A LONG MARCH: THE OTTOMAN CAMPAIGN IN HUNGARY, 1663

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Abstract

Mainly due to the non-inspiring “stagnation and decline” paradigm, seventeenth-century Ottoman history is one of the least known periods in historical studies. Unpopular image of some of the Sultans reigned in the period also affected the general disinterest. To have a sound based knowledge on the century in general and on the Sultans in particular there is an urgent need first to discover and utilize the contemporary sources and then to analyze them in the light of modern scholarship. Based mainly on a least known group of Ottoman sources, i.e., war-accounts, this study entitled “A Long March: The Ottoman Campaign in Hungary, 1663”, aims to provide a chronology of the main political and diplomatic events before and during the Ottoman campaign in Hungary in 1663. It also intends to describe and analyze the Ottoman way of preparing, organizing, and supplying of a campaign in the second half of the seventeenth century by employing the method of “new military history”. By doing do, this thesis attempts to contribute on discussions about the Ottoman art of war in the early modern Europe.
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Introduction

Before discussing a particular Ottoman campaign during the seventeenth century, it is appropriate first to have a close look at the tendencies in modern scholarship with regard to the evaluation of the given period. The seventeenth century is a relatively neglected period in the historical studies of the Ottoman Empire. According to Linda Darling, an Ottoman historian who focuses on fiscal and military problems of the empire in the given century, there are two reasons for this neglect; one is related to the paradigm of the “Ottoman stagnation and decline” and the other to the unpopularity of the particular sultans in this period. It is a fact that many historians have employed the decline paradigm for long years as a simplistic approach to the centuries after the age of Sultan Suleiman I (the Magnificent) (r. 1520-1566) during which the Ottoman Empire reputedly enjoyed its golden age. However, as Darling rightly argued, this approach -as in other collectivist approaches- does not give us a satisfactory explanation for the peculiar political, military, financial, socio-cultural, and intellectual problems of that century. Moreover, such a mode of thinking hinders any attempts to compare elements in imperial structures in the early modern history.

Thanks to the efforts of the revisionist historians,¹ however, there are now enough empirical data and alternative paradigms to allow a critical evaluation of the “declinist” literature. Halil İnalcık and Linda Darling, for instance, showed us that the Ottoman financial

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Institutions were in consolidation and transformation in the seventeenth century, not in a state of decline in the real sense of the word. In addition, Jonathan Grant, a scholar of Ottoman military technology, studied the capacity of the Ottoman weaponry and naval systems from 15th through 18th century and as a conclusion rejected the established theories about Ottoman military decline. These and many other studies paved the way for us to understand this paradigm as a myth that was produced and commonly used as basis for another unfounded paradigm, “the sick man of Europe”, a common view of the Ottoman Empire in western politics and historiography in the 19th century.

As Darling pointed out, the second reason for the scholarly neglect of the seventeenth century-Ottoman history, complementary to the first one, is the image of the Ottoman rulers in the historical consciousness. It is true that authors of scholarly and popular literature dedicated more attention to those Ottoman rulers that could boast military achievements or were the agents of successful modernization efforts. In their works, the reigns of Mehmed II, the conqueror of the Byzantine capital, Selim I, the conqueror of Egypt, and Suleiman I, the “Magnificent” and the “Lawgiver”, figured prominently. Furthermore, the two great reformers of the nineteenth century, Selim III and Mahmud II as well as the “Great Khan” or the “Red Sultan”, Abdülhamid II, were extensively discussed. On the other hand, except for some

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4 As an example of this type of treatment see, Bernard Lewis, “Some Reflections on the Decline of the Ottoman Empire” Studia Islamica 9 (1958), pp. 111-127.
articles in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*\(^5\), monographs on the sultans that reigned in the period of “stagnation and decline” are hardly available.

Mehmed IV who ruled the Ottoman Empire for thirty-nine years between 1648 and 1687 -the longest sultanate in the Ottoman history after Suleiman I- is an appropriate name to discuss the unpopular and sometimes negative image of the Ottoman sultans. It was during the sultanate of Mehmed IV that the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire reached its widest extent with the conquest of Nagyvárad/Varad (1660), Érsekújvár/Uyvar (1663), Crete/Girit (1699), and Kamianets-Podilskyi/Podolya (1672).\(^6\) His contemporaries honored him by the title of “Fatih”, the Conquer, and “Gazi”, the Holy Warrior. However, his military and political achievements did not secure him an everlasting prestige among historians. The disastrous retreat after the siege of Vienna (1683) and the loss of significant castles and provinces, which consequently led to the deposition of the Sultan in 1687, changed the positive attitude of the contemporary authors and their successors. Mehmed IV was not a “Fatih” anymore, but had become an “Avcı”, the Hunter, who spent most of his time in hunting and pursuit of pleasure. When this negative personal attribution conjugated with the paradigm of decline in the mainstream literature, Mehmed IV and his reign became one of the least known and most misrepresented periods in the Ottoman history.\(^7\)

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\(^7\) For a recent revisionist study on the personality of Mehmed IV see, Marc David Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). For a critical
In contrast to the unpopularity of the Sultan, his grand viziers were credited with being the restorers of the empire in the historical literature. The Köprülü grand viziers of Albanian origin who uninterruptedly held the post for twenty-seven years, from 1656 to 1683, received recognition and praise both from their contemporaries and from modern scholars. Mentioned as the leading figures of the restoration period in standard textbooks, it is true that the members of the Köprülü family, i.e., Mehmed Pasha (viz. 1656-1661), Fazıl Ahmed Pasha (viz. 1661-1676), and Kara Mustafa Pasha (viz. 1676-1683), played significant roles in re-ordering the Ottoman military, financial and social structures that were in chaos for decades.

When the Ottoman capital faced political difficulties, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha was appointed grand vizier and given a free hand to reorganize the imperial administration. Due to his efforts, the Ottoman internal politics resumed its traditional style; the sultanate of women and ağas ended. Moreover, the financial situation of the empire recovered because of the measures he took. However, what modern scholars forget to mention in their works is the Sultan, that is, Mehmed IV, from whom these grand viziers took command and on whose

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11 Surplus deficit reduced from -121,002,026 to -12,333,533 akçes or silver coins during the vizierate of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha see, Erol Özvar, “Osmanlı Bütçe Harcamaları (1509-1788)” in Mehmet Genç and Erol Özvar (eds), Osmanlı Maliyesi Kurumlar ve Bütçeler v. II (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2006), pp. 197-238.
behalf they spent all their efforts. Historically and logically, without the consent of Mehmed IV, the restoration policies of these viziers as well as their military and fiscal achievements would have impossible.

After these considerations, we can now turn our attention to the actual subject of this thesis, namely, the Ottoman way of preparing, organizing, and supplying a campaign in the second half of the seventeenth century, during the reign of Mehmed IV. Although the Ottomans were credited in historiography with having created the “near-perfect military society”, the number of studies on the mobilization, supply and logistics of the Ottoman warfare is limited. Aiming to contribute to the available literature, the present study entitled, “A Long March: The Ottoman Campaign in Hungary, 1663”, is an attempt to depict how the Ottomans deployed their material and human resources, and organized their long march in order to fight in a distant border area. Commanded by Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha, the Ottoman army numbered more than 120,000 soldiers that marched on Hungary in the summer of 1663, bringing with them numerous cannons. The confrontation with the Habsburg forces obliged them to stay in Hungary for about two years during which time they seized a number of castles and cities and engaged in several skirmishes. Organizing and leading such an army in a distant region required carefully planned logistics and good command. Based on the

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14 Writing in 1981, Géza Perjés mentioned the necessity to see the Ottoman-Habsburg campaigns as rationally calculated and carefully organized war games that lead some superficial conclusion. See, Géza Perjés, “Game
Ottoman sources it is possible to argue that the serdar-ı ekrem or commander-in-chief, the Grand vizier Fazıl Ahmed Pasha, successfully undertook this difficult task. However, in order to assess the difficulties the Ottoman army faced during the march and to appreciate the success of the grand vizier one needs to evaluate the information given by the accounts of the campaign in the light of modern scholarship. Thus, employing the method of “new military history”, this study will attempt to explore the organizational and social context of the Ottoman warfare in the given campaign, rather than only emphasizing the achievements or the failures of great men in battlefields. Additionally, it will provide a discussion of the relationships between officers and the rank-and-file, moral and material support given to the soldiers, and interrelations between military and civil society. Referred mainly to the Ottoman war-accounts --a source group that less known and therefore less used in the modern scholarship-- this thesis will first provide a general picture of the politics and the diplomacy before and during the campaign. Then, it will establish a chronology of the Ottoman march and determine the route of the army followed by means of a comparative use of the available contemporary sources. A discussion on the basics of the military logistics in the last chapter will provide us with an opportunity to see the limits and constraints of the Ottoman art of war.

