REGULATING EUROPARTIES:
ONE STEP CLOSER TO INTEGRATION OR TWO STEPS BACK?

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List of Abbreviations

AEN  Alliance for a Europe of Nations
ALDE  Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
CEE  Central and Eastern Europe
CESP  Confederation of European Socialist Parties
CP  Comparative Politics
EC  European Community
ECGP  European Coordination of Green Parties
ECR  European Conservatives and Reformists
EDP  European Democratic Party
EFA  European Free Alliance
EFD  The Europe of Freedom and Democracy
EFGP  European Federation of Green Parties
EGP  European Green Party
ELD  Federation of Liberal and Democratic Parties in the EC
ELDR  European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party
EMU  Economic and Monetary Union
EP  European Parliament
EPP  European People’s Party
EU  European Union
EUD  European Union Democrats
IR  International Relations
PASDE  Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
PEL  Party of the European Left
PES  Party of European Socialists
SEA  Single European Act
UEL  Union of the European Left
UEN  Union for a Europe of Nations
Chapter 1: Introduction

Modern democracy, it has been said, would be “unthinkable save in terms of political parties” (Schattschneider 1942: 1). Given the importance attributed to political parties in the functioning of today’s democratic polities (cf. Aldrich 1995; Diamond and Gunther 2001), one might expect the parties of the European Union (EU) to be a vibrant, coherent, and powerful bunch. Yet one needs know little about EU politics to realize that this is not the case. Despite numerous efforts, the EU has had remarkably little success in developing political parties of its own. For decades, EU parties, known colloquially as ‘Europarties’, have existed in relative obscurity. Long denied even constitutional recognition, Europarties have historically depended on the resources of their respective European Parliament (EP) party groups and constituent national parties. In part as a consequence, Europarties have been dismissed as “nothing more than clearing houses, providing information, campaign materials, and organizing (poorly attended) conferences” (Hix 1995: 535). Not only have they been accused of lacking coherent organisational structures, but it has also been argued that they have failed to offer clear policy directions (Hix 1999).

Mindful that the sorry state of Europarties’ development has limited their ability to offer meaningful representative politics, Europarty leaders have taken matters into their own hands, seeking to secure the legal recognition of Europarties and to obtain an EU-based source of financing for their activities. After a decade of such advocacy, the European Council passed ‘Regulation 2004/2003 on governing political parties at the European level and the rules regarding their funding’. The Regulation laid out the necessary criteria for establishing which parties count as ‘political parties at the European level’. More significantly for Europarty leaders, the Regulation also dedicated considerable public funding for Europarties from the EU budget. In the aftermath of the Regulation’s passing, many expected Europarties’ position within the EU political system to strengthen or at the very least, be further defined. It was also hoped that Europarties would gain greater organisational and financial independence from EP party groups and national parties. For the European Peoples’ Party president Wilfried Martens, the Regulation “could prove crucial for the whole way in which we conduct European politics in the future” (in Johansson 2009: 167).

Given the high expectations of the Regulation, six years after its adoption several important questions present themselves: What consequences does the newly adopted
Regulation have for the organisational development of Europarties? Has public funding of Europarties succeeded in altering the power relations between Europarties, EP party groups, and national parties? Does it ultimately represent one step further in the organisational development of Europarties, making them organisationally more similar to national political parties?

These are the questions that this paper aims to answer. It does not focus its attention on the particular activities and influence of Europarties in the EU political system but rather, on their organisational development. Assessing levels of Europarties’ organisational development is important because it determines parties’ capacity to fulfil the roles prescribed to them by the Maastricht Treaty. It shall be argued that, at least in the short term, the passing in 2003 of Europarty Regulation has failed to live up to its proponents’ expectations. In some respects, it even represents a step back in Europarties’ organisational development, increasing their dependence on both EP party groups and national parties.

In making this case, the paper is structured as follows: It starts by providing insight into the competing theoretical perspectives on Europarties. Chapter 3 follows by outlining the analytical and methodological underpinnings of the paper. Chapter 4 traces Europarties’ organisational trajectory before the adoption of the Regulation in 2003. Chapter 5 proceeds with an assessment of the impact of the Regulation on the organisational development of Europarties. Finally, chapter 6 concludes by wrapping the threads of analysis together and offering insight into the Regulation’s impact on the future development of Europarties.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Perspectives on Europarties

This paper explores the impact of the 2003 Europarty Regulation on the organisational development of Europarties. This chapter lays out the framework for this discussion. As shall be seen, Europarties are one of three dimensions along which EU party politics is based. Unlike national parties and EP party groups, the realm of Europarties remains understudied and under-theorized, for reasons that shall be explored below. The following section thus begins by introducing the reader to the transnational context within which Europarties operate. It continues by providing a theoretical discussion of Europarty development.

2.1 Party Politics at the EU Level: Europarties in Context

Party politics in the EU is organized along three dimensions: national parties; EP party groups; and transnational party federations also known as Europarties.¹ This threefold structure is roughly comparable to the three ‘faces’ of national party organization, according to which parties are comprised of three elements – the ‘party in public office’; the ‘party in central office’; and the ‘party on the ground’ – the combination of which forms the party as a whole (Katz and Mair 1993; Katz 2002). Thus where EP party groups embody the ‘party in public office’, Europarties symbolize the ‘party in central office’, and national parties the ‘party on the ground’.²

On the EU level, the balance of power between these three dimensions differs starkly from anything found in political parties operating at the national level. Whereas at a national level the ‘party in public office’ is the most dominant and influential face of party life (Katz and Mair 2002; Van Biezen 2003), in the context of the EU the ‘party on the ground’ is clearly the most powerful of the three components. Indeed, it is national parties—not Europarties—that control the EU electoral arena, nomination procedures for Members of European Parliament (MEP) candidates, as well as EU decision-making. According to Bardi (1994: 360), national parties’ predominant position at the EU level, when combined with

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¹ In the literature, no single term is widely accepted to refer to these extra-parliamentary party organizations at the EU level. Some authors call them ‘European party federations’ (Hix and Lord 1997). Others call them ‘Europarties’ (Johansson and Raunio 2005; Bardi and Calossi 2009) or ‘transnational parties in the EU’ (Bell and Lord 1998; Hanley 2008). The situation is complicated by the habit of some authors, like Bartolini (2005) and Bardi (1994), to use the term ‘Europarties’ to refer to both European party federations and European parliamentary groups. This paper adopts the term ‘Europarties’ but uses it only with reference to the party federations.

² The latter is true because national parties are constituent members of party formations at the EU level.
their unwillingness to forgo such predominance, presents “the most powerful obstacle to the development of genuine Europarties”.

Despite such impediments, Europarties have slowly come into their own. Often described as ‘parties of parties’—since their membership is predominantly corporate: composed not of individuals but rather of national political parties from EU member states - nine Europarties currently operate within the EU (see table 1). Of these, by far the most developed are the four Europarties that correspond to the four traditional European party families: the Socialists – the Party of European Socialists (PES); the Christian Democrats – the European People’s Party (EPP); the Liberals – the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR); and the Greens – the European Green Party (EGP). These four Europarties will serve as the focal point of this study.

Table 1: Parties at the EU Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Europarties</th>
<th>EP Party Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party of European Socialists (PES)</td>
<td>Progressive Alliance of Socialists &amp; Democrats (PASDE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European People’s Party (EPP)</td>
<td>EPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR)</td>
<td>ALDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Democratic Party (EDP)</td>
<td>Greens/EFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Green Party (EGP)</td>
<td>GUE/NGL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Free Alliance (EFA)</td>
<td>UEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of the European Left (PEL)</td>
<td>The Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance for the Europe of the Nations (AEN)</td>
<td>European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Democrats (EUD)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own elaboration.

Over the last decade or so, Europarties have demonstrated signs of greater inclusivity, cohesiveness, and have even begun to structure along the traditional left-right spectrum (Bartolini 2005: 341). One might expect such tendencies to have prodded scholars to devote greater attention to them. To date, however, Europarties have largely been excluded from analytical focus. Their absence from inquiry can largely be explained by their underdevelopment, including their weak organisational structures and meagre resources. Indeed, they remain heavily dependent on EP party groups and national member parties and lack any discernable influence over EU party politics, the combination of which makes them an undesirable subject of research.³ However, even sceptics like Bardi recognise that “things

³One exception is the seminal work of Pridham and Pridham (1981). Notably, however, the situation has improved markedly throughout the last decade as authors have sought to identify and explain various channels
might change as a result of the soon-to-be-enforced Europarty statute” (Bardi 2002: 297) and a boost in the financing and staffing of Europarties.

