The Southern Dimension of EU Foreign Policy: Ideational and Political Factors in Building a Regional Community from the Barcelona Declaration to the Union for the Mediterranean

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Abstract

This thesis analyses the dynamics of EU Foreign Policy towards the Mediterranean from the Barcelona Declaration to the Union for the Mediterranean with reference to both political and ideational factors. The mismatch between the objectives of the Barcelona Process and its implementation appears to be present. Using a three-step sequential approach of EFP making I trace how the Union for the Mediterranean initiative has evolved, despite of the fact that the issues of democracy and human rights in the region are being contested by various actors on the EU level. Content analysis shows that the public discourse on the project is formed by two streams: the EU’s official rhetoric of “deepening and upgrading” and a critical view of analysts who stress that it is unclear how innovative the new approach will be. Importantly, the results show that success of the new initiative is dependent on the EU’s ability to strengthen socio-cultural dimension as a policy tool to address and manage political and economic transition of the region.
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Introduction

Statement of the problem

The end of the twentieth century saw the EU’s relationship with the majority of non-member states of the Mediterranean incorporated into the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The project was based on the negotiation of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, an enhanced form of existing bilateral agreements, a new financial aid facility (MEDA) and an ambitious multilateral political declaration and work programme. Over the same period, security concerns for the Mediterranean became a center of attention for the European Foreign Policy (EFP), testing the EU’s crisis management capabilities and the long-term durability of its approach towards North Africa and the Middle East. Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), has put it the following way, “if these regions are unstable, Europe will not be able to live in security.”

As Ricardo Gomez points out, the EMP and the Southern Dimension of EFP demonstrate the EU’s capacity to embark upon strategic foreign policy behavior but the ability to consistently translate strategic objectives into effective action is not yet in evidence. The long-term objective of the Southern dimension of EFP is to create a zone of economic development, democracy and peace through a process of integration within the Mediterranean macro-region. The key and proximate objective is to establish a Euro-Mediterranean regional grouping which will be based on the creation of a common free trade area by the year 2010. The Barcelona Process, however, sought to go far beyond the economic objectives by intensifying cooperation in political and social spheres. Inevitably, the difficulties which confront effectiveness of the initiative are as great as its potential. The strengthening of

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democracy and the respect for human rights form a core of the Barcelona Declaration and are essential to the success of EFP in the region. The creation of a Euro-Mediterranean regional grouping requires the intensified participation of civil society on both sides of the Mediterranean. As Alvaro Vasconcelos and Geoge Joffe argue, particular attention should be given to issues of cultural and religious rights, as well as to the rights of migrants and to the right of free movement amongst the members of the Partnership. The official view of the European Commission (EC) is that the process should evolve beyond interstate bargaining of formal governments, as civil societies on both sides reinforce common bonds and interests. These issues are often linked in Europe to wider security concerns.

Debate

The main International Relations theoretical frameworks used by scholars in reference to EFP remain rationalism and constructivism. The debate on the nature of EFP is structured around difficulties caused by its multi-level, multi-institutional characteristics. Most importantly, constructivists have pointed out the crucial importance of ideational factors in the analysis of foreign policy conduct, while rationalist scholars stressed economic advantages and reputational status of negotiating states. Comparative politics came from a

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different angle to strengthen rationalist arguments. Simon Hix\textsuperscript{8} suggested the EU as a polity is not special from domestic politics and consequently outcomes of EFP can be analysed as an institutional power game.\textsuperscript{9} In an institutional power game, actors conduct international relations in a strategic manner of bargaining,\textsuperscript{10} contrary to arguing.\textsuperscript{11} A Governance approach and Policy Analysis offered inclusion of a broader set of formal and informal actors across different levels of the EU system with the latter focusing on how EFP is formulated.\textsuperscript{12}

The sequence of EU policy making in rationalist interpretation on the international arena starts from member states’ domestically formed preferences and ends in the interaction among them, with supranational actors playing a subsidiary role in terms of lowering transaction costs. On the other hand, from a constructivist point of view the consequences of interaction on member states’ interests are of crucial importance.\textsuperscript{13} Actors (national governments) are affected by EU social norms in which they are embedded, and these norms not only regulate behaviour, but also constitute their identities and interests, therefore defining their preferences.\textsuperscript{14} Cooperation among member states develops into trust and a habit of coordination, which other actors - such as the EC, policy networks and epistemic communities - are able to exploit and turn into specific instances of policy making. For social constructivists the main reason for EU policy making lies in the dynamics of socialisation, the


\textsuperscript{14} Thomas Risse, Social Constructivism and European Integration, 163.
main actors tend to be the highest ranking national representatives, and the main negotiating style is arguing. A constructivist account of EU policy making stresses the ideational side and involves a variety of actors indicated by neofunctionalism and global governance approaches. It turns the rationalist explanation round, by describing an indirect process through which socialisation affects actors’ interests and preferences.

The theoretical complexity of EFP studies is compounded by the relatively small number of detailed empirical case studies. Christopher Hill contends, “the experience of “European foreign policy” over the last 20 years or so has been so unique that the search for one theory to explain its evolution is doomed to fail.”\(^{15}\) A macro-theory of EU foreign policy remains a distant project. If a general theory is possible, it is likely to be built from a synthesis of theoretical perspectives that take into account the multi-level character of the EU foreign policy-making system, the multiple outputs of EU external policy and the mixture of governmental and supranational decision-making procedures and policy instruments that comprise the Union’s *acquis politique.*\(^{16}\)

Although the literature on the Southern Dimension of EFP itself varies in a range from security studies\(^{17}\) to foreign policy analysis,\(^{18}\) the studies of the nature of EFP approach in the Mediterranean remain limited. Most of the works trace the origins of the external Mediterranean policy of the EU and examine the negotiations that shaped policy and its impact.\(^{19}\) The literature on the subject matter tends to be descriptive or prescriptive, concerned with making sense of the procedural complexity of the Union’s foreign policy mechanisms or offering corrective recipes in the region for the EU’s deficiencies as an international actor.

Research Question

This thesis aims to take a closer look at the development of EU-level foreign policy decisions towards the Mediterranean neighbours on both political and ideational levels. Examining developments which started with the 1995 Barcelona Declaration and until the latest European Commission decision to launch the Union for the Mediterranean of May 20, 2008, my goal is to explain how the process of building of a regional Euro-Mediterranean grouping evolved, despite of the fact that the issues of democracy and human rights in the region are being contested by various actors on the EU level.

Methodology and Theoretical Framework

The evolution of a European policy initiative towards the Mediterranean is the dependent variable in my research. The primary argument of the thesis is that EFP is an ideational process in which member states and EU institutions converge toward a common definition of problems, policy solutions and the EU’s role in them; therefore, in terms of its theoretical approach my research fits in a middle ground, which comprised of states as uncertainty minimisers and EU policy making as an active process of knowledge definition with the aim of policy formulation. The aim of my research is to analyse the nature of EFP approach towards the Mediterranean region from starting of the Barcelona Process to the Union for the Mediterranean.

Adopting the model of the Pars Destruens and the Pars Construens of EFP policy making towards the Mediterranean offered by Federica Bicchi, I argue that cultural rapprochement and building of a common Euro-Mediterranean identity are necessary prerequisites for successful development of Southern dimension of EFP and creation of a Euro-Mediterranean security community. Bicchi suggests that for a foreign policy initiative to

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20 Mark Pollack, “Theorizing the European Union: International Organization, Domestic Polity or Experiment in New Governance? Annual Review of Political Science 8 (2005): 357-398; Bicchi, European Foreign Policy toward the Mediterranean...