Theory and the Rationality of War: the Battle of Mohacs and the Disintegration of Medieval Hungary” *East European Quarterly* XV/2 (1981), pp. 153-62, particularly, p. 156: “Many [historians] have asserted that Ottoman actions were marked by a lust for plunder and reflected a drive toward unlimited territorial expansion… The opposing view, which I also hold, is that… it is inconceivable that an empire as large as Turkey could have been built and maintained for centuries without planning that reasonably took into account the objectives and means available.”
Sources

Ottoman gazavât-nâmes (war-accounts) and vakʿayinâmes (chronicles) are the main sources used in this study. Additionally, works of the western observers on the 1663 campaign will serve as a source group to check and enrich the data given by the Ottoman accounts. The scope of this study does not allow the examination of the significant number of documents kept in both the Ottoman and the Austrian archives.

It is yet not an established tradition among the Ottoman historians to utilize the war-accounts as primary sources in their researches. However, recent studies show us that this source group provides reliable information for historical inquiries. Particularly for a military historian, both the Ottoman chronicles and war-accounts, despite their deficiencies, offer significant qualitative and quantitative data to depict various aspects of Ottoman warfare. Luckily enough, some of the Ottoman bureaucrats and the literary figures that attended the 1663 campaign left us accounts that describe the events that took place during the march. Despite their availability, few modern historians use these sources in their works in an effective manner. This deficiency is mainly due to the philological barrier, however as Virginia Aksan once put, it “has led to many lopsided versions of the east-west confrontation

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16 Rhoads Murphey, for instance, efficiently used the Ottoman chronicles in his work. See, Rhoads Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700 (London: UCL Press, 1998).
which are based primarily on the accounts of travelers and the chancellery and the foreign office documents of European powers”.

There are a number of Ottoman war-accounts on the 1663 campaign. Among them, *Cevâhirü’ı-Tevârih* [The Essences of Histories] by Hasan Ağa, the Grand vizier Köprülü Fazîl Ahmed Pasha’s private secretary and mühürdar or seal-keeper, provides the most precious and direct data on the march. The post that Hasan Ağa held gave him a privileged access to the official correspondences between the grand vizier, the Porte, and the Habsburg court. Hasan Ağa’s *Cevâhirü’ı-Tevârih* was translated into Latin in 1680, five year after its completion, and was dedicated to the Habsburg Emperor. It was used as the main source to describe the events of that period by later Ottoman and western historians.

Another author from bureaucratic circles who produced a work on the campaign was the Ottoman Imperial Court secretary, Mehmed Necati. He completed his *Ez-Menâkıbât-ı Gaza ve Cihad/Tarih-i Feth-i Yanık* [The Stories of Battle/The History of the Conquest of Yanik] in December 28, 1665 and presented it to the Sultan. In this work, he depicted the

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18 In his article published in 1971, Vojtech Kopčan, a Slovak historian who produced works on the Ottoman military and administrative structure established in today’s Slovakia, informs us the main peculiarities of these accounts. See, Vojtech Kopčan, “Ottoman Narrative Sources to the Uyvar Expedition 1663” *Asian and African Studies* 7 (1971), pp. 89-100; cf., Levend, *Gazavatnâmeler ve Mihaloğlu Ali Bey Gazavatnâmesi*, pp. 119-123.

19 Manuscript, İstanbul Köprülü Library, second section, no. 231; Topkapı Palace Manuscript Library, Revan section, no.1307; Vienne National Library, no. 1070, and etc. The work is translated into German by Erich Prokosch, *Krieg und Sieg in Ungarn die Ungarnfeldzüge des Grosswezirs Köprülizada Fazîl Ahmed Puscha 1663 und 1664 nach den Kleinodien der historien seines siegelbewahrers Hasan Ağa* (Graz: Verlag Styria, 1976). There is a Ph.D. work completed on this work. See, Abubekir Siddik Yücel, *Mühürdar Hasan Ağa’nın Cevahirü’ı-Tevarihi* (Kayseri: Erciyes University, 1996).


21 Manuscript, Topkapı Palace Library, Revan section, no. 1308.
campaign in a simple but factual manner and provided a list of military camps from Istanbul
en route to Buda, with a reference to the campaign chronology.

Two poets of the Ottoman court, Mustafa Zühdi and Tâib Ömer, also participated in
the campaign and completed their works upon their return Istanbul in 1665. In his work,
*Ravzatü'l-Gazâ/Tarih-i Uyvar* [The Garden of Battle/History of the Uyvar], Mustafa Zühdi
described the events of the campaign in a literary style. He used his capacity to give detailed
information particularly on the events in the second year of the campaign, on the battle of St.
Gotthard. Tâib Ömer, on the other hand, penned his work, *Fethiyye-i Uyvar ve Novigrad* [The
Conquest of Uyvar and Novigrad], to narrate the stories on things that “were remarkable to
remember”.

Another literary text prepared by Erzurumlu Osman Dede. In his *Tarih-i Fazıl Ahmed
Paşa* [The History of Fazıl Ahmed Pasha], he described the events between 1658 and 1669
in an artistic manner. Evliya Çelebi, a famous Ottoman traveler who equally attended the
campaign provided a great deal of information in his *Seyahatnâme* [The Travel Books].
This famous work, which was translated into many languages and recently published as a

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22 Manuscript, İstanbul University Library, İbnü’l-emin Mahmud Kemal Section, no. 2488. There is a graduate thesis on this work see, Turhan Atabay, *Ravzatü'l-Gaza* (Tarih-i Uyvar) Tahıl, İstinsah, Tenkid (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1949).

23 The work is not missing as Kopçan and Levend argued. It is kept in the İstanbul University Library, İbnü’l-emin Mahmud Kemal Section, no. 2602. There is a graduate thesis on this manuscript see, Abdülvahap Yaman, *Taib Ömer - Fethiyye-i Uyvar ve Novigrad* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1979).


26 Manuscript, Topkapı Palace Manuscript Library, Revan section, no. 1457.

27 For the Hungarian translation see, Imre Karácson, *Evlia Cselebi török világutazó magyarországi utazásai, 1660-1664* (revised by Pál Fodor), (Budapest: Gondolat, 1985). It is possible to assess the information given by
reference text in Turkish, allows us to see what happened during the march from the perspective of a professional storyteller (meddah).

Along with these accounts, the modern historian has numerous chronicles at hand that mainly depict politics and diplomacy before and during the 1663 campaign. Abdürrahman Abdi Paşa, Sultan Mehmed IV’s close companion and trusted chronicler, for instance, offered us a perspective from the Palace in his Vekayınâme [the Chronicle]. The work that covers the period 1648-1682 is an important source since it registered the reactions to the victories and battle by the administrative palace circles during the campaign. Other chronicles that offer insights and information for the present study are İsâzâde Abdullah Efendi’s Tarih [the History], Mehmed Halife’s Tarih-i Gılmâni [the History of Gilmân], Silahdar Mehmed Ağa’s, Tarih [the History], Mehmed Raşid’s Tarih [the History], and Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa’nın Zübde-i Vekayiât [the Essence of the Events].

Evlíya Celebi in a comparative way. Diary of Dávid Rozsnyai who was the translator of Prince Mihály Apafi of Transylvania (r. 1661-1681) during the campaign is available see, Szilágy Sándor, “Rozsnyai Dávid az utolsó török diák történeti maradványai” [The Historical Legacy of the Last Turkish Interpreter, Dávid Rozsnyai], Monumenta Hungariae Historica II Scriptores VIII (Pest, 1867).


30 Manuscript, İstanbul Köprülüler Library, no. 216; Süleymaniye Library, Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa Collection, no. 701; Topkapı Palace Manuscript Library, Koğuştılar Collection, no. 915. There is a PhD thesis completed on this work see, Fahri Çetin Derin, Abdürrahman Abdi Paşa Vekâyî’nâmê’si Tahlîl ve Metin Tenkîdi 1058-1093/1648-1682 (İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yeniçağ Tarihi Anabilim Dalı, 1993).

