact, they are mutually reinforcing factors. Notwithstanding, initial stages of popular protest always start from political opposition and popular protest but the reverse. Strength of political opposition galvanizes elite divisions within incumbent regime. The perception of diminished balance of power “gives rise to opportunist calculations, as elements of the regime begin to consider whether it might not be better to switch over to the opposition side before it is too late” (Thompson and Kuntz 2004: 162). Elite division has an important implication for the process of opposition coalition building. I will deal with the issues of political opposition and coalition building process in the next chapter.
CHAPTER III: Coalitional implications for the resulting regime type

The previous chapter examined possible competing explanations for the electoral mode of regime change and on the basis of comparative analysis singled out an opposition coalition building as the main explanatory variable. The main task of this chapter is to evaluate the strength of an opposition coalition and its implications for the resulting regime types. The first section of this chapter assesses the strength or quality of the coalitions in the four countries. The second section proceeds to a case study of Kyrgyzstan. The case study seeks to explain how the quality of an opposition coalition and opposition actors’ strategic choices cause an electoral revolution and influence the level of electoral competitiveness and consequently, the resulting type of a regime after an electoral revolution.

Assessment of an opposition coalition’s cohesion

Before going to the assessment of the strength or cohesion of the opposition coalitions in the four countries, I would like to spend some time discussing the possible implications of coalition building for regime transition. Sydney Tarrow building on the several social movements works defines a coalition as “Collaborative, means-oriented arrangements that permit distinct organizational entities to pool resources in order to effect change” (2005: 164). Howard and Roessler justify the importance of building opposition coalitions because “opposition political parties lack access to sufficient material resources to build a broad, nationwide political party that is capable of mounting an effective challenge to the incumbent’s hold on power” (2006: 371). These two quotations clearly imply that the primary goal of creating a coalition is to accumulate mobilizational, electoral, material, and other resources in order to effectively challenge the

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13 see Levi, Margaret, and Gillian Murphy. “Coalitions of Contention: The Case of the WTO Protests in Seattle.” Manuscript, Department of Political Science, University of Washington
existing order. Otherwise, opposition forces become an easy target for a government’s manipulation that seeks to marginalize, divide, co-opt, and repress the opposition (Howard and Roessler 2006: 371).

However, if opposition forces decide to cooperate and unite their efforts and resources to resist the incumbent government’s manipulative policies, they can secure a feasible success. Howard and Roessler indentify four ways through which an opposition coalition can achieve political liberalization (2006: 371). First, a strong and united coalition can accumulate more electoral votes and increase costs of the incumbents’ repressions and electoral fraud. Second, by building a coalition opposition forces limit space for the incumbents’ manipulative maneuvers to divide and to clash opposition leaders against each other. Third, a coalition can restrain incumbent elites from using illegal repressions and force them to take a neutral stance. Finally, a united coalition facilitates anti-regime mass mobilization.

Building coalitional networks requires considerable efforts. Various groups participating in coalition building should trust each other (Tarrow 2005: 124). Therefore, in authoritarian regimes, opposition forces need a common space, special circumstances, or appropriate conditions, in which they can build cooperation links with each other and with civil society. Three out of four Levitsky and Way’s (2002) “arenas of democratic contestation” in competitive authoritarian regimes clearly have contributing implications for opposition coalition building. With the exception of judicial arena, other three arenas (electoral, legislative, and mass media) provide good opportunities for political opposition to form a strong and viable coalition.

The first one, electoral arena, is obviously important for the analysis of electoral revolutions. Political opposition parties anticipating electoral fraud try to coalesce even before elections in order to join efforts for exposing electoral cheating of authoritarian incumbents. As electoral playing field in competitive authoritarianism does not provide equal opportunities for all
players, political opposition parties prefer to increase their chances by forming a coalition. In short, anticipation of fraudulent elections gives first incentives for opposition to coalesce. The second arena is independent mass media. It is not part of opposition coalition; nevertheless, some political parties or individuals in coalition might own some media outlets. In Georgia and Ukraine some media tycoons joined political opposition. Finally, the legislative arena can ensure durability of political opposition.

The parliament provides a space where political opposition can coordinate its efforts for building a viable coalition. An opposition coalition has little chance to succeed if it does not have close links with civil society. Such links increase mobilization capacity of opposition parties. Howard and Roessler (2006) in their case study of Kenya demonstrate the crucial importance of political opposition’s coordination in parliament and its linkages with civil society for the formation of a strong anti-government coalition. Similarly, Levitsky and Way argue that legislative arena in competitive authoritarian regimes is a public platform, where opposition groups can gather for denouncing authoritarian incumbents (2002: 56). Even if parliament is controlled by the majority of deputies loyal to authoritarian president, oppositionist parliamentarians can publicly raise some important questions during the legislative sessions and have access to media. In all four “colored” countries the opposition possessed a number of seats in parliament before mass protests started. Ukrainian and to a certain extent Serbian opposition had relatively large representations in parliaments. Several political parties in both countries coalesced against dictators. But the most important is that parliament provides opportunities for coordination of opposition as well as for building a new coalition even after successful revolution.