This paper roots itself in precisely this premise. In so doing, it seeks to assess the consequences of the 2003 Regulation on the level of Europarties’ organisational development. Gauging this impact is significant given that the organisational strengthening of Europarties may have significant consequences for EU party politics and the EU political system. Few studies offer insight into the manifold consequences of the 2003 Europarty Regulation, focusing instead on the Regulation itself, the bargaining that brought about the adoption of that Regulation and the role of Europarty leaders therein (see: von Arnim and Schurig 2004; Day and Shaw 2006; Johansson and Raunio 2005). The implications of the Regulation for the organisational development of Europarties have been the sole focus of only one study (Lightfoot 2006). Even then, however, the study lacked a set of clearly developed criteria with which to assess the Regulation’s influence and was conducted in a descriptive and under-theorised fashion. This paper attempts to remedy such faults, beginning with a discussion on limited theory of Europarty development.

2.2 Theorizing Europarties

Much of the recent discussion concerning Europarties is located within the domain of Comparative Politics (CP). CP conceptualizes the EU as an evolving non-state political system. Unlike the branches of International Relations (i.e. intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism), CP focuses not on “modelling integration as a process” (Lord 2002: 40), but rather on the internal politics of the EU (Hix 1994; 1999). Given their (potential) relevance to EU party politics, Europarties have been an interesting—if contentious—source of study for comparitivists. Broadly speaking, three main approaches may be distinguished: ‘sceptical’; ‘transnational’; and ‘sui generis’. This section proceeds by laying out each of these theoretical approaches before launching a defence of the third approach, which will be employed in modified form throughout this paper.

Sceptics

Many comparitivists argue that Europarties are not consistent with existing models of political parties and party behaviour (cf. Bardi 1994; Mair 2000; Bardi and Calossi 2009).
Rather than treat Europarties as distinct organizations operating within the EU political system, ‘sceptics’ argue that Europarties are simply extensions of national party organizations that do little more than help national parties adapt to their changing institutional environment (Bardi and Calossi 2009). Much of this scepticism derives from what are regarded as political parties’ defining characteristics. For the sceptics, because Europarties fail to live up to what it means to be a political party in a traditional (i.e. nation-state) sense, they are not in fact political parties at all.

To this end, the party literature prescribes three key characteristics to political parties: vote-seeking, office-seeking, and/or policy-seeking (Strøm 1990; Müller and Strøm 1999). ‘Skeptics’ focus on the first two of these, arguing that Europarties fail on both of these accounts. As pertains to the first, they argue that Europarties are all but absent from the electoral arena, since European elections are contested by national parties which compete on national issues. If one views the political party as the sole organization operating within the electoral arena and competing for votes (Panebianco 1988: 6), then Europarties clearly cannot be qualified as political parties. Neither are Europarties office-seeking in the sense understood by Sartori (1976: 63), since there are no offices at the EU level that Europarties seek to fill. Thus, as Hix and Lord (1997: 208) conclude, “The power to obtain political office in the EU ultimately rests with the sub-units of the EU parties: the domestic party organisations”.

Transnationalists
A number of authors, referred to here as ‘transnationalists’, have adopted an entirely different interpretation of the character and relevance of Europarties. Given the EU’s institutional framework, they maintain that it is impossible for Europarties to perform such functions and to uphold the characteristics that the sceptics demand of them. Instead, transnationalists argue that Europarties should be seen as policy-seeking parties. According to Hix and Lord (1997), Europarties developed sophisticated policy networks with working groups, reports and final policy declarations. Particularly important in this regard are party leaders’ summits, organized by Europarties prior to European Council meetings with the aim of developing joint policies towards the EU. Lord (1998: 5) writes:

It would be a mistake to dismiss the federations and groups as mere agglomerations of national parties...While the federations have disappointed as mechanisms of electoral mobilization, they have

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4 A possible exception here are seats in the EP. However, MEPs are elected on the lists of national parties and are thus responsible to them for their re-election, not to Europarties.
unexpectedly developed an impressive role as co-ordinators of party leaders’ summits prior to meetings of the European Council.

Moreover, in addition to developing coherent policy platforms, transnationalists argue that Europarties have developed clear hierarchical and decision-making structures similar to those found in national political parties. Thus, rather than question their party-ness, Hix (2002: 304) characterizes Europarties as being located “somewhere between the American ‘parties as empty vessels’ and the European ‘cartel parties’.”

**Sui Generis**

A third body of scholars analyzes Europarties from the *sui generis* perspective. While agreeing with Hix and Lord’s assertion that Europarties must be placed within the EU’s institutional context, they argue that because the EU system is essentially *sui generis*, it makes little sense to transfer the functions that parties fulfil in national party systems to the EU level. Ladrech (1998), for example, maintains that in studying Europarties, scholars have too often adopted an *a priori* analysis that grounds itself in a national political paradigm. From this perspective, because the EU has yet to develop into a fully-fledged political system, one should not expect it to boast thoroughly developed and functional political parties comparable to their national counterparts. Rather, Europarties’ functioning should only be analyzed in accordance with criteria pertaining to Europarty development (Pridham and Pridham 1981: 7). This approach thus requires scholars to design criteria or thresholds against which it is possible to measure the unique case of transnational party development in the EU (Hix 1995b). It is precisely this approach upon which the following pages are rooted.

### 2.3 Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the transnational context within which Europarties operate. Highlighting the competing strands of comparativist thought on Europarties, it has been shown that there is no single way to conceptualize the role and importance of Europarties. However, of the three approaches mentioned, this paper grounds itself in *sui generis* in so far as it takes for its analytical framework the model constructed by Niedermayer (1983), which measures the organisational development of Europarties by looking at the degree of interaction between Europarties’ component parts. As shall be explained in Chapter 3, Niedermayer’s model is both convincing and operational (Dietz 2000) and particularly well suited for analyzing Europarties’ unique character. The organisational development of
Europarties is therefore not analysed by applying criteria derived from party organizations in national settings. Rather, they are subjected to a different set of conceptual criteria based on the degree of interaction between national parties that comprise each Europarty. However, the organization of Europarties is still seen as subsumed in the general nature of party formation in terms of the interplay of power between different component parts. As a consequence, several insights drawn from comparative political party theory regarding the interaction between parties and their environment will be applied to this study of Europarties. In doing so, the paper tries to combine the advantages of both CP and *sui generis* approaches.
Chapter 3: Analytical Framework and Methodology

The previous chapter introduced the state of the art on Europarties and briefly sketched the competing theoretical strands within the Europa party literature. This chapter proceeds by laying out the analytical framework and methodological approach adopted throughout the remainder of this paper. As shall be seen, Niedermayer’s three stages of interaction provide a useful lens through which to make sense of Europarties’ organisational trajectory. It is against these three stages that the organisational development of Europarties shall be measured. To understand how Europarties evolve from one organisational stage to another, the paper relies on the work of Panebianco (1988), who examines both exogenous and endogenous stimuli to explain organisational change. By treating the Europarty Regulation as an exogenous stimulus, the remaining chapters seek to understand if and how it affected organisational change.

3.1 Analytical Framework: Niedermayer’s Three Stages of Organisational Development

In his study on Europarties, Niedermayer identifies three stages of transnational interaction between the member parties of Europarties: (1) the contact stage, (2) the cooperation stage, and (3) the integration stage (in Dietz 2000). Each stage represents a different phase in the organisational development of Europarties. To reach the first stage—the contact stage—national parties need only interact sporadically. As a consequence, a permanent transnational organization is unnecessary. By contrast, to reach stage two—the cooperation stage—national parties must interact consistently and within a permanent transnational organization. Notably, neither stages one or two require Europarty members to forfeit their autonomy in favour of the Europarty. Instead, they need merely to demonstrate the willingness to participate in Europarty coordinating bodies. This differs substantially from the third stage—that of integration—which requires national parties to surrender much of their sovereignty to Europarty organization (Dietz 2000). While this does not necessarily demand the absolute reallocation of allegiances and activities from national parties to the Europarty structure, it does require a “further level in a system of multiple loyalties” (Johansson and Zervakis 2002: 11). Indeed, until national parties permit Europarties the privileges of individual membership, independent resources, majority decision-making, and the power to impose decisions on national parties (regarding the EU matters), Europarties will continue to lack the
organisational structure needed to implement the functions they were assigned by the Maastricht Treaty.