31 Manuscript, İstanbul University Library, İbnü’l-emin Mahmûd Kemal Section, no. 3014; Ziya Yılmazer İsâzâde Târîhi (Metin ve Tahlilî) (İstanbul: Istanbul Fetih Cemiyeti, 1996).

32 Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi, Revan, no. 1306; Tarih-i Gilmânî Kamil Su (ed.), (İstanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı 1000 Temel Eser, 1976). There is also a PhD thesis on this work see, Ertuğrul Oral, Tarih-i Gilmânî (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2000).

33 Silahdar Findikli Mehmed Ağa, Silahdar Tarihi (1065-1094/1655-1695), vol. 1, Ahmed Refik (ed.), (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1928).
It is possible to check and balance the information given by the Ottoman sources with some European literary texts on the campaign. *A brief account of the Turks late expedition, against the Kingdom of Hungary, Transylvania, and the hereditary countries of the Emperor together with an Exact Narrative of the Remarkable Occurrences at the Siege of Newhausel* (London: Richard Hodgkinson ve Thomas Mabb, 1663) is an account of an anonymous author who describes the progress of the events, particularly the siege of the Uyvar (Hungarian: Érsekújvár, German: Neuhäusel, Slovak: Nové Zámky) castle. Sir Paul Rycat who served in the Ottoman capital as secretary to the Earl of Winchilsea from 1661-1667,36 wrote his *History of the Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1666) -a work that established the author as the foremost English authority on the Turks-. These accounts provide us with significant data from the perspective of contemporary foreigners. Other western authors that produced monumental works on the Ottoman history and allocated noticeable place for the campaign in a classical narrative style are Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall 38, Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen39 and Nicolae Iorga.40

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For the benefit of future research, it seems appropriate to mention some of the documents and registers on the campaign kept in the Turkish and Austrian archives. The Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive in Istanbul (BOA) houses a number of sources describing the fiscal and military preparations for the 1663 expedition. Among the documents and defters the Kamil Kepeci (KK), no. 2635 and Maliyeden Mudevvver Defter (MAD), no. 3157, 4353, and 4538 provide data for the provision of the army; KK, no. 1958 and 1960 for the expenditures of the campaign; and MAD, no. 3275 (p. 175), 3279 (pp. 169-176) and 15877 for the equipment and the amour.

The Österreichisches Staatarchiv (ÖStA), and more precisely, its Kriegsarchiv (KA) and Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), departments are the second place to look for archival materials. To name but a few, the documents in HHStA, Kriegsakten 192, fol. 9r; (KA) Alte Feldakten 1663/9/84; 1663/Türkenkrieg/10/3; 1661-1664/Türkenkrieg/103 and 107; Kartensammlung H III c. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 30-50, are the Habsburg reports, correspondence and military plan/charts related to this campaign. Furthermore, two other Ottoman records preserved in Germany, one in the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek, no. Ms. or. oct. 2329, an imperial order for the Ottoman naval forces carrying the cannon and the armor via the Danube, and the second in Staatbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, no. 256, another order regulating the official celebrations after the Ottoman capture of the Uyvar castle should be added to this list as documents in western archives on this campaign.
Chapter I: Politics and Diplomacy

“Many men, both learned and unlearned, has been long since foretold: the incursion of the Turks into Christendom 7 years before 1670”. These are the first lines of a contemporary account narrating the remarkable events during the siege of the Uyvar castle by the Ottoman army in 1663.41 While the anonymous author shared the opinion of those who perceived the cause of the war as “the heavy judgment of Heaven”, he also hailed the factual reason of the Ottoman expedition in Hungary in that particular year: “the action of Rákóczi, in the year 1657, in Poland, being undertaken without the consent of the Grand Signor”.42

George (György) II Rákóczi (1621-1660), the prince of the Ottoman-suzerain Transylvania43 between 1648 and 1660, found himself leading a strong principality that politically and financially flourished due to the successful administration of his predecessors, particularly during the reigns of Stephen (István) Bocskai (1604-1606), Gabriel (Gábor) Bethlen (1613-1629) and George (György) I Rákóczi (1630-1648). The Vienna (1606) and Linz (1645) peace treaties signed with the Catholic Habsburg emperors led the Calvinist


42 Ibid, pp. 1-3.

rulers of the principality to gain significant political, constitutional and religious rights.\textsuperscript{44} During the Thirty-Years War (1618-1648), the Protestant forces in Western Europe cooperated with the rulers of the principality to open a new front against the Habsburgs.\textsuperscript{45} The Ottomans who considered it their priority to fight against the Safavid dynasty in the eastern front in the first half of the seventeenth century, on the other hand, did not pay much attention to the affairs in Europe, which allowed the Transylvanian rulers to enforce their political position in the region. Thus, the international recognition and political stability gained in that period provided the rulers of the principality with enough confidence to act independently from the Porte to whom they owed allegiance in their external affairs.

Following the policy of his father, George II Rákóczi sought an opportunity to enhance the territorial power of Transylvania. The political crisis that Istanbul experienced in the period and the Cossack uprising in Poland that caused anarchy in the region further encouraged him to move independently from the Porte. Rákóczi succeeded to gain support of the Romanian voivodes, George Stefan of Moldavia and Constantin Serban of Wallachia.\textsuperscript{46} According to an Ottoman source, he even planned an attack on the Ottoman lands by cooperating with Venice.\textsuperscript{47} In 1656, he joined the forces of King Charles X of Sweden, and attacked on Poland with his 60.000 soldiers. However, the Poles decisively defeated him when the Swedish forces withdraw from the war. Since the Ottomans did not approve of this

\textsuperscript{44} Ferenc Eckhart, \textit{Macaristan Tarihi}, Turkish translation by İbrahim Kafesoğlu (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1949), pp.130-132.


\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., p. 353.

\textsuperscript{47} Mehmed Halife, \textit{Târih-i Gelmâni} Kamil Su (ed.), (İstanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı 1000 Temel Eser, 1976), p. 64.
action, Rákóczi's offensive against Poland became the reason for a number of Ottoman military interventions on the principality between 1656 and 1662, including one lead by the old Grand vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha in 1658. Also his refusal of tax payment to the Ottomans and the political and economic developments of the principality that threatened to create political tensions with the Ottomans in the future might be the other reasons of this Ottoman military intervention. It was during these attacks that the Ottoman forces captured the fortress of Yenő (Yanova in Turkish), replaced the Romanian voivodes with the new ones, deposed Rákóczi, and enthroned the Ottoman-backed Ákos Barcsai (1658-1660), who agreed to pay a war indemnity and annual tribute of forty thousand ducats instead of fifteen thousand. However, Rákóczi did not concede defeat and attacked Barcsai to regain his throne. In this endeavor, he trusted to receive the support of the Habsburg Emperor, Leopold I, who sent an envoy to the Ottoman capital to ask forgiveness on his behalf. In May 1660, Rákóczi died of the wounds received at the Battle of Gyalu (Romanian: Gelu) where he encountered with the forces of Seydi Ahmed Pasha, the governor of Buda. Three months later, the Ottoman commander-in-chief Köse Ali Pasha captured Varad (Hungarian:


52 Charles Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1618-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.65: “…Leopold responded positively to Rákóczi’s request for Austrian military intervention… [H]e initially did nothing more than occupy two Transylvanian counties that Rákóczi had ceded to him in exchange for his assistance.”

53 *Tarih-i Gilmâni*, p. 84; *Silahdar Tarihi*, p. 166.

54 Hammer, p. 66.
Nagyvárad, German: Grosswardein, Romanian: Oradea), the most important border fortress of the principality, after forty-four days siege, and thus annexed a new province to the Ottoman lands.\textsuperscript{55} John (János) Kemény, the Catholic General of the George II’s army, tried to organize a counter-attack but when he died in a clash near Nagyszőllős on January 23, 1662, this strategy failed.\textsuperscript{56} The Ottoman-supported Michael (Mihály) I Apafy ascended the throne in 1661 and being obedient to the Porte, he held this post until 1690.\textsuperscript{57}

This line of events partially demonstrates what the anonymous source quoted above indicates as the cause of the 1663 campaign, i.e., the actions of Rákóczi in 1657. The Ottoman policy makers in the capital paid close attention to preserve the ineffective buffer-zone status of Transylvania\textsuperscript{58} by considering its strategic importance for the Ottoman provinces in the region, i.e. Budin/Budun (Hungarian: Buda, established in 1541), Temeșvar (Hungarian: Temesvár; Romanian: Timișoara, established in 1552), Eğri (Hungarian: Eger) Kanije (Hungarian: Kanizsa, established in 1600).\textsuperscript{59} Thus, the Ottomans showed no tolerance towards actions that could possibly disturb the established balance.\textsuperscript{60} By observing the classical

\textsuperscript{55} Silahdar Tarihi, pp. 203-208.

