Reinventing Mostar: The Role of Local and International Organizations in Instituting Multicultural Identity

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Introduction

In July 2004, the opening of the new “Old Bridge” in Mostar was heralded by the international community as a sign of healing and reconciliation for the war-torn city. Destroyed for its cultural significance and indication of an Ottoman heritage, the bridge grew to symbolize the town of Mostar, and efforts were quickly initiated for its reconstruction. The international community viewed the reopening of the new “Old Bridge” as a step towards and representation of “Balkan reconciliation.”

Mostar, a city of about 100,000 located on the Neretva River in southern Bosnia and Herzegovina, emerged from the war with a geographically and ethnically divided population. Fighting in the Central Zone of the city, formerly the bustling crossroads of the urban landscape, transformed the area into a border of separation, with Croats residing along the western side of the central boulevard while Muslims occupied the eastern part of the city. Until 2004 the two populations had parallel political-administrative structures and institutions that oversaw the political and infrastructural needs of their respective sides and populations.

Seen as both literal and metaphorical, the new “Old Bridge” or Stari Most, was one of many reconstruction projects undertaken by local and international NGOs in an attempt to reintegrate the city. Historic monuments, religious buildings and administrative structures

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2 Bosnia and Herzegovina will hereafter be referred to as Bosnia, for brevity. Bosnian Muslims will be referred to as Bosniaks, a term which was adopted by the group in the early 1990s. Bosnian Croats, the other salient ethnic group in this paper will be referred to as simply Croats, again for brevity. A distinction will be made between Bosnian Croats and citizens of the country of Croatia when necessary.
3 These lines are merely indicative of the predominant trend within the city. There has been some return, especially of refugees, to prewar residences that would counter these separations, but these progresses have still been minimal.
were all also eligible candidates for reconstruction, and their rapid rebuilding was viewed as one of the methods that would aid the return of Mostar to its pre-conflict, unified state. Thus, in this attempt to reintegrate the city, local and international NGOs have rebuilt structures and recreated symbols aimed at promoting unification. Many of these buildings, and monuments in particular, that were constructed under the auspices of these organizations seek to emphasize the common history and tradition that different groups in Mostar have shared. Through these symbolic projects, international and local organizations have thereby aided in the imposition and formation of a multicultural identity for Mostar. This multiculturalism has become a significant force driving the reconstruction process.

In spite of these structures that seek to celebrate a shared past, many of these newly reconstructed sites remain group-specific, and proceed to highlight the groupist divisions of the city that they are attempting to unify. The building and rebuilding of churches, mosques and even cemeteries may have helped to maintain the fragmentation of the city. Sometimes those monuments that have been propelled by the rhetoric of integration, like the Jewish Synagogue, only serve the interests of one specific community.

Is urban reintegration being undermined by the construction of group-specific monuments? Are they perceived or intended to be divisive? Or do these monuments serve to highlight the cultural diversity of the city? What does a multicultural Mostar look like?

Mostar provides an interesting case for studying the reconstruction of divided cities, because there are many forces at work. This thesis examines two of those, that of the continued trends toward division, as exemplified through monumental construction, and the efforts of the international community and local civil society in attempting to engender reconciliation. As I will demonstrate, much of this reconciliation is completed via an agenda of multiculturalism. While this agenda has many facets, I will primarily concentrate on promoting multiculturalism through spatial policies and cultural heritage preservation.
The current scholarship concentrating on the urban reconstruction of Mostar has mostly centered on the reconstruction of the new Old Bridge.\textsuperscript{4} The focus on this bridge, however, has also had the effect of narrowing the scholarly and media attention that has been focused on Mostar. Since the opening of the structure in 2004, much of this media and academic interest that was directed toward the city has tapered off, resulting in fewer publications being issued surrounding the reconstruction process and the continued attempts at integration. In such a dynamic political situation, this proves to be a rather sizeable gap in the academic literature surrounding Mostar, which I hope to begin to fill with this thesis.

My main limitation in conducting this project was the fact that I do not speak Bosnian. To counter and temper this deficit, yet still consult primary sources, I decided to look at this project through the lens of NGO activity, since the vast majority of their documents are written in English. All of the interviews I conducted with local organizations were completed in English.

Methodology

In addition to looking at the existing secondary sources, I examine sources from the international organizations operating in Mostar, such as the Office of the High Representative (OHR), focusing on their plans to spatially reunify the city. I also reference documents produced by those organizations actively engaged in urban architectural reconstruction (UNESCO, Aga Khan Trust for Culture, World Monuments Fund) to see how the international community is reimagining the urban identity of the city. From these

publications, I demonstrate that the international organizations operating within the region are spatially and symbolically creating spaces for multiculturalism within Mostar.

Finally, I conducted interviews with local NGOs to gauge how they work to further implement these policies of multiculturalism within Mostar. I focused on four NGOs based on their activities within the urbanism sector and their attempts at promoting multiculturalism within the urban space. Many of these organizations are not strictly involved in physical reconstruction, but rather reconstruction of relations. That being said, their offices and workspaces still serve as these spaces of multiculturalism within the city and they are working to spatially instill multiculturalism within the urban space.

In my interviews, I spoke with one representative from each organization. Each interview lasted approximately an hour and my questions came from a pre-prepared and semi-open questionnaire. While each questionnaire was tailored to the activities of the specific organization I was visiting, I ensured that I was covering the same general topics with each representative. The themes that were discussed included the current and future activities of the organization, their efforts to combat spatial separation of the city, how the organization worked to instill multiculturalism within Mostar and what, if any, cooperation existed with other organizations, both locally and regionally. The exact content of these more general questions can be found in the Appendix of this work. In our discussions of multiculturalism, issues of the advantages and disadvantages of such an agenda were discussed, as well as issues of funding. From each of these organizations, I also requested to see any publications that they had issued, so I had impact surveys, annual reports and brochures to rely on in my analysis of their activities.

These organizations were: Cultural Heritage without Borders, Nansen Dialogue Center Mostar, OKC Abrašević, and Local Democracy Association Mostar. The details of their missions and activities are further analyzed in Chapter 5.
My interview at the Local Democracy Agency in Mostar deviated slightly from this formula. During my limited time within the city, representatives from this organization and I find a mutually convenient time to meet, as the organization was hosting a weeklong conference for youth within the city. I spoke briefly about my project with Jlenia Destito, the Executive Director, and she provided me with several publications to aid in my research. These publications provided me with almost all of the information that I needed to thoroughly analyze and draw conclusions about the organizations operations in Mostar.

**Organization**

In my examination of how the international community and local organizations are creating multicultural spaces within the city, I will explore the monuments of division and unification within the city, and how they compete for dominance within the urban space. Additionally, I will focus on the relationship of these monuments to the spatial organization of the city, especially looking to those who compete within the neutral spaces of encounter that have been designed to promote interaction between individuals of different ethnic groups.

My first chapter will review the current literature on divided cities, the role of monuments in urban space and the dominant theories on multiculturalism promotion and development in post-conflict societies. Chapter two will move to a discussion of the historical developments that have contributed to the contemporary divisions that exist in Mostar. The third chapter begins my analysis of the monuments of division that emphasized the separations within the city, and the rhetoric surrounding their construction, while chapter four examines the efforts in monumentality and spatial unification that the international community has undertaken in order to instill this multiculturalism within the urban space. The fifth and final chapter looks to the role of civil society in these processes and provides a synthesis of my interviews. Finally, I conclude with my own assessments of the policy of
imposed multiculturalism in Mostar, and look to the potential effectiveness of its use in other post-conflict situations.
Chapter 1: Theoretical Background

The study of divided cities and mixed towns has become a recent phenomenon in the field of urban studies. To date, the majority of the literature within this discipline deals with cities that have been divided through conflict or war, and their subsequent rehabilitation, as the examples of Berlin, Belfast and Beirut illustrate. However, some divided cities are still zones of intense internal disagreement and occasional violence, including Jerusalem, Nicosia and Mostar, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose study is the subject of this paper. The position of Mostar in this literature on divided cities is a complicated one. While the city is the administrative center of the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it still does not carry the regional or even international influence of the other metropolises and capitals that compose the literature on divided cities.

Even so, the exact definition of the nature and characteristics of a divided city is still open for debate. Cities can be divided along a myriad of axes and fronts, and the modern city, as Judit Bodnár notes, is becoming increasingly fragmented and “…internal walls are almost universally being constructed in contemporary cities, regional geographies aside.”

Institutional, social, political, ideological, administrative and territorial divisions have all cropped up within this modern city, although some of these separations are obviously more pronounced than others. In addition to these seemingly obvious ways of division, Setha Low points out that cities can be divided categorically, with gender, architecture, religion or ethnicity serving as boundaries. While these divisions can be either literal, as in the case of

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physical barriers, or perceived, the lines and modes of separation can provide a useful framework for analyzing the urban arena.

The segregation and fragmentation of the city has always been existent, with members of different groups often opting to live among individuals with similar backgrounds. Historically members of certain professions have lived in close proximity within urban spaces, and it still is not uncommon to find neighborhoods dominated by individuals of a single origin, such as Chinatowns or Jewish Quarters. Territorialization of the city comes into play, however, when the relegating of a certain ethnic group to a specific space is taken at the expense of others, and boundaries begin to become impermeable, although they do not completely close. The relocation or dictation that a certain space belongs to a specific group can be caused by many factors: individuals within that group can start to stake claims over a territory within the city; governments may dictate that a group must live within a predefined territory, as evidenced through the historical process of ghettoization; or external factors may result in increased territorialization, such as war. The unequal allocation of resources is also one of the main factors in producing territorialization, and causes involuntary segregation within economic ghettos.

As such, there exists a strong connection between the control of resources within a city and territorialization. Tim Cole demonstrates how territorialization contributes to the “exercise of power through the control of space.” Sometimes, the amount of power held by a certain group is diminished because of the resources that are available to them within their territorial area. These spatial regions are commonly referred to as, ghettos, or spaces “to which the subjects or victims of the involuntary segregation process are sent,” and are

8 This factor is concretely exemplified in Mostar. Croatian forces control the areas of the city where more of the historical industry lay. Currently, the aluminum plant, which generates most of the income for Mostar, is located in the western section of the city. The vast majority of employees in this plant are Croatian.
typically “qualitatively inferior” and stigmatized. On the other hand, this power dynamic that arises out of territoriality can also benefit the specific group that occupies the space, especially when economic and political institutions are concentrated within the demarcated region. This situation is evident in Mostar, wherein many of the city’s industrial and economic institutions have been concentrated in the western part of the city. Before reunification, this access to resources allowed the Croat population to flourish economically, demonstrating that, by “demarcating and guarding a particular space” containing these institutions, a group may be able to gain an upper hand on the economic and political aspects of the city, thereby consolidating their power over their own territory and over the region as a larger whole.

In studying this phenomenon of resource allocation and territorialization, Tim Cole writes that there is “value to thinking spatially about” the issue. It is important to recall that these spatial divisions are still porous and individuals can cross into different neighborhoods and spaces within the urban landscape with relatively few complications. A highly territorialized city is still characterized by this relative freedom of movement, making it distinct from a divided city.