A factor that both McFaul and Kuzio included in their lists of “real causes” of successful electoral revolutions is “a united opposition”. This concept is synonymous to “opposition
coalition” that I proposed in the current thesis work. As “united and effective opposition” is an abstract concept, it does not tell us much what it actually means empirically. I disaggregated this concept into several dimensions that will give us clearer vision of the strength of opposition. These dimensions show mobilization capacities and coalitional strength of political opposition. Some of the dimensions that are used in the analysis I adopted from the list of factors presented in the works of McFaul, Beissinger, and Kuzio.

The main goal of assessing these mostly qualitative dimensions of political opposition is to evaluate the strength and effectiveness of opposition coalition-building. Coalition-building or cohesive opposition is the central issue for understanding electoral mode of regime change that includes not only the capacity to overthrow ancien regime but also capacity to influence political developments after electoral revolution. The table data are elaborated on the basis of content analysis of newspapers, International Crisis Group’s country analytical reports, and scholarly articles.

Table 2  Mobilization capacity of opposition\(^\text{14}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mobilization of protesters</th>
<th>Type of mobilization (dominant)</th>
<th>Previous experience with protest mobilization</th>
<th>Social bases of mobilization</th>
<th>Youth organizations</th>
<th>Mobilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>High-scale (1 000 000)</td>
<td>Regionally based and civil society networks</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Mainly City dwellers</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>High-scale 700 000</td>
<td>Partisan, regionally based, and civil society networks</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Farmers, coal miners, and city dwellers</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Medium-scale (100 000)</td>
<td>Regionally based and civil society networks</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Mainly city dwellers</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Low-scale (15 000)</td>
<td>Clan and regionally based networks</td>
<td>Not significant</td>
<td>Mainly rural peasants</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I would like to measure the quality of opposition coalitions by the dimensions, which are represented in tables 2, 3 and 4. For the sake of simplicity, I placed under analysis only limited number of dimensions. There could be more dimensions but I think that some of the tables’ dimensions explain or include many other dimensions as well. The dimensions assess the quality

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\(^{14}\) The numbers of mobilized protesters adopted from Mark Beissinger (2007)
of opposition coalitions during electoral revolutions. The strength of a coalition is measured by its mobilizational capacity and its organizational cohesion. Below, I will briefly examine each of these dimensions, as it will enhance our understanding of degree of political oppositions’ effectiveness in the four countries.

The importance of mass mobilization is usually underlined by social movements literature. The literature on regime change and colored revolutions also consider mass capacity of opposition as crucial variable that often determines regime change outcomes. Ability to mobilize large number of protesters often means that political opposition established close links with civil society. In competitive authoritarian regimes, civil society is a source of strong opposition toward illiberal dictator. Lively civil society can organize mass protest mobilization. The parties with well established partisan networks are able to mobilize their supporters to effectively challenge a dictator and ensure their political prosperity after the downfall of illiberal regime.

The first four dimensions in table 3 refer to mobilizational capabilities of political opposition during revolutions in Serbia, Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. The fifth dimension shows specifically the level of youth mobilization. The sharp contrast in number of protesters might be explained by number of factors. Serbian, Ukrainian, and to some extent Georgian oppositions, in contrast to Kyrgyz one, had better positions in access to financial support, media (especially Ukraine), training seminars for civic activists, and so on. The important is that political opposition in three former countries established close relations with NGOs and civil society activists. In Ukraine and Serbia, political parties significantly contributed to organization of mass protests. All these aspects facilitated political opportunities for mass mobilization.

In Kyrgyzstan, democratic opposition and civic activists failed to mobilize people in Bishkek and therefore, protest mobilization shifted to rural areas where “traditionalists”, at least, were able to mobilize their patronage networks. In Ukraine, democratic opposition mobilized largely civic activists, moderate nationalists, and party partisans. Mobilization also had regionally based patterns. Most demonstrators came to Kyiv from Western and Central regions (Kuzio 2005: 38; Hale 2005: 153; McFaul 2007: 58). Mass mobilization in Serbia started in regions as some cities were governed by oppositionist mayors (ICG N94 2000: 17; Krnjevic-Miskovic 2001: 105). DOS (Democratic Opposition of Serbia) relied on mobilization capacities of civil society organizations (Thompson and Kuntz, 2004: 166). One of the main differences was that Kyrgyz opposition relied on poorly trained rural people, while Ukrainian, Georgian, and Serbian ones were supported by well-trained civil society activists, party electorates, and residents of capital and other cities (Thompson and Kuntz 2004; Kuzio 2005; McFaul 2007; Beissinger 2007).

