ROADMAP FOR THE EU’S ROLE IN ADDRESSING ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM: THE CASE OF PAKISTAN

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Abstract

In this research, I presented a roadmap for EU’s Role in Global Counter-Terrorism. Taking the example of Pakistan I made a case of why external security dimension of EU is crucial for its counter-terrorism efforts. I identified the root causes of radicalization and terrorism which EU should address in order to have effective and sustainable counter-terrorism policies.

In order to present a realistic approach to the way forward, I conducted a detailed analysis of the weaknesses and limitations in EU system in general and its counter-terrorism policies, strategies, and action plans in particular. Based on this analysis, practical and clear recommendations were made to support EU’s role in global counter-terrorism.
Acknowledgments

Thank you so much Agnes for your extremely useful feedback and comments, which enabled me to carry out this research in a systematic and methodical manner. I’m grateful!

Big thanks to the interviewees of the research for their guidance in making me analyze the issues from different perspectives.

Tuba, I could never have done it without you! Shukria.

Bilal Aurang Zeb
September 10, 2009
To the victims of...

Suicide attacks on September 11, 2001 killing 2,996 people in New York
Bombings on March 11, 2004 killing 191 people in Madrid
Suicide attacks on July 7, 2005 killing 52 people in London

And to the victims of suicide attacks in NWFP and FATA in Pakistan on...

August 30, 2009 killing 16 police recruits at the Mingora Police Station, NWFP
August 27, 2009 killing 22 soldiers at Torkham in the Khyber Agency, FATA
August 23, 2009 killing three people in the Morain Town area of Peshawar, NWFP
August 18, 2009 killing four security force personnel at Bannu-Miranzai road, North Waziristan Agency, FATA
August 16, 2009 killing a soldier near a checkpoint in the Swat District, NWFP
July 28, 2009 killing two security force personnel in North Waziristan, FATA
June 22, 2009 killing two policemen at the Takot Police check-post in Battagram District, NWFP
June 12, 2009 killing five people in a mosque in the Cantonment area of Nowshera, NWFP
June 11, 2009 killing a man in the Lattefabad area on Ring Road in Peshawar, NWFP
June 9, 2009 killing 17 persons at Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar, NWFP
June 5, 2009 killing 49 people, including 12 children, at a mosque in a remote village of the Dir Upper District, NWFP
May 28, 2009 killing three policemen at the Shangla police security post on the Kohat road, NWFP
May 28, 2009 killing three people in Dera Ismail Khan, NWFP
May 21, 2009 Killing 18 people in Jandola area of Tank, FATA
May 5, 2009 killing seven people on the Bara road near Peshawar, NWFP
May 4, 2009 killing four security forces personnel in the outskirts of Peshawar, NWFP
May 1, 2009 killing two Frontier Corps personnel in the Upper Dir District, NWFP
April 18, 2009 killing 27 security forces personnel in the Dobai area of Khyber District, NWFP
April 15, 2009 killing 18 people at the Marchand Police Post in Charsadda District, NWFP
April 4, 2009 killing seven civilians, including two schoolchildren, in Minawal, North Waziristan Agency, FATA
April 2, 2009 killing five police personnel in the Harian Kot area of Dargai sub-division, NWFP
March 30, 2009 killing seven people on the Bannu-Miranzai road, NWFP
March 26, 2009 killing 12 persons in the Jandola bazar of Tank District, NWFP
March 27, 2009 killing 83 persons in a mosque at Peshawar-Torkham Highway, Jamrud, Khyber Agency, FATA
March 11, 2009 killing six people in Namak Mandi, Peshawar, NWFP
February 23, 2009 killing a police guard in Bannu, NWFP
February 20, 2009 killing 32 people near Shubra Square in Dera Ismail Khan, NWFP
February 6, 2009 injuring seven people in the Tedi Bazaar area of Jamrud sub-division, FATA
January 23, 2009 killing two security forces personnel near Mingora, Swat District, NWFP
January 4, 2009 killing ten people near the Poltechnic College in Dera Ismail Khan, NWFP
December 28, 2008 killing 43 people in a Government school in the Buner District, NWFP
December 9, 2008 killing five people, including a child, in the Nari Oba area of Buner District, NWFP
December 5, 2008 killing 10 people in the Kalaia area of Lower Orakzai Agency, FATA
December 3, 2008 killing five people at Pir Qala area of Shabqadar tehsil in the Charsadda district, NWFP
December 1, 2008 killing 11 people at the Sangota checkpoint in the Swat valley, NWFP
November 28, 2008 killing seven people in Bannu district, NWFP
November 20, 2008 killing nine people in the Badan village of Bajaur Agency, FATA
November 17, 2008 killing ten people in the Khan-azakhela area of Swat, NWFP
November 12, 2008 killing five people in the Sabhan Khaur village school in the Charsadda district, NWFP
November 11, 2008 killing four people in the Qoryum Stadium, Peshawar, NWFP
November 6, 2008 killing two Frontier Corps personnel at a FC camp in the Mingora area, NWFP
November 6, 2008 killing 22 motorcycle at Salgari road in the Bajaur Agency, FATA
November 4, 2008 killing seven people at a check post in the Khyber District, NWFP
November 2, 2008 killing eight paramilitary soldiers at the Zalaf Fort in South Waziristan, FATA
October 31, 2008 killing nine persons in Marand, NWFP
October 29, 2008 killing nine soldiers in the Cantonment area of Bannu district, NWFP
October 26, 2008 killing 11 security forces personnel at the Naqi check post in the Mohmand Agency, FATA
October 16, 2008 killing four security force at the Mingora Police Station in Swat, NWFP
October 10, 2008 killing 85 persons in the Khyber area of Upper Orakzai Agency, FATA
October 2, 2008 killing four persons in the Charadda town, NWFP
September 22, 2008 killing nine security force personnel at a check post in Swat, NWFP
September 16, 2008 killing three soldiers at the check post in the Kohat area, Swat, NWFP
September 6, 2008 killing 39 people as a security checkpoint in the outskirts of Bannu, NWFP
August 29, 2008 killing five people in the Darna Adam Khel town, NWFP
August 23, 2008 killing seven people at the Charsadda police station, NWFP
August 19, 2008 killing 32 people near the emergency ward of the District Headquarters Hospital in DI Khan, NWFP
May 18, 2008 killing 13 people at the Punjab Regiment Centre market in the Cantonment area of Mardan, NWFP
May 6, 2008 killing three people at a check point in Bannu, NWFP
May 1, 2008 injuring 15 people in a madrasa in the Khyber Agency, FATA
March 20, 2008 killing five soldiers in Zari Noor in South Waziristan, FATA
March 17, 2008 killing two policemen at the police barracks in Mingora, Swat, NWFP
March 2, 2008 killing 42 people at a tribal peace jirga near the Zanghunkhel check-post in Darna Adam Khel, NWFP
March 1, 2008 killing two people in the Jandar area of Bajaur Agency, FATA
February 29, 2008 killing 40 people in the Mingora city of Swat district, NWFP
February 16, 2008 killing 47 persons, including six children, in the Parachinar city, FATA
February 9, 2008 killing 27 people in Nakai near Charadda town, NWFP
February 11, 2008 killing 10 people in Mirali, North Waziristan, FATA
February 4, 2008 killing six persons in Kajiri near Miran Shah in North Waziristan, FATA
January 17, 2008 killing 12 people in Peshawar, NWFP
December 17, 2007 killing 12 army recruits near the Army Public College in the Kohat cantonment area, NWFP
December 13, 2007 killing five people in Nowshera, NWFP
December 9, 2007 killing 10 people, including two children, in the Swat district, NWFP
November 9, 2007 killing three people in Peshawar, NWFP
October 23, 2007 killing 20 soldiers in Nowan Khel, Swat, NWFP
October 1, 2007 killing 18 people at a check post in Bannu, NWFP
September 11, 2007 killing 19 people in Bannu Choa dying, Dera Ismail Khan, NWFP
September 1, 2007 killing six soldiers in the Jandar area of South Waziristan, FATA
August 26, 2007 killing four police personnel in the Shangla district, NWFP
August 24, 2007 killing five soldiers in the Mir Ali town in North Waziristan, FATA
August 24, 2007 killing two soldiers in Amodjel village on the road to Razmak, FATA
August 20, 2007 killing six security force personnel on Kurram Road in the Hangu district, NWFP
August 20, 2007 killing two soldiers at the Tharkhobi check post in North Waziristan, FATA
August 17, 2007 killing five soldiers near Jandar in South Waziristan, FATA
August 3, 2007 killing two people in the Gora village, Swat, NWFP
July 20, 2007 killing four people at Boya near Miran Shah in North Waziristan, FATA
July 19, 2007 killing fifteen people, including two children, at a mosque in the Kohat Cantonment area, NWFP
July 19, 2007 killing seven people at the Hangu Police Training College, NWFP
July 17, 2007 killing four persons at the Khyber security check post in North Waziristan, FATA
July 15, 2007 killing 13 security force personnel and six civilians, including three children, at Marta, Swat, NWFP
July 15, 2007 killing 26 people at the Dera Ismail Khan Police Lines, NWFP
July 14, 2007 killing 24 Frontier Corps (FC) personnel on the way towards Miran Shah from the Razmak area, FATA
July 12, 2007 killing three police personnel in the Swat district, NWFP
July 12, 2007 killing four people in Miran Shah, North Waziristan, FATA
July 4, 2007 killing 11 people on the way towards Bannu from Miran Shah, North Waziristan, FATA
January 22, 2007 killing four security forces personnel near Mirali, North Waziristan, FATA
June 26, 2006 killing six security force personnel, 10 kilometres east of Miran Shah, North Waziristan, FATA
May 28, 2007 killing two Frontier Corps (FC) personnel in the Bolanabad area of Bannu district, NWFP
May 15, 2007 killing 25 people at the Matha Hotel in Peshawar, NWFP
April 28, 2007 killing 31 people in Charsadda, NWFP
February 3, 2007 killing two soldiers in the Barakzai area of Tank District, NWFP
January 29, 2007 killing three people in Dera Ismail Khan, NWFP
January 27, 2007 killing 15 people near Qasim Ali Khan Mosque in Peshawar, NWFP
November 8, 2006 killing 42 people at an Army training centre at Pargal, NWFP
June 2, 2006 killing five soldiers in the Babaghel area of Bannu, NWFP
February 9, 2006 killing 40 people in the Hangu town, NWFP
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction
The fight against terrorism has become a top priority for the European Union the recent years after the 9/11 attacks on the US; 2004 bombings in Madrid; and 2005 suicide bombings attacks in London. In November 2001, immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the European Council, adopted an ‘Action Plan on Combating Terrorism’ at a special summit. In 2002, the EU also agreed on a unanimous definition of terrorism and “standard penalties for terrorist acts” (Merlingen, 2009: 6). The counter-terrorism strategy was agreed by the EU in December 2005 which the measures in the Action Plan under four headings: prevent, pursue, protect, and respond.