21 Ibid, 2-7.
take place there are three conditions necessary. On the *Pars Destruens*, there needs to be an open policy window defined as a situation of cognitive uncertainty, namely uncertainty about how to interpret social reality. On the *Pars Construens*, for the policy window to turn into an active debate leading to policy making, a policy entrepreneur is required, and southern member states, namely France, Spain, Italy and Greece whose vital interests lie in the region tend to be the most effective policy entrepreneurs in EFP towards the Mediterranean. Entrepreneurs can act out of the strength of their convictions (as “believers”) or might broadly aim for policy change (as “brokers”) with little concern about policy details. The third factor is the cognitive interaction among member states and EU institutions, on this stage they develop common knowledge about the new challenges by framing the issues at stake and by putting together separate ideational streams into a narrative that identifies the problem and its solutions.\(^2\) This three-step sequential approach forms a methodological basis of my research.

As a primary technique to analyse ideational basis of the Union for the Mediterranean I use content analysis (textual analysis) that allows working with large amounts of textual information (for the purpose of this research 150 randomly chosen units of text) and systematically identify its properties, e.g. the frequencies of most used keywords by detecting the most important structures of its communication content.\(^3\) The classification scheme offered for this research is to divide the expressive content into three groups “positive-neutral-negative” to identify the discourse around the Union for the Mediterranean.

**Sources**

The thesis is based on analysis of primary and secondary sources that can be cross-checked against each other. Primary sources are Commission and Council official documents, communications, draft texts, and statements, interviews with the EU officials and policy-

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\(^2\) Ibid, 9-10.

makers from the Southern Mediterranean; secondary sources are articles published in newspapers, journals, and online.

**Structure**

My research is concentrated on the process of a regional community building in the Mediterranean as a guarantor of political transformation in the region based on the shared understandings and collective identities. The thesis addresses main constraints that prevent both sides from completing the process and highlights the opportunities for revitalisation of the Barcelona Process in the framework of the Union for the Mediterranean that will be launched in July 2008 with reference to both political and ideational factors. The research goes from a theoretical level of the nature of the EU as an international actor that is manifested in the region through mechanisms of political conditionality and socialisation (Chapter 1) to a practical level of institutional setting and policies initiated by the EU on the regional level based on politico-security and ideational connotations of foreign policy conduct (Chapter 2) with the aim of building of a security community based on common understandings (a common identity) achievable through the socio-cultural dimension (Chapter 3). My contribution is through textual analysis of the official EU documents and interviews (including most recent ones on the Union for the Mediterranean that were not discussed in the literature) and content analysis of secondary sources (newspapers, scholarly articles, web-publications) to show assumptions that compound the core of new EFP approach towards the Mediterranean on both political and ideational levels that allowed the external regional policy to evolve.
Chapter 1 – Theoretical Considerations of Foreign Policy of the EU

This chapter presents theoretical aspects that must be considered while thinking about the pursuit of EU Foreign Policy. Understanding of the nature of the EU as an international actor is far from straightforward. As Christopher Hill puts it, “apart from a very small group of diplomatic practitioners and specialist commentators, few Europeans (let alone those on the outside looking in) have a clear conception of the multiple layers and contradictions that make up what is often called “European foreign policy.”24 This chapter identifies the main features of the EU as an international actor, and elaborates on the mechanisms of political conditionality and socialisation in the Southern dimension as main instruments of expressing EU’s power in the Mediterranean macro-region.

1.1 The EU as an International Actor

The idea that the EU should lead in expressing European power internationally has become a mainstream view. In 2000, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, urged that the EU should become a “superpower but not a superstate,”25 but it remains an odd global power, which often seems to have an overabundance of foreign policy process that produces relatively little in terms of policy output. The complexity of the EU as an international actor is deeply rooted in multi-institutional, multi-procedural nature of the EFP making process. The EU’s acquis politique is compounded of treaty articles, European Court of Justice rulings, and informal agreements among the institutions and member states. Institutional competencies for external diplomatic activity vary with the issue at stake and the treaty provisions associated with it. EU Mediterranean policy is a prime example of this: foreign policy strategies are composites of measures that originate from several sources and thus subject to a wide range

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of decision-making rules and procedures. This complexity influences all phases of the EFP making, from the design of strategies to their implementation.

Some scholars have characterised the EU as an incomplete actor. Taking a neo-classical realist approach, Rynning analyses the ways in which the EU’s foreign policy could evolve. In his analysis, two capacities of international actors are of crucial importance: the capacity to formulate a coherent vision, and the capacity to mobilise resources, including armed forces.\textsuperscript{26} According to this logic, as the EU lacks a strategic vision, development into a strategic actor seems unlikely. However, it has gradually succeeded in setting up an institutional framework that is capable of mobilising resources, which would make it a “civilian actor”. Taking a different starting point, Sjursen seeks to show how the existence of the EU and an EU framework for decision-making on foreign and security policies may affect the way EU member states formulate and justify their foreign policies. The socialisation process may lead to a significant Europeanisation of the member states’ external relations; common European norms become a point of reference in setting a strategy for foreign policy conduct. Membership of the EU has fostered a new identity and added a collective dimension to the definition of external interests and the setting of policy objectives. Both contributions reinforce the notion that the EU’s external competencies are contested. The diffuse nature of authority in EFP has increased with the transfer of policy-making powers from member state to Community level. The lack of clarity over the legal basis for external action and the issue of representation hinder the Union’s attempts to “speak with one voice”. However, rules have incrementally emerged as a product of practical considerations between those involved in the

\textsuperscript{26} Cited in Michele Knodt and Sebastien Princen, “Understanding the EU’s External Relations. The Move from Actors to Processes,” in \textit{Understanding the European Union’s External Relations}, ed. Michele Knodt and Sebastien Princen (Routlridge, 2003), 196-197.
policy process, and EFP proved to overcome the lack of a “coherent, rational body of law under a single institutional framework.”

In the international arena, the EU has become increasingly dependent on outside organisations especially in implementation of its external policies. The EU instinctively seeks to strengthen multilateralism, but in doing so risks further constraining its ability to act forcefully and independently in foreign policy. As Ricardo Gomez maintains, policy might originate on the EU level, but the implementation of it may lie beyond its direct control. In 1999 the publicity around the maladministration of EU funds, including aid programmes in the Mediterranean, was indicative of the control problem in EFP. Institutional and procedural complexity and the problem of identifying key actors and influences involved in the EFP process are at the centre of theoretical debate. Intergovernmentalist approaches have a stronger claim to explaining CFSP where member states are reluctant “to speak with one voice” on key issues. EU’s foreign economic policy is better depicted by approaches that emphasise effective supranational agency. However, distinguishing external economic relations from traditional “politicosecurity” foreign policy, as Gomez points out, becomes anachronistic in an international system in which trade and finance have become matters of “high politics.” In line with this argument and lack of a general theory of EFP, some analysts seek to conceptualise the impact and the roles of the EU on the international arena using the notions of “actorness”, “presence”, and “influence.” One of the most influential assessments of the EU’s performance as an international actor is Christopher Hill’s

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28 Gomez, Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 4.
30 Gomez, Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 1.
“capabilities expectations gap” thesis.\textsuperscript{32} He argues that the balance between the foreign policy capabilities at the Union’s disposal (economic and financial power, policy instruments) and external demands define its effectiveness as an international actor. This point can be illustrated by the example of the Southern Dimension of EFP: the Union has increased the level of resources it provides for the Mediterranean, so the Southern partners have raised their expectations about the extent to which the EU will go in its assistance.\textsuperscript{33}

The existence of the gap is an obstacle to strategic action in EFP. The nature of strategic action itself gave rise to the notion of “civilian power Europe” presented by Francois Duchene. This includes both the characteristics and the values of the Community, thus: “The EC will only make the most of its opportunities if it remains true to its inner characteristics. They are primarily: civilian ends and means and a built-in sense of collective action, which in turn express, however imperfectly, social values of equality, justice and tolerance.”\textsuperscript{34} Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Robert Howse argue that Duchene’s notion of civilian power constitutes both the use of civil (as opposed to military) means to support policy objectives and the external, “civilising” influence of the Community through shared values of liberal democracy, human rights and free market economy. Therefore, while civilian power makes a reference to the tools that are used for achieving foreign policy goals, civilizing power refers to the ends of foreign policy goals.