The previous experience with mass mobilization might have influenced mobilizational skills of opposition (Beissinger 2007: 271). The oppositions in the four countries had some anti regime mobilization experience. During Aksy events in 2002 and Kuchmagate scandal in 2000 Kyrgyz and Ukrainian oppositions respectively failed to sustain long-term protests mainly because demonstrators in Kyrgyzstan were brutally suppressed and six people were killed by police fire and Ukrainians lacked resources and grievances to keep people in the streets for a long period. Serbian protests in 1997 lasted 88 days but they were undermined due to partial concessions made by Milosevic regime and defections from the opposition (Thompson and Kuntz 2004: 165).

As many scholars on colored revolutions emphasize, youth organizations contributed significantly to the success of revolutions in Slovakia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine (Bunce and
Wolchik 2006a; Beissinger 2007; McFaul 2007; Kuzio 2008). In Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, young activists created strong *Otpor, Kmara,* and *Pora* youth organizations. In Kyrgyzstan, there were weak and fragmented youth organizations, which had little impact on revolutionary events. In general, Kyrgyz youth proved itself indifferent or passive regarding to participation in political protests.

In sum, mobilization capacities of political oppositions in the four countries depended on several factors including close links with of political opposition with civil society and the development of party politics. Low mobilization capacity of Kyrgyz opposition can be explained to a great extent by the unfavorable institutional incentives for political parties. The main political parties in opposition coalition were created several months before elections started. In the institutional environment that does not induce party-building, it is difficult to expect established partisan networks from newly formed parties. Nevertheless, part of the responsibility can be assigned to political parties. The leaders of Kyrgyz political parties failed to establish close ties with civil society groups. Most parties represented individual politicians and served as organizational backup for their political activities. As a rule, such parties did not have any clear political programs and consequently political followers.

Table 3  International support for opposition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>US financial Support</th>
<th>International diffusion</th>
<th>International organizations</th>
<th>Transnational activists</th>
<th>Diplomatic support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>65 million USD</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Freedom House, IFES, USAID, IRI, NED, NDI and OSI</td>
<td>Zubr, Otpor, Kmara, OK98</td>
<td>US ambassador, Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>41 million USD</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>OSI, Marshall Fund, Canadian Int. Dev ment Agency, East West Institute, Rockfeller Found-n</td>
<td>OK 98, Glas 99</td>
<td>OSCE, Swiss and Dutch Embassies, Slovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Freedom House, IFES, USAID</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>US ambassador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Soros Foundation, NDI, NED, IRI, Freedom House</td>
<td>Otpor</td>
<td>USA, Russia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data for amount of money provided for opposition by the US government adopted from Mark Beissinger (2007). The names of international organizations, states, and transnational youth organizations that provided diplomatic support and training, technical, and financial assistance are adopted from Beissinger (2007), Bunce and Wolchik (2006a), and Minic and Dereta (2007).
Table 3 provides the dimensions of international support for opposition coalitions. It demonstrates the extent oppositions in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan enjoyed international support and diffusion. In each of the dimensions represented in the table 3, the oppositions in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine received much greater attention from international democratic community. Although international support can be among important factors, which enhances effectiveness of the opposition; however, I suggest that international support plays only secondary and supportive role in success of electoral revolutions\textsuperscript{17}. The comparative analysis conducted in the previous chapter also suggests that international support is not among the most crucial factors that caused regime change in these four countries. In addition, the evidence from Kyrgyzstan demonstrates that Kyrgyz opposition received minimum level of international support, yet it was able to topple Akaev’s regime.

The next features in our analysis are party politics and independent parliament. Party politics was important for the effectiveness of coalitions because the opposition in parliament was able to create political opportunities for mass mobilization. Parliament is also a place where the opposition may concentrate its efforts to check executive power of an authoritarian president (Levitsky and Way 2002). Even before the Orange revolution the Ukrainian opposition had significant number of seats in Rada, the Ukrainian parliament. One of the opposition party leaders, Aleksandr Moroz used parliament to have access to media through which he distributed Kuchmagate related secret tapes (Levitsky and Way 2002: 56; McFaul 2007: 61; Kuzio 2005: 31, 36). In Kyrgyzstan, parties did not play any significant role; however, the parliament accommodated a number of opposition deputies. In Serbia, 18 political parties were united in the influential DOS bloc that played a crucial role in overthrowing Milosevic.