The underlying assumption of Niedermayer’s model is that the strengthening of Europarties’ organization and the prerogatives of their constituents (i.e. national parties) is a zero-sum game. Full autonomy for national member parties requires Europarties that are organisationally weak and un-influential. Thus, only when the interactions among national parties reach the integration stage can we speak of truly ‘European parties’. The indicators assessing the level of interaction and hence, the organisational development of Europarties are listed in table 2.

Table 2: Indicators describing the Europarties’ degree of interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contact Stage</th>
<th>Permanent Communication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Frequency of Communication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation Stage</th>
<th>Permanent Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Permanent decision-making bodies, such as Congress; Council; Bureau; Leaders’ Summits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Unanimous decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Complexity of organization: Existence of subunits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Incorporation of sub-units into decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Use of common symbols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Individual membership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integration Stage</th>
<th>A Partial Transfer of National Parties’ Sovereignty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Qualified or simple majority decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Common policy formulation – Cohesive and detailed common political programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ability to conduct electoral campaigns in EP elections in order to diffuse its common policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Possibility to make binding decisions on member parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Financial independence (from both national parties and party groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The character of links with the EP party groups: Top-down relationship – Europarties provide guidelines to their respective EP group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Dietz (2000) and Sandström (2004)

### 3.2 Explaining Europarties’ Organisational Development

To understand how Europarties move from one stage of organisational development to another, it is necessary to consult the vast body of literature on party organization change (cf. Panebianco 1988; Harmel and Janda 1982, 1994; Katz and Mair 1995; Harmel 2002; Heidar
and Saglie 2003). Within this literature, much attention has been devoted to understanding the origins of organisational change – whether change is the result of external or internal dynamics. In other words, is the source of parties’ organisational change a changing environment, as Katz and Mair (1995) argue, or internal agents such as new leaders or dominant factions, as proposed by Harmel and Janda (1982, 1994), or both?

Given the specific institutional configuration within which Europarties function—a configuration that is largely hostile to their development—organisational change depends on the transformation of this environment. Writes Bartolini (2005: 326): “Europarties are the product of the institutional environment of the EU and have no hope of survival outside it. Their future development will be shaped by the EU institutional development.” Thus, in order to enhance their organisational development, Europarties require an external stimulus to force national member parties to relinquish some of their autonomy and scope of action in favour of Europarties. This paper identifies three such ‘external shocks’ (Harmel and Janda 1994) that have occurred throughout Europarties’ existence: first, the decision to introduce direct elections to the EP in 1979; second, the insertion of the ‘party article’ into the Maastricht Treaty in 1991; and third, the adoption of the ‘Regulation governing political parties at the European level and the rules regarding their funding’ in 2003.

This is not to say that environmental change alone is sufficient to bring about organisational change in Europarties. This would postulate an over simplistic and deterministic stimulus-response schema whereby every externally induced change would cause a subsequent organisational adjustment (Panebianco 1988). As practice demonstrates, there are many examples of slow and often non-existent organisational adjustment to environmental change. This paper therefore adopts Panebianco’s (1988: 242) hybrid approach, which argues that organisational change is generally a consequence of an exogenous stimulus—whether environmental, technological, or both—that combines with endogenous factors to undercut the existing power structure. In other words, “the external stimulus acts as a catalyser accelerating power structure transformation (e.g. of resource distribution among different groups) where the internal preconditions of this transformation already existed” (Panebianco 1988: 242).

In the case of Europarties, the three external shocks outlined above would never have materialized into concrete organisational changes had it not been for Europarty leaders who networked to bring about the organisational improvement of each Europarty in response to institutional change. As shall be argued, each of these external shocks has influenced Europarties’ organisational development. The main question is whether the last of these—the
Europarty Regulation—has propelled Europarties towards the last stage of Neidermayer’s triptych, the integration stage. In the following chapter, the consequences of the first two external stimuli will briefly be assessed using the analytical framework described above, before moving to the main crux of the paper: an analysis of the impact of the Regulation on the organisational development of Europarties.

3.3 Methodology

The methodology applied throughout this paper is qualitative, based mainly on primary and secondary data, including Europarty statutes and manifestos, EU resolutions and treaties, EP reports, and scholarly literature. The chief method of analysis employed is that of process tracing (see Gerring 2001). Through process tracing, Europarties’ organisational development will be placed in an historical-institutional setting and analyzed in light of three institutional developments: the introduction of direct elections to the EP, the insertion of the ‘party article’ into the Maastricht Treaty, and the adoption of the Party Regulation. As stated, the main accent will lay on the most recent external stimulus: the Regulation, which has brought two innovations: the legal recognition of Europarties and their financing from the EU budget. The Regulation is treated as an independent variable and the level of Euro-parties’ organisational development as the dependent variable.

3.3.1 Limitations

Neidermayer’s model provides this paper with a clear set of criteria and thresholds against which the implications of the Regulation for the organisational development of Europarties may be assessed. This allows the paper to avoid the faults of other studies on this topic, which assess the Regulation’s impact provisionally and on an ad hoc basis. However, Neidermayer’s model is not without its limitations. The paper acknowledges its teleological character, in so far as the model assumes that all Europarties develop towards a single final stage: that of integration. As does any model, Neidermayer’s simplifies reality and invariably reduces the variety of diverging paths that can be found in practice. Bearing this in mind, the paper does not assume that all parties must necessarily pass the same linear trajectory, moving from one stage to the next in an incremental, predetermined fashion. Rather, it accepts that Europarties’ developmental trajectory may stall, digress, and will in all likelihood stray from the linear path that Neidermayer envisions. The utility of the model, however, lies in its criteria of integration, which the paper regards as indicators of Europarties’ organisational development. As shall be demonstrated, it is the fulfilment of
these indicators that establishes whether Europarties are in fact actors in their own right, and not mere arenas for national party leaders.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter outlined the analytical framework and methodological approach used throughout this paper. As was explained, Niedermayer’s three stages of interaction will be used to gauge the extent of Europarties’ organisational development. The concept of environmental stimuli will be used to explain how such organisational development came about. The following chapter proceeds by examining two such stimuli: direct elections to the EP and the introduction of the Party Article to the Maastricht Treaty. Understanding how these stimuli affected the course of Europarties’ organisational development should shed light on how the main focus of this paper—the Europarty Regulation—did the same.
Chapter 4: Europarties’ Organisational Development: 1974-2003

Understanding how Europarties’ organisational development responded to the Europarty Regulation—whether for better or worse—demands a thorough understanding of the roots and forms of such development. This paper has thus far sought to place this complex discussion within the context of Neidermayer’s three-fold analytical framework. It has been argued that in order to understand how Europarties’ have evolved organisationally, it is necessary to examine the exogenous stimuli that prod such development into being. This chapter therefore proceeds by laying out two of the three environmental stimuli that have thus far had a defining impact on Europarty development. Precisely because these stimuli preceded the Europarty Regulation of 2003 they offer a useful point of departure in determining how and why Europarties changed in the aftermath of the Regulation’s adoption. As shall be demonstrated, the depth of the stimuli’s impact largely depends on national member parties’ willingness to relinquish autonomy. While such willingness was clearly absent throughout the 1980s, the situation altered somewhat in the early 1990s with the insertion of the party article into the Maastricht Treaty, for reasons that will be explored below.

4.1 The First Stimulus: Direct Elections to the EP

There are few issues pertaining to Europarties upon which scholars agree. One on which they do agree regards the primary catalyst for Europarties’ formation: the decision to hold direct elections to the EP at the 1969 European Community (EC) Summit in The Hague (cf. Pridham and Pridham 1981; Hix and Lord 1997; Bardi 2002; Johansson and Zervakis 2002; Ladrech 2006). Pridham and Pridham (1981: 108-10) argue that without “the immediate stimulus and practical pressures” resulting from the decision to hold direct elections, such party organizations would not have been formed. Indeed, between 1969 when the decision to hold direct elections was made for the first time, and 1979 when the first direct elections for the EP were actually held, three Europarties were formed: The Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the EC (CSP) in 1974; the Federation of Liberal and Democratic Parties in the EC (ELD) and the European People’s Party: Federation of Christian Democratic Parties in the EC (EPP) in 1976. The only Europarty studied in this paper that was formed after the first EP elections is the European Coordination of Green Parties (ECGP) founded in 1983.
Because most Europarties were launched in anticipation of direct elections to the EP, their primary goals were the coordination of the European election campaigns and the adoption of common electoral programs. They also sought to act as “the extra-parliamentary arm of the EP groups in terms of support, control and influence” (Pridham and Pridham 1981: 130). One might have expected these goals to be reflected in a complex, well developed, and hierarchical organisational structure capable of fulfilling them. However, as the next section shows, the four main Europarties were too weak and loosely organized to successfully fulfil any of the goals outlined above. This fact acted as an impediment to their further development, ultimately pushing them into a ‘decade of stagnation’ (Hix and Lord 1997).