\textsuperscript{56} History of Transilvania, p. 360.

\textsuperscript{57} Mihail Guboğlu, “Osmanlı Padişahları Tarafından Transilvanya’ya Verilen Ahidnameler, Kapitülasyonlar (1541-1690)”, p. 1732.

\textsuperscript{58} The Ottoman rulers put strict articles to preserve the buffer-zone status of the Transylvania in any peace treaty signed with its rivals in the region see, Viorel Panaite, “Haraçgüzarlarını Statüleri: XV. ve XVII. Yüzyıllarda Eflak, Boğdan ve Transilvanyalılar Üzerine Bir Çalışma” Osmanlı (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 1999), vol.1, pp. 380-381.

\textsuperscript{59} Peter F. Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman rule, 1354-1804 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993), p. 63.

\textsuperscript{60} Štĕpánek, “Zítvatoruk (1606) ve Vasvar (1664) Anlaşmaları Arasında Orta Avrupa’da Osmanlı Siyaseti”, p.733. From the very beginning of the Ottoman rule in the Central Europe, the Habsburg rulers had claimed rights on the Transylvania Principality. Reports of the grand vizier Yemişçi Hasan Paşa (d. 1603), which indicated the importance of the principality for the security of the other Ottoman provinces in the region, warned the Sultan against the moves of the Habsburgs, see Cengiz Orhonlu (ed.), Osmanlı Tarihine Aid Belgeler Telhisler (1597-1607) (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1970), pp. 65-70.
Ottoman ruling methods, the Grand vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha oversaw the Empire’s interests in the region. Few days before his death, Mehmed Pasha invited Simon Reninger, the Austrian ambassador in İstanbul, to discuss the Transylvania problem in the presence of his son Fazıl Ahmed Pasha, the strongest candidate for the grand vizierate. He warned Reninger and advised him to abstain from elections in the principality.61

The Porte considered the Habsburg occupation of Székelyhíd (Turkish: Sekelhid) and Kolozsvár (Turkish: Kolojvar) castles and their permission to the Croatian ban Nikola Zrinski (Nicholas Zrínyi) (1620-1664), a grandson of the famous defender of the Sigetvár fortress,62 to construct a new castle, Zrínyi Újvár, (“New castle of Zrínyi”, Turkish: Yeni-kale) as acts that violated the Zsitvatorok Peace Treaty (1606).63 Nevertheless, rebellions in Anatolia and the ongoing war with Venice predominantly occupied the Ottoman politics and the Porte chose diplomacy to solve the problem. First, in 1661, the Grand vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha offered to the Habsburgs a treaty in which Vienna would recognize Varad as an Ottoman possession and promised not to support Kemény; in return, the Ottoman capital would terminate its campaign in Transylvania.64 Then, according to a report of the ambassador of the Pope, Fazıl Ahmed Pasha tried to establish a Protestant republic in the region under the leadership of German Prince, Karl Ludwig, during the first year of his

61 Hammer, pp. 90-91.
63 Josef Blaškovič, “The Period of Ottoman-Turkish Reign at Nové Zámky (1663-1685)” Archív Orientální 54 (1986), p. 106. The Zsitvatorok Peace Treaty was renewed in 1615, 1618, 1625, 1627, 1642 and 1649; Sir Paul Rycaut, History of the Present State of the Ottoman Empire (London, 1678), p. 128: “Fort built by the Count Serini, being a matter really against the articles of the last peace.”
64 History of Transilvania, p. 360.
vizierate. This republic would consist of the Protestant nobility in the Upper Hungary and would pay annual tax to the Porte. Karl Ludwig, however, refused this idea. The Grand vizier Fazıl Ahmed Pasha then ordered the governor of Budin, Hüseyin Pasha, and the Transylvanian prince, Mihaly Apafi I, to write letters to the Hungarian nobility in the region to accept the Ottoman sovereignty. The nobility that trusted the European coalition forces did not accept this offer and the grand vizier applied the classical methods to find an ultimate solution that would secure the northern border of the Empire.

It is true that with the vizierate of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha in 1656, the spirit of ghaza or holy war was revived in the Empire and the Ottoman militia regained its dynamism. Fazıl Ahmed Pasha, the eldest son of Mehmed Pasha, who took the post of grand vizierate after his father death in October 30, 1661, had enough experience in statecraft and knew how to manage the human and financial resources of the Empire. Engaged with the problems in Central Europe, the ambitious Grand vizier first warned the Habsburg’s envoys in Istanbul to observe the conditions of the Zsitvatorok Peace Treaty. Initially, he was aiming to end the war with Venice that had continued for fifteen years and then to deal with the problems at the Hungarian front.

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66 It is possible to consider these acts under the frame of political plans of the Grand vizier, i.e., changing the status of the Transylvania from an autonomous principality to an Ottoman province. See, Sir Paul Rycaut, p. 122: “the total subjection of Transylvania”, Hammer, p. 100; Metin Kunt, “17. yüzyılda Osmanlı Kuzey Politikasi Üzerine Bir Yorum” Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi 4-5 (1976-77), pp. 111-116.


68 On the reformist activities of the Köprülü grand viziers see, Ahmet Refik, Köprülüler (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2001). According to İnalcık, the spirit of ghaza remained as the dynamic principle until the end of the seventeenth century see, Halil İnalcık, “Periods in Ottoman History” in Essays in Ottoman History (İstanbul: Eren, 1998), pp. 15-30.

However, in the spring of 1663 when the Ottoman army prepared for a campaign against the Venetian territories in Dalmatia,\textsuperscript{70} the Grand vizier received a firman from the Sultan ordering a march against the Habsburgs. Complaint letters received from the frontier castle and cities on the severe attacks of the Austrian soldiers played an important role in this decision of the Sultan.\textsuperscript{71} Inspired by the Palace preacher Vani Mehmed Efendi, both the Sultan and the Grand vizier favorably considered a campaign against a Christian enemy, which might bring them heavenly reward and worldly prestige if it ended successfully.\textsuperscript{72}

Although in the case of the 1663 campaign the sultan obviously had become very irritated with his Habsburg adversary, one of the underlying causes for sending the Ottoman army on campaign at any time was unrest in the capital. Moreover, as John Stoye observes, “campaigning on a large scale justified enlarging the army to a maximum, and within this expanded force it was easier to contrive a balance of power which subdued the more refractory elements”.\textsuperscript{73} It was also easier for the prominent Ottomans to settle personal scores during the campaign mobilization. Indeed, on September 12, 1663, while the siege of the Uyvar castle was continuing, the Grand vizier used his extended authority to have Şamizade, the reisülküttab or the chief scribe of the Ottoman chancery, and his son-in-law, Kadı-zade İbrahim Pasha executed. Although Ottoman sources have different views on this event,\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{70} Taib Ömer, \textit{Fethiya-i Uyvar u Novigrad}, folio 5b; Erzurumlu Osman Dede, \textit{Tarih-i Fazıl Ahmed Paşa}, folios 3b-4a; Rycaut, p. 120; \textit{Silahdar Tarihi}, p. 235.

\textsuperscript{71} Mühürdar Hasan Ağa, \textit{Cevâhirü’t-Tevârih}, folio 6a. \textit{Silahdar Tarihi}, pp. 236-239. The firman reached to the Grand vizier when he was in Edirne.

\textsuperscript{72} Ahmet Refik, \textit{Köprülässiler}, p. 107.