\textsuperscript{17} see detailed discussions on the greater importance of the domestic factors in democratic transitions over the international ones Way, 2008, and Linz and Stepan, 1996
Karatnycky and Ackerman on the ground of cross-national statistical analysis of regime transitions suggest that presence of nonviolent strong civic coalitions during protest events contributes significantly to the freedom of democracy (2005: 7-9). I place this dimension in the comparative table as possible causal factor for democratic outcome of electoral revolution. The evidence shows that demonstrations in Kyiv were expertly organized. Ukrainian opposition coped well to sustain nonviolent mass demonstrations (one million demonstrators) for a long period, and at the same time, the Kyrgyz opposition was less successful in sustaining nonviolent order during protests. The Serbian and the Georgian oppositions carried out generally peaceful protests; however, the crowds violently stormed some government buildings in Serbia and the parliament in Georgia (Thompson and Kuntz 2004: 168; Way 2008: 58).

Finally, the comparative table includes the two variables such as the opposition’s control over local government and dominance of democrats in the opposition. Beissinger suggests that the opposition’s control over local government ensures a regional power base for opposition forces. Such a regional base facilitates mobilizational success (2007: 270-271). The significance of dominance of democrats in the opposition is particularly emphasized by McFaul (2002). As McFaul argues: “Democrats with power, not the process of transition, produced new democratic regimes” (McFaul 2002: 228).

To identify which of the “coalitional” dimensions of the opposition has the strongest impact on the level of electoral competitiveness after an electoral revolution, I utilized Mill’s indirect method of difference. The indicator for democratic outcomes of electoral revolutions is the level of electoral competitiveness. I measure the level of electoral competitiveness by Freedom House scores for electoral politics. I define resulting regime type according to level of electoral competitiveness. The score higher than 4.00, according Freedom House electoral
process rating, indicates that regime is “electoral democracy” and the score below 4.00 indicates electoral authoritarianism.

Table 4  Comparative analysis of “coalitional” causal factors for the level of electoral competitiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>The opposition’s representation in parliament</th>
<th>Party politics and distinct groups in the opposition</th>
<th>Absence of violence during protests</th>
<th>Control over local government</th>
<th>Dominance of democrats in the opposition</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Cumulative number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of comparative analysis based on Mill’s indirect method of difference suggest that the coalitional dimension with the strongest explanatory power for the level of electoral competition is “party politics and distinct groups in the opposition”. The Serbian and Ukrainian revolutions produced transitions with democratic outcomes to great extent due to opposition coalitions in these countries were cohesive with strong organizational power and discipline. The Serbian and Ukrainian opposition parties had been established long before the electoral revolutions occurred in their respective countries. The parties created close links with civil society and their electorate. These parties and cohesive political groups remained in politics even after an electoral revolution and the disintegration of broad opposition coalitions. They continue taking an active part in politics. The Ukrainian case is instructive in this sense. It shows that even the former incumbent party is able to gain power as a result of free and fair elections. In Serbia, some radical pro-Milosevic nationalist parties were a part of winner electoral coalitions. They are represented in the parliament and are able to gain some cabinet posts.

On the contrary, political parties in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan were formed just before parliamentary elections that turned later to electoral revolutions. It is not surprising that within
such a short period, they were not able to obtain any significant support from constituency. After
the opposition coalitions disintegrated no serious distinct groups left in the political scene capable
to effectively keep accountable new incumbents. The Georgian opposition leader Saakashvili
won his presidency with 96% of votes, the numbers comparable with electoral figures in
Uzbekistan. While this high number of votes can be assigned to post-revolutionary euphoria, it
still indicates lack of alternative political forces in the opposition coalition.

Table 5  The Freedom House scores for electoral process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>Resulting regime type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>Electoral democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>Electoral democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>Competitive authoritarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>Competitive authoritarianism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 indicates the Freedom House scores for electoral process in four countries and
shows post-revolutionary resulting regime type and the level of electoral competitiveness. This
table demonstrates that Ukraine and Serbia became electoral democracies and Georgia and
Kyrgyzstan remained competitive authoritarian regimes. While the scores reflect different
outcomes of electoral revolutions in regime variation and the level of electoral competitiveness,
this strict division between regime types does not reflect qualitative variation between Serbian
and Ukrainian regimes on the one hand, and between Kyrgyz and Georgian regimes on the other
hand.