4.1.1 The Organisational Response of Europarties

When the decision was made to stage direct EP elections, each Europarty responded by forming a permanent transnational organisational structure, thereby bypassing the contact stage of Neidermayer’s triptych. As this passage explains, the organisational structures that emerged were embryonic and underdeveloped at best, failing to fulfil even the modest requirements of the cooperation stage (see Table 3).

Table 3: Europarties’ organisational development in the 1970s and 1980s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Permanent Communication</th>
<th>CSP</th>
<th>EPP</th>
<th>ELD</th>
<th>ECGP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Permanent Organization</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Decision-making in:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Unanimity</th>
<th>Q. Majority (in practice unanimity)</th>
<th>Q. Majority (in practice unanimity)</th>
<th>Unanimity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureau/Executive Committee</td>
<td>Unanimity</td>
<td>A. Majority</td>
<td>Q. Majority</td>
<td>Unanimity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders’ Meeting</td>
<td>No rule</td>
<td>No rule</td>
<td>No rule</td>
<td>No rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence of Subunits</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes-Since 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporation of Subunits into Decision-making</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Common Symbols</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Membership</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Transfer of National Parties’ Sovereignty</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesive and Detailed Euromanifestos</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to Conduct Electoral Campaign</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binding Decisions on Member Parties</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Independence from EP Party Groups</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Parties</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Guidelines to EP Groups</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own elaboration based on the analysis of Europarties’ statutes and their practice

5 The extra-parliamentary nature of Europarties and their connection to EP groups was most clearly stated in the ELD statutes, which claimed “the Federation is represented in the EP by the Liberal Group” (Art. 10).
At outset, all Europarties functioned roughly identically, adopting decisions only by consensus. Even then, they could only introduce non-binding ‘recommendations’ to their national party members. There were no provisions for punishing or expelling member parties that did not comply with the decisions. This was due to the fact that Europarties were financially dependent on national party members through membership fees. As a consequence, Europarties had “embarrassingly low” (Bardi 1994: 362) numbers of paid staff, just three employees per Europarty (Pridham and Pridham 1981). To carry out their day-to-day tasks, they relied on the resources and logistics of their respective EP party groups.

This embryonic organisational structure prevented Europarties from successfully conducting the functions for which they were founded. Although they started with the very ambitious objective of adopting detailed electoral manifestos, it soon became apparent that without a more developed organisational and decision-making structure, achieving such goals would prove impossible. As a result, each Europarty struggled to adopt a common electoral manifesto. In the case of the CSP, the differences among national member parties were so great that the party refrained from adopting a manifesto for the 1979 EP elections, settling instead on a short political declaration supported by the party’s leaders (Pridham and Pridham 1981). Although the two other Europarties managed to adopt manifestos, they were of a highly general character, incapable of offering concrete policy proposals. Moreover, national parties were allowed to adhere to their own manifestos alongside the one agreed upon by the Europarty. A similar situation characterized the 1984 and 1989 elections, with Europarties adopting vague statements of principle rather than detailed and coherent Euromanifestos to serve as guidelines for national parties in their election campaigns.

As regards the coordination of EP electoral campaigns, Europarties performed worse still. With insufficient resources to support their campaigns and outshone by national parties whose national candidates competed on national issues for EP elections, Europarties’ activities were invisible for most voters and even national party activists (Neidermayer 1984, 1989).

No less problematic for Europarties’ organisational development was their position within the EC decision-making structure: They were linked only through EP groups. Launched as extra-parliamentary party organizations, Europarties expected to control and supervise their respective EP groups (Pridham and Pridham 1981), as was stipulated in their statutes6. However, such high hopes went unrealized. After the 1979 elections, EP groups

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6 For example, according to the ELD’s 1976 statutes, the Congress should receive reports from the EP group and make recommendations to it (Ar. 26).
gained sufficient political, organisational, and financial resources (directly from the EC budget) to function independently of Europarties’ influence. They secured both office and policy goals by relying on their own highly structured internal organizations. As a consequence, EP groups had little incentive to contribute to the development of Europarties (Hix and Lord 1997). Clearly, Europarties’ organisational development could only have stemmed from national parties’ initiative. Since national parties were not yet ready to surrender their autonomy in favour of Europarties, the latter were stuck in a ‘gray zone’, somewhere between the contact and cooperation stage of organisational development.

4.2 The Second Stimulus: The ‘Party Article’

Clearly, European elections did not serve as a strong enough stimulant to enhance Europarties’ organisational development beyond the gray zone. For this to occur, another environmental stimulus was necessary: the insertion of a so-called ‘Party Article’ (Article 138a, which became Article 191 in the Amsterdam Treaty) into the Maastricht Treaty. The party article stated that:

Political parties at the European level are important as a factor for integration within the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union.

Although the party article was vague and offered no legal basis for Europarties’ funding or any role for Europarties in EP elections, it was considered “the first clear indication of the party federations attempting to alter the institutional environment for their own ends” (Hix and Lord 1997: 190). Indeed, without the joint action of the presidents of the EPP, CSP, and ELD using their party networks and high-level contacts to lobby presidents of the Commission, EP and European Council, an article on political parties at the European level would have never been incorporated into the Maastricht Treaty (see: Johansson and Zervakis 2001; Johansson and Raunio 2005). Despite its obviously declarative character, the article awarded Europarties constitutional recognition, which strengthened their position with relation to national parties and EP groups. Three factors were crucial in changing Europarties’ role within the EU political system and convincing national governments to pave the way towards the constitutional recognition of Europarties: 1) the increasing politicisation of the EU, 2) the organization of Party Leaders’ Meetings around European Council meetings, and 3) EU enlargement.

As pertains to the first factor, the increasing politicisation of the EU meant that the governance of the EU, with its expanding *acquis communautaire*, began to play a central role
in domestic policy making. This encouraged national party leaders across the EU to engage in policy discussions pertaining to EU issues. Europarties presented ideal venues for such networking. As a consequence, their utility for national parties increased markedly in the 1990s.

This was most evident in the second factor, which was the growing participation of higher-ranking national party officials in the meetings organised by Europarties. Whereas in the 1980s such meetings were primarily attended by lower-ranking party officials, by the 1990s the attendance of national party leaders had risen significantly, particularly in the case of the EPP and PES (Hix and Lord 1997; Hix 2002). These meetings were organized immediately prior to the European Council with an identical internal agenda. Thanks to this, Europarties wielded considerable influence over the Council agenda and arguably its decision-making. According to Hix (1996: 312), Europarties emerged as a “crucial forum for the co-ordination of national party policies” towards the various EU issues discussed in the European Council. Significantly, both governmental and opposition parties had incentives to participate in these meetings. For governmental parties, there was the lure of forming alliances with like-minded actors, while for opposition parties there was the chance that they could pressure governmental parties participating in the European Council.

Finally, the third factor contributing to the changing perception of Europarties’ importance in the eyes of national parties was EU enlargement. Throughout the 1990s, Europarties assisted sister parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in democratizing, consolidating, and ultimately joining the EU (see: Pridham 1996; Delsoldato 2002). Some of their tasks included helping CEE parties to build their organisational infrastructures, train their staff, craft their programs and ideologies, etc. (Delsoldato 2002; Hanley 2008). All of these tasks would have been much harder to achieve had it not been for the transnational platform offered by Europarties—a fact that was not lost on national party leaders.

4.2.1 The Organisational Response of Europarties

The inclusion of the party article into the Maastricht Treaty provided Europarties a much-needed window of opportunity through which to enhance their organisational development. Conscious that their previous organisational structures hindered their fulfilment of the roles assigned to them by the party article, Europarty leaders sought the support of national party leaders to achieve organisational restructuring. The response of all four Europarties was swift and unprecedented. By the end of the 1993, all four Europarties adopted new statutes containing significant alterations. Four important innovations could be identified: a change of
their names; more complex organisational infrastructure; the institutionalization of the party leaders’ summits; and new rules on decision-making.