\textsuperscript{74} İsa-zade Tarihi, p. 79; \textit{Silahdar Tarihi}, p. 277; \textit{Tarih-i Gılmani}, p. 109.
readjusting the power balance seems the main reason for the execution of such significant figures of the ruling class.\textsuperscript{75}

On Ramazan 3, 1073 / April 11, 1663, the grand vizier Fazıl Ahmed received the title of \textit{serdar} in Edirne (Adrinople) and began his march towards Belgrade.\textsuperscript{76} Three days later of his arrival to Belgrade, he accepted the envoys of the Habsburgs, Baron Goes and Beris, and the Austrian ambassador in İstanbul, Simon Reninger, whom demanded peace negotiations.\textsuperscript{77} The Grand vizier asked them to remove the Austrian soldiers from the Transylvanian castles, to demolish Zrínyi’s new castle, and to free the Muslim captives.\textsuperscript{78} The envoys, on the other hand, also stated their conditions: the Székelyhíd and Kolozsvár castles would remain under the control of the Emperor and in return, they would destroy Zrínyi’s new castle.\textsuperscript{79} To convince them of the strength and the capacity of the Ottoman army to gain what he demanded, the Grand vizier showed Baron Goes the tents and cannons gathered in the field of Belgrade.\textsuperscript{80} When the Grand vizier informed him with a \textit{telhis} of the conditions demanded by the Habsburg envoys the Sultan became very angry and reiterated his order to launch a campaign against the Habsburg Emperor.\textsuperscript{81} Fifteen days later, when Fazıl Ahmed Pasha entered Ösek (Eszék), he accepted the envoys for the second time. In addition to his early requests, he asked an annual tax payment of 30.000 golden ducats as in the reign of the Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent. The envoys accepted to convey the earlier conditions to the

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{75} Rycaut, pp. 135-136.

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Silahdar Tarihi}, p. 240.

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Cevâhirü’-Tevârih}, folios 8a-8b; \textit{Silahdar Tarihi}, pp. 232-237.

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Silahdar Tarihi}, p. 243.

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Silahdar Tarihi}, p. 244.

\textsuperscript{80} Hammer, pp. 103-104.

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Silahdar Tarihi}, p. 244.
\end{footnotes}
Emperor but refused the latter one. Finally, in a meeting in Buda in June 30, Ali Pasha asked the Austrian envoys on behalf of the Grand vizier to pay either 30,000 ducats annually or 200,000 florins as they paid at the time of Koca Murad Pasha (1606). The envoys demanded time to give an answer. Ali Pasha gave the envoys fourteen days while the army continued its march en route to the Uyvar castle.

As will be discussed extensively in the following chapters, the Ottomans waged a mostly successful campaign against their adversaries. In order to consolidate the territorial gains made after their advance had been halted during the battle of St. Gotthard, the Ottomans concluded the Peace of Vasvár, on August 10, 1664. This 20-year truce confirmed Ottoman suzerainty over Transylvania and stipulated that the Austrian and the Ottoman troops had to be removed from the region. This treaty provided the Ottomans with the possibility to keep the fortresses they had captured during their march. Leopold I agreed to make a “gift” of 200,000 florins to the Sultan. The main reason of the willingness on the Habsburg side to sign this treaty was to secure the eastern frontiers in order to be able to engage militarily in the West. In addition, the economic crisis that had struck the Habsburg Empire limited the scope for military expenditures. However, this peace treaty considerably annoyed the Hungarian nobility. They felt that their national leader, Count Nikolas Zrinyi, had not received the necessary support of the imperial commander Montecuccoli. The discord between the

82 Hammer, p. 103.
83 Hammer, p. 104.
84 Ottoman version of the treaty kept in BOA, İbnülemın – Hariciye, no. 408. There is also a letter of Leopold I sent after the treaty signed see, BOA, Ali Emiri, no. 8876.
86 Idem.
Habsburg emperor and the Hungarian noblemen was also rooted in the religious tensions caused by the increased counter-reformation. The Ottomans and in particular the Grand vizier Ahmed Pasha understood this situation very well and used it to further the Ottoman cause.

In addition, it was also a tradition in the Ottoman governmental system to pay close attention to the security and welfare of the population that had accepted the Ottoman suzerainty. An Ottoman document preserved in the village of Dolný Kamenc on the upper reaches of river Nitra shows us that Hüseyin Pasha, the governor of Buda and the commander of the Uyvar castle, provided security of the inhabitants of this village against the attacks of the Crimean Tatars, Cossacks, and the soldiers of Moldavia and Wallachia who have participated the Ottoman campaign as auxiliary units. In another document from the same village, Çatra-patrazâde Ali Pasha, the governor of Leve (Levice in modern Slovakia), ordered İsmail Beg, the commander of Leve regiment, to protect the subjects of the village who accepted the Ottoman authority from any aggression that would come from the army.

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88 For details of the Ottoman organization in the newly acquired regions see, Halil İnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquests” *Studia Islamica* 2 (1954), pp. 103-129.

Chapter II: March and Confrontation

The Ottoman army began its march in a customary way. On February 9, 1663, the tuğ-i Sultan or Imperial standard, symbol of the start of a campaign, was prepared for the march. A week later the imperial tents, and on the February 22, the tent of the Sultan himself were readied. The army gathered in Davutpaşa on March 18, and following the traditional route used for the western campaigns advanced towards Edirne. Those soldiers attending the campaign had to join the army by March 21, 1663. In Edirne, the ammunition and provision needed for the campaign were gathered. On April 11, The Grand vizier Fazıl Ahmed Pasha was appointed as commander-in-chief, or serdar, and left for Sofia. There, the horses were put on the pastures to feed on fresh grass. After a sixteen-day stay in Sofia, the Ottoman forces moved to Halkali Pınar where the Sultan sent the commander a firman with a sword and caftan, traditional gifts to animate the ghaza spirit. When the army subsequently reached Belgrade on June 8, almost all its units had been assembled. The soldiers were so numerous that the city of Belgrade became a carnival of colors because of their tents. The army stayed in the city for twelve days in order to undertake the logistical aspects of the campaign. The cannons, mortars, ammunition, cereals and other provisions were brought in from İstanbul and the

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90 Mehmet Necati, Ez Menakibat Gaza u Cihad, folio 1b.
91 Erzurumlu Osman Dede, Tarih-i Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, folios 3b-4a.
92 Silahdar Tarihi, p. 240.
93 Silahdar Tarihi, p. 242; Tarih-i Gilmani, p. 108.
94 Ez Menakibat Gaza u Cihad, folio 2b.
95 Taib Ömer, Fethiyye-i Uyvar u Novigrad, folio 8a.
96 Tarih-i Gilmani, p. 109.
material already present in Belgrade were loaded unto one hundred and forty ships and transported from the Belgrade port to Budin via the Danube River. Then, the army moved to Zemun and stayed for another two days there. On June 22, they reached Mitrofe (Mitrovice) where the soldier could buy cheap food. It was June 28, when the army arrived Ösek (Eszék). There, the soldiers received their provision and the cannons uploaded to the ships. Finally, on July 17, the army arrived Buda. Based on the information Mehmed Necati provided, the distance between one menzil or resting place and the next differed between two to eight hours of marching distance.

Although it is a popular discourse to mention about the geographical and political illiteracy of the Ottomans, recent studies show us that the Ottoman decision-makers were careful enough in planning and organizing their attacks in the European lands. They were aware of the castles, rivers, natural resources, swamps, defense lines, balance of powers thanks to the activities of their well-developed information-gathering system. Preparing sound reports on the geographical and strategic peculiarities of the region was the responsibility of the frontier pashas. Therefore, based on the reports of the pashas in the Habsburg frontier, the Ottoman ruling class made a decision to march on the Uyvar castle after carefully debating the issue in a meeting held in Buda on July 23, 1663. The motives

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97 Tarih-i Gilmani, p. 109; Tarih-i Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, folio 5b.

98 Idem.

99 Silahdar Tarihi, p. 245.

100 Ez Menakibat Gazu u Cihad, folio 3a.

101 See appendix.


103 Cevahirü‘-Tevarih, folio 13b; Tarih-i Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, folio 7a; Hammer, p. 103.
supporting the decision included the relative ease with which the castle could be taken, the prospect of plentiful booty, and not in the least the prestige that could be gained by the enterprise – the more so since a high official of the emperor resided in the castle. Other possible targets for the Ottoman army were Raba (Yanık kale) and Komorn (Komaran). However, it was considered difficult to enter Raba, and the castle of Komorn was ready for defense with its wide and waterlogged ditches.  

i.Çiğerdelen

The first confrontation of the Ottoman army with the German and Hungarian soldiers took place during the Battle of Çiğerdelen (Hungarian: Párkány; Slovak: Štúrovo), on August 6, 1663. To reach the Upper Danube, the Grand vizier ordered his pashas to build a bridge near Esztergom. Hüseyin Pasha, Kaplan Mustafa Pasha, and the governor of Niğbolu, Kadızade İbrahim Pasha, were selected to coordinate this challenging task.  However, when the Ottoman army reached Esztergom on August 2, the bridge had not yet been finished, which compelled the Grand vizier to take a personal interest in the construction of it. Four days later, the bridge was finally completed and Köse Ali Pasha, the governor of Halep (Aleppo), Mehmed Pasha and the governor of Anadolu, Yusuf Pasha with their soldiers numbering 8,000 strong crossed the bridge over the Danube and reached Çiğerdelen. On the day when the Ottoman army passed to Upper Danube, the Ottoman soldiers captured a messenger who carried more than twenty-five letters. This intercepted correspondence contained instructions for the officials who commanded the Uyvar and the Novigrad castles.