Cities, such as Mostar, become divided and not merely victims of intense territorialization, then, when this territorialization and competition over resources and power comes to a head. The same factors that produce intense territorialization, such as violent conflicts or unequal distribution of resources, can also result in more concrete divisions within the urban space. In these divided environments, conditions make traversing the political, anthropological and social boundaries that separate groups dangerous and difficult, if not

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11 Cole, 81.
12 Cole, 67.
impossible.\textsuperscript{13} Frequently, these divisions are further compounded by complete administrative and territorial partition.\textsuperscript{14}

That being said, most of the literature regarding divided cities looks at the implementation of programs aimed at political and administrative unification, with little emphasis directed at the reunification of the urban space. Reconstruction of relations in the physical or spatial sense, obviously, most frequently emerges in academic scholarship when discussing spaces that have been plagued by intense internal conflicts, like Nicosia, or war, as in the case of Beirut. Whether these divisions are political or have erupted as the result of violent conflict, the literature still tends to see the divided city as a potential center of peace building and as a model for dealing with conflicts in other locations or on a larger scale. For example, Scott Bollens, who examines divisions in cities that have emerged as a consequence of nationalist or group-based claims, examines local grassroots organizations that have gained legitimacy in three communities and looks at how these associations have transcended such group-based claims, thereby potentially serving as a model for social and political reintegration.\textsuperscript{15}

Jo Beall, Owen Crankshaw and Susan Parnell, in their study of political and spatial unification in Johannesburg, expand on this idea, noting that the successes achieved in a metropolis can be applied to other urban situations plagued by divisions.\textsuperscript{16} In particular, they look to the example of Johannesburg where, according to the authors, policy decisions that

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have sought to promote government transparency and fiscal restraint have led to an increase in the mixing of different races in the post-apartheid society. These macro-level reforms have been supported on a more local level by civil society organizations, and the authors have observed, “NGOs are valuable in supporting and bolstering the role of membership organizations” that are “committed to transforming their neighborhoods and, indeed, the city.”

In the case of Johannesburg, then, economic policies have driven changes on the spatial level, and the authors indicate that this model may be useful in combating divisions in the rest of the country as well as in other deeply divided societies.

The idea that the city can be the fundamental unit of peace building has not escaped those actors who are involved in reconstruction in Mostar, and many are looking to apply this model in other divided societies. However, as I will show, this model has had limited success, and an assessment of the success of the project raises some doubts about its applicability, especially as the reconstruction of the urban space in this situation has hardly been peaceful.

In fact, in many post-conflict spaces, reconstruction has produced or escalated tensions within the targeted communities. Questions of what should be restored to its original state, what should be left in its current state and what should be modernized all arise within the post-conflict reconstruction process. Within divided cities, these questions are more sensitive, especially since many sites within the urban space often remain contested. Monuments within the public space especially, receive heightened levels of attention as they can, and do, serve as representatives of the city, thus claiming a monopoly over the physical manifestations of the city’s tradition and memory. Sharon Zukin discusses the way in which cultural heritage is a way of controlling cities, and goes on to note “the material landscape itself – the buildings,

17 Beall, Crankshaw, Parnell, 201.
parks, and streets – has become the city’s most important visual representation” continuing to observe that “all public spaces…are influenced by the dominant symbolic economy.”

Yet, how do these buildings come to represent the city? In *The Production of Space*, Henri Lefebvre again introduces the concept of power and control over public spaces. He notes that space is produced, although not necessarily meant to be “read.” Some segments of space, however, are produced with the explicit intention of such an analysis, and those are the parts of space that concern me within this thesis:

“Monumentality, for instance, always embodies and imposes a clearly intelligible message. It says what it wishes to say – yet it hides a good deal more: being political, military, and ultimately fascist in character, monumental buildings mask the will to power and the arbitrariness of power beneath signs and surfaces which claim to express collective will and collective thought.”

Lefebvre notes that monuments are not just “a collection of symbols” that float independently in space, but rather that they impose a cultural hegemony over the urban area. Through this imposition, “each monumental space becomes the metaphorical and quasi-metaphysical under-pinning of society.”

Given this consideration of monumentality, it becomes obvious why the fate of such structures in post-conflict reconstruction can become such sources of controversy. In his book, *The Ghosts of Berlin*, Brian Ladd details how these conflicts played out after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Ladd looks at the discussions surrounding the treatment, reconstruction and restoration of buildings and monuments as the reunification process was occurring in post-1989 Berlin. Ladd writes, “Buildings matter. So do statues, ruins, and even stretches of vacant

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19 Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 143.
20 Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 143.
“land” because “they are the symbols and repositories of memory.”²³ Going on to note that “these arguments about buildings and squares are inevitably arguments about history and identity,” Ladd’s analysis about the position of these monuments in contested and divided societies can serve to explain a great deal about the situation in Mostar.²⁴

While many articles have been published about the position of urbanism within Mostar, especially surrounding the rebuilding of Stari Most, there have been a few notable works that deal with the role of monuments in the reconstruction of Mostar. The first, and most thorough, is Emily Makaš’s dissertation, Representing Competing Identities: Building and Rebuilding in Postwar Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, which examines the controversies surrounding national building projects that have been undertaken in Mostar through the lens of local, state and international media. Due to her knowledge of Bosnian, and extensive examination of the media reactions to these works, I have come to rely heavily on her work when examining the nature of the rhetoric surrounding the construction of monuments. Heiko Wimmen, a journalist living in Mostar who has done some comparative work on the reconstruction of Beirut and Bosnia, is another author whose grasp of the situation in the city has aided my own research endeavors. While mostly focusing on the reunification of the education system, his use of Dan Rabinowitz and Daniel Monterescu’s conception of a “trapped minority” in his evaluation of the divisive actions of the Croats of Mostar adds interesting dimensions to the assessment of the ethnonationalist tendencies within the city that have worked to inhibit reunification.²⁵ This metaphor is especially useful when considering the local politics that are at play within the city, as it can serve to explain the reasons for the

²⁴ Ladd, 61.
²⁵ For more information see: Daniel Monterescu, and Dan Rabinowitz, Mixed Towns, Trapped Communities: Historical Narratives, Spatial Dynamics, Gender Relations and Cultural Encounters in Palestinian-Israeli Towns, Re-Materialising Cultural Geography, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).
actions of certain local actors, and their aversion to the reunification program proposed by the international community, especially in the case study of the educational system that Wimmen uses.

What these works on Mostar have not focused on is the subject of my research: the role of the international community and local NGOs in promoting urban reunification in Mostar and the relationship that exists between these two forces. Despite this gap in the literature on Mostar, the role of local and international organizations in the physical reconstruction process has been widely studied in other locations. As such, studies focused on development and global governance theory have proved to be vital in the formulation of the theoretical framework of my thesis.

The first of these investigations is Mark Duffield’s book entitled *Global Governance and the New Wars*, which looks at the international community’s involvement in post-conflict reconstruction in terms of development and security. Through the engagement of civil society organizations and state-level institutions, a “cross-cutting” governance web emerges that seeks to effectively transform a society and combat underdevelopment. The goal of this development is the achievement and maintenance of a “liberal peace” that would work to prevent the outbreak of future conflicts. Development in this sense, however, is not strictly economic. Sometimes, as Duffield notes, restoration, reconstruction and the provision of economic investment in post-conflict societies is not enough to prevent the outbreak of future conflicts and a “wider social impact” is necessary, sometimes going as far to necessitate the changing of “whole societies and the behaviour attitudes of people within them.”

Some of these attempts that have been undertaken by the international community to change the social fabric of the societies that they are working to reconstruct, are examined in

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27 Duffield, 42.
Naomi Klein’s recent work, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*. This book looks to the historical insertion of the international community and free-market practices into situations in which extensive reconstruction is required, and, within this discussion, Klein demonstrates how the processes of reconstruction and the provision of development aid have become highly politicized. Mostly focusing on the recent Iraq War and the tsunami in Indonesia, Klein concludes that by capitalizing on “mega-disasters” the values of the international community, and most notably particular factions within the United States, have come to dominate the world. While the values that she examines have to do with the libertarian free-market, and my work is concerned with the imposition of multiculturalism, this work is still interesting, for its assertion that through development and reconstruction, an ideology can be implemented, especially due to the politicization of the entire process.

Will Kymlicka writes about the hegemony of the values international community in reconstruction situations, from a different angle, mostly in the form of promoting liberal multiculturalism. Before going onto discuss exactly how this imposed multiculturalism played out in Mostar, it is important to examine what is actually meant by multiculturalism and how the international community envisions this ideology. In 2004, BBC News did an interview with the representatives of four non-governmental organizations and think tanks in Britain, questioning them on their definitions of multiculturalism. This piece ultimately demonstrated the diversity in the definition of the term. All of the subjects interviewed suggested that multiculturalism was a positive force that involved cross-cultural exchanges between members of groups with different backgrounds. They additionally recognized that these groups could contribute and benefit the greater society, although differed on their


opinions of the extent and form that this contribution takes. Kymlicka sees multiculturalism as an “umbrella term” that is used “to cover a wide range of policies designed to provide some level of public recognition, support or accommodation to non-dominant ethnocultural groups.”

In his book *Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity*, Kymlicka goes on to note that international organizations are largely engaged in a policy of “multiculturalism-promotion” and that this multiculturalism has been an ideology advanced by the international community since 1989. This imposition of liberal multicultural values and their expression in reconstruction and building projects can be construed as an invention and imposition of tradition in areas that have fallen under the influence of the international community. As Eric Hobsbawm would suggest, these actors are attempting to impose their own particular interpretation or tradition of multiculturalism, while painting it as a continuation of the past, as is exemplified in the case of Mostar.

The international community has attempted to portray Mostar as a multicultural space, through a discussion of the previous “shared” culture within the city, as seen through “qualities such as language and territory.” As Judith Bing indicates, “Above all, the multicultural past was taken to include an amalgam of the Ottoman period with subsequent physical and cultural developments.” This idea of a shared past and the inherent multicultural characteristic of the prewar city, as Makaš highlights, have been vital for the creation of the idea that there is a tradition of multiculturalism in Bosnia and in Mostar, which can be reconstructed. Ascertaining the validity of whether or not this multiculturalism actually existed in prewar Bosnia is of little importance, although statistical data would indicate that

31 Kymlicka, 16.
32 Kymlicka, 16.
33 Makaš, 153.
there is some truth to this claim; only the perception of a prewar multiculturalism is actually needed to guide the international community’s efforts in physical reconstruction and political reunification.

Yet, how did the international community go about reinstating and reinventing this multicultural tradition within Mostar? My focus within this paper is on monuments, and how they can be “read” as symbols of multiculturalism or division within the city. Croatian and Bosniak groups have sought to construct their own national projects to emphasize the divisions of the city while trying to control the visual representation of the urban space. The international community and local organizations, however, have also tried to spatially and monumentally construct space that is designed to impose the cultural hegemony of multiculturalism over the urban landscape. These organizations have additionally sought to create neutral spaces in which members of different populations can interact in order to promote interaction and forcibly change the dominant separatist behavior patterns of the city.

Before going onto discuss the history that led up to these divisions, and the actual spatial and symbolic division itself, it is important to understand how I see nationalism, and the national projects that have cropped up within the urban space of Mostar. Nationalism, as Gellner would suggest, is a modern phenomenon that emerged during the era of industrialization. The nation, then, is a product of shared culture and is transmitted via a standardized educational system and print capitalism. As Anthony Smith would note, “what gives nationalism its power are the myths, memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritages and the ways in which a popular living past has been, and can be, rediscovered and reinterpreted by modern nationalist intelligentsias.” Thus, it is important to remember that

the ethnic tensions prevalent in Bosnia are by no means indicators of “ancient hatreds” among
groups that have been brewing for centuries, since before the arrival of the Ottomans.

None of my discussions on Bosniak and Croat national or nationalist projects are
meant to reify either side or to portray them as monolithic. As noted above, divisions can cut
across a myriad of axes, yet in Bosnia and Mostar, divisions based on ethnicity are those that
have been the most instrumentalized and have been the driving forces behind the divisions
described within this work.
Chapter 2: History of Urbanism in Mostar and the Bosnian War

How have architecture and city planning been politicized and linked with control of the urban space within the city of Mostar? The history of urban planning and construction within Mostar, from Ottoman monumental construction to the industrial developments of the twentieth century, has become very relevant, especially when considering the politicization surrounding cultural heritage preservation and spatial policy in the contemporary urban space of Mostar.