In sum, the comparative analysis conducted in this section suggests that the resulting from
electoral revolution a regime type to great extent depends on what type of the opposition is in
place during electoral revolutions in each particular case. Despite the oppositions in all four
countries succeeded in building anti-regime coalitions and overthrowing ancien regimes, the
countries followed different political trajectories. Kyrgyzstan and Georgia are back to
authoritarianism. The dominance of weak and fragmented democrats in the Georgian opposition did not prevent pro-western and to some extent liberal Saakashvili’s regime from sliding back to authoritarian rule. This observation contradicts to McFaul’s claim that the balance of power in favor of democrats results in democratic transition. Democrats in Kyrgyzstan were even weaker than in Georgian case. They were forced to ally with regional leaders as on their own democratic forces were not able to mobilize masses. It is not surprising that the opposition led by regional leaders relied on traditional patronage networks rather than on civic activists. Consequently, as the Freedom House electoral scores indicate, the electoral processes both in Georgia and in Kyrgyzstan are getting worse even if compared to the early periods of Shevarnadze and Akaev’s rule.

**Coalition-building in Kyrgyzstan**

The case of the Kyrgyz Tulip Revolution demonstrates that authoritarian regimes can be overthrown by weak political opposition. The Tulip Revolution has shown that coalition building plays a central role in strengthening the opposition’s potential to challenge authoritarian regime. While successful in overthrowing autocratic president, the opposition coalition was unable to achieve democratization of the country. Despite “liberalizing outcomes” of an electoral revolution, the Kyrgyz opposition did not go to decisive democratic reforms. Due to internal rivalries and lack of clear vision of democratic reforms, political opposition did not manage to resist cooptation and manipulation policies of the new government. While the previous section showed that an opposition coalition played a critical role in determining the outcomes of an electoral revolution and identified “coalitional” factors that influence the level of electoral competitiveness, this section provides descriptive analysis of an opposition coalition building in
Kyrgyzstan. It also shows how the opposition’s internal weaknesses led to the failure of the democratic reforms in the country.

The first attempts to build anti-regime coalition were undertaken even before the Tulip Revolution. In 2001, four opposition parties formed the coalition “Popular Congress of Kyrgyzstan” in response to controversial secret negotiations on territorial concessions of the Kyrgyz government with China (Khamidov 2002). The coalition failed to seriously challenge the government as opposed to efforts of individual deputy Azimbek Beknazarov, whose anti-Akaev actions provoked protest mobilization of his constituency. In 2002, during clashes in Aksy between security forces and supporters of Beknazarov six people got killed. This political crisis had important implications for future political developments in the country. First, it seriously undermined the legitimacy of Akaev’s regime. Even some of the core regime supporters tried to distance themselves from Akaev. Second, the crisis showed growing dissatisfaction and political influence of opposition leaders from the southern part of the country (Khamidov 2002). Third, president Akaev “scapegoated” and forced to resign some chief officials including head of presidential administration, interior minister, and prime minister Kurmanbek Bakiev, who later became one of the leaders of an opposition coalition that toppled Akaev. The president announced local police responsible for the bloodshed during protests. Akaev taught a hard lesson that incumbent elites learned quickly. When next political crisis came that is the Tulip revolution, the police was careful enough not to fully trust the president. The Aksy crisis created a favorable soil for elite defections during the Tulip revolution. The general amnesty calmed down convicted Aksy police officers who feared persecution for firing at the demonstrators. However, the police’s dissatisfaction with central authorities for being blamed for shootings remained. As International Crisis Group reported: “The prospect of regional police forces beginning to make
their own political decisions is worrying” (ICG N34 2002: 11). The president’s attitudes toward loyal elites generated wide spread perceptions on Akaev as a non-reliable partner or patron. Curious enough that one of the ardent anti-Akaev oppositionists Topchubek Turgunaliyev anticipated the downfall of the president claiming that Akaev would suddenly resign and flee the country before next presidential elections (Khamidov 2002).

The Aksy crisis became a focal point for the emergence of a new anti-regime coalition. This time a more viable coalition was created. In contrast to the previous one, the new coalition involved not only political parties but also human rights activists, NGOs, and independent parliament deputies. They formed a movement “For resignation of Akaev and reforms for people” and organized some anti-Akaev rallies and demonstrations. Some of the independent media joined protests by criticizing president’s family for rampant corruption. However, this chaotic and diverse coalition disintegrated well before next parliamentary elections in 2005 and never posed serious challenge for Akaev’s rule.