104 Hammer, p. 104.

105 Taib Ömer, *Fethiyye-i Uyvar u Novigrad*, folio 8b.

106 Ibid, folio 9a.
Misled by a false report, Count Forgacs, the commander of the Uyvar castle, went to stop the Ottoman passage on the upper Danube. However, he suffered a decisive defeat at Ciğerdelen. His army consisted of 8,000 hussar or heyduck, 500 infantrymen, German and Hungarian soldiers. At the end of the battle, 4,800 soldiers of the Habsburg side had been killed.

ii. The Uyvar Castle

In 1545, Pál Várdai, the archbishop of Esztergom, ordered to build a reed-embrasured palisade to protect his lands from Ottoman attacks on the right bank of the Nitra River. The palisade was then named after the archbishop, Ėrsek Úyvár –the new castle of the archbishop. However, when it became clear that this relatively small castle could not prevent the Ottoman attacks, the imperial council in Vienna decided to build a new castle in accordance with the renaissance fortification model that would provide security for the road leading to the capital. The most modern technology was used in the construction of this fortress. This renewal of the old fortification started in 1573 and was finished by 1580; however, the works to improve its defenses continued until 1663. The fortification then consisted of a stonewalled fortress that occupied an area of approximately three kilometers. It was surrounded by a 35-meter wide and 4, 5 meter deep moat filled with the water of the Nitra River. The castle was considered one of the most modern fortresses in Europe at the time it was built, a prime example of the star fortress that was considered an appropriate

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107 The number of the soldiers were more than 10,000 according to Taib Ömer, see, Fethiyye-i Uyvar u Novigrad folio 9b.

108 Fethiyye-i Uyvar u Novigrad, folio 12b.


110 Blaskovics, p. 106.
defense against a prolonged attack with artillery in the preceding centuries. It had once been captured by the Ottoman forces in the 1605 and was afterwards given to Borcskay. The Austrians succeeded in retaking the castle and subsequently spent a great deal of resources to improve the strength of the walls of the fortress. Evliya Çelebi reports on the castle as follows:

It has six towers and each tower is like the Alexander wall. In the west there is the 'white tower', in the east there is the 'tower of the pope', in the south there is the gate of Vienna with on its left the 'wet tower'. In the north there is the tower of Komaran, with the king’s tower at the side of the kible. Each tower has forty-fifty cannons and a gunpowder storage room. They did not keep all the gunpowder in the same place so as not to lose all what they have in case of fire. Each tower contains a thousand men, and it is not difficult to find a place in time of battle.  

The Ottoman source *Ihtisar-ı Tahrir-i Atlas Mayor* describes the geographical position of the fortress as follows:


The Ottoman army reached the castle on August 17, 1663. In accordance with the tradition, the Grand vizier first called upon Adam Forgacs, the commander of the castle, to surrender. However, when Forgacs refused this Ottoman offer the siege started. On the twenty-fourth day of the siege, the Crimean, Wallachian and Moldavian forces joined the

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main army. Ottoman spies informed that general Montecuccoli was coming to rescue the castle with 30,000 soldiers and 45 cannons. To stop the advance of the adversary, the Grand vizier ordered Kibleli Mustafa Pasha and the Crimean soldiers. The army of Montecuccoli was decisively defeated and the Ottoman soldiers made raids until the vicinity of Vienna, returning with a great amount of booty.\footnote{Fethiyye-i Uyvar u Novigrad, folio15b.}

The Uyvar castle fell to the Ottomans after a siege of thirty-eight days on September 25, 1663. Two days later the Grand vizier settled in the fortification, ordered repairs to be made and assured the defense of the fortification. The first person in charge of the town was Kurd Mehmed Pasha, who was \textit{mazul} (not appointed to an official duty) at the time of the conquest. The Budin vizier Hüseyin Pasha was appointed as the \textit{muhafiz} or commander of the castle. After the capture of the castle, the Ottoman soldiers found 40 canons and 14,000 kile flour.\footnote{Menakibat-i Gaza u Cihad, folio 14b; Silahdar Tarihi, p. 273.} These provisions were very useful to meet the needs of the Ottoman soldiers, who continued their military activities.

After the Uyvar castle, other castles in the vicinity were also captured. The Nógrád (Novigrad) castle fell to the Ottomans on November 14, after a siege of 27 days. The Tatar forces, at the same time, plundered Moravia. When the region of Uyvar was thus completely subdued, the Grand vizier sent letters to the surrounding palanksas, granting them pardon.\footnote{Silahdar Tarihi, p. 273} Then the army moved back to Belgrade for wintering.

\footnote{Hammer, p. 108.}

\footnote{Hammer, p. 109.}
Chapter III: Logistics and Manpower

i. General

Recent studies on the Ottoman warfare in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries have shown us that the Ottoman campaign logistics was based upon a complex, well-structured organization. These structures were needed for the organization of infrastructural activities, the mobilization of the army, the supply and transportation of food, munitions, and other necessities.\(^{118}\) In addition, in his reference work *Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700*,\(^{119}\) Rhoads Murphey demonstrated the financial, environmental, technological, and motivational limits of the Ottoman warfare organization. Within the framework of these academic studies, this chapter uses the reports of the chronicles and the war-accounts further to highlight the organizational side of the campaign as well as the difficulties faced by the Ottoman during their march towards the castle of Uyvar.

Because of its flexible mobilization, logistics and training, the Ottoman army triumphed not only over the fragmented Balkan States, and still earlier over the Byzantines, but was also victorious in Central Europe and the Mediterranean. It is true that disposing of a ready supply and logistics is crucial to ensure the success of even small-scale campaigns for without arms and foods, no army can function properly.\(^{120}\) For the 1663 campaign, the war

\(^{118}\) Hakan Yıldız, *Haydi Osmanlı Sefere: Prut Seferi’nde Organizasyon ve Lojistik* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2006), p. 27


equipment and the provision had been prepared the previous year as a preparation for a campaign against Venice.

In his *History of the Present State of the Ottoman Empire*, Sir Paul Rycaut explicitly described the preparation for the 1663 war:

Though the Turks have their affairs but ill managed at sea, and their success accordingly fortunate; yet their preparation for land services are more expedite, and executed with that secrecy and speed, that oftentimes armies are brought into the field, before it is so much as rumored by common mouths that any designs are in agitation: For though it was now winter, yet the design against Germany went forward, forces were daily sent to the frontiers, cannon and ammunition for war, transported by way of Black Sea, and the Danube. Orders issued out to the princes of Moldavia and Walachia to repair their wharfs and keys along the river for the more convenient landing of men and ammunition, and to rebuild their bridges for the more commodious passage of the Tartars; that horses should be provided against the next spring, for drawing all carriages of ammunition, and provisions; their magazines stored with quantities of bread and rice, their fields well stocked with sheep, and other cattle, and that no necessaries be wanting which concern the victualing or sustenance of a camp.\(^{121}\) … Thirty pieces of cannon from Scutari, and fifty from the Seraglio, most of a vast bigness and weight, which had served in the taking of Babylon, with great store of ammunition and provisions of war, were transported up the Danube to Belgrade, and the princes of Moldavia and Walachia had now commands sent them to quicken their diligence in making their preparations of war, and in providing sheep, beef, rice, and all forts of victuals for supply of the camp; and general proclamation was made in all places.\(^ {122}\)

While it is certainly the case that the Ottomans were capable of mobilizing large armies, it is important to remember that size alone was not enough to guarantee success in military enterprise. The army had to arrive at its destination fit for battle. To bring the troops to the battlefield by means of naval transport was expensive. On the other hand, army movements over land were logistically difficult. In both cases, progress was slow. During the


\(^{122}\) Idem, p. 131.
wars with the Habsburg Emperor, the Ottoman exercised naval control of the Danube. In contrast, the Habsburgs showed less interest in their Danube fleet.\textsuperscript{123}

The 16\textsuperscript{th} century was an era of budget surpluses; during the following one, the Ottoman Empire would be plagued by budget deficits. Therefore, a question that naturally rises is how the Ottomans were able to gather sufficient sources in order to cover the expenses for the 1663 campaign in this financially chaotic period. An answer to this crucial question can possibly be found in the Ottoman archival documents. Hans Georg Majer, in his attempt to compare the problems of Austrian and Ottoman armies during the seventeenth century, stressed the Ottoman capacity to collect the taxes called “avariz-i divaniye” (extraordinary impositions), and more specifically, \textit{sürsat, nüzül} and \textit{iştira} levies,\textsuperscript{124} that helped the empire to obtain provisions (\textit{erzak}) and fodder, and their transportation to the military camps. In addition to these taxes levied in kind, distant provinces had to send cash for the other expenses. While these extraordinary levies sometimes provoked negative reactions among the Ottoman subjects, solving their financial problems without having to resort to external funds as the Austrians did, was quite an achievement for the Ottomans.\textsuperscript{125} In contrast to that of the Ottoman army, the supply chain of the Habsburgs was not well organized and controlled. As a result, prices of provisions started to rise very quickly and the soldiers’ wages did no longer suffice to pay for food and fodder. Thus, the Habsburg soldiers raided the Hungarian lands in

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\textsuperscript{123} Allan Z. Hertz, “Armament and Supply Inventory of Ottoman Ada Kale, 1753” \textit{Archivum Ottomanicum} 4 (1972), p. 105.