By the early 1990s, the EPP was the only Europarty whose name included the party title. However, this changed in November 1992 when the Confederation of Socialist Parties became the Party of European Socialists (PES). This was followed by the transformation of the Federation of Liberal, Democratic and Reform Parties into the European Liberal, Democratic and Reform Party (ELDR) in December 1993. The same year witnessed the replacement of the European Coordination of Green Parties with the European Federation of Green Parties (EFGP). Symbolic though it may sound, changing their names was reflective of a much deeper organisational transformation of Europarties in the early 1990s. This was visible in the creation of new decision-making organs. The EPP and ELDR established three new official organs, while the EFGP created two, and the PES one.

Arguably the most significant change following the adoption of the Party Article was the institutionalisation of party leaders’ meetings, attended by participants in the European Council, as the central decision-making organ in the EPP, PES and ELDR. Although Congresses formally remained the supreme decision-making bodies, in reality the party leaders’ meetings became the dominant organ (Hix and Lord 1997).8 Furthermore, the PES instituted the Party Leaders’ Conference as the only organ capable of making recommendations and resolutions to member parties and EP groups.

New rules of decision-making were also adopted. In the aftermath of the Party Article, most Europarties established majority votes for day-to-day administrative decisions and unanimity for political decisions. Admittedly however, their decision-making remained highly consensual. Apart from the PES, which allowed party leaders to adopt decisions by a qualified majority in those policy areas where the EU Council also used a similar voting method, most Europarties reached decisions by consensus.

4.2.2 Integration Stage Still at Bay

As table four shows, the environmental changes that occurred in the 1990s did not enhance Europarties’ organisational development beyond the cooperation stage. This was because several crucial requirements remained unfulfilled. As regard individual membership, only the

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7 The only Europarty which did not include in its new statutes the provisions for party leaders’ meetings was the EFGP, which is understandable since its member parties did not participate in national governments and thus did not have representatives in European Council.

8 For example, Euromanifestos had to be approved by a party leaders’ meeting before going to the Congress.
EPP permitted this.\(^9\) Although other Europarties debated this issue, national party members nixed the idea, arguing that it was superfluous since their own members were, in any case, indirectly members of Europarties. There was no change whatsoever regarding two other indicators: use of common symbols in election campaigns (such as Europarty logos or acronyms), and the adoption of detailed and cohesive manifestos. Although Europarties did adopt Euromanifestos for the 1994 and 1999 European elections, in an effort to achieve consensus they were written in extremely general terms.\(^{10}\) Hence Smith’s conviction that Euromanifestos were “bland, offering little more than platitudes... and little in the way of hard policy proposals” (1999: 93).

Where Europarties seemed least likely to enter the integration stage, however, was with respect to their lacking financial independence. By the end of the 1990s, nothing changed from the situation in the 1980s. Arguably, Europarties’ financial and logistical dependence on EP groups had even deepened. The new statutes of the PES and ELDR went so far as to list EP groups as sources of income, whose contributions made up almost half of Europarties’ income (Bardi 1994). Moreover, all Europarties throughout the 1990s ‘borrowed’ office space from their respective EP groups and even used their interpreters. Most of Europarties’ staff was seconded from EP group staff or national member parties. Although the number of paid staff increased, it remained menial. The PES, for example, had just 13 paid employees, EPP had 10, and ELDR had just six (Bardi 1994). In addition to staff and logistical costs, funds for conferences and workshops were also derived from the EP budget.

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\(^9\) Despite the formal provision for individual membership, it is not clear if anyone ever took advantage of it, since no individual membership records are kept (Bardi 1994).

\(^{10}\) Even such a vague character of Euromanifestos could not ensure their usage by national parties. A telling example is the Blair-Schröder ‘third way’ manifesto issued just before June 1999 elections without any consultation within the PES, despite some departures from the PES Euromanifesto (Ladrech 2002; Moschonas 2004).
Table 4: Europarties’ organisational development in the 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PES</th>
<th>EPP</th>
<th>ELDR</th>
<th>EFGP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Permanent Communication</strong></td>
<td>Yes, with higher frequency</td>
<td>Yes, with higher frequency</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Permanent Organization</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making in:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Unanimity</td>
<td>A. Majority (in practice unanimity)</td>
<td>A. Majority$^{11}$ (in practice unanimity)</td>
<td>Q. Majority (in practice unanimity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau/Executive Committee</td>
<td>A. Majority for administrative issues; Unanimity for political issues</td>
<td>A. Majority for administrative issues; Unanimity for political issues</td>
<td>A. Majority (in practice unanimity)</td>
<td>Q. Majority (in practice unanimity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders’ Meeting</td>
<td>Q. Majority$^{12}$</td>
<td>Unanimity</td>
<td>Unanimity</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence of Subunits</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incorporation of Subunits into Decision-making</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Common Symbols</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Membership</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Transfer of National Parties’ Sovereignty</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cohesive and Detailed Euromanifestos</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to Conduct Electoral Campaign</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Binding Decisions on Member Parties</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Independence from:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP Party Groups</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Parties</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Guidelines to EP Groups</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s own elaboration based on the analysis of Europarties’ statutes and their practice*

### 4.3 Conclusion

This chapter presented two stimuli that prompted the organisational development of Europarties: the call for direct EP elections and the adoption of the Party Article into the Maastricht Treaty. It has been argued that the divergent influences of these two stimuli largely depended on national parties’ willingness to support greater organisational development at their own expense. The case has also been made that although the Party Article brought about some much-needed changes within Europarties, such changes were not

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$^{11}$ Although ELDR statutes allowed for majority decision-making it also stated that “in all the organs of the ELDR Party efforts shall be made to establish the broadest possible measure of agreement among the member parties” (Article 16).

$^{12}$ But only for those policy decisions that are decided by qualified majority in the EU Council. For all other issues unanimity was still the norm.
sufficient to speak of integration. One of the major obstacles remained their financial dependence on EP party groups and national parties. The next section seeks to determine if and how the Europarty Regulation sought to resolve this.

This paper offers an analysis of how the Europarty Regulation of 2003 has affected the organisational development of Europarties. To make sense of this relationship, the previous chapter demonstrated how, even after two environmental stimuli—direct EP elections and the addition of the Party Article— Europarties lagged behind the integration stage. Although Europarties did succeed in developing organisationally from one stimulus to the next, they continued to suffer from manifold failings which inhibited their achievements. This chapter seeks to determine whether the adoption of the Europarty Regulation and its subsequent revision in 2007 helped remedy such failings. It begins by outlining the provision of the Regulation, before assessing its impact and the causes thereof.

5.1 The Third Environmental Stimulus: The 2003 Party Regulation and Its 2007 Revision

Adopted in November 2003, ‘Regulation 2004/2003 on governing political parties at the European level and the rules regarding their funding’ is short and to the point. In addition to defining what a ‘Europarty’ is, the bulk of the Regulation is dedicated to Europarty financing. As pertains to the former, the Regulation defines a ‘political party at European level’\(^{13}\) as either ‘an association of citizens’\(^{14}\) or ‘an alliance of political parties’\(^{15}\) which satisfies four key conditions: 1) it must have legal personality in the Member State in which its seat is located; 2) it must be represented in the EP, or national or regional assemblies in at least one quarter of the Member States, or it must receive at least three per cent of the votes cast in each of the one quarter of Member States at the most recent EP elections; 3) it must respect both in its programme and activities the fundamental principles on which the EU is founded (i.e. liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law); and 4) it must have participated in elections to the EP, or have expressed the intention to do so (Regulation (EC) 2004/2003: Ar.3). Only party formations that fulfil these conditions are entitled to funding from the EU budget.

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\(^{13}\) The terminology used in the Regulation indicates the unwillingness of national parties to relinquish their sovereignty and dominant role within the EU. Instead of ‘Europarty’ or ‘European political party’, the term employed in the Regulation was ‘political party at European level’.

\(^{14}\) Which pursues political objectives and which is either recognized by, or established in accordance with, the legal order of at least one Member State (Ar. 2).