A new debate has arisen recently because of the Union’s evolving European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and related ability to gain access to military means. Nowadays Duchene’s notion looks rather controversial due to its contention that civilian power could substitute for military power in becoming a basis for the EU’s influence in world affairs. As


\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, 26.

Stelios Stavridis argues, the use of force at “one end of a long spectrum” may be the only way to make the civilian power concept credible in international system. The development of a military dimension in the EU is evidence to the EU’s perceived need for a more coherent foreign policy approach. There are two main principles which must be observed if the Union’s value-based identity is to be retained. First, that military means should be used by the Union only when sanctioned by International Law, through a United Nations Security Council mandate. Second, that use of military means must be associated with a comprehensive approach to security that reflects and supports the Union’s “civilising” influence. This approach is reflected, to some extent, in the 2003 European Security Strategy, which explicitly links security with human development issues such as poverty eradication.

Nevertheless, Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler argue that the notion of civilian power in the presence of military capability has become “a contradiction in terms”; and that conceptualization of the Union as a value-based community requires an alternative approach that proposes a collective identity for the Union as a “normative power”. Such an approach is provided by Ian Manners, who understands it as “a power that is neither military not purely economic, but one that works through ideas and opinions.” His notion seeks to eschew the civilian/military dilemma in favour of a concentration on the EU’s international identity and core values that form ideational basis of EFP (core values – peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, and subsidiary values – social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and effective governance). The EU exercises normative power in projecting these values, and in promoting the establishment of related norms for the practice of international community. For the EU itself it has implications, as

38 Ibid, 238.
Frank Schimmelfennig maintains on the case of enlargement “rhetorical action” takes place in EFP: no state can oppose a values-based discourse with narrow, national interests. All member states agreed on the need to extend the values of democracy, the rule of law and human rights to the newly independent states of Europe, even, with the exception of long term prospects for trade, there were no economic reasons why enlargement had to happen.\(^ {39}\)

One of the dimensions of expressing EU’s power internationally is the practice of region-building. As Karen Smith contends, the promotion of regional cooperation emerges from the nature of the EU.\(^ {40}\) The logic of the Barcelona Process suggests that the EU sets the conditions for a community of peace by concentrating on “soft” security concerns (economic, social relations) rather than assessing a danger in a militaristic sense. In the Southern Dimension for a long time the dominant policy instrument has been the terms of Association Agreements that decided the level of concessions on import volumes to be offered to each partner. Simultaneous negotiations take place to define the final terms of the policy package. As Gomez underlines, what began as a disparate collection of commercial agreements has grown into a complex policy package embracing a broad range of issues and sectors.\(^ {41}\) Utilisation of political conditionality, that will be discussed in the next section, has a strategic impact on projecting core values of the EU within macro-region, and provides a crucial test for the EU as an international power in a region rent by conflicts.


\(^ {41}\)Gomez, *Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, 16.
1.2 Political Conditionality in the Southern Dimension of EFP

Traditionally the policy based on European values characterises EU’s international identity. However, it is hard to assess the substance of the normative dimension of EFP. Richard Youngs maintains a middle-ground position that “interest-based strategies are socially informed by longer-term values.”\(^{42}\) The EU’s involvement with its own security matters, seen as the continuation of the present (stable authoritarian) regimes at the expense of political liberalisation in the region was hotly criticised by Bechir Chorou.\(^{43}\) Nevertheless, better governance and effective promotion of democracy and human rights remain to be essential objectives of the EU’s external policy.\(^{44}\) The nature of the EU’s approach towards the Mediterranean is described by Youngs as the “long-term game constructing a deeply embedded sense of Partnership, informed by the notion of ongoing “contractuality”.”\(^{45}\) Commitment to political reform is an essential part of the “external constructivist dynamics” of the EU.\(^{46}\) On the political side, as Annette Junnemann argues, the EU recognises that lack of democracy is a main source of instability in the Mediterranean region.\(^{47}\) Therefore, advancing political reform in the Southern Mediterranean is justified on both politico-security and ideational levels of EFP.

Political conditionality as an instrument of advancing political reform can be understood in a broader context of Europeanisation, which described as an external dimension compounded of “exporting forms of political organisation and governance that are typical and

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46 Richard Youngs, “Conclusion: Conceptualizing the EU as a Promoter of Democracy” in *The European Union and Democracy Promotion*, 200.
distinct for Europe beyond the European territory." The mechanism of political conditionality developed in the Southern Dimension of EFP mostly on the basis of positive experiences gained during Eastern enlargement. As Bicchi suggests, the ENP is to a large extent replicated the EU’s enlargement strategy, modelling procedures of pre-accession negotiations and consequent adaptation by the partners (new member states). However, unlike in the accession negotiations process, the ENP gives the participants an opportunity to go at their own pace. As one of the representatives of the unit “European Neighbourhood Policy General Coordination” of DG “External relations” put it, “the partner countries can implement a significant part of the acquis based on their domestic needs and in this way regulate the extent to which they want to deepen their relationship with the EU.” The biggest question at stake remains whether political conditionality can work without EU membership perspectives. There is a fundamental difference between Eastern and Southern Dimensions of the ENP with the former understanding political conditionality as a tool of “reinforcement by reward” of a membership in the long-run, and the latter lacking “scale of rewards to conduct far reaching reforms.” Success of political conditionality in the Southern countries depends on the level of its linkage to the financial assistance for the region. So far in EFP financial policies the EU has put strategic objectives in front of concerns for human rights and democracy. For example, in the EMP the EU failed to reward Morocco as the best

51 European Commission. Information Visit of Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences of Maastricht University (Brussels, April 3, 2008).
performer in terms of political transition while giving 351 million Euro over three years to backward Egypt.\textsuperscript{54}

As seen by analysts, one of the best ways to make political conditionality work in the region is “indirect targeting governments and leading them towards compliance.”\textsuperscript{55} The Commission puts an emphasis on building ties with domestic civil societies (NGOs); however, it has been criticised for its focus on Western NGOs that are capable to go through lengthy application procedures for funding, while local civil society groups that may effectively empower democratic transition and human rights are left out of the process as they must meet the approval of respective governments.\textsuperscript{56} The process of “indirect targeting” relies on a bottom-up socialisation process as the Southern Dimension of EFP due to political context does not offer a framework for sufficient interaction at the top governmental officials’ level. Peculiarities of the socialisation process in the Southern Mediterranean will be discussed in the next section.

1.3 Socialisation Process in the Mediterranean Macro-region

Jeffrey Checkel argues that international regimes are based on “a learning process where each party is both teacher and student,”\textsuperscript{57} the Southern Dimension of EFP lacks mutuality since the EU is the one to decide how to allocate financial resources and subsequently to define what sort of values and norms should be “common” for the partners. This strategy is severely constrained by local elites’ willingness to tolerate political transition: only Israel and Lebanon satisfy the Copenhagen Criteria.\textsuperscript{58} Michael Emerson and Gergana

\textsuperscript{55} Fraser Cameron and Eberhard Rhein, “Promoting Political and Economic Reform in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.” \textit{EPC Issue Paper 33} (May 2005), 11.
Noutcheva maintain that the EU in its relations with the Mediterranean needs to engage in a dialogue instead of imposing a vision of how they should develop.\textsuperscript{59}

From the initial Barcelona Declaration to the Union for the Mediterranean one of the main tasks of the Southern Dimension was to strengthen the existing political dialogue of member states and partner countries and to increase its efficiency.\textsuperscript{60} Achievement of this task will provide with the basis for enhanced socialisation of the governmental officials. As an initial step of this process the EU launched the establishment of bilateral sub-committees on human rights. The spread of the human rights discourse in the region can be seen in the rhetoric of local top governmental officials. In his speech marking the 8\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the enthronement HM King Mohammed VI of Morocco claims:

\begin{quote}
Thanks to its wise foreign policy, Morocco has become an effective partner in promoting global issues, including peace and security, the fight against terrorism, cultural and inter-faith coexistence, respect for human rights, the advancement of women, as well as sustainable development, environmental protection and good governance. Morocco’s commitment to these values and objectives can been assessed through specific geo-political priorities.\textsuperscript{61}
\end{quote}

In similar way, Tunisian President Ben Ali in his speech in commemoration of the twentieth anniversary in power vowed to grant more funding to the opposition parties and their press, in order to increase their presence in the media and in public spaces in order promote democracy and human rights in the country.\textsuperscript{62}

The instances of interest in human rights issues among the leaders of the Southern Mediterranean show concerns of the regimes with their image internationally; limited reforms manifest attempts to strengthen credibility of claims on potential rewards from the EU side rather than the top-down social learning process. However, the Barcelona Process provides with a forum for the meeting of decision-makers where socialisation can be strengthened. The normative function of the EMP is significant because it is the only forum where Israel and the

\textsuperscript{59} Emerson and Noutcheva, From Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood Policy.