In this research, by highlighting the weaknesses and limitations of the EU’s counter-terrorism measures, I’ll explore the extent to which they are successful or otherwise. I will argue that it is important for the EU’s security to play an effective role in combating ‘global’ terrorism as the external dimension of its counter-terrorism policies have a number of limitations and flaws. I argue that the EU can only play its role effectively if it addresses the root causes of terrorism through sustainable measures. Therefore, I’ll take Pakistan as a case study to explore root causes of terrorism at different levels. I believe that the EU’s role in addressing root causes of terrorism in Pakistan is vital because Pakistan has gained an important position in the global fight against terrorism due to its geographical position as Talibans and al-Qaeda carry out their worldwide operations from their safe havens in areas bordering Afghanistan.
Terrorism is a contested terminology and has many interpretations. One person’s freedom fighter could be another’s terrorist. The root causes of terrorism are also complex under different factors and circumstances.

1.2 The Rationale
In this research, I have presented a roadmap for the EU’s Role in Global Counter-Terrorism. The research highlights root causes of terrorism and recommends the ways with which the EU can intervene and play its role in addressing them. The research is structured in such a manner that it first elaborates the EU’s limitations in counter-terrorism measures in order to present realistic recommendations. This study provides a step further than reinventing the wheel and builds on the current states of affairs by drawing lessons from measures already taken by the Pakistani government, the Northern Alliance and the EU in Pakistan.

1.3 Research Questions

Main Research Question 1

How do contextual, terrorist organizational, and individual levels contribute to root causes of terrorism.

Sub-questions:

a. How political and socio-economic factors provide fertile ground for terrorism to flourish?

b. How can we explore the link between contextual and individual levels by understanding the group dynamics and nature of terrorist organizations?

c. How psychological aspects of an individual’s behavior help in explaining why certain individuals get recruited by terrorist organizations while others do not?
Main Research Question 2

What are the limitations and weaknesses of the EU’s counter-terrorism measures, and what are the reasons behind these flaws?

Sub-questions:

a. Why is terrorism prevention in Pakistan important for the EU?

b. What is the EU’s long-term approach to counter-terrorism and what are criticisms to linking security with development?

c. Who is in the driving seat of the EU’s counter-terrorism measures and what legitimacy concerns are associated with agenda setting and policy making?

d. What are the limitations of the EU’s external dimension of counter-terrorism efforts?

Main Research Question 3

What role can the EU play to prevent global terrorism by targeting the root causes of terrorism in countries such as Pakistan?

Sub-Questions:

a. How can the weaknesses in the EU’s counter-terrorism measures be addressed and made legitimate, effective and sustainable to combat global terrorism?

b. What practical measures can the EU take to address root causes of terrorism in Pakistan at the political, socio-economic and individual levels?

1.4 Methodology

This research is exploratory in nature. The primary as well as secondary data is collected at the EU Policy formulation and implementation level; and at Pakistan level. To provide overall guidance on the research and understand the context from different perspectives, five semi-structured telephonic and face-to-face interviews were conducted with academic scholars,
journalists and development professionals in the field of international relations, terrorism and European integration. This diverse representations of views on the topic helped collecting rich data.

Detailed literature review and analysis was carried out on terrorism from different schools of thought in books, journals, conference papers, newspapers, electronic media, seminars, conferences and guest lectures. The literature on actors, organizations, policy instruments and action plans at global, the EU and country levels was also analyzed. I also attended classes at the International Relations Department at the Central European University in courses taught by Professor Michael Merlingen, a well-renowned scholar in the fields of European security policy, notably the CFSP/ESDP, and critical IR theory.

1.5 Framework of Analysis
The analysis of the case of Pakistan is carried out at three levels to explain and identify the root causes of terrorism. These include contextual, terrorist organizational, and individual levels.

The contextual level explains the social context in which terrorism comes into being and affects the identity and behavior of individuals in a society. It focuses on “causes of terrorism in the political, economic and social conditions that correlate to increased incidences of politically motivated violence” (Ozer, 2007: 64).

At the terrorist organizational level, using the Irving L. Janis’ Groupthink Theory, an attempt is made to identify the impact of group dynamics on terrorist decision making by exploring the nature of terrorism organizations. It focuses on group dynamics-related process that facilitates radicalization and an increased risk of violence in previously non-violent protest groups.
The individual level addresses psychological traits and characteristics of terrorist group members that predispose them to seeking membership in violent organizations such as terrorist groups. I will also explore the link between contextual and individual levels.

The European responses to global terrorism are critically analyzed at two levels. These include internal security and external security.

At the internal security level, I will highlight a systematic evolution of the EU’s counter-terrorism policies in the wake of 9/11 and London/Madrid bombings and detail how cross-pillar governance dynamics have increased and blurred. I will analyze how legitimate is the agenda-setting process of the EU; who is in charge and which important actors lack power. I will also elaborate the inter and intra institutional problems of the EU.

At the external security level, I'll discuss why terrorism prevention in countries like Pakistan is important for the EU. I’ll discuss the EU’s long-term approach of linking development with security and then provide the critique to this approach. I’ll elaborate the reasons behind the limitations of the EU’s external dimension.
CHAPTER 2
ANALYZING THE ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM: THE CASE OF PAKISTAN

2.1 Introduction
Terrorism is a contested terminology. One person’s freedom fighter could be another’s terrorist. With multiple interpretations, the notion still shares certain common characteristics. Sezgin (2007) quoting Schmid offers ten of those characteristics which include: “use of violence; the (conditional) threat of (more) violence; production of terror/fear in a target group; targeting of civilians, non-combatants and innocents; for intimidation, coercion and/or propaganda; a method, tactic or strategy of conflict waging; communicating the act(s) of violence to larger audiences; the illegal, criminal and immoral nature of the act(s) of violence; the predominantly political act; and a tool of psychological warfare to mobilize or immobilize sectors of the public” (19).

Sinai (2005) argues that the root causes of terrorism consist of “multiple combinations of factors and circumstances, ranging from general to specific, global, regional or local, governmental-regime, societal or individual levels, structural or psychological, dynamic or static, facilitating or triggering, or other possible variations, some of which may be more important and fundamental than others” (216).

Keeping the complex nature of the root causes of terrorism in view, I have explored them at the contextual and individual levels in Pakistan. It is common sense that the external environment influences the behaviors of individuals in a society. In this context, the external factors of Pakistani areas that border Afghanistan are explored in the light of political, historical and socio-economic situation of the region. The socioeconomic inequality in particular results in individuals with a sense of deprivation. This context provides a fertile ground for terrorists and
terrorist organizations to influence and exploit individual behaviors and perceptions of the members of a society.

In this chapter, the root causes of terrorism at contextual, terrorist organizational and individual levels are analyzed after providing a detailed background of how radicalization evolved in Pakistan. Then, the link between the context and individual behavior is elaborated. The idea is to provide grounds for the EU’s intervention at these different levels to give direction to long-term effective policies that address root causes of global terrorism. The chapter is concluded with summarizing the findings.