\textsuperscript{124} Lütfi Güçer, \textit{XVI. ve XVII. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Hububat Meselesi ve Hububattan Alınan Vergeler} (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1964), p.95 ff.

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order to find the necessary victuals and other provisions. A Bavarian eyewitness complained that the soldiers were ‘not behaving like Bavarians but like the real enemies of this land.’

ii. Weather and Timing

The timing of Ottoman campaigns usually obeyed a strict timetable. The campaign season's beginning and end were marked by the astronomical calendar with the spring and autumn equinoxes as starting and ending point. Practical considerations played an important role, such as the requirement for the soldiers to be back in time for the harvest. Moreover, in winter, provisions became scarce to come by and at any rate very expensive.

Although in the case of a campaign, mobilization was announced around March 21, in practice the troops would report to their units on *Hızır Ilyas* Day (May 3). During the period in between, the troops' horses were given a last opportunity to feed on the wholesome spring pastures. *Kasım Day* (November 5) generally marked the end of the campaign season. However, this tradition of a fixed date for demobilization could negatively interfere with the course of a campaign. When an insignificant stronghold was captured too late in the season, this endangered the whole enterprise by making it impossible to lay siege to the actual target. In the case of the 1663 campaign, it took 119 days for the Ottoman army from the departure of the first units from Edirne to the establishment of a fully manned and fully equipped military force at Esztergom ready to make the river crossing and proceed against the Uyvar castle. Naturally, this rate of advance of the Ottoman troops was greatly dependent upon the prevailing weather conditions. The most suitable season for taking the road in

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126 Majer, p. 190.

Anatolia and Thrace was summer when little or no precipitation ensured that the main routes stayed dry. However, conditions in Hungary were quite different from the relatively arid Anatolian plateau. As Caroline Finkel observes:

The Danube and its many tributaries... were liable to flooding and the surrounding planes to water logging – a common occurrence in the heavy late summer rains repeatedly mentioned in the chronicles of these years.\(^{128}\)

In a directive sent in early September 1663 by the sultan to the grand vizier, he commented on the military situation as of the 10th day of the siege and warned the field commander against prolonging the operation in enemy territory for longer than 50 days (until mid-October at the latest), so as to avoid placing the army at risk from entrapment by steadily rising water levels in nearby streams and rivers.\(^{129}\) It is clear from the correspondence that the sultan was aware of this difficulty.

### iii. Food and Fodder

The provision of the army was ensured by means of the *menzil* system.\(^ {130}\) Executed by Ottoman officials called *Menzil emins*, a tax called *sürsat* was imposed by which the villages in the vicinity of the *menzil* or halting place were obliged to sell cereals to the passing army according to the current market value. To ensure this procedure was effectively put into practice, *firmans* were sent to the *kadis*, judges, responsible for the regions on march route before the campaign took off. For instance, the pashas of Buda and Eger ordered the villages


\(^{129}\) *Cevahirü’t-Tevarih*, folios 28b-29a.

and towns to deliver cereals and fodder to the camp at the Uyvar castle. The subjects in Miskolc received orders to deliver 4000 *kile* barley (arpa) and 1990 *kile* millet (darı).\(^{131}\)

In spite of the impressive preparations in order to assure an adequate provision, in practice it was near impossible to feed the army on a regular basis when adverse weather and geographical conditions disturbed the coordination between the provision trains and the advancing army. In the particular case of the campaign against the Habsburgs in 1663, the last minute directing of the army towards Budin meant that most of the provisions that had been prepared the previous year for a war against the Venetians had been sent to the Dalmatian region.\(^{132}\) As a result, the Ottoman army suffered serious shortages during its campaign against the Uyvar castle. Both Ottoman and European sources report on this situation. The contemporary pamphlet *Diarium oder Ausführliche und wahrhafftige Relation über die Belägerung und Übergab weitberühmten Haup Vestung in Ober Ungarn Neuheusel...Im Jahre 1663* describes the situation as leading to outright mutiny:

> On the 2\(^{nd}\) of September, two Ottoman soldiers had defected to the Habsburg camp. They explained that the greater part of the common soldiers had confronted the Grand Vizier with the demand for bread because they were starving. They threatened to lay down the weapons if their wishes would not be met.\(^{133}\)

### iv. Guns and Technology

It would be mistake to assume that the Ottoman military power was weak in the 17\(^{th}\) century as compared to the previous era. Nor can it be argued that the Ottomans displayed


\(^{132}\) *Tarih-i Gırmni*, p. 114.

apathy and a general lack of appetite for military endeavors or that the Ottoman army was unsuccessful. An academic study that compared the Ottoman military technology with that of Europe empirically proves that the view that the Europeans gradually switched to the use of lighter rifles, which were easier to carry and handle, whereas the Ottomans continued to use antiquated and heavy weapons is untenable.\(^{134}\)

In spite of the limitations of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century arms, the success of the Ottoman campaign in Hungary was mainly dependent on an abundant supply of ammunition, which in turn could only be ensured by well-organized logistics. For the transportation of the big cannons and ammunition, both ships and land forces were used.\(^{135}\) During the 1663 campaign, one hundred and forty Ottoman vessels transported the army’s ammunition and cannons via the Danube. Under the leadership of the governor of Kütahya Yusuf Pasha and the governor of Sirem, İbrahim Pasha, \textit{arabacıs} or wagoners from Sirem then were appointed to carry the loads from the ships.\(^{136}\) A description of this transport is given in the \textit{Isazade Tarihi}:

\begin{quote}
Badehû mühimmat-ı cebehane için yüz kırk gemi idad olumuş idi. Toplar vesayir mühimmat tahnil olunup Sirem çerahorları ile Anadolu beylerbeyisi Ostorgan’a çıkarmağa tayin olundu.\(^{137}\)
\end{quote}

As was described above, the different gunpowder mills and storages of the empire provided the Ottoman campaign with the necessary amounts of gunpowder. The detailed records of the military supplies used during the 1663-64 campaign show that the total quantity


\(^{135}\) Taib Ömer, \textit{Fethiyye-i Uyvar u Novigrad}, folio 8b.


\(^{137}\) \textit{İsazade Tarihi}, p. 73.
of gunpowder distributed during the siege of the Uyvar castle as well as the gunpowder delivered to different Ottoman fortresses in Hungary amounted to more than 6,611 kantar, i.e. approx. 375 tons. According to Montecuccoli, an amount of 100 tons gunpowder used during the siege. According to Ágoston, not less than 3,410 kantar (184 tons) of gunpowder was used for the siege of the fortress.