Until the arrival of the Ottomans in the fifteenth century, Mostar was a small settlement located along the banks of the Neretva River. The hamlet received its name, meaning “bridge keeper,” because of the small wooden bridge that crossed the river, facilitating movement and commerce throughout the region. In the sixteenth century, the Ottomans would replace that bridge with the now famous, Stari Most, and that structure would grow to become a symbol of the town. This period of Ottoman control was one of intense building, and saw the construction of monuments, markets and housing units. This expansion transformed Mostar into a prominent regional trade hub.

The monuments that were constructed under the auspices of the Ottoman Empire did not reflect a strictly Islamic tradition, although much of the construction of religious buildings did include mosques. However, the Ottomans also contributed to the building of marketplaces, public baths and private accommodation38. The Orthodox Church was built with funds gifted from the Ottoman sultan, and a Jewish synagogue was erected in town in order to meet the demands of the burgeoning Sephardi Jewish population, recently expelled

As many historians have noted, this period was one of heightened interaction between members of different religious groups. In the urbanism sector, the Ottoman period saw the coexistence of several different religious structures within a single space. However, on the social front, due to provisions in Islamic legal codes, Muslims were almost always given more powerful positions than Christians, although there were some exceptions. Despite this overarching hierarchical inequality, “there were no significant clashes” in Ottoman Bosnia, and any uprisings against the Ottoman sultanate saw Christians of all denominations joining “the side of the local Muslims.”

During the eighteenth and nineteenth century, while still technically controlled by the Ottoman Empire, Mostar, and Bosnia as a whole, was granted increased autonomy. In 1878, however, the entire vilayet, or province, of Bosnia and Herzegovina was transferred into the hands of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which began its own urban initiatives in Bosnia’s cities. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Mostar were marked by an expansion of the urban grid and an overall modernization of the city. The Austro-Hungarians laid railroad lines throughout the entire territory of Bosnia, connecting Mostar to the coast, Sarajevo and, subsequently, the larger part of the European continent. Within the city itself, the Austro-Hungarians built residential quarters, improved roadways and added new bridges. The city center moved westward, to accommodate the burgeoning population, and in turn the majority of these new structures, which were designed in a neo-Classical style, fell largely outside the historic Ottoman city core. This shift of the city center helped to preserve the Ottoman cultural heritage in the city, throughout the entire modernization process.

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40 The Ottoman Empire categorized its subjects by religion, not ethnicity.
42 Pašić.
The interwar period brought little development to Mostar, although the city administration managed to avoid much of the ethnically motivated political disputes that plagued the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. After the Second World War concluded and Tito assumed power in the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the industrial capacity of the city expanded. Mostar added an aluminum plant, wine production facilities, a food-processing plant, a university campus and sports complexes, thereby allowing the city to solidify its position as a regional hub. The city became a beacon for Tito’s mantra of “brotherhood and unity” and, as Judith Bing asserts, distinctions between the ethnic groups were “blurred.” With no clear ethnic majority, the 1991 census indicated that the urban population consisted of 35 percent Muslim Bosniaks, 34 percent Bosnian Catholic Croats, 19 percent Orthodox Serbs and 12 percent others, a category that included Yugoslavs, Jews, Roma and other minorities. Members of these various ethnic groups largely interacted and intermingled in urban daily life, exemplified by the fact that the Municipality of Mostar had the largest percentage of mixed marriages in the former Yugoslavia, amounting to almost one-third of all unions.

Pre-war statistics indicate that 24,000 Bosniaks and 6,000 Croats lived in the eastern part of the town, where the historic Ottoman city center was located, while 30,000 Croats and

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46 Bing, 240.
15,000 Bosniaks lived in the western portion of the town. These statistics indicate that there may have been some degree of separation between the two dominant ethnic groups of the city, the Bosniaks and Croats, prior to the beginning of the conflict. More Croats lived in the western side of the city than did Bosniaks, and more Bosniaks lived in the eastern portion than did Croats. Even so, as these numbers indicate, a substantial number of Bosniaks continued to reside in the west and a large portion of Croats lived in the east of Mostar, effectively neutralizing this slight separation of population. Additionally, it is important to remember that these numbers only represent the dispersions of two ethnic groups, composing approximately 70 percent of the population of Mostar at the time. The remaining thirty percent of the population, consisting of Serbs, Yugoslavs, Jews and Roma, were also dispersed throughout the city, further reducing any trends toward polarization.

The war, however, dramatically altered the structure and environment of the city, ultimately fragmenting it, both physically and socially. In March 1992, Bosnian voters overwhelmingly supported the creation of an independent entity, and a month later Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) forces descended on the city and began artillery strikes. Croat and Bosniak troops mounted a successful defense of the city, and drove the JNA forces out of the city in mid-June. Shortly thereafter, however, tensions flared between Croatian and Bosniak forces, and the city was under siege once again. The Croatian Defense Council’s (HVO) attacks on the city continued for almost a year, and during that time non-Croats were forcibly removed from the western part of the city.

The signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and

49 Bose.
50 Many Serbs boycotted this referendum for independence, however, so the results remain controversial.
Herzegovina, or the Dayton Agreement, ended the hostilities in Mostar, and the country as a whole. The Dayton Agreement divided Bosnia into two entities – one for the Republika Srpska, which was given 49% of the territory of Bosnia, and the other for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was delegated the remaining 51% of the territory and is divided into ten cantons. Five of these cantons have a Bosniak majority, three have a Croat majority and two are ethnically mixed. Mostar is the administrative center of the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton and is considered to be ethnically mixed.

The conflict, however, brought heavy damage to Mostar. Over one-third of the structures in Mostar were completely destroyed, and at least ninety percent of the buildings that were located in the city center were damaged. War campaigns of ethnic cleansing extended to the cultural heritage sphere, and attacks on monuments, museums and libraries came to be as common as those on other, more traditional, military targets. Andras Riedlmayer compiled a report on the destruction of cultural heritage in Bosnia for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and found that that of the almost three hundred mosques that he surveyed, “None…were found to be undamaged, while only 22 mosques (less than 8 percent of the total) were assessed as lightly damaged.” Most of the damage was sustained to minarets, the most obvious markers of a mosque and of the Muslim community’s presence in the city, although a large percentage of the structures were completely destroyed. Architecture that spoke to the Ottoman cultural heritage in the city was disproportionately targeted, but Catholic and Orthodox monuments did not escape unscathed.

An inventory released in a newsletter compiled by the Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture in Istanbul, assessed the damage to Islamic monuments in Mostar,

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52 Makaš.
noting that almost all of the mosques were “totally destroyed.” A prior report issued by the Ministry of Urban Planning and Environmental Protection in Bosnia June 1992, just before JNA forces concluded their attacks, demonstrates how extensive the damage to cultural heritage was in Mostar, even towards the beginning of the conflict. This report looks particularly at the damage to Jewish and Catholic sites within the city, and notes that at least ten churches had been damaged in the fighting. In a letter written to UNESCO by Bosnia’s Institute for Protection of Cultural, Historical and Natural Heritage offices, Sejdalija Mustafic notes, “these attacks [on cultural heritage] have been planned to destroy systematically all the Bosnia and Herzegovina’s heritage especially those belonging to the Ottoman heritage.”

In addition to sustaining heavy infrastructural and cultural damage, the city’s population also physically divided itself along ethnic lines. The war forced an ethnic separation of populations, with the vast majority of Croats moving to the western portion of the city, while most Bosniaks remained in the eastern portion. Almost all of the Serbs fled the city, with many moving to the Republika Srpska. The commercial center of the city was transformed into the front line during the conflict, and the central boulevard served as a physical demarcation of the division after the war. Carl Grodach observes that many individuals in Mostar “perceive the Bulevar as a very real border.” While it has been too politically sensitive to measure changes in the demographics of the city, estimates indicate that Croats, have become the dominant majority group, comprising approximately 60 percent

of the population, while Bosniaks make up the remaining 40 percent. Other minority ethnic groups, most prominently the Serbs, were largely driven out of the city during the conflict, leaving the subsequent ethnic divisions of Mostar more pronounced.

This spatial and ethnic division of the city was, and remains, very evident. Especially after the cessation of hostilities, it was still very dangerous for individuals to cross the Boulevard. Sumantra Bose cites the introduction of a common currency and the standardization of license plates as two of the only mechanisms that were successful in helping to bridge the divide and to engender unrestricted travel throughout the city space. Despite these standardizations, “By 2000 freedom of movement with motor vehicles was close to total in Mostar, although it remains (self-)limited for pedestrians.”

Following the war, to combat these separations and restore security, representatives of the international community descended on Mostar with the goals of facilitating reconstruction, and ultimately reunification. The international community in Mostar is represented by a myriad of multinational organizations, such as the World Monuments Fund (WMF), International Monetary Fund (IMF), the former European Union Administration of Mostar (EUAM), the United Nations Office of the High Representative (OHR), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to name a few. Some of these are international donor organizations, while others are global governance organizations, aiming to promote stability and help to create a secure and legitimate governing body. Intergovernmental or international organizations have member states and are distinct from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which are considered to be civil society groups, as government representatives do not head them. Foreign governments, independently of international organizations, have also played an influential role in the international presence in


\[58\] Bose.

\[59\] Bose, 111.
Mostar, both by providing funds to reconstruction projects and sometimes even establishing their own NGOs.\textsuperscript{60} Rebecca Kotlo estimates that in 1995 as many as 1500 NGOs were operating in the Federation alone.\textsuperscript{61}

While there are a myriad of different organizations operating within Mostar with drastically different mandates, there is extensive cooperation between the different groups and almost all of them are discussing an agenda of multiculturalism. For example, the Aga Khan Trust for Culture (AKTC), an Islamic foundation with a clear agenda of preserving Islamic cultural heritage, bathes its activities in Mostar in the rhetoric of multiculturalism. Thus, this discussion of the international community and NGOs is not an attempt at reification of the organizations operating within Mostar; it is just a reflection of their common agenda and extensive cooperation.\textsuperscript{62}

Yet despite the efforts of the international community and local organizations to attempt to bring about reconciliation and reunification within the city, the international community institutionalized the ethnic segregations of the city. The Interim Statue for the City of Mostar, divided the city into seven administrative districts, three for Croats and three for Bosniaks, and one internationally administered Central Zone, along the area of the former front line.\textsuperscript{63} This area was designated for development and designed to eventually encourage the mixing of the different ethnic groups, within an allegedly neutral space. The international community had originally intended this Central Zone to be larger, but the size of the area was reduced to meet the wishes of Croat politicians. This division by ethnicity, intended to

\textsuperscript{60} For example, the Nansen Dialogue Center, which has branches throughout Bosnia was established and funded by the Norwegian government.
\textsuperscript{62} Chapter 5 will examine the details of this agenda in the NGO sector more thoroughly.
establish security and stabilize the city until a legitimate power-sharing government could be established, served to further emphasize and institutionalize the divisions between groups. The Statue, however, still maintained the “legal and functional unity” of the city and allowed the city of Mostar to have jurisdiction over some aspects of governance, such as public transportation and urban planning.\(^{64}\)

Despite this push for overall unity, the administrative separation of the city into two distinct zones resulted in the development of “parallel” infrastructural institutions, which have continued to solidify the divide. As Jolyon Naegele noted in the beginning of the 2000s, more than five years after the end of open hostilities, “…Mostar has two local governments, two universities, two police forces, two water-supply agencies, two electricity distributors, two chambers of commerce, and two municipal bus companies.”\(^{65}\) Political divisions also plagued the city, with the conservative Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party, who initially received substantial support and funding from officials in Zagreb, claiming allegiance among many Bosnian Croats, and the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), representing the Bosniak constituency of Mostar.