2.2 Background

_Talibanization of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)_

Explaining the geographic terrain of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Markey (2008) describes it as an area with “harsh geography, poor education, and scarce infrastructure” (22). With an estimated population of 3.5 million, FATA is approximately 10,500 square miles, sharing a border of 300 miles with Afghanistan (see map below).
The term talibanization describes the process of altering cultures or sub-cultures into ones which are based on the radical and conservative interpretation of Taliban-style Islam. Tellis (2008) describes that after Talibans were thrown from power in Afghanistan, they moved to the southern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan and to western side of Pak-Afghan border. The people from these regions were trained as Talibans by Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID). As FATA is relatively safer than Afghanistan, the core leadership of Talibans also moved to this area. Quoting Fair, Tellis (2008) argues that these Talibans have grown into a “mature insurgency with the militant opposition able to eject government forces from a given
territory, hold ground against state opposition, and coerce any local opponents into cooperating to sustain the newly secured safe haven” (Tellis, 2008: 16).

According to Markey (2008), Talibans have made an attempt to control administrative powers of the Pakistani government and spread their interpretation of Islam through force and terror. The local chiefs represent different tribes in this region. These chiefs are terrorized by Taliban by attacking and killing them. These armed groups of Taliban have “denounced contraceptives, polio vaccination, and girls’ education as un-Islamic; girls' schools and NGOs have been attacked; health workers have been murdered, women compelled to don Taliban-prescribed veils; schools threatened; barber, video and music shops destroyed” (Shirkat Gah, 2007: 1).

**Talibanization of the Swat Valley in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)**

Starting with their terrorist activities in FATA, the Taliban in coordination with local extremist clerics have expanded their power to the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan while gathering more sympathizers in the more settled areas of the country starting with the Swat valley.

One of these clerics is Mullah Fazlullah, son-in-law of Maulana Sufi Muhammad who is the founder of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammad (TNSM), a radical group of militants which has been trying to enforce Islamic Shariah law in the region (SYT, 2008). Fazlullah’s campaign runs through an illegal FM radio station where he gives speeches against the government and the west. The radio has also been used to spread terror through giving orders to slaughter government officials or whoever dared raising their voices against them. These militants took control of the “police stations, Basic/Rural Health Units, educational institutions, and other government offices and vehicles” in the Swat valley (SYT, 2008: 3).
In reaction, the government on the other hand deployed army and paramilitary troops, police and helicopter gunship into Swat valley in November 2007 and a guerilla war started between Talibans and the government. This led to a series of suicide attacks and remote control blasts throughout the country and particularly in the NWFP. According to Tellis (2008), Pakistan has deployed more than 85,000 troops in the region and more than 600 of them have sacrificed their lives. The situation has worsened since 2007 as the local and Afghan Talibans are joined by al-Qaeda.

As of June 2009, more than 3 million people have been internally displaced due to the conflict in the NWFP according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC, 2009).

2.3 Framework of Analysis

*Terrorism is better understood as emerging from a process of interaction between different parties, than as a mechanical cause-and-effect relationship.*

(Bjorgo, 2005)

After detailing the background of process of talibanization in Pakistan, now I’ll do an in-depth analysis of the root causes of terrorism in Pakistan. This analysis will be focused on three areas: economic, political and socio-economic conditions that provide the context for terrorism; group dynamics in terrorist organizations; and psychological characteristics of terrorist group members.
2.4 Contextual Level

This level explains the social context in which terrorism comes into being and affects the identity and behavior of individuals in a society. It focuses on causes of terrorism in the political, social and economic conditions that result in terrorism. Ozer (2007) argues that taken together, the big picture of terrorism, it can be said that preconditions of terrorism prepare a fertile condition for terrorism, and specific precipitators, such as anger and hate, motivate certain individuals (especially young people) to join terrorist organizations.

The contextual level in FATA and NWFP can be explained in two categories:

- Political factors
- Socio-economic factors
2.4.1 Political Factors

Role of the US: Historical Context

In Afghanistan, the freedom fighters are the key to peace. We support the Mujahadeen...

President Ronald Reagan, Seventh State of the Union Address, January 1988
(Chossudovsky, 2008)

Theoretically analyzing, Bjorgo (2005) maintains that “used as an instrument in their foreign policies, some states have capitalized on pre-existing terrorist groups rather than creating them” (257). This has been the case in Pakistan where military coups were supported by the US as its foreign policy means and then these military governments were used to create and train terrorists.

Bhutto, a democratically elected prime minister in the 70s, had always called for a foreign policy which was non-aligned and free from the US infringement. In 1977, his government was dismantled through a military coup backed by the US, resulting in Martial Law enforced by General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq who later became the President in 1978. Zia’s government was given huge aid by the US to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan by creating and empowering Mujahadeen. During this period, “local religious leaders, or mullahs, translated an influx of financial support into a massive expansion of extremist-minded seminaries, or madrassas, which trained a generation of students in Islamist militancy” (Markey, 2008: 6). As the Soviet Union got defeated and the purpose of the US foreign policy fulfilled, the US left the region with a fertile ground for the planting of a major regrowth of fundamentalism. These Mujahadeen would be later used as freedom fighters against Indian’s occupation of Muslim-dominated Kashmir.
Chossudovsky (2008) argues that “successive US administrations have contributed to repealing the Rule of Law, destroying Pakistani institutions of civilian and secular government and instating military rule since the late 1970s” (1). Support of undemocratic governments in Pakistan by powerful foreign actors such as the US is therefore one of the major reasons for fundamentalism in Pakistan, and “an insurmountable obstacle to needed regime change” (Bjorgo, 2005: 259).

**Conflict with India**

The conflict between India and Pakistan provides a strong basis to understand the roots of terrorism. The conflict goes back to the partition of British India on August 14, 1947 when despite densely populated Muslim population, the Hindu ruler of Kashmir decided to become part of India. This resulted in the first war between India and Pakistan which came to an end by the intervention of UN in 1948. The UN resolution called for a referendum in Kashmir to be organized by India. Delalieu (2005) describes that “out of a fear of seeing the Muslim majority of Kashmir swing towards Pakistan, India declined to organise the vote” (2). In 1987, the state elections in Kashmir were badly rigged by India (Haqqani, 2004). The reluctance of India to resolve the issue and the “indifference attitude of international community over the issue as led to the belief that continued militancy by Pakistan may be the only way of highlighting the issue in the conflict” (ibid: 355).

With an ever increasing military force, both India and Pakistan spend more than 3 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. Both countries are nuclear powers and a constant battle for power exists in the region. To balance this power, Pakistan has used the Mujahedeen trained with the US support in the Soviet war to fight against India in Kashmir as
freedom fighters. On the other hand, according to India Human Rights Report 2009, the Indian security forces are committing severe violations of the human rights including “extrajudicial killings and torture, sexual violence on women and children, and killing unarmed demonstrators” (Chakma, 2009: 79). This helps the freedom fighters in justifying their actions and gaining more support from the local population.

In Afghanistan, Pakistan has always backed Pashtun regimes (such as Talibans). On the other hand, India has provided support to Taliban’s opposition - the Northern Alliance warlords and politicians, and anti-Taliban Tajiks and Uzbeks (Jones and Shaikh, 2006). Thus, an indirect war between India and Pakistan continues in Afghanistan where both countries provide diplomatic and military assistance to their allies.

2.4.2 Socio-Economic Factors
In this section, I'll argue how different socio-economic factors provide basis for creating an environment in which terrorism flourishes. This section is divided into two parts. In the first part, I explain how certain policies of western countries (in coordination with Pakistani military dictators) help building the perceptions in the minds of common people that the war against terrorism is actually a war against Muslims in disguise. In the second part, I’ll explain how lack of justice and governance, poverty, unemployment and illiteracy in FATA and NWFP also help in a sense of deprivation and inequality and thus provides fertile ground for terrorists to make false promises to change the situation and gain power and support from the locals.

Sadri (2007) makes an effort to explain the social factors with the cultural theory. He argues that “extremist subcultures” arise as a result of radicalization of cultural norms and values which are
“frustrated by barriers of expression and implementation” (34). These conditions, he maintains, provide great opportunity for “ultra radical mutations” of ideologies (ibid).

Western countries such as the US have always mostly promoted antidemocratic military governments in Pakistan as explained in the previous sections. These governments have allowed the US to carry out operations inside Pakistan. Common people think that allowing the US operations inside their country is against the sovereignty of Pakistan. To add to this uncomfortable feeling is the causalities of civilians including children and women during the operations by using armed drones such as the Predator and the more heavily armed Reaper which are remote-controlled. Rogers (2009 a) argues that these drones, although cheap in terms of military alternatives, are “notorious for inflicting large numbers of civilian casualties, which has provoked outrage in Pakistan” (3). One of the first attacks of drones went badly wrong in September 2008 when fifteen people (most of them children and women) were killed (Rogers, 2008 b).