\textsuperscript{60} Commission, A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy, 6.

\textsuperscript{61} “Speech of King Mohammed VI marking the 8th anniversary of his enthronement.” \textit{Maghreb Arabe Presse}, 30 July 2007.

Arab countries are sitting at the same table trying to establish mutually beneficial cooperation in the issues of trade and culture not only with the EU partners, but within the Gulf region itself.

Indirect targeting of elites utilising a bottom-up approach is more likely to be successful strategy for EFP’s Southern Dimension.\textsuperscript{63} The biggest challenge of the Southern Dimension for the EU as an international actor is to deepen the bottom-up socialisation on the level of local civil society groups and to compliment it with the involvement of top level governmental officials in social learning process in order to maintain stability of its neighbourhood. From a theoretical level of the role of the EU as an international actor in the region and its policy instruments in the next chapter I go to a practical level of institutional setting and policy-making within the Barcelona Process from the Barcelona Declaration to the Union for the Mediterranean in order to show the main challenges and highlight the opportunities for the EU in the region.

Chapter 2 – The Barcelona Process as a Transformative Mechanism in the Region

The Mediterranean, a region where different cultures and religions coexist and where national and religious minorities may clash, is also a place where the gap between Economically Developed Countries (North) and Less Developed Countries (South) so obvious in terms of geographical proximity – only 14 kilometres separate Gibraltar (UK) from Africa. The EU has realised that stability in its broad southern frontier is of extremely importance since the 1960s, when it started to establish different forms of bilateral cooperation with countries of the region. The major breakthrough in relationship between the EU and Mediterranean countries was the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in the mid nineties. The starting point of the EMP was the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Barcelona on 27-28 November 1995, initiated the Barcelona Process, a wide framework of political, economic and social relations between the Member States of the European Union and countries of the Southern Mediterranean.

The EU enlargement, on 1st May 2004, has brought two Mediterranean Partners (Cyprus and Malta) into the EU. Nowadays the EMP thus comprises 37 members: 27 EU Member States and 10 Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey). Libya has maintained observer status since 1999. Being a complimentary mechanism of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) framework, the EMP does not rely on membership perspectives for the Southern partners; it aims at formation of a security community in the region. This chapter shows evolution of the Southern Dimension of EFP as an ideational process with the purpose of broadening the range of options for explaining EU external policies and, more generally, policy making in the EU. The chapter aims at reassessing

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main tasks across three chapters of the initial Barcelona Declaration in the EU discourse. It is centred on cases of innovative change in EFP making in the context of particular conditions of the Mediterranean across the range of initiatives from the Barcelona Declaration to the Union for the Mediterranean.

2.1 Institutional Challenges of the Barcelona Process as a Foreign Policy Approach

The Barcelona Process established the foundations of a new model of regional relationship. In the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean partners declared the three main objectives of the Partnership:

1. The definition of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue (Political and Security Chapter).
2. The construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area (Economic and Financial Chapter).
3. The rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural and human partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies (Social, Cultural and Human Chapter).  

Some scholars see the Barcelona Process as a unique expression and reassessment of the EU’s civilian and normative powers: its three headings cover European values and practices in the political, economic and social spheres. The Declaration is built upon norms of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, in theory, non-compliance with them can lead to suspension of financial aid under the MEDA program; however, this procedure has not been used so far.

In many ways the EMP was perceived on the part of the EU as an instrument to ensure that its southern neighbours are politically stable and safe, and developed in economic terms, not to pose security risks related to illegal immigration, organised crime, trafficking in drugs and human beings, or terrorism. Analysing the nature of the EMP as an instrument, we can clearly see that in classical terms the EU can offer countries of the region neither “carrot” nor “stick”. In 1987 the Council rejected an application from Morocco to become a member on the grounds that Morocco was not a European State, therefore, closing the perspectives of membership for the other countries of North

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66 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Overview.
68 Barcelona Declaration.
Africa. By comparison, Cyprus, geographically an island in Southwest Asia, has extensive historical, cultural, and political ties to Europe and entered the EU in 2004. Whether Turkey is a European country, given that only 3 percent of its territory lies in Europe and its population is more than 90 percent Muslim, is a controversial question. On the other hand, Turkey has historically been a part of European diplomacy; it is strategically important, and a member of NATO. Article 28 of the Association Agreement signed in 1963 includes the option of Turkey eventually joining the EU, and Ankara in fact lodged an application to accede in 1987. The European Parliament, Council, and Commission confirmed Turkey’s eligibility, and the EU formally started accession negotiations with Ankara in 2005. As Cynthia Roberts argues, the term “European State” is as much subject to political (ideational) interpretation as it is geographical assessment.  

The “carrot” in the form of perspectives for membership is not applicable to all Mediterranean partners, but Turkey - in which, as opinion polls state, the EU lost all its credibility due to unsatisfactory progress of negotiations, therefore, conditionality as a “stick” cannot be applied either.

The total expenditure for the European Neighbourhood Policy including the EMP in 2007 was 1.4 billion euro, which represents less than 1% of its total 126.5 billion euro budget. Financial incentives for countries of the region to take reforms are not sufficient. As HRH Prince el Hassan bin Talal of Jordan stated in his lecture at CEU the EMP is facing deep crisis: for his country as for the region this instrument simply does not work. As a possible solution he emphasised the need for a better communication between the EU and the region, called for peaceful resolution of regional conflicts and activating partnership programs in solving the economic, political and social problems the Mediterranean world face.  

Due to instrumental nature of the EMP, the EU has been circumspect in dealing with political matters within the first chapter of the Barcelona Declaration, relying on keeping regional stability without being too assertive in democratic transformation and

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promotion of human rights. As Zoltan Horvath argues from a moral point of view, the EU is obliged, as one of the most developed regions in the world, to assist developing and poor countries, which are marginalised economically and politically; however, it is the governments of particular countries who must initiate the reform process.

Unlike the previous bilateral agreements, the Barcelona Process is built on complementarity of two dimensions – bilateral and regional.

Bilateral dimension. The European Union performs a number of activities bilaterally with each country. For example, the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements that the Union negotiates with the Mediterranean partners individually. Although they reflect the general principles governing the Euro-Mediterranean relationship, each of the agreements contain characteristics specific to each partner’s country geographic location, political and economic situation, reform programmes, needs and capacities. Therefore, an important feature of the Partnership is differentiation. Over the years of its existence bilateral dimension with its targeted projects and individual solutions for each country has proven to be the most effective. Looking at the example of Morocco, there has been undeniable progress in the areas of democratic reform and respect for human rights, in particular the adoption of the new family code, the law on political parties, the law outlawing torture, the strengthening of local democracy, the reform (under way but still very slow and problematic) of the justice and prison systems, and drafting of the new electoral code. The recommendations of the Fairness and Reconciliation Commission (IER), which was set up to right the wrongs suffered by the victims of arbitrary detentions and forced disappearances, helped in the adoption of several new constitutional reform measures. Morocco is one of the leaders in the framework doing the best in terms of use of offered funding to implement various reforms, while some countries like Syria or Libya refuse to talk with the EU about human rights and political

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reforms. This divergence among the states has a significant impact on the regional dimension of the EMP which proved to be by far less effective.