In March 2004, however, Mostar was reunited on the administrative level with the adoption of the new City of Mostar Statute, which replaced the temporary one. This reunification coincided with the opening of the newly reconstructed *Stari Most*, thereby ending the official divisions of the city. With the launch of the OHR’s “Mostar – One City” campaign, aimed at promoting the idea of administrative integration and the merits of the new statute to the citizens of the city through billboards, newspaper advertisements and commercials, Mostar saw the first unified citywide elections since the end of the war and the subsequent restructuring of government. A certain number of government positions were

\(^{64}\) “Annex to the Dayton Agreement on Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Agreed Principles for the Interim Statute for the City of Mostar.”

reserved for Croats, Bosniaks and other minorities, in order to ensure that no single ethnic
group could dominate the city council. As Paddy Ashdown, the UN High Representative
wrote in an open letter to the citizens of Mostar, “…the new system has been carefully
designed to ensure that no single people can dominate the others. Mostar will now have a
single Assembly, a single administration and a single budget - but control of these will be
distributed among all the representatives of Mostar’s citizens, and all its constituent
peoples.”

Despite these unification attempts, a myriad of political, social and economic barriers
on the local level continue to disrupt the reconstruction and reunification efforts of the
international community. For one, the new City of Mostar statute was not adopted without
complications and objections, from both the HDZ and the SDA. In addition, high levels of
unemployment and low economic investment in the city have hindered reconciliation efforts
and helped fuel trends towards divisions based on nationality. While the administration of the
city was ultimately integrated successfully, representatives active within the government often
still have nationalist agendas or influences, making it difficult for any productive legislation
to be passed. Several of the parallel institutions, such as telecommunications companies, that
served the western and eastern sides of the city have not been fully integrated into one unit,
complicating the ability of the city’s government to deliver equal and adequate services to the
entire citizenry.

In fact, even some of the unified administrative structures have fallen victim to the
pull of these national agendas. As an architect for the Urban Planning Department in Mostar

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66 Paddy Ashdown, “High Representative’s Letter to the Citizens of Mostar,” Available:
(accessed 5 April 2009).
67 Anes Alić, “Status of Bosnia’s Mostar Unsettled,” Transitions Online, 8 November 2003,
Available: www.ceeol.com/aspx/getdocument.aspx?logid=5&id=E8897DB2-CCC4-11D7-
68 Larissa Vetters, “The Power of Administrative Categories: Emerging Notions of
noted in 2005, “In Mostar, one boss has to be Croat and the other Bosnian, so in this case, the head of the urban planning department is Croat and the director of the new Urban Institute will be Bosnian….I can still see on this level a lot of protection of national interests…I am afraid that it will always be a problem in urban planning here.”\textsuperscript{69} Even so, as Scott Bollens notes, those urbanists not motivated by national projects are reluctant to engage in, and thus combat, the issue of ethnic territoriality.\textsuperscript{70} Thus, the activities of the international community and local organizations are some of the only efforts in urbanism and cultural heritage preservation that aim to engage the city as a whole, and create these neutral spaces of encounter.


Chapter 3: Monuments of Division

Despite administrative attempts at unification, the urban landscape of Mostar still bears many symbols of division. The divisions that continue to persist in the city have been compounded by a symbolic marking of territory, with both Bosniaks and Croats constructing national projects in order to emphasize the borders of their administrative zones. The allegedly neutral Central Zone in particular, has seen fierce competition over the space within it, as each national group attempts to bring the area under its sphere of symbolic influence. In this marking off of territory, as Henri Lefebvre notes, “space thus acquires symbolic value” and has resulted in a further physical and psychological division of the city.\(^{71}\)

Croatian Monuments

Standing in the Spanish Square in the center of the city and looking southward down the main Boulevard, these spatial divisions are evident. On the western side of Mostar, Roman Catholic monuments and symbols of Croatian national history have attempted to indicate Croat control over the space. These Croatian national projects have especially attempted to assert some control over the Central Zone, in spite of the area’s designation as a neutral space. Solely concentrated on the western bank of the central Boulevard, these monuments serve as a symbolic borderline that separates the Croatian west from the rest of the city. In this way, the allegedly central space within Mostar is being converted into a border space, and the functioning of this border area is further accentuated by the fact that, further into the western portion of the city, the quantity of these monumental structures diminishes, save for a few

churches and street names that reflect Croatian history and cultural heritage.

I will examine two national projects that have helped to form this symbolic border in the Central Zone, the Franciscan Church and the Jubilee Cross. Although there are many other structures that also serve this purpose, such as the HVO Monument, the Catholic Church and the Croatian National Theater, these two have gained a significant amount of local and international media and academic attention. Both of these structures serve to highlight the distinctiveness of the Croatian community, in comparison to the remainder of the population, largely separating Croatian territory from the Bosniak one within the urban space. These are the most prominent symbols of division that have been erected on the Croatian side, and their message is clear. Yet, the construction or restoration of many of these structures has been surrounded by the rhetoric of multiculturalism, even though they seem to be further emphasizing divisions within the city.

The first of these divisive monuments is the Franciscan church, whose original construction was embarked on in 1866. Yet, in 1992, JNA forces attacked the monument as part of their campaign of cleansing the cultural heritage of the city, and the church was severely damaged, although the structure, and its former bell tower, managed to survive the fighting. However, in 1997, the entire edifice was torn down completely, and efforts were undertaken to completely reconstruct it. Work on the new church concluded in 2004, with much of the funds having been donated by the local Croatian community, and the site has been a source of controversy ever since. While some members of the Franciscan community heralded the reconstruction of the church as a monument that “demonstrates that Mostar is

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Photograph 1: The newly constructed Franciscan church and bell tower from two angles. The first, from the front of the church, demonstrates the scale of the building in comparison to surrounding objects. The second, in combination with the Jubilee Cross on the hill above, demonstrates how these monuments are creating a borderline on the central boulevard. Croat politicians also renovated the orange building in the foreground, the Mostar Gymnasium, in an attempt to further cement this border area. However, the international community halted this work, and took over the administration and reconstruction of this school, ultimately opening it as a semi-integrated educational institution. [Images: Author]

...multicultural because each group has its own separate spaces within the city,” the structure can also be perceived as a Croat national project that attempts to delineate territory and emphasize the separation between populations, especially when considered in light of the divisive tendencies that have taken hold in the city.\footnote{Makaš, 265.}

The scale of the bell tower is out of proportion when compared with the surrounding buildings, and with the church itself, making the symbolic marking of territory more pronounced. The original tower stood at thirty meters, while the recently erected version is...
over three times its size, at 106 meters. Jolyon Naegele notes that the tower, “dwarfs everything in Mostar” except for the Jubilee Cross, discussed below. Any visitor to Mostar notes that the bell tower can be seen from most locations in the Central Zone, as well as many locations through the city. Thus, the structures serves as a clear indicator of the boundaries of the Croat section of the city, despite its position within this supposedly neutral, central space.

The other prominently Catholic monument that dominates the Mostar skyline, is the Jubilee Cross on Hum Hill. Although not directly located within the Central Zone, it is positioned in the western half of the town and its image is visible almost everywhere along the Boulevard, and, again, through a myriad of other locations within the city. Erected in the year 2000 by the Diocese of Mostar, the cross allegedly commemorates the birth of Jesus, and consequently, was billed as a symbol of peace and multiculturalism. Supporters noted that the thirty-three meter cross was constructed from weapons that were used during the Bosnian War, and that these weapons, no longer used for ethnic and cultural cleansing have worked to highlight the peaceful nature inherent within the symbol of the cross.

Yet, the Jubilee Cross is still a source of conflict and controversy. It was reportedly constructed on the very site on Hum Hill where Croat forces shelled the now famous Stari Most, and, during the war, whoever controlled this territory had control over the entire city. Thus, the construction of an overtly Croat and Catholic monument on a natural feature that has been so closely connected to power and control has obvious implications in such a contested space. Indicating Croat control of the city, or at least carrying that potential association, the cross has become one of the most controversial structures in the entirety

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77 Naegele.
78 Makaš, 269
Photograph 2: A close up image of the Jubilee Cross on Hum Hill and an image of the cross captured from the eastern, predominately Bosniak side of the city, demonstrating its visibility from many sections of the city. The second image also speaks to the monumental competition over urban dominance that exists in Mostar. [Image: Author].

of city, to the point where petitions have circulated demanding its removal.\textsuperscript{80} It still stands, however, and during the evening hours, the symbol is illuminated, making it an ever-present monument on the city skyline.\textsuperscript{81}

Since these monuments can be seen from many locations within the city, the borderland of Croat space has become solidified within the urban landscape. These two structures are truly monuments of division, and not mere representations of the various communities who live within Mostar. The location, design and size of several of these structures suggests that they were not built just to express the cultural heritage of a certain group, but rather to cause that tradition to dominate the urban space.

\textsuperscript{80} Makaš, 273.
\textsuperscript{81} Traynor.
Interestingly, these monuments have also been slightly divisive within the Croat community, pitting the Franciscans against the Catholics for who has the most prominent monument within the skyline, emphasizing the fact that divisions and fragmentations can run along a myriad of axes. Together, however, they do represent two factions of a Croat community, and they work in conjunction to cordon off the territory controlled by that group.

**Bosniak Monuments**

Bosniak groups have also sought to emphasize the ethnic territorialization of the town, although their national building projects have not been as heavily funded as those undertaken by their Croat counterparts, and thus have had less of a visual or symbolic impact. These Bosniak projects also largely emphasize religious symbolism, and the eastern territory of the city is marked as Muslim and Islamic, primarily via the reconstruction of mosques and their corresponding minarets. Most mosques were heavily damaged in the fighting that plagued Mostar, and minarets, because of their obvious symbolism and connection to Ottoman cultural heritage became favorite targets.

Some of the mosques that have been restored, however, were abandoned years before the start of the war, yet they have still been candidates for reconstruction. For example, the Neziraga Mosque, located within the Old Town, was abandoned in 1932, and completely torn down in 1950, a full forty years before any of the present conflicts began. Reconstruction started, however, in 1999, with a donation from the Sheikh of Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates, and the project won the Aga Khan Award for Architecture in 2007. As a result of

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82 Makaš, 415.
photograph 3: A view of the Bosniak side of the city. [Image: Author]

Projects such as this, in 2002, there were thirty-eight mosques in the eastern portion of Mostar, compared to sixteen in the 1980s, emphasizing an increased attempt at symbolically and religiously marking the eastern sector of the city as Bosniak.\footnote{Makaš, 294.}

While most of these newly reconstructed mosques are located on the eastern side of the city, the Derviš-paša Bajezidagić Mosque is a notable exception. Falling on the western side of the Boulevard, a few meters from the Franciscan Church and the cornerstone of the Jewish synagogue, this mosque is a break in the strict Bosniak-Croat urban dichotomy that exists in Mostar. It is one of the only structures that has been associated with the Bosniak cultural heritage in western Mostar. Built in 1592, the structure was dynamited during the
war, restored in 2004, and subsequently deemed to be a national monument.\textsuperscript{86}

However, not all Bosniak reconstruction projects have involved the rebuilding of religious monuments and Islamic schools. The restoration of the historic Ottoman core has also aided in promoting the distinctions between the two sides of the city. Ottoman houses, bazaar buildings and public baths have all been rebuilt and renovated, primarily under the auspices of the Aga Khan Trust for Culture. While much of this restoration in the Old Town has been intended to encourage tourism and economic stimulation in the region, the area is still markedly different from the western portion of the city, thus helping to emphasize the distinctions that persist between the two.