As reaction, the resident tribes reacted by seizing Pakistani paramilitary forces in FATA. Taking advantage of the situation, “the more extremist outfits, including al Qaeda elements, have sought to exact their revenge by undertaking lethal suicide attacks against Pakistani military and intelligence personnel within the FATA and deep inside the nation’s heartland in an effort to compel the Pakistani government to terminate its counterterrorism operations conclusively” (Tellis, 2008: 20).

Tellis (2008) while quoting ICG’s 2006 report argues that the perception that Pakistani government’s permission to the operations is “illegitimate support for western governments involved in a global anti-Muslim crusade” (17) has increased in recent times. While quoting
Zahab (2007), he further argues that the position of Talibans has strengthened as a result and they have “filled the power vacuum caused by the demise of the poor governance in the FATA” (17).

**Lack of Justice and Governance, Poverty, Unemployment and Illiteracy**

A study conducted of Turkish provinces by Ozeren and Gunes (2007) reveals that high numbers of terrorist incidents are related to poverty and inequalities between provinces. This finding can be linked to the FATA situation as well. Markey (2008) describes that “the FATA is the poorest, least developed part of Pakistan. Per capita income is roughly $250—half the national average of $500. Nearly 66 percent of households live beneath the poverty line. Only ten thousand workers now find employment in the FATA’s industrial sector. The FATA’s forbidding terrain further serves to isolate tribal communities from markets, health and education services, and many outside influences” (5).

Schmid (2005) argues that one area where poverty plays a contributory role is the area of unemployment. Young people become frustrated and hopeless in the political and economic circumstances that prevail in a society, thus becoming more vulnerable to false promises by those who suggest terrorist and violent means to bring about a social and political change. For example, Schmid cites that “almost a quarter of the recruits of insurgent groups in Kashmir cited ‘joblessness’ as a recruiting motive” (ibid: 228). The U.N. estimated that over 32 percent of the population of Pakistan, roughly 52 million young people, is between the age group of 10 to 24 (UN, 2003). This is the largest number of youth than ever before in the history of this country. A country like Pakistan with a ‘youth bulge’, poor education system and high unemployment rates, would seem to be at a higher risk of seeing young men attracted to political violence, including terrorism.
Although some scholars find the link between poverty, education and terrorism as weak, I argue that combining these factors with political and historical context, lack of good governance, and unequal distribution of power and resources - result in feelings of indignity and frustration, which provide a fertile ground for people to reverting to violent means.

The reasons behind low literacy rate in Pakistan are complex. One of these being little allocation of budget to education - 2.3% of the GDP (UNESCO, 2007) compared to huge spending on keeping military forces and maintaining government’s bureaucracy. The education system in Pakistan is clearly divided into two streams. The first one is the ‘Urdu-medium’ (mostly government schools) for lower middle and lower classes with poor quality curricula, weak infrastructure, and untrained and unqualified teaching staff. Majority of the students in this system drop out before secondary school and the rest find it impossible to afford tertiary education and if they can, they find it extremely difficult to survive in university education where the medium of instruction is entirely in English. The second, more expensive system is ‘English-medium’ (mostly private schools) for middle, upper middle and higher classes. The students from this system can afford tertiary education and survive in the scheme of studies to which they are already used to. In addition, it is comparatively easier for them to find jobs in a market where spoken English, good university degree and a modern and urban personality are considered absolute priorities.

These conditions are not merely a coincidence. The continued and ever increasing divide between the rich and the poor, partially as a result of the education system mentioned above, have helped the elite to stay in power for generations. The corrupt political elites, military dictators, feudal lords and even terrorists fear that ‘education’ is the only tool that can help
empowering poor people, which in turn implies sharing of power between elites and common people. As the elites have the power to make decisions through policy formulation, they do not take the risk of allocating budget to sectors, such as education and development, where there are implications for them to lose power.

In areas like FATA where nearly 66 percent of households live beneath the poverty line (Markey, 2008), people find it life-saving to send their children to religious schools where boarding and education are free. According to BBC (2009), there are fifteen thousand madrassas (religious schools) registered with the Ministry of Religious Affairs while there are no statistics available on unregistered madrassas. The Federal Minister of Education shared in the Senate that there are nine thousand ghost schools in Pakistan with 500 in the NWFP. Most of these ghost schools are used by the feudal lords as their personal use. Some are used godowns (warehouses) for crops, and some for keeping animals (Mehar, 2009).

According to Markey (2008), “the literacy in FATA is only 17 percent, compared to the national average of 40 percent; among women it is 3 percent, compared to the national average of 32 percent” (5). BBC reports that in January 2009, Taliban banned girls’ education and more than 200 girls schools have been destroyed and two and a half thousand government departments have been closed. More than 50,000 students had suffered by February 2009 (Kaakar, 2009).

On the other hand, weak governance in FATA and NWFP, especially in the areas of judicial and law enforcement, has raised “calls for the implementation of sharia or Islamic law, as an alternative to corruption and inefficiency” (Markey, 2008: 8). Because of the prevalence of

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1 Ghost schools are schools that exist in papers only and do not exist in reality. The corrupt government officials use the budget of these schools for their personal benefits.
illiteracy in the region, the interpretation of sharia law is more abstract hypothetical than formal. Taking advantage of the situation, local Taliban clerics such as Mullah Fazlullah (mentioned before) have skillfully won popular support to implement Afghanistan’s Taliban style sharia which is radical and conservative in nature.

In conclusion of this subsection, I quote Bjorgo (2005) who argues that when “local or international illegitimate or corrupt powers possess an overwhelming power compared to oppositional groups, then the latter see no other realistic ways to forward their cause by normal political measures” (259). Thus they revert to violent means if other avenues are not seen as realistic options for replacing these regimes, and ultimately terrorist organizations grab this opportunity to promote their political agenda.

2.5 Linking External and Individual Factors
In this section, I’ll explain how the external factors mentioned so far affect the behavior at the individual level. Using the Irving L. Janis’ Groupthink Theory, I’ll make this link by analyzing the group dynamics and nature of terrorist organizations.

*Group Dynamics of Terrorist Organizations*
According to the Janis’s theory, one of the structural faults of terrorist organizations is isolation (Ozer, 2007). With isolated structures and implementation of activities from underground, the terrorist organizations put in place an intentional strategy for their members to have minimum or no interaction with the real world as communication with the real world entails enlightened minds inside organizations.
Consequently, the attitudes and behaviors of individuals are affected strongly by the powerful forces of group dynamics. The terrorist organization therefore becomes the sole source of information and security for its members. Ozer (2007) argues that “this situation produces pressure to conform and to commit acts of terrorism. Especially peer pressure, group solidarity, and the psychology of group dynamics help to pressure an individual member to remain in the terrorist group” (73).

Another structural fault of terrorist organizations is ideology (ibid). This provides an important attraction to new recruits. As explained in the contextual level above, the external factors in a society result in lack of self worthiness, meaning and hope in individual members. The terrorist ideologies offer these individuals a meaningful role in life and a chance to change their social and political reality. Sometimes, selected Quranic verses are taken out of context to influence individuals’ attitudes to fight against the ‘evil’ and to have a successful life here and hereafter. The terrorist organizations brainwash new recruits, who are usually young people, with their ideology and offer that ideology as “as an absolute remedy for existing problems” (ibid). Bjorgo (2005) explains that these ideologies are a consequence of fundamental political or personal reasons and are at least an “intermediate cause of terrorism” (258).

**Homogeneity of members** offers another structural fault of terrorist organizations. These organizations appeal believers with the same type of mindset. Ozer (2007) argues that “this monotone and single mind prevent to flourish fruitful minds, which subsequently kill the richness and openness of people’s minds. Single mind or reading single source of information generally makes individuals prejudice and prejudiceism makes people fanatic and fanatism generally leads to violence because individuals who limit their mind with single source of information are more likely to see the world just in black and white” (73).
He summarizes the group dynamics as:

...group gives its members the emotion of invulnerability, which ensures them some degree of obvious risks or dangers. Additionally, group think helps to rationalize the wrong doing and gives a morality to its members to justify their selves. Stereotyping is one of the most dangerous characteristics of groupthink. In this step of group socialization, members of the group dehumanize their enemies and justify themselves to kill the others in their mind. In addition, group pressure, self-censorship, unanimity, and mind guards provide group solidarity inside the organization.

**Psychological Aspects of an Individual's Behavior**

Individual factors (also known as precipitator factors) help in explaining why certain individuals join terrorist organizations while the others don’t. Talibans are recruited mostly from Afghan refugee camps and madrassas in the extremist subcultures. These Taliban foot soldiers, according to Markey (2008), tend to be “uneducated, poor Pashtuns with few other employment prospects” (17) with a narrow worldview limited to the world of madrassa or that of the refugee camp.