*Regional dimension.* Official documents state:

> “Regional dialogue represents one of the most innovative aspects of the Partnership, covering at the same time the political, economic and cultural fields (regional cooperation). Regional cooperation has a considerable strategic impact as it deals with problems that are common to many Mediterranean Partners while it emphasises the national complementarities.”

Between 1995 and 2005 the regional dimension was enhanced across the Partnership’s three chapters by the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, by the establishment of the European Investment Bank Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) and by the inauguration of the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures. The idea of bringing the region divided by conflicts together under the EMP is too ambitious; due to its instrumental nature, institutional developments cannot change the fact that the regional dimension of the Barcelona process is developing at the speed of the most backward countries.

The Barcelona Process was developed as a response to the dynamic of the EU’s external relations in relation to North Africa and Middle East. The initial institutional setting was built on the assumption that most of the countries in the region are not eligible for membership based on the ideational interpretation of political and cultural boundaries of Europe. Complementarity of two dimensions of the Barcelona Process can be contested as “one size fits all” approach is not applicable in the Southern Mediterranean due to tremendous differences in political, economic and social conditions among different countries of the region.

### 2.2 Convergence of Civilisations, Commonality and Dialogue in the Barcelona Process

The 2004 enlargement brought up the idea of complementarity of the Barcelona Process and newly-developed idea of the ENP. Immediate interests of member states and security concerns called for a new approach towards the region. The Commission noticed that the ENP will supplement existing regional and sub-regional agreements, developing “further regional cooperation...”

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73 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Overview.
and building on the achievements of the EMP.” Therefore, the ENP is not seen as a substitute to the EMP. The ENP offers a new approach of extension of the *acquis*, similar to the accession negotiations process for candidate countries to the partners providing an impetus for domestic reforms. Romano Prodi formulated the aim of the ENP as “an extension to the neighbouring region of a set of principles, values and standards which define the very essence of the European Union.” Both policy instruments are constantly referred in the EU documents in the context of shared understandings, dialogue, and the “convergence of civilisations.” On the other hand, in the context of contemporary history the region is perceived through the prism of negative discourses of “Islamic threat”, “fortress Europe”, and the “clash of civilisations”.

The key point of indifference to the problems of other parts of the world is a lack of identification with others. Because we identify with our we-group, we tend to consider the they-group as apart from us. As a result, our responsibility for the they-group is more limited than for our we-group. People in most countries accept significant responsibility to assist the least fortunate citizens of their national we-group through national social welfare budgets. We feel we have a duty to do so. Internationally, most of us feel much less responsible. The Barcelona Process with its set of policy instruments provides a framework for development of the region which in modern context is seen as a group of reference for Western liberal societies. The EMP and the ENP give incentives for strengthening of political and cultural dialogue throughout the macro-region including both southern Mediterranean and the EU states. This can be the first step towards the world of different civilisations each of which is learning to coexist with the others. Despite of its great potential on a normative level of EU officials’ rhetoric, Bechir Chorou sees the Partnership mainly as an instrument that primarily serves European interests in the region: “Europe wants a secure access to


76 Barcelona Declaration.

oil and gas and protection against waves of migrants.”

A strong element of paternalism on the side of the EU, being manifested through its agenda-setting powers for the Partnership, remains a distinctive feature of both bilateral and regional dimensions. Within the debate on the nature of the ENP itself, some scholars argue that the EU “openly acknowledges the unequal power relations between itself and its neighbours.” Emerson provides an accurate the “hub-and-spoke” model that depicts the nature of the relationship with Europe at the center and its neighbours placed at various distances determined by their strategic importance and the extent to which they are willing to cooperate.

As stated in the official documents, the goal of creation of a zone of economic development, democracy and peace at the southern frontier of the EU through the process of integration is to establish a security community mutually beneficial for both the EU and southern partners. On the level of ideational intergovernmentalism, as Alvaro Vasconcelos and George Joffe maintain the building of a regional grouping in the Mediterranean is not merely the question of conflict resolution, but of building mutual confidence and trust within a context of political change and economic success. It is evident that peace and security cannot be achieved simply by resolving inter-state conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli conflict. Political, economic and social considerations, such as economic underdevelopment, unemployment and illiteracy, are interrelated, not to mention other issues including abuses of human rights, lack of the rule-of-law and democratic deficits in the countries of southern Mediterranean.

Contested nature of the local (authoritarian) political traditions constantly comes up in the European political discourse, and prevents cultural rapprochement. However, so far immediate security

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82 Barcelona Declaration.
83 Vasconcelos and Joffe, The Barcelona Process, 3.
concerns prevailed over norms and values. Francesco Cavarota argues that “good authoritarianism is more favourable to European security than bad democracy.” Hafedh Zaafrane and Azzem Mahjoub claim that the EMP seems to be of a comprehensive nature, where the three-pillar division is self-fulfilling and inseparable. However, detailed analysis of the Barcelona Declaration shows inconsistencies across its three chapters.

In the first chapter of the Barcelona Process achievements of the EU are limited to the establishment of a financial facility to support willing Mediterranean partners to develop and implement political reforms, introduction of special programs of joint cooperation and professional exchanges in the field of elections, implementation of the Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism based on the 2001 Laeken framework on common definition of terrorism in the countries of the EU, adoption of special programs to support local NGOs dealing with the issues of human rights and gender equality. The main task of the first chapter to develop a security community within the macro-region, as defined by Karl Deutch as “a group of people who has become integrated... share identity and loyalty, have a feeling of common belonging,” requires the emergence of collective identity. The EU’s role as a world power in the region and a promoter of collective regional identity is weak due to inherent inability to influence local political situation or eliminate negative discourses towards the region on the domestic level.

Among other issues that constraint building of a common identity between the partners, building of shared understandings and establishment of common spheres of interests are inequalities in power relations between the partners within the frameworks. To Ebernard Rhein it is crucial that the EU maintains the predominant role. It is the EU that is appraising the state of affairs which leads

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to the impression that North is dictating South what to do. The question of an enhanced co-
ownership of the process has repeatedly been brought up over the last years and is vital for the Barcelona Process not to be perceived as serving European interests.

In the second chapter, the extension of four freedoms (the free movement of goods, the free movement of services and freedom of establishment, the free movement of persons, including free movement of workers, the free movement of capital) is dependent on the degree of compliance with the reforms stated in the Action Plans developed on the EU side. European interests define the pace of implementation of particular policies within the Barcelona Process: the liberalization of trade with creation of a Free Trade Area (FTA) by the target date 2010 is on the Action Plans, while the free movement of persons for Southern partners is not likely to be on the agenda. The Declaration stresses that the FTA should be achieved progressively through dismantling tariff and non-tariff barriers in trade in manufactured goods, liberalization in the rights of establishment and providing services; however, liberalization in trade in agricultural products is limited by “a possible selected number of exceptions and timetables for gradual and asymmetrical implementation.” The Declaration recognised the crucial role played by Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and financial assistance for the EMP to succeed. Energy security is a vital question for the EU, therefore, it promotes implementation of sub-regional energy projects leading to a Euro-Mediterranean energy market, including the progressive integration of Mashrek-Maghreb electricity networks with the EU electricity network; the integration of Middle East gas networks, energy co-operation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority; and development of several important pipeline connections. Due to political instability of the region, realisation of most of the projects is delayed.