While the restoration of this Bosniak cultural heritage has largely been funded by international philanthropic organizations, and is again designed to promote multiculturalism and tourism, the increasing presence of minarets in the urban skyline can be seen as divisive, especially when viewed in the context of divisions and in combination with the series of Croat national projects that have been undertaken. While mosques do reflect an Islamic and Muslim cultural heritage, the quantity of structures that have been restored far outstrips the needs of the local Bosniak community, thereby making these structures divisive.\textsuperscript{87} As Joloyn Naegele has noted, “the town's postwar skyline is…a source of growing frustration” for the citizens of Mostar, especially as these reconstruction projects are serving to mark divisions of territory.\textsuperscript{88}

**Graffiti**

The presence of graffiti in the city, while not strictly monumental, represents a more grassroots attempt at solidifying divisions. While a full analysis of the location and content

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Makaš, 294.
\item Naegele.
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was an impossible task for me to complete during my stay, some notable examples stood out that emphasized the divisions that persist within the city. Most of the graffiti that I saw during my stay in Mostar concerned itself with football teams and their fans. Although allegiance to these teams can be itself a divisive force, separations are compounded in Mostar, as the two prominent football teams in the city are associated with specific ethnic groups. The supporters of FK Velež Mostar, who are primarily Bosniak, have tagged “Red Army” throughout the eastern portion of the city, a phrase that designates the team’s fan base. When I saw this tag on the western side of the Boulevard, in Croat territory, it was frequently crossed out or attacked, whereas the slogans were largely left alone within the eastern portion of the city. Similarly, the signs of “Ultras” indicating support for the football team associated with the Croats, HŠK Zrinjski Mostar are, predictably, concentrated primarily within the western half
of the city. While not a true representation of the separations that persist, the presence or absence of this type of ethicized graffiti in different sections of the city adds a popular dimension to the differentiation of urban space.

Two other interesting examples of this type of street art are worth mention. The first is connected to street signs that direct drivers and pedestrians throughout the city. Signs indicating the location of Stari Most and the center of the city exist all throughout the urban space. Some of these signs, however, have been manipulated to direct drivers away from the actual center of town, and toward the center of the Croatian half of the city. These changes, in the form of graffiti, further emphasize the divisions that have persisted within Mostar.
The second example of graffiti worth mentioning actually attempts to bridge the divide between the two polarized portions of the city. In the bus and train stations in April 2009, students from the United World College in Mostar, made chalkings on the ground calling for change within the city. While less permanent than the other graffiti markings in the city, mainly due to the medium that was used, the chalk drawings are attempting to use a form of expression that traditionally promotes division within the city and utilize it to call for integration and change.

The role of graffiti in Mostar has yet to be studied thoroughly, and is excluded from most academic work on the city. A cursory examination of some of the current examples reveals that this is a medium that is aimed at solidifying the divisions that already exist within the city of Mostar. The persistence of this street art also demonstrates the fact that divisions still persist in this city, in everything from football team allegiance to spatial separations.

Conclusion

No matter where an individual stands in Mostar, these divisions are evident. Within the Bosniak section of the city, mosques are prevalent, while the monuments speaking to a Croatian Catholic heritage can be seen in the distance, toward the west. The opposite holds true in western Mostar, where virtually no mosques are visible, and the only indicators of a Muslim presence within the city are manifested in the graveyards, where headstones indicate the religion of the deceased. Only within the Central Zone are the monuments of both religions interacting and representing the varied communities of the city, even though the quantity and scale of these structures has raised the question as to if these structures are really celebrating the multicultural nature of the city, or meant to divide it. Yet it is in this Central Zone where the international community has made the majority of its efforts to promote multiculturalism, and incorporate these divisive monuments and spatial separations with the
implementation of structures and policies that accommodate these structures and traditions, instead of merely relegating them to one side of the city.
Chapter 4: Monuments of Unification

The conception of a multicultural Mostar has largely become a way for the international community and local organizations to attempt to overcome the ethnic segregation of space that has persisted in the city, and to promote trends of reunification. On the symbolic front, the international community has engaged in its own process of marking space, attempting to counteract the groupist divisions prevalent in the urban landscape by superseding them with monuments dedicated to reconciliation and reunification. These monuments, therefore, could serve to incorporate and accommodate symbols of religious diversity under a unifying multicultural identity for the city.

Four major projects, explicitly intended to institute a multicultural identity for Mostar, have been undertaken or supported by the international community. One, the reconstruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar, was a continuation of the symbol production that had already been occurring in the city space, and sought to add a representation of multiculturalism to the urban landscape. The second involved financial and logistical support of the reconstruction of a new monument dedicated to Bruce Lee, which was intended to demonstrate a shared heritage among the people. The third monument, also financially supported by the international actors in Mostar, saw the drawing up of plans for a new Jewish cultural center in the neutral Central Zone. Finally, the restoration and reopening of the Mostar Gymnasium was intended to contribute to the unification of the education system in the city, by integrating Bosniak and Croat students. These last two monuments were erected in the neutral Central Zone of the city, a site that the international community hopes to develop to promote interaction among members of different ethnic groups. While each of these monuments was created to serve a different purpose and was undertaken by distinct actors, the rhetoric surrounding the
constructions has centered on the roles the projects take in promoting multiculturalism.

**Stari Most**

The most famous of these symbols is the new Old Bridge, or *Stari Most*, whose reconstruction process garnered international attention and interest in the city. The bridge, which was originally built in 1566 by Ottoman architect Hayreddin, stood for over four hundred years, until it was subjected to Croat shelling and was ultimately destroyed in November 1993. Almost immediately after its destruction, plans to rebuild the monument were created, and eleven years later, in July 2004, the bridge was completed and reopened in a lavish ceremony. Bosnia’s Commission to Preserve National Monuments designated *Stari Most* as a national monument in 2004.

The Aga Khan Trust for Culture, who had played a role in the 1986 restoration of the Old Town, and the World Monuments Fund (WMF), drew up initial plans for the reconstruction of the bridge complex. However, the World Bank soon took over by attempting to secure funding for the reconstruction of the bridge, while UNESCO stepped in to provide technical expertise and assistance. Funding for the reconstruction initiatives was provided by several foreign governments, including the European Union, Croatia, the Netherlands, Turkey and Italy, who provided the largest donation at three million dollars.

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89 Amir Pašić, *The Old Bridge (Stari Most) in Mostar*, Studies on the History and Culture of Bosnia and Hercegovina, 4, (Istanbul: Research Centre For Islamic History, Art, and Culture, 1995).


91 The bridge itself was not the only structure to be reconstructed as part of this project: two lookout towers on either side of the arch were rebuilt. They now house a museum and the Mostar Diving Club.

dollars. Hungary contributed logistically to the project by providing divers to scour the riverbed and retrieve fallen pieces of the bridge, and other foreign governments added similar support. Throughout the reconstruction processes the firms charged with the project attempted to replicate the techniques and materials that were used in the original building in the late sixteenth century. Overall, the World Bank evaluated the reconstruction of the bridge to be a success at having achieved the original objective of improving “the climate for reconciliation among the peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) through recognition and rehabilitation of their common cultural heritage in Mostar.”

Before its destruction, however, Stari Most, served as a symbol of the city of Mostar,

\footnote{World Bank “Implementation Completion Report”}
not a symbol of reconciliation. The ubiquitous image of the Old Bridge was reproduced and disseminated on various media, with its image appearing on everything from travel books, to money. *Stari Most* truly became an “icon” of the city. The bridge was not discussed in the context of multiculturalism, but rather as a symbol of great beauty and impressive engineering. A 1994 UNESCO statement given to the Council of Europe, after the structure’s destruction, discusses the threatened bridge in the context of its beauty and historic value, making no note of its connection to multiculturalism or ability to reconcile. As Carl Grodach writes, “…mention of the bridge as a symbol of Bosnia’s diverse cultural heritage does not appear until after its destruction.” Thus, the use of *Stari Most* as a symbol of reconciliation and multiculturalism was invented and imposed by the international community, as a way to participate in the symbol creation process that was already happening in the city.

Even so, the bridge is a convenient metaphor that carries obvious symbolism. Literally, it can and has been construed as a physical reconnection of the two previously warring factions, although this conception of the bridge is in fact a little misleading given that the river banks it connects are both located in Bosniak territory. Figuratively, *Stari Most* is a symbolic bridge that is crossing the differences that once divided these two ethnic distinctions. Amir Pašić, one of the main actors in reconstructing the bridge, exemplifies the exploitation of this figurative symbolism by writing, “…the rebuilding will symbolize the restoration of this country and the reconciliation of its people who will come together to

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rebuild the old Bridge, and all of Mostar’s bridges, linking them as people once again.”

97 Or, as George Simmel notes in his essay, “…in the correlation of separateness and unity, the bridge always allows the accent to fall on the latter.”

98 In any case, the bridge speaks to a common past and shared history that existed within the town, especially given its four hundred year life-span.

This project was one of the World Bank’s “pilot” forays in the field of cultural heritage reconstruction, and represents a growing trend linking development to the preservation of cultural heritage. As the “Implementation Completion Report” continues to note, “reconciliation among the peoples was described as a prerequisite for economic revitalization and social cohesion in Bosnia’s post conflict situation.”

100 While the World Bank did engage in one other major project in Mostar, the sanitation of the Mostar water supply, this cultural heritage development project was noted for its ability to bring infrastructural and economic benefits to the city, mainly in the form of tourism.

Stari Most is not the only bridge to have been rebuilt in Mostar, although it definitely has been the focus of most of the international attention that has been directed at the city. UNESCO also worked to help reconstruct the Crooked Bridge, another Ottoman structure in the Old Town resembling Stari Most, which was completed in 2001 with funding from the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. The Crooked Bridge did not collapse during the war, although it sustained some damage. Instead, flooding to the city in 2000 caused the bridge to collapse,

97 Grodach, 51.


100 World Bank, “Implementation Completion Report.”
Photograph 7: An image of the Crooked Bridge, looking eastward into the Bosniak section of the city, and the Friendship Fountain. [Images: Author]

and UNESCO helped to rebuild it within a year. This bridge, as in the case of *Stari Most*, can be seen to contribute to the beautification of the city and continued promotion of tourism.

Additionally, Mostar’s sister city in Italy, Montegrotto Terme, donated a piece of public art to the city, which takes the form of a broken bridge. The so called “Friendship Fountain,” housed in Zrinjevac Park, is meant to represent the connection that exists between the two cities, demonstrated by the meeting of the water streams coming from each side of the severed bridge. The keystone of the fountain, however, is conspicuously absent. Emily Makaš notes that there has been little attention given to this sculpture in the local and state media, but its form can still be perceived to be controversial, especially in a city like Mostar, where

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bridges have taken on so much significance. Bridges have assumed and been given symbolic significance in the city by being bathed in the rhetoric of multiculturalism. The metaphor they present is a convenient one, and has been used by numerous NGOs and members of the international community in attempting to explain the steps toward reconciliation that have been undertaken in the city.

Bruce Lee Statue

A few meters down the path from the Friendship Fountain in Zrinjevac Park stood the Bruce Lee statue. The construction and erection of this structure also received a considerable amount of international attention. Planned by a local NGO, Urban Movement Mostar, and supported financially by German Federal Cultural Foundation and Open Society Institute, the monument was erected as part of a “De/construction of Monument” initiative sponsored by the Sarajevo Center for Contemporary Art. It was the first statue of Bruce Lee in the world, with the inaugural ceremony in November 2005 falling just one day before another Bruce Lee statue was to be erected in Hong Kong.