The first signals of emergence of “Tulip” coalition appeared only four months before the revolution. On 29 December, 2004, the political movements Ata-Jurt (Fatherland), Jany Bagyt (New Direction), Popular Congress of Kyrgyzstan, and Popular Movement of Kyrgyzstan as well as non-government organization Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society announced the formation of opposition coalition Civic Solidarity For Free and Fair Elections (MSN 2004). However, the three out these four political movements that initiated this coalition were established only several days before. The names of these movements without any partisan networks were unknown for ordinary voters. Therefore, these movements were rather symbolic political entities that represented several prominent political opposition figures. But the fact of creation of coalition demonstrated that political opposition was willing to cooperate in resisting to Akaev’s daughter’s brand party Alga Kyrgyzstan (Forward Kyrgyzstan).
Only a few leaders in the opposition could claim nation wide support or at least, political recognition by citizens from most of the regions of Kyrgyzstan. Most of the opposition leaders could rely on support of narrow constituencies or on support of voters in single or in several regions. Democratic leaders of opposition similarly relied on support of relatively viable civil society represented mainly by NGO leaders, liberal intelligentsia, and some democracy oriented youngsters (KelKel). Most of their social and political support derived from urban population of Bishkek and few other towns.

Consequently, during the Tulip Revolution three main categories of opposition were identifiable. The first one was represented by former diplomats, so called ambassadors, with Roza Otunbaeva, former ambassador and foreign minister, at the head. Along with civil society leaders, this group represented an intellectual opposition. That was a rather small circle, but many of them while working abroad in diplomatic service became well familiar with international context. Roza Otunbaeva being a representative of one the international organizations in Georgia during Rose Revolution tried to implement some features characteristic for colored revolutions. When they were rejected from registration as candidates for parliamentary elections, the “ambassadors” set up their tents in central square of Bishkek in January 2005, emulating this practice from the activists of Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Although the “ambassadors” failed to mobilize mass support, this example demonstrated their eagerness to use power of symbols. Otunbaeva made several references in interviews to mass media to Georgian and Ukrainian revolutions during protest events in Kyrgyzstan. She was an initiator of using yellow color as a symbol of Tulip Revolution.

The second opposition group included mainly regional leaders. I will call this group “traditionalists”. This group was less familiar with advanced methods of protest employed in Georgia and Ukraine. Unlike “ambassadors”, who mainly relied on support of politically passive
urban residents of Bishkek, regional leaders including Kurmanbek Bakiev, a future president, preferred to mobilize his traditional patronage networks. They mobilized clan and regional based networks and their strategies differed from those ones in Bishkek. They blocked main highways and the airport in Osh, as well as took some administrative office buildings in Talas, Osh, and Jalalabat. These strategies might have emulated from examples of other “colored” revolutions with some modifications.

Ironically, the spread of protests in rural areas and middle size towns became possible due to internal diffusion rather than international one. When the first protesters in Jalalabat region seized administrative buildings, rural protesters in other regions emulated their strategies. They quickly figured out that in order to attract attention of authorities they had to seize important objects like airports, main administrative buildings or main highways. The opposition leaders in Jalalabat also tried to send their emissaries to other regions in order to expand the protests (Radnitz 2006:136).

In Kyrgyzstan, traditionalists framed their challenge to Akaev’s regime as democratic protest movement against authoritarian and corrupt regime. During the protests they used democratic and revolutionary rhetoric. In many cases, if a traditionalist candidate lost the elections he mobilized his patronage networks publicly claiming that Akaev’s regime used administrative resource against him. Single member districts reinforced regionally and local based political support for traditionalists. It was not difficult for the lost candidates mobilize several hundred people, mainly their relatives and kinsmen.

The third group was represented by civil society activists. NGOs had a great contribution to effectiveness of political opposition. Some NGOs, mainly human rights organizations and NGOs engaged in promotion of democracy, actively participated in demonstrations. NGOs attempted to provide the common links that would connect isolated political parties with civil
society activists and ordinary voters. They also contributed to moderation of the conflict and tried to train people to act nonviolently, but their overall impact on revolution was very limited in comparison with Ukrainian case, for example.

The evidence from Kyrgyzstan contradicts to D’Anieri’s assumption that security forces can disrupt mass mobilization before it is going to reach a tipping point. Special forces undertook considerable effort to stop mass mobilization before it was going to grow to large scale. They fought back against demonstrators who occupied administrative buildings in Osh and Jalalabat. But these measures led to the opposite effect. These actions of special police radicalized protest movement. Next morning about 10 thousand protesters attacked local police stations in Jalalabat and captured airport in Osh in order to prevent Bishkek from sending new police troops to southern regions controlled by opposition (ICG N97 2005: 9).

These events that probably occurred beyond opposition elite’s control demonstrate the opposition’s poor organizational skills and mobilization management. The leaders of the opposition were not able to control the actions of the masses. They did not have time to anticipate or react on what was going on. They coordinated their efforts depending on how events were unfolding. In other words, it was often the unfolding events that determined actions of the opposition.