Ozer (2007) while quoting Hirschi states that “delinquent behavior is resulted from the absence of a strong social bond which consists of four elements: attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief” (65). He argues that social institutions such as family, school, and criminal justice system support individual bonds. Poor social institutions also weaken the conformity of the society and ultimately the society loses control over individuals. The external factors discussed above such as lack of justice and governance, poverty, unemployment and illiteracy, worsen the social control, and individuals start losing their faith against the values and the norms of the society; thus, crime flourishes.
These places provide appropriate conditions for terrorist organizations to recruit new members. The individuals in these societies are generally disturbed and hopeless for future life. Due to their positions in life, they are “restless, dissatisfied and haunted by the fear that their best years will be wasted before they reach their goal” (Ozer, 2007: 67). This makes them vulnerable to any movement that offers alternatives for bright hopes for future.

The individuals in such an environment also lack needs related to belonging to a group, interaction with friends, self-esteem, self-respect, and other social and ego needs (see Maslow’s hierarchy of needs). In order to meet these needs, they seek some kind of people for group cohesion and joining a terrorist group gives them a sense of self importance. Ozer (2007) maintains that in situations like these, individuals are more willing to get inspired by a strong and charismatic leader such as Mullah Fazlullah to recover their self-worth and self efficacy.

2.6 Conclusion
Keeping the complex nature of the root causes of terrorism in view, I have explored them at the contextual, organizational and individual levels. At the political level, I highlighted the historical role of the US in creating Mujahadeen to fight Soviets in Afghanistan with the help of military dictators in Pakistan. These Mujahadeen were later used by the Pakistani government to balance India’s brutality in Kashmir. I also highlighted the fight for balancing power between India and Pakistan on the grounds of Afghanistan where Pakistan backed Talibans and India supported the Northern Alliance.

At the socio-economic level, I analyzed how the western support to military dictators in Pakistan and then insensitive use of drones in the tribal areas have resulted in creating hatred of western powers among common people of Pakistani society. The lack of justice and governance, poverty,
unemployment and illiteracy in FATA and NWFP just add to the situation and give terrorists an opportunity to gain power and support from the locals by making false promises to change the existing situation.

In the last part of the chapter, I explained how the external factors affect the behavior at the individual level by analyzing the group dynamics and nature of terrorist organizations. I argue that the external factors and an absence of a strong social bond in the members of a society, ultimately result in hopeless individuals with low self-worth and self efficacy. These circumstances provide fertile grounds for terrorist organizations to recruit members and then retain them in their group using tactics of isolation, ideology and homogeneity.
CHAPTER 3
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN RESPONSES TO “GLOBAL” TERRORISM

3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I will critically analyze the EU’s response to ‘global’ terrorism, elaborate its limitations and discuss the reasons behind the EU’s weaknesses in counter-terrorism policies. In the first part, I will highlight a systematic evolution of the EU’s counter-terrorism policies in the wake of 9/11 and London/Madrid bombings and detail how cross-pillar governance dynamics have increased and blurred. In the second part of this chapter, I’ll discuss why terrorism prevention in countries like Pakistan is important for the EU. I’ll also discuss the EU’s long-term approach of linking development with security and then provide the critique to this approach. In the final part of the chapter, I’ll elaborate the reasons behind the limitations of the EU’s external dimension. I will analyze how legitimate is the agenda-setting process of the EU; who is in charge and which important actors lack power. I will also elaborate the inter and intra institutional problems of the EU.

3.2 Systematic Overview of the Evolution of Counter-terrorism Policies

The European take on the US ‘War on Terror’

*The US war on terror is ‘a good cause’ but the ‘wrong concept’*

_Gilles Andréani, Former Head of Policy Planning, French Foreign Ministry (Keohane, 2008)_

The susceptibility of Europe was driven home by the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London. Although the current counter-terrorism policy of the EU is highly influenced by the US after
9/11, it is still different from that of the US being based on a “justice model rather than a war model” (Merlingen, 2009: 1). Majority of Europeans do not support the US approach of ‘War’ on terror which is why the European policy makers prefer using the word of ‘fight’ instead of ‘war’. They tend to distinguish the US approach as “over-reactive and militarily driven” (Keohane, 2008: 134). Europeans maintain that the US focuses too much on short term than long-term political change which is why terrorism has increased as a result of the US war in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Despite this general impression of Europeans citizens and European policies on terrorism, ironically the approach of the EU policies tells a different reality. The London bombings diagnosed home-grown groups of radical individuals involved in the attack. The order of priorities for the EU policies makers however did not focus on long-term solution of addressing the root causes of this radicalization.

Even so, another major difference between Europeans and Americans is that the US has mainly chosen to fight its war on terror abroad, whereas the Europeans have focused primarily on the threat at home. Instead, most of the measures advocate the “roll-out of biometric identifiers, information-sharing, the re-introduction of internal border checks, the reinforcing of external border controls, the retention of telecommunications data, the expeditious implementation of the European Evidence Warrant and the like” (Balzacq and Carrera, 2005: 2). Although these measures have their own importance, it does not differ much from the US in that it does not address factors that lead to violence and the circumstances that lead individuals to revert to terrorism.
**Evolution of Counter-terrorism Policies**

In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht established the EU and created a new structure with three pillars. These included the supra-national ‘Community Pillar’ and intergovernmental ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (CFSP) and ‘Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters’ (PJCC) pillars. The European Council decides upon the general political direction of the EU and coordinates CFSP (Zach et al., 2007).

In 1999, the Cologne European Council launched the project of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as a distinctive part of the CFSP. The aim of ESDP is to “complete and thus strengthen the EU's external ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities for international conflict prevention and crisis management” (EurActiv, 2004: 1). ESDP does not replace but complements NATO.

After 9/11, counter-terrorism has developed into an important agenda on the CFSP. The EU has used two types of strategies to counter-terrorism efforts. One strategy has direct effects, such as provision of monetary and skills-building support to developing countries to strengthen their counter-terrorism capacity. In addition, a terrorism article is included in its “trade, aid and cooperation agreements with foreign governments which covers measure such as exchange of information and suppression of terrorist financing” (Merlingen, 2009: 10).

Another strategy to counter-terrorism has indirect effects, such as promoting good governance and justice, which is long term in nature and addresses, for example, radicalization process. I will elaborate this later in the section on the ‘EU’s Long-Term Approach to Counter-Terrorism’.

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Balzacq (2008) identifies four main strands to the counter-terrorism policies of the EU’s. These include “the prevention of radicalization; information-sharing; border management; and to render these policies concrete, the EU utilizes distinct instruments, which, broadly speaking, can be divided into regulatory (e.g. action plans), incentive (e.g. development aid) and capacity instruments (e.g. information exchange) – although because they are often complementary, they pervade all four policy strands” (76-77).

In November 2001, immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the European Council, adopted an ‘Action Plan on Combating Terrorism’ at a special summit. According to the Council of the European Union (2004), the EU agreed on seven strategic objectives which resulted in a revised Action Plan with over 100 measures. In 2002, the EU also agreed on a unanimous definition of terrorism and “standard penalties for terrorist acts” (Merlingen, 2009: 6). This resulted in stricter immigration laws and border security, stronger rules to freeze the assets of terror suspects, and creation of the European Arrest Warrant and the establishment of Joint Investigation Teams (ibid). In the wake of 9/11, Europol and Eurojust have become one of the main bodies of the EU in counter-terrorism efforts.

The counter-terrorism strategy was agreed by the EU in December 2005. The strategy gathers the actions in the Action Plan under four headings: “prevent (addressing the root causes of terrorism); pursue (using intelligence to apprehend terrorists); protect (security precautions); and respond (emergency response)” (Keohane, 2008: 131). In 2007, the European Commission presented a memorandum which listed “51 adopted and 33 proposed pieces of legislation as well as 22 Communications and 21 reports under the heading of the fight against terrorism” (Commission, 2007 quoted by Edwards and Meyer, 2008: 2).
Cross-Pillar Governance Dynamics

Edwards and Meyer (2008: 3) explain that the boundaries among the three pillars of the EU have become blurred because of the “politics” of counter-terrorism strategies. Unlike the Community method of decision-making in the first pillar, the intergovernmental governance mechanisms in the second and third pillar are based on unanimity rule and exclude the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. This results in lack of transparency in the decision-making processes and “the efficiency and overall usefulness of the operational setting is, as a consequence, sapped” (Balzacq and Carrera, 2005: 4).

The cross-pillar governance dynamics have also increased. The EU, for example, uses the trade conditionality in the first pillar to further counter-terrorism strategies. The lists of suspects are generated in the second pillar on CFSP and later on used to adopt laws on preventing terrorism financing in the first pillar. Edwards and Meyer (2008) elaborate this as follows:

…the functional unity’ of counter-terrorist policies at the level of instruments undercuts the institutional and legal differences between pillars and can in case of political necessity override their legal mechanisms. This in turn spurs increased demands for judicial and parliamentary oversight of measures, which rely on legal and administrative instruments of pillar I, but are politically decided under second and third pillar rules […]. There is still no coherent and ranked set of policy objectives or agreement at which level action should be taken in various policy areas and through what kind of co-ordination mechanism.
3.3 The EU and Pakistan

Why is terrorism prevention in Pakistan important for the EU?