The builders of the Bruce Lee statue continued the metaphor of bridge building, noting that because of his background, “Bruce Lee was, above all, a symbolic bridge between the East and the West.” Bruce Lee was seen as a figure that every citizen of Mostar could share, because of his extensive popularity as a figure in popular culture and distance from the hyper-political situation of the city. The statue was oriented toward the north, so that Bruce Lee could protect the whole of Mostar from external aggression, as opposed to protecting one

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102 Makaš, 330.
103 Enter the Dragon, DVD, Directed by Ozren Milharčić 2005; Vagabundo Productions, 2008.
105 Raspudić
side of the city from the other. Thus, the statue served and protected a multicultural and united city, and by doing so, this project complements and contributes to the goals of multiculturalism that have been advanced by the international community.

The project managers of the statue have additionally emphasized how the development and construction of the monument itself demonstrates the multiethnicity of the statue. Urban Movement Mostar, which was established in 1999 and seeks to “develop critical mind and individual thinking, to demystify newly established national values and the media, to overcome national mythologies, to raise public awareness on the relevance of public good, and to put an end to urban devastation,” is headed by a Serb and a Croat, Veso Gatalo and

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The multiethnic cooperation that exists at the uppermost levels of the organization that created the Bruce Lee statue yields a further element of multiculturalism to the monument.

This endeavor of reconstruction of the urban space in Mostar is significant because it was built with local initiative, and thus stands in sharp contrast to the reconstruction of Stari Most, which was very much a project of the international community. The monument, however, has not fared as well as the new Old Bridge. On its first night, the Bruce Lee statue was vandalized and the defensive weapon that he was holding in his hand was removed. Shortly thereafter, the statue was spray painted black, and the base bearing the inscription “Your Mostar” was also tagged. As a result, the statue has been removed from the park, although Raspudić had promised that it would be returned once lighting was installed.

As of April 2009, however, there was lighting in the park during evening hours, but the statue was still conspicuously absent.

**Jewish Synagogue and Cultural Center**

The third major symbolic reconciliation project that has been supported by the international community is the development of a new Jewish Synagogue and Cultural Center, to be placed in the Central Zone in close proximity to the Franciscan church and a newly restored mosque. The original synagogue in Mostar was damaged during WWII, and was transformed into a puppet theater by Communists in the early 1950s. The synagogue was restored to working condition by 1996, however, members of the small Jewish Community in Mostar, which has approximately 45 members, requested space for the building of a new

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108 Enter the Dragon.
109 Raspudić.
synagogue in the Central Zone.  

Jewish representatives in Mostar have heralded the building of this synagogue as a “symbol of peace and inclusiveness” that opens up space for the presence of another community in the Central Zone, increasing plurality of the area and breaking up the sharp Croat-Bosniak dichotomy that seems to exist within the city. Its position in this Central Zone is significant, the area having been the former front line during the conflict. Recognizing this, plans for the future structure reflect the intention of the Jewish Community to “build their temple in glass as a symbol of trust.”

While this structure will ultimately serve only one religious community in Mostar, the international community has recognized the symbolism of its construction, as the synagogue

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111 Dragicević.
112 Makaš, 305.
113 Dragicević
will increase the number of cultures represented within this contentious Central Zone, and is thus still a symbol of multiculturalism. In fact, it is claimed that that the location of the synagogue will be such that “Mostar would have religious buildings from all of the main western religions within one hundred and fifty meters of each other. This is a claim they allege can only be made by two other cities in the world: Jerusalem and Sarajevo.”

Additionally, the site will serve both Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jewish groups, further increasing the multicultural potential of the site. The complex will also house a library and museum, which will be accessible to all citizens of Mostar.

While it was scheduled to open at the end of 2002, little progress has been made on the construction site, save for the symbolic laying of the cornerstone on Holocaust Remembrance Day in 2001. Some issues developed over the land allocation laws, mostly due to the complexities of obtaining permission to build on land in the Central Zone, but those have largely been resolved. Thus, the “obligation to build the Jewish Cultural Center and synagogue remains” however funding delays and changes in the city administration have not allowed the project to be fully realized.

**Mostar Gymnasium**

Finally, the Mostar Gymnasium is both a physical and function representation of the international community’s attempts to instill multiculturalism over the urban space of Mostar. Constructed in an Oriental style in the late nineteenth century as part of the Austro-Hungarian attempts of urban modernization, the building sustained heavy damage during the war. Its location in the centrally situated Spanish Square, made the site appealing to the international

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114 Makaš. p. 302.
115 Dragicević
116 For a more detailed description of these issues and the media coverage surrounding them, see Makaš.
community, who sought to integrate students from different ethnicities within a single educational institution. As Heiko Wimmen writes, “From the perspective of the IC [international community] the unification of the Gymnasium thus presented an almost irresistible opportunity to undo the Croat strategy of separation, to engineer the reunification of the city and to establish a showcase example for the benefits of cross-communal coexistence and cooperation.”

Despite these initial intentions, the Southwest Municipality of Mostar, which falls on the Croatian side of the city, began renovations and opened a grammar school on the first

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The international community, however, quickly halted these restorations and took over the project. With donations from Spain, Turkey, Norway, Germany and other foreign governments, the international community is working to restore the building. A unified administration was created in 2004, coinciding with the opening of Stari Most and the reunification of the City Council, but students remain largely segregated.

Despite these setbacks, however, some attempts at integration and multiculturalism have been brought to the Mostar Gymnasium. By the end of 2006, as Azra Hromadžić notes, “…the computer science classes were fully integrated, so that for the first time since the beginning of the war, Bosniak and Croat students jointly attended classes taught by a Serb teacher.” In addition, the United World College in Mostar (UWCiM) was introduced to the Mostar Gymnasium in 2006. Occupying the top floor of the building, UWCiM draws students from all national backgrounds in Bosnia, forcing them to live and study together.

United World College is a high-school educational network, with campuses in twelve countries, that seeks to engender understanding and tolerance between and among groups. Students from across the globe participate, although most schools have a stipulation that a certain percentage of the local population be admitted, which, in Mostar, is almost fifty percent. The branch of the school in Mostar is the first UWC with an “explicit aim to contribute to the reconstruction of a post-conflict society, and also the first to be housed within an existing public school.”

While UWCiM is still designated as an NGO and has been received with a certain degree of suspicion by the local community, it has provided a space for interaction among students of different ethnic backgrounds and committed itself to the promotion of multiculturalism in

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119 Makaš, p. 332.
122 United World Colleges.
123 United World Colleges.
Mostar.

**Central Zone**

Several of these monuments, both of division and unification, are located in the Central Zone. While not exactly a monument in itself, the Central Zone is a symbolic area that attempts to engender the reunification of the city. The international community has sought to promote interaction between members of different ethnic groups via the reconstruction of this neutral space, which would become the commercial center of the city, thereby forcing populations to mingle as they conduct their everyday business. The plans for reengineering of this area involved the building of public parks, cultural centers, residential and office complexes, and offering incentives to commercial enterprises. Many of the NGOs, which will be discussed in the fifth chapter of this thesis, operate out of this centralized area.

While the bulk of this project has yet to be realized, and the Central Zone in Mostar is still perceived as the dividing line between populations by most of the city’s inhabitants, much can be gleaned from the plans put forth by the international community about the future of the area. The first phase, which is currently underway, involves the promotion of tourism and economic growth for Mostar and is designed to “create places of encounter” by building a movie theater, office building and co-ethnic educational facilities. The second phase, which has not yet begun, further emphasizes this creation of common space, by installing a market area, housing units and other public spaces such as parks and plazas. In the formulation of these spaces, the international community hopes to create a new area of entertainment and commerce, forcing members of the two ethnic groups to interact in their daily lives, and thus diminish the sharp territoriality that has sprung up between the two groups in the post-war

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The third and fourth phases of the project, which will take several years to be fully implemented, involve additional expansion on this notion of the creation of spaces of encounter, which was proposed during the first phase. The last two phases of the project reengage the international community in the venue of symbol production, by establishing a museum of history for the city, which will represent the multicultural past of the city and serve as a representation of the official history of the area. This museum will showcase the history of the city as a whole, and not merely that of one particular ethnic group. By doing so, this museum will continue to combat future attempts at territorality, because it will claim a monopoly on the official history of the city – like a national museum does over national history – and not allow a single ethnic group to dominate its discourse. In this way, the international community hopes to further its promotion of multiculturalism.

Conclusion

The monuments of unification that the international community has supported in Mostar work to instill multiculturalism over the urban landscape. Combined with the spatial policy of the city, exemplified through the area of the Central Zone, these monuments suggest that there is a place for multiculturalism and that the competing symbols of division are merely representations of that ideology.

The position of the Central Zone within the larger city, between the two territorialized sections, not only creates a zone of interaction, but also the impression that the two populations are interacting. This perception alone is enough to start leveling the territorialization that has persisted in the city, because it starts to form the impression that the symbols demarcating territory originally erected by the two ethnic groups are just symbols of

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diversity, since there is a developed zone of interaction and multiculturalism. NGOs and other organizations further aid in the creation of these multicultural spaces, both via their programming and their locations as spaces of dialogue.
Chapter 5: NGOs and Activism: Creating Spaces of Encounter

NGOs have become increasingly important in the reconstruction of society in post-conflict zones and often aid in this imposition of multiculturalism. The international community, mainly foundations and other philanthropic organizations, have directed a substantial amount of funding towards these organizations in Bosnia. Those associations that concentrate on multiethnic cooperation and the opening of dialogue between disparate groups typically receiving the largest grants.\textsuperscript{126} In recent years, however, such sources of funding have started to dry up, as prominent international donors shift their sights to more recent areas of conflict or cease funding of certain programs, and a substantial number of NGOs have closed or limited their operations. A multitude of multinational organizations have also left the area, as the work that they had intended to complete has concluded.\textsuperscript{127} The local organizations that are operating within Mostar are obviously not immune to these forces, and many groups have been struggling in recent years.

However, the civil society organizations operating within Mostar continue to contribute to the leveling of ethnic tensions and the promotion of multiculturalism within the city of Mostar. Their approaches to combating urban segregation are varied, with some directly involving themselves in the monumental reconstruction of urban space, such at Cultural Heritage without Borders and Urban Movement Mostar, and others looking to bridge the relationships between ethnic groups by turning themselves into neutral spaces of

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\textsuperscript{127} Grødeland.
encounter where diverse populations can interact. These NGOs that serve as places of encounter also contribute directly to urbanism and urban reconstruction via the restoration of their offices and workspaces. The majority of these offices are located within the Central Zone, itself a contribution to the development of an urban neutral space, in order to emphasize their apolitical and unaligned status.

Rebecca Kotlo defines a non-governmental organization as “an independent voluntary association of citizens who work together on continuous bases, for the purpose of realizing a common goal, which is not accumulating power, earning money or illegal activities.”  

Before the war, the NGOs operating within Bosnia were primarily social organizations or labor unions. This categorization has largely changed, and by the conclusion of the war, humanitarian groups and those promoting reconciliation had come to dominate the NGO scene in the country. Laws within the Federation dictate that NGOs can operate as foundations and citizens or humanitarian organizations. In 2001, for example, the Law on Citizens Associations and Foundations, which was adopted by the national Parliament, expanded the legislation regulating these organizations by allowing them to be registered on the state level, permitting cross-entity activities, and necessitating membership of at least three Bosnian citizens. Notably, these associations are not tax-exempt.