\(^{15}\) Which represents structured cooperation between at least two political parties (Ar. 2).
Article 10 regulates the distribution of the funds according to two criteria: first, each Europarty must secure at least a quarter of its annual budget from sources external to the EU budget and second, 15% of the EU funds reserved for parties are distributed in equal shares to all Europarties, while the remaining 85% are distributed only to those Europarties which have members in the EP in accordance with their proportion of elected members. The Regulation also specifies additional obligations linked to public funding, including: the prohibition of Europarties’ use of EU funding for the direct or indirect funding of national parties (Art. 7); the obligation for Europarties to use public funds only for those expenditures directly linked to the objectives set out in Europarties’ programmes, such as administrative expenditures, meetings, research, and cross-border events\(^\text{16}\) (Art. 8); the prohibition of donations that are anonymous, derived from the budgets of EP party groups or public companies, or which exceed €12,000 annually from any single donor (Art 6(c)); the obligation to declare all sources of income except donations less than €500 (Art. 6). The Regulation does not specify the total amount of public funding but leaves it to the EP to decide within its annual budget and to administer accordingly.\(^\text{17}\)

Three years after the adoption of the regulation, the EP took initiative for its adjustment and improvement. In March 2006, it adopted a resolution on Europarties based on the Leinen report. According to the resolution, the 2003 Regulation was but a “first step towards a legal framework for the European political parties.” It also noted several weaknesses related to it, such as its short-term orientation\(^\text{18}\), heavy bureaucratic requirements, and failure to assign a clear role to Europarties in EP election campaigns. To improve the Regulation, the resolution suggested that funds be determined not annually, but on a five-year cycle; that Europarties be allowed to roll-over surpluses to the following year as well as to have more flexibility in using EU funds; there should be an appropriate increase in financial support for Europarties given the increase in their number and rising costs; European political foundations linked to Europarties should be established and financed from the EU budget; and finally, Europarties should draw up European-wide lists for EP elections and have a role in referenda and the election of the Commission President.

\(^{16}\) The Regulation does not explicitly state campaigns for EP elections as one of the permitted expenditures for Europarties.


\(^{18}\) This ‘financial short-termism’ is reflected in the requirements of 2003 Regulation that Europarties are financed only on an annual basis, and that they are not allowed to transfer surpluses to the following year.
Not surprisingly, such a bold integrationist proposal that sought to award Europarties meaningful political powers was not well received by a Council dominated by national parties. Still, Regulation (EC) no. 1524/2007, which amended 2003 Regulation, was finally adopted by the EP and Council on 18 December 2007. It diverged considerably from the EP resolution. However, even the dilution of the proposal did not prevent the inclusion of new and important changes, particularly as pertained to Europarties’ organisational development. Three such modifications emerged.

The first set of amendments introduced new financial provisions allowing Europarties to transfer a maximum 25% of their annual total income from one year to the first quarter of the following year, as well as to accumulate reserves up to 100% of Europarty’s average annual income. The second set of amendments authorised the establishment and public funding of European political foundations affiliated with Europarties. The purpose of such foundations was to complement the objectives of Europarties, to enhance their public visibility, and to generate debate on EU public policy issues. Finally, the third novelty of the revised regulation was that it allowed for the use of EU funds in the financing of Europarties’ campaigns for EP elections.¹⁹

5.2 The Regulation’s Impact

In the wake of its adoption, the 2003 Regulation was viewed by many as a major breakthrough. For EPP president Wilfried Martens, the Regulation meant that the “EPP can function as it was intended to when it was founded 25 years ago, as a genuine transnational party.” (in Johansson 2009: 167). Martens was equally thrilled, characterizing its revision as a “turning point” since Europarties “are finally given the role that they and their electorate deserve: being at the centre of the European political process, not at the margins.”¹⁰ Scholars shared similar sentiments. Even the most prominent Europarty sceptic, Luciano Bardi, argued that the Regulation provided the legal and financial basis for the effective establishment of integrated political parties at the EU level (Bardi and Calossi 2009).

The high expectations of both practitioners and scholars alike were understandable. Compared to previous two environmental stimuli, the Regulation had the most direct baring on Europarties. By awarding them legal recognition, assigning them EU funds, allowing them to campaign in EP elections, and permitting them individual political foundations, the

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¹⁹ Provided Europarties do not directly or indirectly support campaigns of national political parties or their candidates.

²⁰ Available at: http://www.epp.eu

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Regulation recognised Europarties as actors in their own rights, thus indicating their growing relevance.

The question that remains unanswered, however, is whether the Regulation has succeeded in stimulating Europarties’ transition towards integration. Given their new financing regime, are Europarties autonomous and strong enough to discipline national party members? Can they help assign policy guidelines to their respective EP groups? The following pages seek to find out.

5.2.1 The Organisational Response of Europarties – Integration Unaccomplished?

The impact of the Regulation can be evaluated both quantitatively and qualitatively (Ladrech 2007). To date, scholars have primarily been concerned with simple quantitative indicators, such as the rising number of Europarties, the number of new Europarty statutes, etc. These authors have by and large assumed that such developments are indicative of a positive organisational trend (cf. Lightfoot 2006; Day and Shaw 2006). Lightfoot (2006: 310), for example, argues that the Regulation spurred the “organisational consolidation within the five main Europarties, with developments such as new statutes, new logos, new premises, new staff and so on.” What such indicators do not tell the reader, however, is what impact they have had on Europarties’ organisational development—for better or worse. It does not, after all, suffice to simply highlight the fact that Europarties’ introduced new statutes. Instead, one must analyse whether any qualitative changes exist in those statutes that would satisfy the integration criteria. Indeed, a more sophisticated, qualitative, and comparative analysis is necessary to assess the organisational development of Europarties. As the rest of this section demonstrates, the application of this form of analysis offers a far more mixed picture of the Regulation’s impact on Europarties.

Introducing new Statutes

Europarties’ organisational response to the Europarty Regulation was almost immediate. In 2004, all four Europarties introduced new statutes recognizing the new legal status they had acquired. organisationally, however, the statutes remained unchanged: Decision-making bodies and decision-making rules went unaltered and consensual decision-making for political decisions remained the norm. For example, Article 7 of the PES statute states that all PES organs must attempt “to establish the broadest measure of agreement following full consultation.” Should a decision not be made by consensus, national parties need not be bound by it. Hence, even today—six years after the adoption of the Europarty Regulation—
the implementation of Europarties’ decisions remains dependent on the good will of national parties.  

The new Europarty statutes did, however, offer some change. In the case of the EFGP, the new statute brought a new name: the European Green Party (EGP). Moreover, the new statutes outlined the bodies responsible for the party’s financial management, given that this would make it eligible for funding. No doubt the most significant change was the introduction of individual membership to the EGP and ELDR. While it remains unclear whether and to what degree the introduction of individual membership was a consequence of the Regulation, it seems to have little practical effect on Europarties’ organization. Not only do individual members compose a mere ‘marginal minority’ (Donnelly and Jopp 2009: 25), but they lack voting rights and may attend Congresses only as observers. In fact, the new PES statutes make no mention of individual members, referring instead to so-called ‘PES activists’ and ‘city groups’.

Cutting ‘the umbilical cord’ with EP groups

Separating Europarties organisationally from EP groups was the direct product of the party Regulation. To be eligible for EU funding, Europarties had to leave their EP offices, to stop receiving financing from their EP groups, and to stop using EP groups’ resources, such as staff and interpreters. This has had ambiguous consequences for Europarties’ organisational development.

On the one hand, having their own premises and recruiting new staff for which they—not national member parties or EP groups—footed the bill, allowed Europarties to craft independent administrative structures. This has made their activities more visible as autonomous and separate activities of Europarties (Day and Shaw 2006).

On the other hand, however, Europarties’ independence from EP groups has created several difficulties. For one, they are now required to hire new staff under contracts governed by Belgian law (Day and Shaw 2006). In addition to doubling their salary expenditures, they

In 2007, the PES suspended the Slovak party SMER for forming a governing coalition with a far-right party. However, this is a rare example. Moreover, as was the case in the EPP expulsion of a Portuguese party in 1993, the suspended party was small and relatively un-influential.

The ELDR statutes also allows electronic membership. The EGP gives individual members status of ‘supporters’.

The ELDR still does not have any registered individual members, while the EPP has only 120 members, and the EGP has some 1300 supporters (Voerman 2009).

The concept of ‘PES activists’ was launched in 2006, enabling individual members of national member parties to participate in PES activities. ‘PES activists’ is primarily Internet-based and its main goal is to allow PES to maintain connections with party members at the grassroots level. There are 12000 registered PES activists. They are allowed to participate at PES Congresses as guests. Moreover, in 2008, they were allowed to take part in drafting the PES manifesto.
must devote considerable sums to renting premises near the EP. Furthermore, they are forced to pay for the services of translation, an expense previously covered by EP groups. Hanley (2007: 497) goes so far as to argue that Europarties are actually poorer and less well equipped as a result of the Regulation.\(^{25}\) This has forced Europarties to increase their membership fees (Day and Shaw 2006: 318). In this respect, the Regulation has had the paradoxical effect of increasing Europarties’ financial dependence on national member parties.