…it was more likely that al-Qaeda would be able to launch successful terrorist attacks in Europe than in the United States, due to Europe’s proximity to Afghanistan.

Barack Obama during a joint press conference with President Nicolas Sarkozy in Strasbourg on April 3, 2009
(Fox News Network, 2009)

Because of its geographical position, Pakistan has gained an important position in the global fight against terrorism after the leadership of terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda has reassembled themselves in FATA and NWFP, areas that share border with Afghanistan. Pakistan’s role is considered “crucial” to the success of northern alliance in this region (Kronstadt, 2003).

The Afghan Talibans have successfully managed to regroup and safely “dissolve” into hospitable North-West Frontier Province and FATA (Tellis, 2008) after their defeat against the US in 2002. They are joined by other national and international terrorist groups including local Talibans, al-Qaeda and Uzbek fighters. Pakistan has captured al-Qaeda Operations Chief Abu Zubaydah and the alleged September 11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Muhammad. Osama bin Laden, his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri (CFR, 2005) and Taliban’s former leader Mullah Omar (Markey, 2008) are believed to be hiding in the same region. These groups continue to plan, fund, and inspire terrorist attacks in Pakistan, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the United States (Cordesman, 2008: 93).
The roots of terrorist attacks in Europe have already been diagnosed in Pakistan. Rashid (2005) confirms that British intelligence found out that most of the terrorist behind London bombings were British with Pakistani origin and received their training in Pakistan prior to the bombings. Some EU countries may argue that the global terrorism is a business of the US and some Western European countries only. However, I would argue that what happened in London and Madrid could happen to any European country. In addition, the Lisbon Treaty includes for the first time an ‘internal solidarity’ clause, which obliges member states to assist each other in case of a terrorist attack on one of them.

Two British academics, Gregory and Wilkinson as quoted by (Keohane, 2008), maintain that:

The EU is at particular risk because it is the closest ally of the United States, has deployed armed forces in the military campaigns to topple the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and has taken a leading role in international intelligence, police and judicial co-operation against Al-Qaeda and in efforts to suppress its finances.

Ozeren and Gunes (2007) while quoting Ors and Cetin analyze that terrorists have become extremely dangerous because they are decentralized, without a recognizable chain of command and territoriality in the form of “horizontal and indistinguishable” organizations all around the world. Terrorist organizations make best use of latest technological developments and technologies for planning and funding their activities. Tellis (2008) while quoting Bakier (2007) describes that “growing utilization of encryption software makes it difficult to monitor such communications systematically” (28). These reasons make the EU more vulnerable to global terrorist attacks than ever before.

**The EU’s Long-Term Approach to Counter-Terrorism**

In this section, I’ll discuss the indirect and long-term approach of the EU in counter-terrorism efforts. Giving example from the EU’s activities in Pakistan, I’ll first elaborate what actions EU
is taking or has planned to take within this approach. Then I’ll provide the critique to this approach.

At least on paper, the EU has pledged to deal with the social economic and political issues that contribute to the root causes of terrorism. A communication by the European Commission, published in September 2005, highlights “education, integration policies, interfaith dialogue and the promotion of inter-cultural understanding” as tools to deter the radicalization process (Commission, 2005: 1). According to Keohane (2008), the three central aspects of the external dimension of the EU counter terrorism include: “promoting UN conventions; dialogues on countering terrorism; and counter-terrorism assistance” (140).

Let’s elaborate the counter-terrorism assistance. The Commission includes counter-terrorism articles such as “human rights, development assistance and trade in its agreements with other countries” (Keohane, 2008: 141). The Commission’s Counter-Terrorism Technical Assistance Strategy put forth the strategic policy rationale of the EU’s counter-terrorism assistance. The strategy is based upon the following rationale:

EC assistance should build upon existing cooperation and assistance, and be characterised by a collaborative approach with recipient countries; it should focus on areas of EC comparative advantage - geographically, with a particular emphasis on the Wider European neighbourhood and - thematically, providing longer-term institution building necessary to ensure durable results, covering UNSCR 1373 priority areas such as police and judicial cooperation, financial law and practice, and border management (Commission, 2004: 6).

According to De Kok (2007), the EU is the largest grant donor to Pakistan, having provided “€ 330 million to Pakistan in the last ten years and plans to provide € 398 million more in the next seven years” (1). The Commission plans to spend 87% of the budget in Pakistan on the Rural Development, Natural Resources Management, Education and Human Resources Development in the provinces of NWFP and Balochistan (MIP, 2007).
Is Security linked to Development?

The evidence from European policies suggests that development and security can be both complimentary and oppositional. A precarious balance, and some tension, exists between the notion of security-informed development, on the one hand, and development-mediated security, on the other hand.

(Youngs, 2007)

In this section, I’ll provide a critique to the EU’s approach of considering security and development as mutually-enhancing the EU’s foreign policy objectives. This is not to say that development is not a root cause of terrorism but what is the nature of link between security and development is debatable.

Economic and political underdevelopment has been considered by the EU as one of the root causes of terrorism in the post 9/11 scenario. This has resulted in increased development aid to the third world countries as mentioned in the previous section. Although the EU has made some progress in developing security-development link, Youngs (2007) argues that “what this link means in practice is still contested” (1). Differences exists on what this link entails for allocating resources and what effect does diplomatic arrangements have in the light of the EU interests on this link. Critics such as Department for International Development (DFID) argue that EU allocates financial resources to middle income countries (such as those in the Middle East) where their security interests are at stake than the poorest countries, which shows a dominance of security over development.

Youngs (2007) further criticizes that the Commission lacks any knowledge of the security impact of development projects and development experts lack the capacity regarding challenges related to security. Furthermore, the distribution of aid weakens its security utility. Instead of having a
clear strategy of differentiating between the goals of these two policies, the EU uses an “ad-hoc approach based on the rather easy assumption that all good things go together” (ibid: 1).

3.4 Legitimacy Concerns
The agenda setting and policy making process of the EU’s counter-terrorism policies in wake of 9/11 have been greatly criticized. Bossong (2008) maintains that the EU’s Action Plan on counter-terrorism came forward as a result of “hectic garbage-can process of agenda-setting and policymaking” (42). Ambitious agendas were set with tight deadlines which overburdened the governance mechanisms and capacity of the EU. The first review of the Action Plan in 2002 showed that the targeted outcomes and resources for implementation were not achieved, thus making the Plan unrealistic and inefficient (ibid).

The origins of the Action Plan show that the policymakers took advantage of post 9/11 window of opportunity to provisionally overcome the structural limitations of the EU in developing security policy, and pushed for extensive agenda-change for measures that were not approved through regular legislative process of the EU. For example, in April 2005, the European Parliament rejected the proposal on ‘retention and storage of telecommunications data’ which was presented by France, Ireland, Sweden and the UK in April 2004. Balzacq and Carrera (2005) argue that this proposal did not comply with the principle of proportionality. The House of Lords EU Select Committee in the UK also showed their apprehension that this proposal is “theoretically dangerous to adopt” (ibid: 3).

As the Parliament’s report puts it:

…the ends do not justify the means, as the measures are neither appropriate nor necessary and are unreasonably harsh towards those concerned, […] given the volume of data to be retained, particularly internet data, it is unlikely that an appropriate analysis of the data will be at all possible (European Parliament’s
Despite these criticisms, the extraordinary Council Meeting in July 2005 reintroduced it into the policy agenda. This shows that controversial proposals such as this are introduced in the times of crisis through the back door without respecting the principle of proportionality and EU’s legislative process. Because of the diverse counter-terrorism policies at the national level, EU’s image becomes that of a body that legitimizes measures approved by particular members in different circumstances.

The principle of legitimacy is also risked because of the very framework of the third pillar in which counter-terrorism decisions are made within the EU. These measures are adopted purely on intergovernmental basis and thus exclude participation of the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice.

3.5 EU’s Institutional Problems
While describing the institutional problems of the EU, Keohane (2008) describes that Gijs de Vries was appointed as the EU’s ‘Counter-terrorism Coordinator’ after the incident of 9/11. However, he resigned from this job in March 2007. Although his job was to help better coordination of EU’s counter-terrorism policies among member states, he was not successful in making governments follow his recommendations. Keohane further argues that this was primarily because he had “no powers, no budget and could not propose legislation; nor could he chair meetings of national justice or foreign ministers to set the anti-terrorism agenda” (ibid: 133).
In addition, contention exists between the Commission where policies are initiated and the Council where interior and foreign ministers make decisions on these policies. On the other hand, tensions exist within the Commission itself where, for example, the DG of Justice, Liberty and Security (the smallest DG) makes an effort to coordinate with other DGs involved in initiating counter-terrorism measures such as the Internal Market DG and the Research Directorate.