I have concentrated on the activities of four NGOs that continue to operate in Bosnia. Three of these organizations have offices in Mostar, and the fourth has an office in Sarajevo, but has done extensive restoration work within the city. These NGOs were chosen because of their diverse approaches to contributing to the further development of the city, and also because they are some of the few who have sustained their operations. Despite their diverse

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129 Kotlo.
130 Kotlo, 18.
131 Kotlo, 20.
approaches to reunification, which range from reconstruction of cultural heritage to promoting democratization, the core ideology of multiculturalism is still evident in the activities and mission statements of each group.

The first organization I spoke with, OKC Abrašević, a youth center that is located in the Central Zone, aims to bring “urban culture back” in Mostar by promoting reconciliation by means of cultural and educational initiatives. The newly restored youth space has areas for concerts, a café, a sexual health education center and a radio broadcast booth. It serves as an open space, notably housing the meetings of local protest and eco-groups, and periodically screens films, and thereby serving as Mostar’s de facto cinema. As Kathryn Hampton, a volunteer who has worked with Abrašević for about a year and a half, noted, “Abrašević is an open space. This protest group, if they could not meet here then there is really no other place in the city that they could meet.” Attendance at larger concerts sometimes reaches 250 individuals, although Hampton believes that the alternative cultural offerings and fact that most people prefer to attend “events on their side of the city” rather than journeying into the center of town has limited some of the youth center’s potential audience.

Right next door, Mostar’s branch of the Nansen Dialogue Center (NDC), founded in 2001, also works as an open space where members of the local community can meet to exchange ideas and participate in multiethnic workshops. The Nansen Dialogue Center in Mostar is part of the larger Nansen Dialogue Network, which has branches in ten cities throughout the Western Balkans. The entire network is formed out of these regional centers and the Nansen Academy in Lillehammer, Norway. The project emerged out of a series of

133 Since the end of the war, Mostar has not had a cinema.
134 Hampton Interview.
135 Hampton Interview.
interethnic dialogue seminars, hosted by the Academy in Norway, the sought to engage individuals of different ethnicities from Bosnia, even though the war was still going on.\textsuperscript{137} The participants in these workshops returned home and began the regional branches, in order to bring the benefits of the program to a wider segment of the population.\textsuperscript{138}

NDC primarily targets the educational system within the city, working to promote multiethnic dialogue between students, parents, and teachers of different backgrounds, as they have few opportunities to interact on a daily basis. Some of their educational programs have worked with the Mostar Gymnasium, which is housed in the restored Austro-Hungarian building in the Central Zone. NDC also seeks to provide a space of dialogue for local politicians through “Dialogue School” programming. As Elvir Djuliman, a staff member of the Mostar branch, indicated, “in communication a lot of barriers are broken,” and these symposiums are steps toward reintegration and reconciliation.\textsuperscript{139} NDC sees the provision of this space as being crucial to combating urban segregation since “one of the biggest problems is that they [the citizens of the city] do not have a space for multiethnic gathering.”\textsuperscript{140}

The Local Democracy Agency of Mostar (LDA) also focuses their efforts on easing the integration of local school systems and promoting cooperation among politicians and citizens of the city. LDA, which was established in 2004 as part of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, undertakes these initiatives in the context of democratization and the promotion of human rights in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{141} The organization helps to create spaces of encounter via workshops, trainings and roundtable discussions that are held within their offices in the Central Zone. In addition, LDA also sponsors artistic

\textsuperscript{138} Nansen Dialogue Network, “History of the Nansen Dialogue Network.”
\textsuperscript{139} Elvir Djuliman, interview by author, written notes, Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 21 April 2009.
\textsuperscript{140} Elvir Djuliman Interview.
workshops and organizes volunteering projects for the city’s youth. Jlenia Destito, the Executive Director, has noted that there is still a lot of progress that needs to be undertaken regarding issues of democratization, human rights and “multicultural policies and public service,” but that these services have still helped to combat the urban segregation in Mostar.  

The last NGO that I focused on in my research also sought to continue this trend of creating neutral spaces in which multiculturalism could flourish. Cultural Heritage without Borders (CHwB), which was founded in 1995, is a relief organization that links the preservation of cultural heritage to development. The organization has offices in Kosovo, Sweden and Sarajevo. I focused on the operations of the Sarajevo office, which engaged in restoration projects throughout Bosnia, and was very influential in helping to reconstruct the urban space of Mostar. The organization sought to instill multiculturalism throughout the urban landscape of the city via the physical reconstruction of three buildings within the historic Ottoman sector of the city, thereby contributing to the restoration of the “common heritage” of Mostar. The organization emphasizes sustainability and development, in addition to restoration, and Lejla Hadzic, the Regional Coordinator of the organization, indicated that the projects offered opportunities to train local architects, create employment opportunities, and provide economic assistance to the city. Ultimately, CHwB aims to

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143 Urban Movement Mostar, the organization that constructed the Bruce Lee statue, also fits into this model of attempting to instill symbolic multiculturalism in the city. I chose not to concentrate on them in my empirical research, however, as their work was featured in the previous chapter.
144 Lejla Hadzic, interview with author, written notes, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16 April 2009.
“work for the inclusion of cultural heritage in the process of reconciliation” and preserve this cultural heritage for future generations.\textsuperscript{146}

While multiculturalism can be understood in a myriad of ways, and each organization has their own distinct initiatives to help reintroduce that multiculturalism within the urban space of the city, there are many similarities between the conceptions of multiculturalism that these NGOs are trying to institute. All of the representatives from these organizations that I spoke with emphasized the multicultural history of the entirety of Bosnia and how the war forcibly resulted in the creation of “two monoethnic cultures.”\textsuperscript{147} However, some representatives from these NGOs also emphasized the high degree of similarity among Bosniak, Croatian and Serbian cultures in language, history and tradition.\textsuperscript{148} As Elvir Djuliman, of the Nansen Dialogue Center noted, “I wouldn’t say that the cultures are so different, it’s a really thin line between these separations.”\textsuperscript{149} He went on to say, however, that these differences had been instrumentalized, emphasized and manipulated by national projects and politicians, and that one of the best ways to bridge these gaps is through instituting practices of multiculturalism that seek to accommodate these perceived differences.\textsuperscript{150}

These practices that are being implemented understand multiculturalism as inclusion and representation of individuals from a variety of ethnic backgrounds. While in contemporary Mostar, this primarily includes Bosniaks and Croats, the inclusion of Roma, Serbs and other minorities appears on the agenda of some organizations, such as the LDA. In February 2008, LDA Mostar hosted a workshop entitled “Inclusion and Multiculturalism: The Canadian Context” which sought to teach high school students how all identities can be

\textsuperscript{147} Kathryn Hampton Interview.
\textsuperscript{148} Lejla Hadzic Interview.
\textsuperscript{149} Elvir Djuliman Interview.
\textsuperscript{150} Elvir Djuliman Interview.
peacefully accommodated within a society. The leadership of many of these organizations also reflects this tendency toward accommodation and representation of individuals of different backgrounds. For example, Kathryn Hampton noted the inherent multiculturalism in OKC Abrašević by pointing out the multiethnic membership and leadership of the youth center.

These approaches to inclusion and multiculturalism are not merely strategies to assist with the reconciliation process within the urban space of Mostar. The promotion of multiculturalism, both in rhetoric and in programming, is an agenda that is required by many donor organizations. Thus, in some way, standards of multiculturalism are imposed by the international community through the provision of conditions on aid and funding, which in turn has the potential to create complicated relationships with NGOs and can even reduce the overall effectiveness of NGOs and their activities. These stipulations are not just imposed by international actors working in Mostar, but are also attached to funds made available by philanthropic foundations, other intergovernmental organizations and donor governments.

Typically, receipt of aid or program funding is conditioned and granted based on the perceived multicultural nature of the organization, which can be exemplified, as discussed above, by the NGOs multiethnic membership or programming aimed at the promotion and celebration of plurality. As Elissa Helms notes in her study of the relationships between international donors and women’s NGOs in Bosnia, funders demand multiethnic membership or participation in the organizations that they are supporting, and many NGOs accommodate these demands by presenting themselves as embodiments of these standards.

151 Local Democracy Agency of Mostar.
152 Kathryn Hampton Interview. Hampton emphasized that Croats, Bosniaks and foreigners, like herself, are all employed by or volunteer at the organization.
154 Elissa Helms, “The ‘Nation-ing’ of Gender? Donor Policies, Islam and Women’s NGOs in Post-War Bosnia-Herzegovina.”
The policy statements issued by the Swedish International Development and Cooperation Agency (SIDA), one of the main funders of CHwB, provides some of the clearest examples of the wishes of donor organizations. SIDA always conditions their funding based on the need for promoting reconciliation between groups as well as emphasizing the need to maintain a gender balance within the project personnel. SIDA’s policy statements regarding the Agency’s support for civil society also emphasize cultural and institutional “pluralism.” Before SIDA enters into a partnership with another civil society organization, the Agency examines the structure, values, legitimacy and impact that the potential partner organization possesses. In the category of values, SIDA’s policy statements emphasize the need for the local organization to have a mission of “development and peace” as well as “tolerance for other groups and interests.” In terms of structure, the need for “representativity” of the society is stressed.

The major donors to LDA Mostar and NDC Mostar, the Association of Local Democracy Agencies and the Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs respectively, also stress the need for multiethnic representation in both activity participants and organization leadership. Some of the only organizations that receive substantial funding which do not claim to have multiethnic representation among their ranks are those that are designed to promote minority cultures, such as the Jewish community organization in Mostar or Roma-rights groups.

However, when requesting funding, all organizations typically highlight activities that are focused on building civil society, promoting the return of refugees, youth empowerment

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155 Lejla Hadzic Interview.
157 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency.
158 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency.
159 Elvir Djuliman Interview and Local Democracy Agency of Mostar.
or promoting inter-ethnic communication via symposiums or activities, which have been supported and characterized as multicultural initiatives by the international community. In a recent application sent to an Austrian philanthropic organization that sought to obtain funding for radio broadcasting workshops for youth in Mostar, OKC Abrašević highlighted that adolescents from both sides of Mostar would be participating, and that the results of their collaboration would be broadcast throughout the entire city, a further attempt at unification. The same application, sent to the Embassy of the Czech Republic in Bosnia, which often stresses the need for development, also highlighted the sustainability of the project and how these workshops would train these youths for future media careers.

While tailoring applications for funding to the wishes of the donor organizations is by no means a new or revolutionary phenomenon, the emphasis on multiculturalism assumes a special significance when applied in Mostar. By funding organizations that promote plurality and multiculturalism, the international community not only creates incentives for organizations to conform to their standards, it also ensures that the number of projects promoting multiculturalism far exceeds other initiatives aimed at emphasizing division, thereby helping to further instill these ideas of plurality over the city. Additionally, it ensures that many organizations will advance the rhetoric of multiculturalism within their programming, so that they may receive more funds to operate.

In addition to the monetary aspect, this agenda of imposed multiculturalism has its advantages for NGOs in Mostar. The similarity of the objectives of each organization works to encourage cooperation between organizations and projects can become more effective through the sharing of resources and technical expertise. Each of the four NGOs that I talked to indicated that they had engaged in at least minimal cooperation with other organizations in the area, with some, such as OKC Abrašević indicating extensive cooperation with other local

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160 Kathryn Hampton Interview.
organizations. CHwB issued an Impact Assessment Survey in early 2007 that indicated that this cooperation increased the sustainability of their projects in Mostar, and that many local actors were invested within their projects. Cooperation is not always successful, however, and Elvir Djuliman noted, “experience has shown that the initiatives which aim to gather all NGOs do not yield huge benefits” because their different mandates complicates the foundation of a common platform. Instead, NDC focuses on collaborating with organizations that also seek to promote intercultural dialogue within neutral spaces, such as LDA Mostar and Forma F, a women’s association operating in the city.