90 Barcelona Declaration.
In the third chapter, namely social, cultural and human chapter, the Mediterranean region is seen as a potential source of risk associated with “societal insecurity”, therefore, societal stability is one of the main concerns of the EU countries. Main efforts are put in development of regional skilled labour through special training programs, promotion of gender equality, and creation of new local enterprises. The key idea of the third pillar is to “reaffirm that dialogue and respect between cultures are a necessary precondition for bringing the peoples together” was initially understood on the side of the EU as a promotion of educational and cultural exchanges for young people. The importance of legal migration opportunities in the context of the growing demography in the region was recognised in the Barcelona +10 Programme developed as a follow-up strategy of the Barcelona Process in 2005. In the policy document the last heading of the initial declaration was divided into two chapters “Social, Cultural and Human Chapter” and “Migration, Social Integration, Security and Justice.” Previous restrictive arrangements of the Barcelona Declaration such as “a concerted action and cooperation to fight illegal immigration through the conclusion of bilateral readmission agreements” and aiming at “reducing migratory pressures” were contradictory to the spirit of the third chapter of the Declaration stating “the promotion of dialogue between different cultures and civilizations”. New arrangements of the Barcelona +10 Programme and the Regional Indicative Programme (2007-2010) emphasized the importance of legal migration opportunities as an important instrument of socio-economic development of the region which provides both new opportunities for training and working experience for local labour force and capital flow from migrants to their families back to home countries that increases their purchase power and strengthen local economies, while supplying countries of the EU with extra labour force. Judicial cooperation on criminal matters within the macro region is seen as an effective mean to short opportunities for

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93 Barcelona Declaration.
94 Ibid.
96 Barcelona Declaration.
97 Ibid.
human and drug trafficking and to respond to common threat from international terrorist networks.

Emphasis on the last two chapters in the Barcelona +10 Programme as a prerequisite for progress in political and security chapter demonstrates an innovative approach of the EFP towards the region. It is based on understanding that cultural rapprochement between the peoples shall go beyond cultural and youth exchange programs, and recognition on the part of the EU that previous policies to reduce migratory pressures to sub-optimal level put in danger political and economic objectives.

Emphasis on economic and social issues reflects immediate concerns of the EU citizens that include stable access to energy supplies, migration and security. Enlargement for some time was a main foreign policy instrument for the EU. However, perspectives of further enlargement to Southern Mediterranean are claimed to be nonviable, and emphasis is put on existing regional policy instruments. The Commissioner for external relations and ENP Benita Ferrero-Waldner reaffirmed this argument:

“Our traditional approach to projecting security and stability beyond our borders has been enlargement. But we cannot enlarge ad infinitum, and it is possible that we may be reaching the limits of what EU public opinion can bear, at least for the time being. We will honour our commitments to those already on track for membership, but we cannot allow ourselves to get ahead of our public opinion... By helping our neighbours we are helping ourselves.”

The rationale behind the development of the Southern Dimension of EFP is to address European problems, and than the concerns of its neighbours. Vasconcelos and Joffe explain lack of progress in the Barcelona Process by lack of commitment on the EU side to democracy and human rights in the region; those are essential for the success of cooperation and building of a security community. Thus, the regional grouping must be linked to cultural and social affairs; the model which is limited only to the political and economic aspects of cooperation will not help to overcome negative consequences of transition on the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea.


100 Vasconcelos and Joffe, The Barcelona Process, 5.

101 Ibid.
The notion of democracy in the Action Plans itself raises questions. It is evident from the documents that the Commission is not talking about an ideational construction but about a specific form of polity based on “the rule of law, good governance, promotion of good neighbourly relations and the principles of human rights and sustainable development,” following this premise, in rationalist terms norms and values can be defined as “goals” of the EU. In the Communication from the Commission of December 2007 we find:

“The ENP is a partnership for reform that offers “more for more”: the more deeply a partner engages with the Union, the more fully the Union can respond, politically, economically and through financial and technical cooperation. As the partnerships develop, within the common ENP framework, the policy’s operation is becoming increasingly differentiated.”

Rationalist goals of the EU in the Mediterranean region include persuasion of local governments to reform process, while they are bound to conduct good neighbourly relations, maintain societal security, and prevent illegal migration. The values such as good governance, rule-of-law, human rights and sustainable development are European per se, and may be extraneous to the local culture. Therefore, they can lead to an identity conflict. On the one hand, by emphasising the principle “more for more” and by expressing the ambiguous position towards the deficiencies of authoritarian regimes in the region, the EU undermines the founding objectives of the Barcelona Process. The EU’s ambition to fulfil its role as a civilian power and to manifest the Barcelona Process as a transformative mechanism for advancing of freedom and democracy are attainable only if the Union sets political conditionality as a prerequisite for cooperation in other areas. Commitment of the local governments to reform process can be motivated by domestic needs or people-to-people socialisation process. In the context of non-compliance with the EU objectives, as I emphasised in the first chapter of the thesis, the goals of EU foreign policy can be advanced through the latter. Promotion of people-to-people interaction and socialisation lies within the scope of the Social, Cultural and Human chapter of updated Barcelona +10 Programme. As a follow-up for the European Commission’s initiative at the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Affairs Ministers

103 Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 64.
104 A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy, 2.
Conference in Lisbon (November 5-6, 2007) the year of 2008 was announced as the first year of Euro-Mediterranean Inter-Cultural Dialogue with the aim for successful development of Mediterranean macro region through understanding of different cultures and religions. The Anna Lindh Foundation for the dialogue between cultures that was officially inaugurated in April 2005 in Alexandria is to play the defining role in the implementation of the “rapprochement project”. After an initial period of work during which the Foundation has established itself as the common Euro-Mediterranean institution dedicated to cultural dialogue, partners consolidated the institution by approving new statutes and appointing a new leadership to be in place from April 2008. The Commission proposed to give particular visibility to the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting on cultural dialogue with events in Euro-Mediterranean partner countries to promote intercultural dialogue and diversity in order to raise the profile of the Foundation. Communication from the Commission states:

“...audiovisual, cinema, as well as promotion of the cultural heritage are excellent vehicles for intercultural dialogue between the Mediterranean countries and Europe. In addition, a new Heritage Programme will be launched which is centred on the appropriation of the cultural heritage by the local population as well as on access to knowledge of the cultural heritage.”

In recent years the European Commission with support of some member states is acting as an agent of cultural rapprochement between North and South emphasising the role of the Mediterranean as a “cradle of great civilisations” trying to overcome stereotypes that seem to be inherent in the European mass perception of the region as a politically unstable “conflict-ridden zone”.

Ideational shift of the EFP towards social, human and cultural issues illustrates new vision on the side of the EU towards the macro region. Mostly it can be related to the discursive practices of northern European states. Sweden has played among all the current EMP-27 the key-role in developing the cultural dimension of Barcelona since the mid-1990s. The close relationship between Sweden and Egypt in the making of the third basket agenda was clearly marked when

107 Ibid.
Egypt proposed that the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation be called after Anna Lindh. Germany has also been trying to play a role in the area: The Minister-President of the Land Baden-Wurttemberg, Erwin Teufel, stated during the Stuttgart Conference:

“...this is the first time... that the foreign ministers are meeting at a location that is not within sight of the Mediterranean... the EMP is not something that only concerns those states immediately bordering the Mediterranean – it is a Partnership that affects the entire EU... I am convinced that we should no longer just see geographical proximity as the crucial element for cooperation. To my mind it is more important to establish where our common interests lie – for example in the economy, culture, education or the environment.”

This is a good example of a symbolic construction of the Mediterranean; the discourse is made meaningful through economic and cultural references. Analysing the possibilities of formation of a security community, Emmanuel Adler proves that the most promising way to achieve long-term security, economic welfare, political stability, and peace is neither an elaborate system of alliances or collective security system, nor a functional scheme of economic integration, but the socio-cultural process of constructing a region. The task of building of shared interests and understandings within the community seems to be hard to achieve as it requires full compliance of the local governments to the reforms while political conditionality cannot be enforced. The Barcelona Process provides a significant opportunity for cultural rapprochement, if the EU is enabled by its member states to reinforce coherent policies towards the region and act as a responsible actor in both international and regional arenas.