**Electoral campaigns, common symbols, and Euromanifestos**

In its unrevised form, the original 2003 Regulation made no explicit reference to Europarties’ role in EP elections. It was therefore not surprising that Europarties remained “almost entirely invisible” in the EP elections of 2004\(^{26}\) (Day and Shaw 2006: 320), continuing a tradition of paltry policy platforms that offered little insight into the political preferences of the Europarties as a whole.\(^{27}\) Yet the revisions of 2007 provided something of a breakthrough in this regard, given that they allowed Europarties to participate in European election campaigns and to use EU funds to that end. As a result, Europarties played a far greater role in the 2009 EP elections than ever before\(^{28}\). Indeed, all four Europarties, and the two largest in particular—PES and EPP—invested heavily in online tools, including blogs, videos, Facebook and Twitter in an attempt to directly engage with voters. The EGP went one step further, basing its campaign on common events organised across the EU.

Moreover, the debate amongst the major Europarties was more politicised and polarised along traditional left-right issues than at any point in EU history.\(^{29}\) Finally, Euromanifestos were significantly improved. The PES 2009 Manifesto, for example, was expanded considerably, offering a total 71 proposals for the upcoming legislative term of the EP (Roa Bastos 2009)\(^{30}\). Perhaps most importantly, there is some indication that even national parties took Euromanifestos seriously throughout the 2009 campaign. Herman

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\(^{25}\) Currently, there are about 15 employees in the biggest Europarties and possibly as few as one plus a part-timer in the smallest (Hanley 2008: 48).

\(^{26}\) The exception here is the EGP, which was the first Europarty to attempt an embryonic pan-European campaign. At the 2004 European elections its national parties agreed to use common symbols and messages from a centralised manifesto. See: ‘Greens first political party with EU-wide campaign’, (EurActiv 25/01/08). Available at: [http://www.euractiv.com:80/en/elections/lamberts-greens-political-party-eu-wide-campaign/article-169870](http://www.euractiv.com:80/en/elections/lamberts-greens-political-party-eu-wide-campaign/article-169870)

\(^{27}\) The 2004 EPP manifesto, for example, was just three pages long, offering only 11 brief proposals (Roa Bastos 2009).

\(^{28}\) For an overview of 2009 EP elections and campaigns in each individual EU country see: [http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/1-4-2-2.html](http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/1-4-2-2.html)


\(^{30}\) The process of crafting this Manifesto was a novelty. The PES, for the first time, allowed individual activists to participate in its preparation by sending their contributions. See: [http://elections2009.pes.org/](http://elections2009.pes.org/)
Schmitt found that with respect to the four largest Europarties “there is a high degree of compatibility between the message that is produced in the European manifestos and the one that emerges on the national level in election campaigns.” This suggests that national parties are no longer averse to incorporating the stances and positions agreed upon on an EU-wide level.

Despite such positive developments, however, the 2009 elections also exhibited deep problems with respect to the role of Europarties in EP electoral campaigns. It has since become evident that the Regulation should not have assigned a campaign role for Europarties without elaborating the nature and extent of this role. Two years after the adoption of the Regulation revisions, it remains unclear what precisely Europarties can and cannot do within electoral campaigns. Clearly, Europarties are constrained by the fact that the Regulation prevents them from directly or indirectly financing national parties and their campaigns. But how precisely they are constrained remains unclear. Moreover, until national parties are willing to transfer part of their sovereignty and allow Europarties to lead campaigns, the success of Europarties’ campaigning role will invariably be limited. This is well-illustrated by Europarties’ inability to reach a consensus on common candidates for the EC presidency. Until majoritarian and binding decision-making replaces decision-making by consensus, the integration stage will remain at bay.

Financial independence

One of the primary reasons Europarty leaders supported the Regulation was its promises of financial independence. Johansson (2009: 174), for example, writes that whereas Europarties’ development had once been “hampered by their dependence on their national members for resources”—given that national party members could force their will on Europarties by threatening to rescind their membership subscriptions—“the new circumstances in which the Europarties find themselves promote a more independent position.” This paper questions this line of argumentation. Its findings suggest that, contrary to the hope of its advocates, the Regulation has served to increase Europarties’ reliance both on national parties and EP party groups.

Article 10 of the Regulation stipulates that the eligibility of EU funding depends on Europarties’s ability to provide 25% of their annual budget from their own resources. It has

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32 The only exception being the EPP, which succeeded in doing so only one month prior to the elections of June 2009.
been argued that this provision prevents Europarties’ from growing too dependent on public funds (Morlok 2002). However, because their ‘own resources’ stem from membership fees, the Regulation awards national parties a marked influence on Europarties. This situation is further compounded by the strict limitations the Regulation imposes on individual and organisational donations to Europarties. Moreover, because EU funds are allocated on an annual basis, without the possibility of carrying surpluses over to the following year, Europarties are unable to conduct long-term planning, a fact that further exacerbates their dependence on national parties. Indeed, even if national parties cannot contribute more than 40% of Europarties’ annual budget, without their 25% Europarties are losing the other 75 from the EU.

Aware of this limitation, Europarties have sought to eliminate this provision from the revised Regulation. However, the resistance of national parties has proven too strong. The most Europarties managed to achieve was to reduce the threshold for their own resources from 25% to 15%. A more important achievement was the inclusion in the revised Regulation of a provision allowing Europarties to carry over surpluses into the following year. This strengthened Europarties position vis-à-vis their member parties. Yet they still remain in a subordinate position. One telling example in this regard is the prohibition of Europarties to transfer money to national party members, a provision which clearly shields national parties from the potential influence of Europarties.

Europarties’ financial independence from EP groups has proven equally troubling. Cutting the umbilical cord with EP groups did lesser Europarties’ dependence on the former (although at the price of increasing their dependence on national parties). However, by awarding EP groups control over Europarty financing, the Regulation actually secured their dominant position. Indeed, the Regulation stipulates that the EP should: administer the funds, decide if a Europarty satisfies conditions for receiving funds, determine the amount of money available for Europarties, and conduct the management of the overall Regulation. This clearly makes Europarties financially dependent on EP groups.

Contrary to its advocates’ expectations, the Regulation has not contributed to the financial independence of Europarties. In allowing provisions that make national parties indispensable for Europarties’ eligibility to receive public funds, and in assigning the EP control over Europarty financing, the Regulation actually secured Europarties’ dependence on national parties and EP groups.
**Policy guidelines to EP party groups**

Having failed to provide Europarties financial independence, the Regulation also failed to equip them with political independence. Being dependent on the EP for their funding and on the EP groups for supporting legislation that would further empower them, Europarties are unable to exercise any significant policy influence over their respective EP groups. Such a situation is further exacerbated by these two party formations’ differing *modus operandi*. Europarties are characterised by far weaker cohesion than EP groups (Hix et al 2007). Their inability to use majority decision-making for political decisions and to craft coherent policy programs prevents Europarties from effectively communicating their preferences to their respective EP groups. This is why they cannot exercise any leadership role vis-à-vis EP groups. Moreover, the asymmetrical relationship is visible in the fact that each Europarty’s organs (i.e. Congress, Presidency and the Leadership Meetings) includes representatives from EP group (usually its president), while Europarties are not represented in EP group meetings. Although Europarties and their groups often act in unison, this is only when EP groups have an interest in doing so. Europarties do not have any instruments to impose their policies on EP groups’ legislative activities.33

Notably, the ELDR may be an exception in this regard. According to Hanley (2008: 122-23), the ELDR’s manifesto serves as the working programme for its EP group. More importantly, the ELDR has the final say over the composition of the group, enjoying a potential veto on admissions. However, this veto power of the ELDR, which is so atypical for other Europarties, has never been used in practice. Thus, even in the case of ELDR one cannot speak of a top-down relationship with respect to its EP group. At best, it could be said that the two ‘work in tandem’ (Hanley 2008: 123)34.

As table five shows, after the adoption of the 2003 Europarty Regulation and its 2007 revision, Europarties succeeded in reaching the cooperation stage, managing even to fulfil several of the requirements of integration. As a consequence of the regulation’s provisions, Europarties are now able to conduct electoral campaigns with EU funds. This resulted in

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33 All four Europarties expect their EP groups to describe their activities in their report to the party Congresses. However, this is just a formal requirement and does not present any instrument of influence for Europarties over their EP groups.