As this example demonstrates, the requirement that NGOs have an agenda of multiculturalism has the potential to create a lot of problems, both in the efficacy of the programs and organizations that are being funded but also in the relationship between local civil society and these larger multinational foundations. One of the first problems with this emphasis on multiculturalism arises from the fact that, as Helms indicates, multiethnic cooperation and membership is not always possible or economically viable, especially in rural areas where few NGOs may be operating. Indeed, creating programs with other NGOs or attempting to draw a diverse body of individuals into the leadership roles in an organization, can expend vital financial resources and decrease the overall efficacy of the projects. Kathryn Hampton is of the opinion that, sometimes, if the collaborations are undertaken with foreign NGOs, then there is little sense of local ownership to the project, and has seen that the departure of these NGOs can cause the initiatives to fall apart.

Combined with the fact that funding may not always be available or demands of the

161 Kathryn Hampton Interview.
163 Elvir Djuliman Interview
164 Elvir Djuliman Interview
165 Bronwyn Evans–Kent and Roland Bleiker.
166 Kathryn Hampton Interview.
donors may change, leaving later portions of the initiative strapped for cash, cooperation with other groups, which can yield very positive results, is also a big risk for small, local organizations to assume. As Bronwyn Evans-Kent and Roland Bleiker write in their article, these uncertainties can create tension between local and multinational organizations, as local NGOs might feel that the international community does not understand the difficulties encountered when attempting to promote a multiethnic initiative. Meanwhile, the international community and donors may feel that local NGOs are modifying projects and not fully completing the tasks for which they received funding.\footnote{Kathryn Hampton Interview.}

Despite these challenges, the international community continues to give financial support to organizations promoting multicultural initiatives and planning, and so organizations design their projects to fit these wishes. In this way, the international community is imposing their own ideology of multiculturalism over the activities of local organizations, which ultimately extend to directly affect the public. In combination with the actual multiculturalism imposed over the administration of the city and its infrastructural corporations and the symbols of multiculturalism dominating the urban spaces, the international community has instilled this ideology over most aspects of life in Mostar and examples of this multiculturalism pervade daily life. However, the city still remains as divided as ever, despite the international community’s extensive attempts to over come these divisions and reinstitute Mostar’s pluralistic identity, which characterized it during prewar times.
Conclusion: Mostar as a Model?

In March 2009, residents of Mostar, protesting the failure of local politicians to appoint a new mayor, nearly five months following the election period, held a demonstration in which they nominated their own candidate for the position: a donkey. With the HDZ and the SDA each vying for their own party members to assume the position, while simultaneously calling for changes to the Mostar Statute, and, in addition, with little assistance coming from the Office of the High Representative to rectify the standoff, residents of Mostar proposed that the animal become mayor of the city, implying that the donkey could be more effective in the position than any of the squabbling politicians.

The infighting, while not only drawing attention away from other issues that have been plaguing the town, such as high employment and the lack of provisions for social programs, also demonstrates the failures of the multicultural, ethnic power-sharing government that has been imposed on the city. Ethnic tensions have continued to persist in Mostar, almost fifteen years since the cessation of violence. These issues do not only appear in the political realm, but instead traverse all aspects of life, from education to an individual’s choosing of which shops to frequent.

As Hobsbawm has noted, in his theory surrounding the invention of tradition, not all endeavors to impose a certain tradition over a population have been, or will be, successful. What does this persistence of ethnic tensions say about the (re)invention of a multicultural tradition in Mostar? And how successful have these policies of multiculturalism been in

repairing the citywide separations, especially in terms of urbanism? How effective have local organizations been in combating these divisions?

These questions are especially relevant, as many international organizations and local associations have been looking to the potential application of the “Mostar Model” in other post-conflict and divided societies. Many of the local organizations that I profiled have already begun to expand to other areas in the Western Balkans, and the international community is facing new global governance challenges in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo. If elements of the multicultural “Mostar Model” are to be employed in these situations, notably in terms of urban reconstruction and reunification, then the successes, failures and potential issues of applicability of the model must be addressed.

Local nongovernmental organizations have, to date, been the most effective at combating this separation because of their aggressive programming and provision of concrete neutral spaces. These programs have targeted a myriad of groups within the city, from promoting interethnic dialogue between politicians to high school students, to providing cultural offerings such as movies or concerts, where individuals can go purely for entertainment, with mixing between ethnicities arising as a secondary benefit. However, given the current political strains on the city, as exemplified by the donkey episode, these initiatives must still reach even further, in order to combat, and perhaps eventually overcome, the ethnic tensions that are still existent.

This is not to say that the local NGOs operating within Mostar have not come up against their obstacles, and they definitely have, even with of all of their achievements. Sustainability and longevity are significant concerns for any organization that relies almost entirely on external funding to operate. As some of my interviewees noted, a sense of

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ownership among the local population over these types of reconciliation projects tends to be limited, further compromising the potential sustainability of the initiative. Additionally, as will be discussed in more detail below, the fact that many of these organizations are perceived as external forces allows their critics to write them off as being foreign and illegitimate, potentially leaving the associations without much support from large sectors of the local community. Yet, in spite of these drawbacks, the efforts of local nongovernmental organizations, as demonstrated through my research, have been among the most successful within the “Mostar Model.”

The spatial and monumental endeavors of the international community have made less headway in the attempt to combat ethnic division within Mostar. The Central Zone remains underdeveloped, and as a result, people are not driven into this neutral area, where they will be forced to interact with individuals from all sectors of society. While government institutions, NGOs and some religious structures have been placed in this area, there are still few shops, cafes and restaurants that would attract individuals on a daily basis. The future plans for the space, however, do seek to further develop and introduce institutions that are unique to the city, such as museums and movie theaters, into the Central Zone. Once this future development is realized, the Central Zone does have the potential to become one of the most successful initiatives within the “Mostar Model,” however there is still much progress to be made.

The monumental strategies of the international community, on the other hand, have done little to create a tradition of multiculturalism within the urban space, especially given the divisive tendencies of several other structures. Instead, these monuments have just inserted themselves into the competition of cultural dominance within the city, rather than effectively leveled the competing Croat and Bosniak traditions under a banner of multiculturalism. Additionally, the building of these monuments has often taken place at the expense of the
reunification or restoration of other structures within the city, namely the parallel institutions which have become fixed features of the urban space. Since the primary focus of the majority of the international community and foundations lay within the cultural heritage preservation sphere, at least initially, attempts to install multiculturalism in other segments of society, such as the administrations of these institutions or the streamlining of delivery services, lay neglected, and it became more difficult to completely unify these infrastructural components. This oversight is one of the biggest failures of the “Mostar Model” because, as John Yarwood notes, while “the EU,” although the same can be said for other organizations, “stressed investment in physical objects” and “was less concerned with repairing the process of urban management.” As such, there were many missed opportunities to engender reunification.

Due to the mixed success of this model, is it appropriate to apply the international community’s strategies for post-conflict reconstruction in Mostar to other situations? Yes. And, no. The strategies employed in Mostar would function well within post-conflict, divided societies, which need a significant amount of reconstruction, such as the rest of Bosnia or Iraq. In both of these situations, the populations subject to division have previously existed within a common territory, share a similar language and have space available that can be dedicated to the instillation of a neutral, multicultural space, as it has been destroyed in conflict or has not yet been fully redeveloped. While in the remainder of Bosnia, since much of the urban space has been rebuilt, there may not be an opportunity for the implementation of a Central Zone, per se, but local nongovernmental organizations can still work to create neutral spaces on a smaller scale. In other divided societies, however, this “Mostar Model”

may be less appropriate. For example, in places such as Jerusalem, Nicosia or even northern Iraq, in which members of the divided populations do not share a similar language, spatial policies will largely be ineffective, as there will be obvious obstacles that could continue to drive populations apart.

On a more general level, there are other forces that could render this model to be ineffective or inappropriate, mainly dealing with the perception of external organizations and the idea that their values are foreign, and potentially incompatible with those shared by the population. Thus, this allows critics to advocate for a broad rejection of these seemingly “imposed” projects and rhetoric. Multiculturalism, then, can be perceived as a foreign value, and has the potential to be largely rejected by politicians and the population, on whom it is being imposed, rendering it as a rather ineffective strategy. In order for this “Mostar Model” of multiculturalism to achieve success in these societies, the international community and local organizations must overcome accusations that they are foreign and alien constructions.

Overcoming these allegations may require these groups, especially local NGOs, to prove that they are sustainable, which is complicated, given the tenuous nature of funding sources along with the fact that each global governance organization and NGO is created with a specific mandate, and thus may not have the authority, or ability, to attempt to solve all issues of society which are in need of resolution. As Mark Duffield has indicated, almost all aspects of society may need to undergo some sort of transformation, especially in post-conflict areas, in order to ensure a “liberal peace.” A single organization, even one as sizeable as the OHR, and especially one dealing strictly with urbanism, cannot completely nor immediately rectify the situation at hand.

Imposing multiculturalism in an obvious sense, such as with monuments, will not

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directly translate into multiculturalism on all levels of society. In fact, attempting to impose multiculturalism in such an obvious way can backfire, as, again, it is can be seen as a foreign and “western” value. The best way for the multicultural “Mostar Model” to be imposed within the society is indirectly, and in consultation with local actors. In this way, the system is subtler, and can also be more readily accepted within society, because the local population can express their opinions regarding the best way to reconstruct their own society. Some actors might try to obstruct this progress in order to satisfy their own ambitions, as the squabbling politicians from the Mostar mayoral debacle have been demonstrate, but, the subsequent protests reveal that these individuals sometimes do not accurately represent the general public opinion. Through consultation with the local population, the values of multiculturalism are no longer “foreign” or “western” but actually can come to be a reflection of local opinion and culture.

Fortunately for the citizens of Mostar, but perhaps unfortunately for the politically ambitious donkey, Mostar’s politicians settled their dispute, and a new mayor was chosen. While this incident of ethnic tension was resolved amicably, and did eventually pass, there still remains much work to be completed in the city in terms of combating ethnic divisions. The opening of Stari Most in 2004 was just one step in the process of reconciliation, instead of a symbol of the full and complete reunification that it was painted to be. As one local famously quipped, “That may be too much reconciliation for one bridge,” and indeed it is. But that reconciliation can come in other ways, mainly through local organizations and multicultural initiatives. In the end though, multiculturalism will only be accepted by the population of Mostar when the full integration of infrastructural institutions and almost total reconstruction of the town has been in achieved. In that way, the policies of multiculturalism

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of the international community will no longer be directives imposed by some external force, but rather will have become parts of “normal” Mostarian life, and serve to engender the reunification of the city space.
Appendix 1: General Interview Questions

What projects in Mostar is your organization currently engaged in?

What have been your most successful projects? Why? What kind of impact do you feel that they had on the community?

How do these activities directly contribute to combating spatial separation in the city?

Does your organization emphasize multiculturalism? If so, how? How would you define multiculturalism?

What do you feel are the advantages and disadvantages of such a strategy?

Who are your major donors? When drafting grant applications or other funding requests, what do these donors typically require or emphasize? Is there an emphasis on multiculturalism? How do you tailor your proposals to meet these demands?

To what extent do you cooperate with other NGOs in Mostar? How was this beneficial or detrimental to your progress?

What types of projects is your organization looking to undertake in the future?
Appendix 2: Map of Mostar

Map 1: A map showing the monuments and organizations discussed in this thesis. [Map base: Cava, Additions: Author]


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