The other necessary commodity for siege warfare, ammunition, was fortunately somewhat less dangerous and difficult to transport. Yet again, considerable quantities were necessary to ensure military success, translating into a very heavy load that had to be transported. The Ottomans’ calculation of the ammunition needed for a campaign amounted to about 300 bullets for each rifle and 100 cannon balls for each cannon. Hammer claimed that the cannons used for the siege of the Uyvar castle were of 22, 35, 48 and 64 calibers. However, Montecuccoli, the commander of the Habsburg army, reported that during the bombardment of the Uyvar castle, the Ottoman soldiers propelled projectiles with a diameter of no less than seventy-five cm. Furthermore, during his negotiations with the Habsburg envoy, the Ottoman grand vizier claimed the Ottoman army to have 123 field guns and 12 siege cannons, or a total 135 cannons at its disposal. According to the aforementioned calculations, this meant that about 13,500 projectiles had to be transported. It is hardly

138 BOA, MAD, no., 15877, see “Sources” above.


141 Hammer, p. 106.

surprising that for such a logistically challenging undertaking, the Ottoman army had gathered sixty thousand camels and ten thousand mules, as was boasted by the grand vizier.\textsuperscript{143}

The gunpowder was transported to İstanbul from various well-known \textit{baruthanes} located in places such as Karaman and Egypt.\textsuperscript{144} The gunpowder of the latter (as well as that of Bagdad) was highly rated by Evliya Çelebi who compared its quality favorably with that produced in İstanbul.\textsuperscript{145} Indeed, the gunpowder that was produced in the capital was reputed to be moist. This was not without consequences, as it affected its ballistic power. As a result, the projective capacity of the cannon was reduced and the direction of the projectile thus deviated, causing damage to the cannon’s mouth. During the Uyvar siege, eight cannons were damaged this way. Finally, it can be observed that the high rate of gunpowder consumption during the siege was not without consequences for the price of the raw materials used to produce gunpowder: in May 1664, the Ottomans had to pay 25 akçe for one \textit{okka} of refined saltpeter.\textsuperscript{146}

\textbf{vi. Manpower}

The Ottoman army consisted of two major groups of soldiers, the Janissaries and the soldiers of the provinces. Other groups that took part in the maneuvers were providing diverse services, such as the rowers, the sappers and the marketers who sold various provisions to the soldiers. Physicians and barbers were also accompanying the troops.

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{143} Hammer, pp. 102-103.
\item \textsuperscript{144} Ágoston, p. 93.
\item \textsuperscript{145} Evliya Çelebi, \textit{Seyahatname}, vols. 6, p. 193.
\item \textsuperscript{146} Ágoston, p. 83.
\end{itemize}
The mobilization of the army was a major undertaking. For the campaign against the Habsburgs in 1663, orders were sent to the Pashas of Diyarbakır, Aleppo, Caramania, and Anatolia among others. Rycault states that:

Seven and twenty letters, accompanied by as many vests, after the Turkish manner, were sent to as many Pashas of the empire to dispose the strength of their countries in a warlike posture, so as to march when the Grand signors commands should require them to attend his designs.147

As to the actual strength of the Ottoman army that left on the campaign, the sources provide discordant information. According to Hammer, it was 121,600 men strong.148 He also claims that while the troops were marching on Ösek (Eszék) a letter of the Crimean sultan arrived. In this letter, he promised to send an army consisting of 100,000 soldiers under the command of his son, Ahmed Giray. In addition, 15,000 Kazak soldiers would come later.149 Finally, the voivodas of Wallachia and Moldavia also attended the siege with their men.150

Charles Ingraodownplays the number of Ottoman troops by stating that Ahmed Köprülü led an army of 60,000 into Royal Hungary.151 Blaskovics on the other hand believed it was more than double that size, consisting of 70 thousand infantrymen and 80 thousand cavalry forces.152 Writing in 1879 in his Geschichte des Infanterie-Regimenteres, Georg Prinz von Surhsen claimed the number of the Turkish soldiers to be 200,000, with 10,000 Tatars,

147 Rycault, p. 128.
148 Hammer, 102-103.
149 Hammer, p. 103.
152 Blaskovics, “The Period of Ottoman-Turkish Reign at Nové Zámky (1663-1685)”, p. 106.
and 9000 Wallachian and Moldavians.\textsuperscript{153} However, Marsigli’s figure of 30,000 Janissaries and 155,000 provincial cavalry and infantry has been generally accepted in the works on the Ottoman campaigns in the given period.\textsuperscript{154}

For the tributary princes, the participation in military campaigns theoretically should have postponed their tribute paying, as both Ottoman authorities and the voivodes were aware. In fact, the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars, forced to come to the siege of the Uyvar castle, spoke of their dilemma, “Is it possible for us to pay harâc and take part in the battle at the same time?” However, the Porte would try to solve this incomparability by considering the military-political circumstances specific to each case.\textsuperscript{155}

Morale and motivation are two crucial components of success in any endeavor. Doubtlessly, high levels of morale and motivation formed the basics of successful warfare. Along with technological advance and effective logistics, they paved the way to victory. Whenever the underpaid and under-appreciated soldiers encountered numerous physical difficulties, they lost their morale, and as a result the war. In order to preserve the morale of the troops, the granting of awards and/or the promising of awards was the most powerful motivating tool deployed by the commanders. The Ottoman military tradition, indeed, used these tools in an effective way.\textsuperscript{156} The sources provide us with several examples from the 1663 campaign showing the Ottoman practice of motivating the soldiers in kind. The cebecibaşı, the one responsible for the assurance of the military equipment, was promoted due


\textsuperscript{156} Murphey, \textit{Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700}, pp. 133-168.
to the performance he showed in arranging the provision and armor in a timely manner. He became the defterdar and was granted the honor to enter Belgrade at the side of the Grand vizier. Low-ranking soldiers were also in the position to benefit from the generosity of the grand vizier. During the first confrontation with the enemy in Çağerdelen battle, Fazıl Ahmed Pasha granted 40-50 gurus for each captive, and 25-30 gurus for each head. Besides, while there was reward, there existed also punishment. To provide discipline in the army, roll calls were frequently made. To assure attendance it was declared that: “those who failed to be at the camp during the roll calls would lose their livelihoods (dirlik)”.

However, the physical health of the troops had also to be taken care of because evidently, military life was fraught with danger for the common Ottoman soldier. During the siege of Uyvar, many soldiers were wounded and it was considered the duty of the Ottoman ruler to care of them. In an Ottoman document dated January 30, 1664, a certain Hasan who was one of the surgeons attended to the campaign asked 10,000 akçes from the central treasury to meet the expenses for the treatment of the soldiers.

In addition to material and physical care, spiritual assistance was also considered important. Mass prayers before the march were a common practice in the Ottoman capital. As Mehmed Halife informs us, ninety-two içoğlan, boys serving in the inner part, Enderun, of the Topkapi Palace, were ordered to read Surah al-Feth, “the Victory”, ninety-two times in a week during the earlier campaign. In the morning of the first day of the siege of Uyvar

157 Hammer, 102.
158 Hammer, 105.
159 Tarih-i Gilmani, p. 111.
160 BOA, İbnülemin Sihhiye, no. 35 cf. Osmanlılarda Sağlık - vol. II Arşiv Belgeleri (eds.) Çoşkun Yılmaz and Necdet Yılmaz (İstanbul: Biofirma İlaç Sanayi, 2006), p. x
161 Tarih-i Gilmani, p.65.
castle, on the other hand, the army prayed for success and made sacrifices. In order to keep soldiers’ spirits high, a group in the army played musical instruments during the siege of the castle.

\[162\] Hammer, p. 106.

\[163\] Hammer, p. 107.
Conclusion

Fazıl Ahmed Pasha, the grand vizier of the Sultan Mehmed IV, took the responsibility of organizing and commanding an Ottoman army consisted of more than 120,000 men and numerous war-equipments in the campaign of 1663. Not only to secure his own post but also to solve the authority problem in the central Europe, the young serdar had to gain a victory over the Christian enemy in his first campaign. Had to encounter various environmental and partial provisional restraints he achieved to return the capital as a victorious commander.

Thanks to the accounts of his contemporaries, today, nearly three hundred and the fifty year later of this campaign, it is feasible to assess what happened in the march. This study, based on mainly the Ottoman accounts, tried to put some insights to analyze the limits and constraints of the Ottoman art of war. It showed us that instead of numerous deficiencies they have the Ottoman narrative accounts have potential to serve as a source group that enable researchers to have sound knowledge not only on the political and diplomatic side of the Ottoman campaigns but also on the parts related to the logistics of the warfare. Obviously, any study on a particular campaign has to be considered as incomplete without an examination of the archival sources. Thus, to have a complete picture there is an urgent need to discover and analyze the archival sources related to this campaign and synchronize the data with other source materials. At the end, the evaluation of the findings of such particular studies in the light of the modern warfare scholarship will help us to have a sound ground to discuss the theories such as the military revolution or the Ottoman “stagnation and decline” in the early modern Europe.
## Appendices

Military camps en route to Buda

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*Source: Mehmed Necati, *Ez Menakibat Gaza u Cihad*, Topkapı Palace Museum Library, Revan Section, no. 1308, folios 1b-7a.*
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