The process of building opposition coalition was spontaneous. Despite main opposition leaders had signed coalitional agreement even before parliamentary elections started, in practice, there was little cooperation and coordinated actions. As one of the opposition candidate politician acknowledged:

To be honest, we, the opposition, never really sat down together. There were never any discussions; nobody spoke out about serious questions, about the presidency, about our programs. We didn't speak about a [single] leader. (Crisis Group interview, Osh, 3 March 2005 ICG N97 2005:2)
As this quotation suggests, no one in the opposition did not really know what to do if the opposition would gain state power. To be fair to the opposition leaders, they probably did not expect that Akaev’s regime would fall so soon. It is not surprising that opposition leaders did not know what to do when the regime actually collapsed. Again, as an honest response of the oppositionist suggests, the leaders of political opposition coalition did not elaborate their possible plans, political programs, and political and constitutional or any other reforms.

After deposing Akaev, the opposition coalition quickly disintegrated. The new provisional government headed by Kurmanbek Bakiev, leader of Popular Movement of Kyrgyzstan (NDK). He formed the new cabinet that included some opposition leaders as well as ministers from Akaev’s former governments. After several reshuffles, the government failed to include representatives of all coalitional groups. That is a normal political process; however, after several months of Bakiev’s rule, it became more obvious that Bakiev made new government appointments on the basis of personal loyalty and patronage networks. There was little sign of Bakiev’s inclination to political and particularly to constitutional reforms. Demands on constitutional reforms were especially popular after the revolution. One of the first Bakiev’s promises was to conduct constitutional reforms that would be directed toward reduction of presidential power and provision of conditions favorable for free and fair elections.

Starting from the spring of 2006, the new opposition coalition “For Reforms” was formed. This coalition was more organized and representative than the one that overthrew Akaev. Growing coordination of opposition deputies in the parliament facilitated formation of the coalition. In addition, the establishment of close links with some civil society groups apparently increased the strength of political opposition. The coalition organized series of demonstrations throughout 2006 with demands to conduct political reforms. The protests culminated in
November 2006 when the president agreed to adopt new version of constitution that significantly reduced his power. In December, one month later after the November constitution was adopted Bakiev counterattacked against the opposition and regained his authorities back by using constitutional inconsistencies for his benefit (Marat 2008: 314). The new wave of coalitional consolidation was defeated in the April 2007 due to the opposition splitting into two opposition blocs and some opposition leaders were co-opted by incumbent regime. As a result, political opposition was demoralized and was not able to raise new protests after obviously fraudulent parliamentary elections in December 2007. One more empirical evidence that support my argument on importance of coalition building comes from events of April 2007. The same opposition that succeeded in putting pressure on the incumbents in November 2006, this time proved itself inefficient due to splits in united coalition. The failure of the opposition turned to the benefit for authoritarian incumbents who eventually consolidated their power. Consequently, Kyrgyzstan shifted to a new phase of authoritarian consolidation.
CONCLUSION

The main goal of this research has been to identify the causal factors for the variation in outcomes of electoral revolutions. The comparative analysis in this research demonstrates that a coalition building plays a central role in explaining the success of an electoral revolution. In contrast to cases of failed revolutions, the oppositions in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan were capable to build anti-regime coalitions and to overthrow dictators in respective countries. The elite divisions within an incumbent regime reinforce the probability of the successful regime change. But the solidarity within ruling elites imposes additional constraints on a coalition-building process and increases costs for protest mass mobilization. It is hard to say how much repression is needed to stop mass-mobilization as well as to identify a tipping point when the incumbent elites start to defect. However, it is clear that increasing repressions can either prevent protests or lead to radicalization of the anti-regime movement. The evidence from Uzbekistan shows that permanent repressions in the absence of favorable economic conditions may lead to the latter scenario.

The main finding of the current research, however, is that democratic outcomes of the revolution are strongly influenced by organizational cohesion of an opposition coalition. The weakly organized coalition disintegrates immediately after a successful electoral revolution. A cohesive coalition also eventually disintegrates. The main difference is that after the disintegration of organizationally strong coalition distinct players such as political parties, blocs, and other smaller coalitional entities remain in politics and continue to influence decision making process in the country. This argument is endorsed by the comparative and the case study analyses conducted in the third chapter. The comparative analysis of the four “colored” cases shows that Serbia and Ukraine, where coalitions were well organized and included long-established parties
and/or blocs with distinct political groups, experienced significant rise of competitive politics. At the same time, the case study of Kyrgyzstan shows how weak cohesion and the absence of strong and organized actors in the opposition coalition led the country back to authoritarian rule.