34 Hanley (2008: 122) explains this atypically close relationship between the ELDR and its EP group by arguing that “liberals, being mostly in opposition within their states, tend by compensation to invest heavily in work within the EP.”
more cohesive and detailed Euromanifestos, as well as the usage of common symbols. However, the Regulation proved incapable of coaxing national parties into transferring part of their sovereignty to Europarties. Indeed, the Regulation’s passing failed to provide Europarties either with the power to enforce binding decisions or majoritarian decision-making. Most importantly, the regulation failed to live up to its raison d'être: providing Europarties financial independence from both national parties and EP party groups. The rest of this chapter seeks to understand why this is the case.

Table 5: Europarties’ organisational development after the adoption of the party Regulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PES</th>
<th>EPP</th>
<th>ELDR</th>
<th>EGP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Permanent Communication</td>
<td>Yes, with higher frequency</td>
<td>Yes, with higher frequency</td>
<td>Yes, with higher frequency</td>
<td>Yes, with higher frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Permanent Organization</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making in:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Q. Majority (in practice unanimity)</td>
<td>A. Majority (in practice unanimity)</td>
<td>A. Majority (in practice unanimity)</td>
<td>Q. Majority (in practice unanimity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau/Executive Committee</td>
<td>A. Majority for administrative issues; Unanimity for political issues</td>
<td>A. Majority for administrative issues; Unanimity for political issues</td>
<td>A. Majority</td>
<td>Q. Majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders’ Meeting</td>
<td>Unanimity/Q. Majority</td>
<td>Unanimity</td>
<td>Unanimity</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence of Subunits</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporation of Subunits into Decision-making</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Common Symbols</td>
<td>Yes/with some exceptions</td>
<td>Yes/with some exceptions</td>
<td>Yes/with some exceptions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Membership</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Transfer of National Parties’ Sovereignty</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesive and Detailed Euromanifestos</td>
<td>Yes, to some extent</td>
<td>Yes, to some extent</td>
<td>Yes, to some extent</td>
<td>Yes, to some extent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to Conduct Electoral Campaign</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binding Decisions on Member Parties</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Independence from:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP Party Groups</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Parties</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Guidelines to EP Groups</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, to some extent</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own elaboration based on the analysis of Europarties’ statutes and their practice
5.3 Potential Explanations for the Lack of Integration

In contrast to the high hopes of its enthusiasts, the Regulation failed to provide Europarties more power and autonomy in relation to national parties and EP groups. Six years after the adoption of the Regulation, Europarties remain the weakest link in EU party politics. Although they are closer to integration than they once were, the final stage of organizational development remains at bay. Using the theoretical framework adopted throughout the paper, three factors responsible for the lack of integration may be identified: 1) the shortcomings of the Regulation itself, 2) the absence of change within the wider institutional environment, and 3) the lack of internal preconditions for deeper organisational change.

Regarding the Regulation, the previous pages lay out the provisions that were designed to secure the continued centrality of national parties in EU party politics. By making national parties (financially) indispensable, by refusing to allow Europarties to transfer surpluses onto the following year, and by assigning EP groups control over Europarty financing, the Regulation constrained Europarties’ organisational development. The situation changed somewhat with the revisions of 2007. While it is too early to judge their potential impact, the crux of the problem is sure to remain the same: Europarties will continue to be financially dependent on national member parties until they have utility for more than national party leaders alone. Once interest groups and individuals get interested in Europarties and start financing their activities, their financial dependence on national parties might change. Unfortunately for Europarties, this is difficult to imagine within the current EU institutional configuration, which clearly favours national party activities.

Oddly enough, the Party Article of the Maastricht Treaty caused greater change in Europarties’ organizational development than did the Europarty Regulation, upon which so many hopes were pinned. The crucial difference lies in the fact that the constitutional recognition of Europarties in the Maastricht Treaty followed a larger trend within the EU’s institutional environment. At the time the Party Article was introduced, the EU was firmly committed to integration. Not only had it recently passed the Single European Act but the EU had committed itself to finalizing the European Monetary Union and paving the way towards Eastward enlargement. The combination of these institutional changes stimulated national parties’ interest in Europarties. National parties believed that Europarties might potentially prove useful in reducing transaction costs, allowing for the sharing of information, and even the channelling of policy influence on an EU level. By contrast, the adoption of the Europarty
Regulation did not coincide with any larger changes within the EU’s institutional framework. The regulation alone could not suffice to motivate national parties to surrender part of their sovereignty in favour of Europarties. Admittedly, this could very well change with the activation of the Lisbon Treaty and the further politicisation of the EU along left/right dimensions. Such developments would likely encourage national parties to further coordinate their activities and policies at the EU level, thereby raising the utility of Europarties.

Yet the lack of organisational development cannot be explained solely by external factors. It is also necessary to shed light on those internal factors that might potentially influence parties’ organisational change. According to Panebianco (1988: 53-4), the survival and development of any organisation depends on the distribution of collective and selective incentives. Collective incentives, such as collective identity and a sense of belonging, are rooted in the ideologies and key values that parties establish during their formative years. Since their founding, Europarties have been quite successful in distributing collective incentives, since it is ideology that first binds political parties across Europe. However, as Panebianco points out, ideology is not enough to secure party survival and development. The party also needs to develop selective incentives for its members to maintain an active loyalty for the long haul. Such incentives include the promise of upward mobility or greater prestige. Given their limited means, Europarties have clearly failed to distribute selective incentives in a meaningful manner. This helps explain why the party Regulation could not contribute to a deeper organisational development of Europarties: They lacked the internal preconditions to undercut existing power structures.
Chapter 6: Conclusion: The Regulation and the Future Development of Europarties

Since their inception in the mid 1970s, Europarties have undergone significant development. Having begun as mere ‘clearing houses’ and ‘umbrella organisations’, they endured a long evolution, emerging in 2009 as more organised and more relevant for their national party members. In recent months, they took on the new role of campaign organisations, increasing the amount of resources they were granted by the EU and even creating their own political foundations. For the first time, Europarties are in a position to accumulate significant financial surpluses and to conduct long-term planning. Although each environmental stimulus described in this paper aided the evolution of Europarties, the last stimulus—the Regulation—has had the most direct bearing on the current state of Europarties’ organisational development.

However, as this paper has shown, the Regulation has thus far failed to provide for the financial independence of Europarties and has therefore proved incapable of granting them their political independence. Europarties are still far from being centralised and hierarchical organisations and thus remain unable to fulfil the major requirements of the integration stage. Six years after the adoption of the Regulation, Europarties remain the weakest link in EU party politics. Ironically, the Regulation further secured Europarties’ subordination to national parties and EP groups.

Viewed from this perspective, the findings of this paper could be taken to suggest that the Regulation actually presents a step back in Europarties’ organisational development. Yet such an analysis is ultimately short sighted. In the long term, the Regulation could very well serve as a major leap forward. Although the Regulation did not succeed in securing all the requirements of integration, it introduced several significant innovations with which Europarties will not soon part. To the contrary, Europarties are likely to build on the past accomplishments in their quest for greater influence within the EU political system. Such was certainly the case in 2008 when, after having gotten a hold of EU financing, Europarties succeeded in increasing such allotments from 6.5 million euro in 2004 to 10.6 million, with an additional 5 million dedicated to their political foundations. In this sense, the Regulation’s ultimate contribution could lay the foundations for future innovations on a path towards integration. In the language of historical institutionalism and path dependency, the Regulation
may ‘lock in’ the further organisational evolution of Europarties onto paths that are difficult for national parties to reverse. A prime example is offered by the Leinen Report, which the EP adopted in 2006. Its bold integrationist proposals stemmed directly from the Regulation. Although the Council rejected the Report’s proposals that awarded Europarties clear political powers, it adopted those that ultimately strengthened their position. This opened the door for future attempts by Europarties and their EP group allies to offer yet more proposals that would award genuine political powers to Europarties and weaken the hold of national parties.

That said, the impact of the Regulation on the future development of Europarties will also depend on the future course of EU institutional development. Currently, national parties do not have sufficient incentives to strengthen Europarties’ organisational development. Should the Lisbon Treaty enter into force, however, it would modify the EU’s institutional configuration in such a manner as to strengthen the tendency towards parliamentarianism. This, in turn, would further stimulate the partisan dimension of EU politics. The result would be a more central role for Europarties and a closer degree of policy coordination with EP groups. Nevertheless, such a scenario is sure to meet the resistance of national parties. As Europarties become more empowered and influential, their member parties will likely seek to oversee the process, thereby hindering Europarties’ organisational development. Thus, to meet the next challenge on the road to integration, Europarties will have to ensure that their own self-interest is in the interest of their national party members.
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