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110 Adler Emanuel, Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations (London: Routledge, 2003), 229.
2.3 The Union for the Mediterranean: a New Vision for a Regional Partnership

On the intersection of the first and second chapters of the Barcelona Declaration, French President Nicolas Sarkozy proposed in 2007 the formation of a Mediterranean Union which would consist principally of the states of the EMP and operate parallel to the European Union. Some analysts see in this initiative a threefold task: to oppose Turkish membership in the EU through providing Ankara with an alternative route to partnership with Europe as a pillar of the new Union for the Mediterranean, to create mechanisms to control illegal immigration from North Africa into France and Southern Europe, and to exploit American diplomatic weakness in the region while extending European leadership there. The fact that the new French president on many occasions stressed his friendship with Israel is quite unusual for traditional French pro-Arab, and it can be seen as another sign of Sarkozy’s will to strengthen the EU’s role in the region through the settlement of Arab-Israeli conflict.

European Foreign Policy making is an ideational process involving member states and EU institutions. As Bicchi argues, a collective policy toward the Mediterranean has developed as member states have crafted new understandings of Euro-Mediterranean relations and forged new initiatives based on them. She maintains, member states and the EU institutions put forward potential solutions and endeavour to back these up with appeals to facts and evidence. They thus create common knowledge, which then acts as a reference framework within which interstate bargaining can follow. Schimmelfennig offers the argument that, “in a community environment a rationalist stage of preference formation is followed by a constructivist stage of international interaction.” Actors using community values thus influence outcomes, but their policy preferences are not affected by the interaction. This process of cognitive interaction consists of

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112 Bicchi, European Foreign Policy Making toward the Mediterranean, 2.
“framing” the new challenges and piecing together separate ideational streams into a narrative that defines the problem and its solutions at the EU level.\textsuperscript{114}

The narrative of the new Union reflects both the EU’s strategic interests in the region and main concerns of the southern partners:

- Improving energy supply;
- fighting pollution in the Mediterranean;
- strengthening the surveillance of maritime traffic and "civil security cooperation’’;
- setting up a Mediterranean Erasmus exchange programme for students, and;
- creating a scientific community between Europe and its southern neighbours.\textsuperscript{115}

Sarkozy had originally envisioned the new Union as a grouping comprised only the EU’s Mediterranean countries and its neighbours but not the EU as a whole. But this proposal received strong criticism, particularly from Germany, which feared the plan could split the EU, with the new grouping becoming a rival to the EU itself. In the end, Sarkozy backed down and agreed to allow all member states to participate.\textsuperscript{116} He also agreed to change the original title of the "Mediterranean Union" to the "Union of the Mediterranean" to counter fears that the new body would become a rival to the bloc. Northern states also dominated by holding to their position that no budget extensions beyond the funds allocated for the Barcelona Process should be given to the new initiative, confronting demands of Southern member states (France and Italy) that the financing would be multiplied in order to reduce migratory pressures from the Southern Mediterranean by improving economic situation in the region. As a response Sarkozy announced his intention to seek additional funding from the private sector, hoping for up to 14 billion euro.

The concerns of the South about disparity in power relations with the North are reflected in the Union's management structure. Two directors in charge of coordination of cooperation between the EU and the partner countries are to come for two years one from the EU member states and the

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid, 3-4.
other from a non-European Mediterranean country. Both will be supported by a secretariat, to be located in a yet-to-be-determined southern EU city. Barcelona and Marseille have been named as potential candidates; however, Sarkozy denied having endorsed the French city. The fact that the southern EU nations will hold the first presidencies is seen as a partial victory for Paris.

As I have shown in the previous sections of the thesis, the EU has been hesitant in encouraging political transition in the region, with some researchers claiming that “actively or passively the EU is supporting authoritarian regimes that are politically stable.”117 Previously, the internal dynamic of the EFP making demonstrated a split between the Northern member states calling for a tougher line on democracy and human rights in the Mediterranean, while France, Italy, Spain and Portugal advocating security and stability “come first” approach. In the vision of the Union for the Mediterranean we can observe a trend towards EU-wide convergence over Mediterranean issues with further institutionalisation of the EU position. In the rhetoric of the European leaders ideational dimension seems to be dominant in strengthening the Southern dimension of EFP. As President Barroso said during the meeting to adopt proposals “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” on May 20, 2008:

“This is a pivotal moment for the EU and our Mediterranean Partners. The Barcelona Process has proven its value to build bridges between Mediterranean partners. The impulse by the next French Presidency of the EU is an opportunity to strengthen and complement this cooperation. But it will take stronger political will, in both sides of the Mediterranean, to seize this opportunity to enhance understanding, peace and prosperity among all our nations, cultures and religions, for the benefit of our citizens.”118

In the situation of cognitive uncertainty (further evolving of regional conflicts, increasing migratory pressures and lack of success of the previous EU regional initiatives) with the support of French leadership acting as a policy entrepreneur, EU member states and EU institutions started developing a common ideational frame towards the region. Sarkozy points out that "Europe does not turn its back towards the Mediterranean Union anymore". He rejected criticism that he had

117 Chorou, Security Partnership and Democratisation, 166.
planned the union as an exclusively French project, saying that "I never had the idea of excluding any EU states... I never regarded it as a rival to the EU".\textsuperscript{119} German Chancellor Angela Merkel explained position of her government by acknowledging that the Barcelona Process "was slowing down and needed to be revitalised... it needs to be politically more significant and better supported by the member states".\textsuperscript{120} The French-German axis proclaimed by Sarkozy is the result of tactical bargaining. Emerson considers the new project as "an opportunity to rationalise and revitalise the EU's present set of policies towards the Mediterranean, which is stuck in a condition of laborious lethargy".\textsuperscript{121}

Optimism of the EU and some academics is not widely shared by mass media of the macro-region. The press represents one of the main channels of public discourse framing. In order to analyse the formulation of the discourse around the new initiative of the EU I used content analysis of 150 randomly chosen units of text from European (100) and the Southern Mediterranean (50) newspapers, journals and websites. The method is based on the analysis of frequencies of most used keywords by detecting the most important structures of its communication content.\textsuperscript{122} The classification scheme offered for this research is to divide the expressive content into three groups “positive-neutral-negative” to identify the discourse around the Union for the Mediterranean. In 150 articles I found 544 keywords that characterise the idea and the vision of the Union for the Mediterranean, frequency distribution and some examples of the most frequent key words are presented in the table 1.

\textsuperscript{119} EurActiv, Summit Approves the Union for the Mediterranean.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Neuendorf, \textit{The Content Analysis Guidebook Online}. 36
Table 1. Content analysis on the Union for the Mediterranean

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<th>POSITIVE</th>
<th>NEUTRAL</th>
<th>NEGATIVE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERCENTAGE</td>
<td>46% (250)</td>
<td>11% (60)</td>
<td>43% (234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXAMPLES</td>
<td>reinvigorating</td>
<td>reinvigorating</td>
<td>confusing</td>
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<td></td>
<td>reinforcing</td>
<td>reinforcing</td>
<td>poorly conceived</td>
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<td></td>
<td>greater cooperation</td>
<td>greater cooperation</td>
<td>awkwardly presented</td>
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<td></td>
<td>upgrading relations</td>
<td>upgrading relations</td>
<td>loosely defined</td>
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<td></td>
<td>more understanding</td>
<td>more understanding</td>
<td>restrictive</td>
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<td></td>
<td>evolutionary</td>
<td>evolutionary</td>
<td>based on unequal power relations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>an opportunity</td>
<td>an opportunity</td>
<td>ambiguous</td>
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<td></td>
<td>peaceful</td>
<td>peaceful</td>
<td>blurry</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mutually beneficial</td>
<td>mutually beneficial</td>
<td>based on deficiencies of the Barcelona Process</td>
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<td></td>
<td>based on shared values</td>
<td>based on shared values</td>
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Content analysis shows two main streams formulating public discourse on the project: the EU’s rhetoric of “deepening and upgrading” of the relationship with the Southern Mediterranean and a critical view of analysts who stress that it is unclear how innovative the new approach will be. Almost equal distribution of positive and negative characteristics shows that the press on both shores of the Mediterranean sends mixed messages to the public; therefore, deepening the confusion around the project.