3.6 Limitations of EU’s External Dimension
The external security dimension of EU to counter-terrorism efforts lags behind the internal dimension in terms of allocation of resources, number of proposals and political drive. The prevention of radicalization is also limited to the member states only and its foreign response has been “vague in aspiration, extremely cautious and, arguably, starved of meaningful additional resources” (Keohane, 2008 cited in Edwards and Meyer, 2008: 11). The EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism is highly composed of security issues within the EU and most of the external policies are related to development aid and trade agreements to which counter-terrorism is merely an add-on. This makes the allocation of resources to counter-terrorism aspect of external policies even more under-resource, for example the state-building missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. There are a number of reasons behind the limitation of the EU’s external dimension which are discussed hereunder.

As EU is not a national government, its ability to have security initiatives at supranational level is limited. Most of the counter-terrorism activities such as sharing intelligence and conducting investigations across the border are done bilaterally or among small groups of countries. An example is the combined counter-terrorism unit agreed by France and Spain in 2005 to carry out joint operations (Balzacq and Carrera, 2005). As discussed in earlier chapters, the legitimacy of
EU has weakened because incidents such as 9/11 have been used as a window of opportunity to provisionally overcome the structural limitations of the EU in developing security policy. Consequently, the EU measures have been unsuccessful in minimizing the lack of trust among member states which provides a major roadblock to implementation of EU-level measures.

Furthermore, national intelligence services of member states feel reluctant to share intelligence with high number of countries. Merlingen (2009) argues that EU states with sufficient resources and capacity hesitate to share information with those that have less resources and capacity for “fear of seeing the material compromised” (11). In addition, different EU states have different administrative and legal structures which further complicate the situation. The member states thus find it easier to opt for bilateral cooperation. Bossong (2008) maintain that diverse “national and sector-specific efforts persists beneath a fairly weak but politically symbolic EU framework” (43). On the other hand, the national governments are unwilling to give powers to the EU as national security policies are at the core of national ‘sovereignty’ and giving this power to EU would imply direct interference with the national laws and regulations.

Another challenge for a lack of EU level response to global terrorism is that some member states do not feel at risk from the al-Qaeda terrorist network or more generally ‘global’ terrorism. Countries that are not part of NATO forces in Afghanistan, and/or countries that have not directly suffered from terrorist attacks believe that the fight against terrorism is a problem of the US and some countries in the Western Europe. Baltic States, for example, treat Russia as a bigger threat than global terrorism. In the end, “divergent threat assessments of this sort give rise to divergent policy preferences” thus limiting the ability of the EU to have common counter-terrorism policies (Merlingen, 2009: 15).
In order to analyze who is in-charge of the EU’s counter-terrorism policies, we need to see which actors have most power in agenda setting and implementation. We have already discussed that the appointed Counter-terrorism Coordinator has no powers. According to Keohane (2008), the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) was initially assigned to formulate EU’s counter-terrorism policies but instead the Commission did this task under the pillar of Justice and Home Affairs. In addition, the GAERC had no resources and expertise to carry out this task.

I would argue that the real powers regarding EU’s counter-terrorism policies lie with the interior ministers of the member states which is one of the reasons why there is high emphasis on internal response to terrorism and comparatively weak external component. Right after the approval of the Action Plan in 2004, the interior ministers decided to “consolidate the de facto situation by stating that they ‘should have the leading role’ in the EU’s fight against terrorism” (European Council, 2004 cited in Keohane, 2008: 132). Thus, from the very outset, the foreign ministers lacked a political ownership in counter-terrorism policy making and implementation. The interior ministers of the G6 (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the UK) now work together to share information, capacity and resources and lead counter-terrorism policies. From this trend, we can predict that the G6 will lead the counter-terrorism policies rather than EU as a whole.

In conclusion, it’s important to mention that institutional fragmentation is another reason for weak EU counter-terrorism policies. Some measures fall under intergovernmental pillars while others under the community pillar. Each of these pillars involves a number of stakeholders and there is a lack of harmonization between these stakeholders. Merlingen (2009) while quoting Bossong
(2008) maintains that this situation results in “agenda overload, frictions and rivalry and decision blockages” (16).

3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I critically analyzed the limitations of EU’s counter-terrorism measures and identified the reasons behind these limitations. I discussed that although Europeans criticizes the US for its short term policies, the order of priorities for EU policies makers also have not focused on long-term solution of addressing the root causes of this radicalization after London and Madrid bombings. EU is playing limited role in contributing to fight against ‘global’ terrorism. The Afghan Talibans and other national and international terrorist groups including local Talibans, al-Qaeda and Uzbek fighters have reassembled in the Tribal areas of Pakistan have become extremely dangerous because they are decentralized, without a recognizable chain of command and territoriality, and make best use of latest technological developments and technologies for planning and funding their activities.

Regarding its indirect and long-term approach in counter-terrorism efforts, the EU has pledged to deal with the social economic and political issues that contribute to the root causes of terrorism through development aid. However, I argue that that EU allocates financial resources to countries where their security interests are at stake than the poorest countries, which shows a dominance of security over development.

Based on the principle of legitimacy, I highlighted that EU’s policy makers used 9/11 as a window of opportunity to provisionally overcome the structural limitations of the EU in developing security policy, and pushed for extensive agenda-change for measures that were not approved through regular legislative process of the EU. In addition, measures are adopted purely
on intergovernmental basis and thus exclude participation of the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice.

I argue that as EU is not a national government, its ability to have security initiatives at supranational level is limited and most of the counter-terrorism measures are strategized bilaterally or among small groups of countries. This is because national intelligence services feel reluctant to share intelligence with high number of countries. Also, some member states do not feel at risk from the al-Qaeda terrorist network or more generally ‘global’ terrorism. On the other hand, the interior ministers (particularly that of the G6) have most power and resources in leading EU’s counter terrorism policies than the foreign ministers, EU’ Counter-terrorism Coordinator, and the General Affairs and External Relations Council.
Chapter 4
Roadmap for EU’s Role in Global Counter-Terrorism

Conclusion and Recommendations

4.1 Summary of Main Findings
In this research, I presented a roadmap for EU’s Role in Global Counter-Terrorism. Taking the example of Pakistan I made a case of why external security dimension of EU is crucial for its counter-terrorism efforts. I identified the root causes of radicalization and terrorism which EU should address in order to have effective and sustainable counter-terrorism policies.

In order to present a realistic approach to the way forward, I conducted a detailed analysis of the weaknesses and limitations in EU system in general and its counter-terrorism policies, strategies, and action plans in particular. Based on this analysis, practical and clear recommendations were made to support EU’s role in global counter-terrorism.

Keeping the complex nature of the root causes of terrorism in view, I have explored them at the contextual and individual levels in Chapter 2. The external factors such as politics, socio-economic factors, and history constitute a context. I argued that context effects and individual’s attitudes and behaviour and terrorist organizations bridge the contextual and individuals levels by exploiting the circumstances for their own political benefits.

Tracing back in history, I identified how Mujahadeen came into being and how their services are still utilized by the Pakistani government. I also highlighted the fight for balancing power between India and Pakistan on the grounds of Afghanistan and Kashmir.
At the socio-economic level, I analyzed how the lack of justice and governance, poverty, unemployment and illiteracy alienate the people of NWFP and FATA – thus making them more vulnerable to support terrorist organizations and leaders. I explained how the external factors affect the behavior at the individual level by analyzing the group dynamics and nature of terrorist organizations. I argue that the external factors mentioned above and an absence of a strong social bond in the members of a society, ultimately result in hopeless individuals with low self-worth and self efficacy.

While evaluating the counter-terrorism measures of the EU in Chapter 3, I critically analyzed the limitations of EU’s counter-terrorism measures and identified the reasons behind these limitations. I argued that EU is playing limited role in contributing to fight against ‘global’ terrorism. Regarding its indirect and long-term approach in counter-terrorism efforts, the EU has pledged to deal with the social economic and political issues that contribute to the root causes of terrorism through development aid. However, I argue that that EU allocates financial resources to countries where their security interests are at stake than the poorest countries, which is shows a dominance of security over development.

Based on the principle of legitimacy, I highlighted that EU’s policy makers used 9/11 as a window of opportunity to provisionally overcome the structural limitations of the EU in developing security policy, and pushed for extensive agenda-change for measures that were not approved through regular legislative process of the EU. In addition, measures are adopted purely on intergovernmental basis and thus exclude participation of the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice.
4.2 Roadmap for EU’s Role

If we interpret the ‘root’ causes of terrorism as general and vague issues which are extremely difficult or often impossible to change such as globalization and modernization, we won’t be able to draw our attention to specific recommendations. Therefore, I have clearly differentiated between short, medium and long term strategic recommendations. Based on the findings from the previous chapters, the recommendations in this chapter answer the key questions such as what role can EU play to prevent terrorism by targeting the root causes of terrorism in countries such as Pakistan, and how can the limitations in policies, strategies and action plans of EU be filled to make them effective and sustainable in combating future global terrorism.