If what McFaul’s model states is true regarding the first post-communist transitions in 1990s, then, we might argue that electoral mode of regime change brings considerable modifications to the McFaul’s noncooperative model as concerns recent regime changes as a result of colored revolutions. The first modification concerns McFaul’s argument on the distribution of power in favor of the democratic opposition. This factor was not clearly specified in his original article (McFaul 2002). However, in his later articles, McFaul (2005; 2007) hints on “a united and effective opposition”. The findings of the current research suggest that not only distribution of power but mainly cohesion of an opposition coalition is important for democratic transition. The second important modification concerns the dominance of democrats in the opposition. Again, comparative analysis conducted in this research suggests that the dominance of democrats in the opposition is facilitating but not necessary condition for a democratic breakthrough. The dominance of fragmented democrats in the Georgian revolution did not result in democratic transition whereas the Serbian coalition equally dominated by nationalists and democrats produced greater democratic outcomes.

The results of the thesis contribute to the study of electoral revolutions by highlighting the importance of strategic choices made by political actors and particularly, by political opposition. These strategic interactions influence the probability of the success or failure of an electoral revolution. More precisely, the decision of the opposition forces to unite in one broad-based coalition significantly increases chances for the successful regime change and for democratic transition. These findings endorse actor-centric approach proposed in my thesis. However, it does not imply that the structural, cultural, institutionalist, and international factors are insignificant.
For example, the existence of strong political parties or other distinct political groups that have considerable importance for cohesion of opposition coalitions might be explained by various factors. Favorable institutional design gives incentives for creating and developing political parties and programs. The economic growth and balanced social development increase number of well educated and politically aware middle class citizens that are more likely to resist illiberal policies of an authoritarian government. Robust political culture may involve the tradition of large-scale protests, which are often a necessary condition for successful democratic revolution (Beissinger 2007: 271). Finally, international support fosters the development of civil society and advocacy groups, especially in poor and authoritarian countries. In short, I consider political actors as the main explanatory factor determining the outcomes of regime transitions, while other factors play a supportive role.

The fact that I consider elections as the main indicator of regime type does not mean that I fall into “electoral fallacy”. However, even if the elections do not account for full-blown democracy they are a necessary condition for democracy (Bunce and Wolchik 2006b: 9). At the same time, this strict division into electoral democracies and competitive authoritarianisms does not reflect qualitative differences in the variation of outcomes of colored revolutions. Some more complex typological analysis is needed to distinguish qualitative differences between the four resulting regimes. Some speculative reflections below might be helpful for identifying future directions of possible research on the regime types resulted from electoral mode of regime change. The new incumbents in Kyrgyzstan and Georgia used cooptation in order to consolidate their new authoritarian regimes. Cooptation diminishes power and internal cohesion of the opposition. I suggest that successful transition from electoral revolution to full-scale competitive politics has to be secured by proper institutional arrangements, which limit power of a president. I also suggest that the retreat to authoritarian rule became possible because democratic forces in
the opposition were not capable to decisively push president Bakiev to constitutional reforms immediately after revolution had occurred. The Kyrgyz opposition wasted its democratic chance in December 2006, when allowed Bakiev to retreat from newly adopted amendments to constitution, which envisaged serious reduction of presidential executive power. The Ukrainian transition to electoral democracy was secured by a constitutional agreement between Yushenko and other political forces (Hale 2005:163). Serbia is an electoral democracy: however, the Serbian regime is distinct from the Ukrainian one. Although Serbian elections are highly competitive, the referendum on the new constitution was characterized by electoral fraud and it fell short of being free and fair. The new constitution adopted in 2006 reflected illiberal and exclusionary for ethnic minorities nationalist trends in Serbian politics (ICG N44 2006: 1, 8-10).

The transition is distinguished by military intervention in state affairs, incorporation of remnants of Milosevic’s repressive apparatus to the new regime, and highly polarized politics, which resulted in assassination of prime-minister Djindjic in 2003 (Pribicevic 2004). Georgia might represent a borderline case. Despite president Saakashvili making some efforts to root out corruption and introduce democratic reforms, the electoral process falls short of international democratic standards. The presidential power is practically unconstrained by other branches. Drawing on Georgian experience my speculative suggestion is that excessively charismatic leader might be not good for competitive politics. Henry Hale makes a similar claim. He suggests that even presidents committed to democracy are tempted to impose reforms from above “through existing concentration of power rather than to build the broad-based coalitions that other kinds of institutions may necessitate” (Hale 2006: 312).

In the end, I have to highlight some limitations of this research. The first potential problem of my research project is volatility of political developments in the four countries. The political situation in these countries may change and does change very rapidly. The conclusions
drawn from my analysis might be irrelevant in some time. The political developments may distort or undermine my research outcomes. The second problem is a small number of cases so far available for comparative analysis of the colored revolutions. The generalizations made in this research are tentative and can be modified as new potential cases with distinct outcomes may emerge in the future. Finally, the depth of this research may not on the sufficient level due to space and time limitations of MA thesis.
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