Based on different sections in Chapter 2 and 3, this roadmap for EU in global terrorism is recommended under the following headings:

- EU’s level
- Pakistan’s level (Political, Socio-economic, individual factors)

4.2.1 Addressing EU’s Limitations

As discussed in Chapter 3, the agenda setting and policy making process of EU’s counter-terrorism policies have been greatly criticized in light of the principle of legitimacy. To ensure ‘democratic accountability’ of policy making process, I argue that it is a must to involve European Parliament. On the other hand, the European Court of Justice needs to be given more powers to play its role as the protector of the rule of law by conducting judicial reviews. In order to develop counter-terrorism policies in a transparent way and ensure that it is not led by a particular group, judiciary can play a vital role in upholding European values of democracy and justice. Lisbon treaty will make it possible to apply supranational methods to justice and home affairs. This would include majority voting and greater powers to the European Parliament.
However, according to Merlingen (2009), it does not “address the closely related problem that EU-level bodies with anti-terrorism competencies such as Europol, Eurojust and SitCen lack any significant executive powers” (15). In addition, as terrorism is a complex phenomenon, a community approach would require a coherent institutional setting, or else too many stakeholders and initiatives would blur the counter-terrorism actions, making their implementation inefficient.

I support Balzacq and Carrera (2005) who suggest that EU also needs to consider the root causes for radicalization within the EU and the measures adopted by the EU should “match the diagnosis” (5). The initial analysis after the London bombings showed involvement of British citizens with Pakistani origins. In addition to focusing on internal security measures such as biometric IDs and border control, EU must also consider “a policy of recognition (equal treatment) and integration (social inclusion), not only of tolerance” (ibid: 5).

Although EU has done some good work in tracking root causes through its long-term approach to counter-terrorism through development aid, I recommend that more holistic approach to counter-terrorism is required at political, social, economic and individual levels. The key components of EU’s foreign policy, security and development being one of them, should be “mutually supportive and not subordinate to each other” (Youngs, 2007: 3). To draw an efficient link between development and security, we need to see if the development policy is more sensitive to security, or security policy has added any tangible development perspectives.

The EU needs to maintain unambiguous space for ‘development’ so that development outcomes are not compromised over other foreign policy objectives for example Security or Trade. To
make sure that there is adequate political space and agenda setting power in policy making, EU needs to maintain a Commissioner for Development and an independent budget line.

4.2.2 Addressing Political Factors at Pakistan’s Level
Europe has been criticized for not taking a long-term and methodical approach to promote democratic transformation in the Middle East and South Asia unlike its efforts in promoting democracy in East Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe from 1970s till 1990s. This is verified by EU’s funds allocation. For example, $800 million for controlling illegal immigration compared to €10 million for democracy-promotion projects in Southern Mediterranean region in 2005 (Keohane, 2008).

As discussed in Chapter 2, Pakistani military needs to be powerful primarily because of its conflict with India and to maintain the power balance in the region. This in turn results in huge portion of budget going to security. Support to the military from western states such as the US for their foreign policy interests just adds to the dilemma in making military more powerful to overthrow the democratic governments, implement Marshal Laws and implement unrepresentative policies. Markey (2008) argues that the “pathological imbalance between civilian and military power at the national level continues to hinder stable, efficient governance in Pakistan” (22). Decisions related to national security have been made by dictators who have their military biases whereby they consider “militants as its allies against India” (Haqqani, 2004: 360). In addition, the military governments such as that of Musharraf promise ambitious results with tight deadlines to the western powers (primarily to stay in power). However, with so much aid coming in without desired outcomes results in lack of trust by donors and ultimately common people suffer. On the other hand, majority of civilian politicians in Pakistan are secular and less vociferous about war with India. As Haqqani (2004) argues that “political and economic factors
have weighed more in the calculations of civilians than have the strategic doctrines propounded by the military” (360).

With this background, I would recommend that in Pakistan only a representative and stable government can tackle terrorism in a meaningful way. One of the root causes of terrorism therefore is Pakistan’s conflict with India. I understand that solving this conflict is a long-term, complex process which will take time. However, I recommend that EU can play its role by taking some short-term steps to improve Indo-Pak relations.

First, conflict resolution between India and Pakistan would require initiation of a process of dialogue about Kashmir. The EU can play its part in encouraging this process to start.

Second, Pakistan must deactivate all militants in Kashmir by discontinuing their support and taking apart their infrastructure. The EU can make sure that this is done with extensive nationwide consensus within Pakistan. On the other hand, India needs to stop grave human rights violations in Kashmir. EU can promote its own values of democracy and justice by keeping an eye on the state of affairs in Kashmir and assigning its Delegation in the territory.

Last but not least, I recommend that EU needs to do a total boycott of dictatorship and military rule in Pakistan and with the help of its western alliance, put pressure on the military governments to withdraw from political power.

4.2.3 Promoting Rule of law and Good Governance

We discussed in Chapter 2 that if the government institutions are corrupt and ineffective, then taking advantage of the environment, the terrorist organizations and leaders provide a hope to
common people by promising quick and cheap justice and fair provision of services. In the FATA and North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan, the administrative institutions and courts are perceived as inefficient and the police forces are under-resourced. These factors contribute to overall alienation of the region.

FATA has a colonial-era administrative system in which the political agents in the FATA are the main link between the government and the region. With so much power invested in one category of actors, it is not possible to have modern and democratic institutions. Institution building requires certain preconditions and cannot be transformed overnight. However, short to medium term focus on reforms and provision of resources can improve the situation and develop trust in people for the government’s intentions.

EU can play its role by taking a number of crucial steps. The EU should support Pakistan in formulating effective strategies for judicial reform in the NWFP and FATA by sharing technical expertise within the EU and Pakistani governments as well as other international organizations. In order to gain immediate credibility among the people of this region, the Pakistani government can implement immediate reforms that focus on providing quick relief to litigants in cases that are pending for a long time. Also, the EU can provide technical assistance to the local police by building strong liaison with the NATO, Frontier Constabulary and Pakistani army.

4.2.4 Winning the battle for hearts and minds
As already discussed, a wide perception exists that the war against terrorism is a war against Muslims in disguise. This perception gets stronger when the western powers support antidemocratic military governments in Pakistan; show little concern on human rights violations in Kashmir; and use armed drones that result in civilians causalities including children and
women. Terrorist organizations take advantage of these circumstances and convince people to tackle this direct attack on their sovereignty and arouse them to fight for their rights and the religion.

Sheer use of force, without tackling the root causes of radicalization, to suppress terrorism often results in further spread of terrorism, violence and radicalization that impeding it. This is apparent from the results of the US war in Iraq and Afghanistan and Musharaf’s counter-terrorism policies in Pakistan. This can be compared to the “mythological struggle against the monstrous Hydra” (Silke, 2005: 242) which has a frightening pliability to recover from even the most severe strikes and if its head was cut, two more would grow swiftly in its place. Thus it could survive a bombardment of savage blows, growing stronger in the aftermath of each attack. What can we learn from this in the context of war against terrorism?

In this regard, I recommend that the counter-terrorism measures need to be holistic in nature that address root causes of terrorism discussed in different parts of this research. As EU states’ forces are not operative inside Pakistan, EU can still play a role in minimizing civilian casualties. Markey (2008) argues that “accurate information” is extremely important to calculate an attack’s political implications. EU has technical expertise in information and intelligence that can be used to minimize civilian casualties and “help policymakers determine whether local dynamics will make any given strike counterproductive in the context of a broader counterinsurgency mission” (ibid: 28).
I conclude this section by quoting part of the speech of Gijs de Vries, the former EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator who said:

The struggle against terrorism is first and foremost a conflict over values. To win the battle for hearts and minds our policies to combat terrorism must respect the rights and values we have pledged to defend, including the rights of prisoners. Abu Grahib, Guantanamo and CIA renditions have damaged America’s standing in the world and have compromised our common struggle against terrorism. Credibility matters. The European Union continues to believe that in this battle we should be guided by established international legal standards, including international human rights law. Any war paradigm should operate within these standards. (de Vries, 2006 quoted by Keohane, 2008).

4.2.5 Bridging the Strategic Communications Gap

Struggling with terrorist organization using their own tactics and methods is the best way to prevent future activities of terrorist organizations.

(Ozer, 2007)

The terrorist organizations and their leaders in Pakistan have made best use of communications to exploit print and electronic media and build support for their causes. Local clerics such as Maulana Fazlullah in Swat Valley and Mangal Bagh in Khyber have effectively used FM radio frequency to motivate and assemble local militants. Markey (2008) argues that the Pakistani government has been unsuccessful in silencing these militants and also have not been able to present their side of the story to public. This is primarily because the military spokespersons are not ready to admit the weaknesses of army and instead raise unrealistic expectations that leave Pakistanis irritated and puzzled.

Although the EU cannot play a major role in overcoming this attitude of Army, it can still make some valuable contributions. The EU can draw upon its strategic communications experience and build capacity of Pakistani military. In addition, EU can offer skills building in radio
broadcast jamming. Promotion of public information technologies such as internet and cable to reach populations particularly in areas where the writ of the government is minimal and/or where people have sympathies for terrorists such as the tribal areas of Pakistan.
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