As I have shown in this chapter, the EU’s approach towards political transition in the Mediterranean is limited by the instrumental nature of its foreign policy defined by divergent interests of member states, prioritisation of stability vs. democracy, and lack of interest on the side of Southern partners to undertake reforms. On the ideational side, the EU includes democracy and human rights as political objectives to be fulfilled by the southern partners. In the political discourse formed by the rhetoric of the EU officials there are attempts to justify political transition for both
security and identity considerations. However, forced democratization is perceived in the region itself as extraneous to the local political culture; therefore, political objectives cannot be achieved only through a socialisation process and emphasis on cultural rapprochement within the macro-region is needed. The vision of the new launched Union for the Mediterranean represents a shift to the more coherent strategy on the side of the EU towards the region, and a new type of behaviour as a more responsible international actor. My analysis shows that political goals can be achieved only if they are set as prerequisites for the economic aid from the EU side. The socio-cultural dimension is the missing link between the normative approach and the security considerations of the EU and requires wider cooperation in the fields related to societal security.
Chapter 3 – Evolution of the EFP towards the Mediterranean, a Common Identity and Building of a Security Community

For a few years now, the EU and Southern partners have received much criticism concerning inherent inability of the Barcelona Process to attain its objectives. The bitter illustration of lack of success was on the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Process, where the Arab Mediterranean leaders were absent. Most analysts from the region claim that the Process has not improved the asymmetries still dividing the Mediterranean. Building common understandings and a sense of belonging on a region-wide basis remains a distant objective. However, both sides emphasise the importance of associating the Union for the Mediterranean with the EMP, estimating that such a model will contribute towards a re-launching of the Barcelona Process. This final chapter aims to analyse the nature of the new approach through the three-step sequential model of EFP making. It argues that cultural rapprochement and building of a common Euro-Mediterranean identity are necessary prerequisites for successful development of the Southern dimension of EFP and creation of a Euro-Mediterranean security community.

3.1 A Policy Window, an Entrepreneur and Cognitive Interaction for the Union for the Mediterranean

The idea that existing patterns of Euro-Mediterranean relations can be improved came out of the overall attempt to redefine EU’s role as an international actor. The policy window or a “window of opportunity”\(^{123}\) arises in a situation of “cognitive uncertainty” as to what must be done at the member states’ level about challenges that originate from the region. When new issues come on to the agenda, then policy makers face a novel situation and they are “puzzled” about EFP making. Therefore, they are forced to consider new interpretations and policy solutions. Looking back in the historical context Bicchi suggests that, it was only when a majority of member states have

experienced cognitive uncertainty about the Mediterranean, then they have been able to discuss the Mediterranean at the EC/EU level.\textsuperscript{124} Is it the case with the Union for the Mediterranean?

It should be noted that none of the EU’s initiatives targeting the region has to date truly achieved its objectives. All European initiatives sought to make the Mediterranean a space of peace, stability and prosperity, aimed at the stabilisation of the region through the virtues of free-exchange. Europe demanded compliance on the part of its Mediterranean partners to its core values, notably of democracy and the rule of law, offering them financial facilities to undertake reforms, and even promising access to the “four liberties” to those who progressed most quickly within the frameworks. The diverse initiatives failed to convince the public. The Southern Mediterranean countries are reluctant to initiate rapid social and political reforms. Those of the EU are not inclined to come with direct investments, technological transfers, or solution of cultural and migratory issues. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict intensified an already complex situation and resulted in a political block within the Partnership. All these challenges created uncertainty of member states about social reality and prioritised the Southern Dimension of EFP.

On the Pars Destruens, the opening of the policy window nowadays can be associated with the new perception of security challenges by the Europeans, namely migration, Islamic fundamentalism, and terrorism. The governments of member states are uncertain about how to frame these phenomena and they share the situation of cognitive uncertainty. This factor allowed the policy-window to open. The biggest concerns of the EU were addressed in the interview by Ferrero-Waldner: "The more we can develop the region in the South, the less illegal migration there will be…The more prosperity we can give, the less terrorism, the less criminality will be there."\textsuperscript{125}

On the Pars Construens, for the policy window to turn into an active debate leading to policy making, a policy entrepreneur is required, and France whose vital interests lie in the region took this role. Dorothee Schmid, a prominent scholar on the Euro-Mediterranean relations, had predicted two

\textsuperscript{124} Bicchi, \textit{European Foreign Policy Making toward the Mediterranean}, 3.

possible broad scenarios before the initiative was launched: that of a French “sole rider”, which is fated to fail; or then that of a Barcelona re-launch via the Mediterranean Union – this if the French take the time to pursue a thorough audit of the successes and constraints of the EMP, notably since the introduction of the ENP.\textsuperscript{126} The latter also required an effort to redefine the shared priorities with the powerful member states that do not border the Mediterranean as Germany and the United Kingdom. This opportunity was realised on a full scale, even though Sarkozy had hoped for a much more tightly knit alliance restricted to territories with Mediterranean shores. France acted as a policy entrepreneur as a “believer”, out of the strength of its convictions that the new initiative will be “a potential avenue for peace between Israel and the Palestinians and might be offered to Turkey as an alternative to EU membership.”\textsuperscript{127}

The third aspect of the new EFP initiative was the cognitive interaction among member states and EU institutions. Newly perceived security challenges created uncertainty about policy relevant knowledge. As Ann Florini maintains, previously established ways of thinking, in our context about relations with the Mediterranean non-members, are challenged by new debates at the national level (about the perspectives of Turkish membership), an evolving international environment, and more generally by a perceived mismatch between the “previous way of doing things” and developments on the ground.\textsuperscript{128} On this basis member states engaged in a debate at the European level about a new strategy for Mediterranean non-members and a candidate country. In addition to the fact that the initial project was perceived as an external threat to the Southern Dimension of EFP by member states that do not border the Mediterranean, Sarkozy’s idea provoked strong reaction in Turkey as the project was apprehended as a threat to the possibilities of Turkish membership. After the active consultation process the EU came with a common position expressed by the Commission that this project is "not directed against Turkey", nor is it aimed at diverting the focus away from Turkey's


\textsuperscript{127}\textsuperscript{127} Deutsche Welle, EU Plans Smaller Union...

EU accession talks." At this stage, the main actors developed common knowledge about the new challenges by framing the issues at stake, namely energy security, environmental problems, and cultural rapprochement. Janez Jansa, a Slovenian Prime Minister, whose country is holding the current EU presidency told the establishment of such a union “enjoyed support in the council” and European Commission President Jose Manual Barroso added: "Today we recognized the need to upgrade the Barcelona Process... When it was launched, it was a quite a different time, but now things have changed, we need to adapt." The process of making foreign policy initiative at the European level could evolve because of two main factors. On one hand, there is France that promotes the formulation of a European initiative. On the other hand, the definition of a common understanding evolves in the interaction between all member states and EU institutions. The analysis of the nature of EFP making demonstrates the following logic: the articulation of new political and security perceptions pushed the region up on the EU agenda; the most effective entrepreneurship is provided by a single member state, though working in conjunction with the Commission and other member states. The debate evolved by contextualising ideas, elaborating new concepts and establishing conceptual parallels with the Barcelona Process, as Barroso stressed: “the Union for the Mediterranean is not to replace the Barcelona Process but to upgrade it”.

In the Southern Mediterranean the initiative gained a lot of attention, as it is expected to overcome deficiencies of the Barcelona Process: French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said during his recent official visit to Algeria "President Bouteflika had expressed interest in the project from the very first day we talked about the Union for the Mediterranean... and it is anticipated in the region.” Dr. Ahmed Driss argues that the revision of the Mediterranean Union proposed by Sarkozy in his Toulon speech in February 2007 following the December 2007 tri party France-Italy-

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131 Ibid.

Spain summit fell short of initial ambitions, yet overcame some major obstacles inhibiting the partnership.\(^{133}\)

The potential of the new initiative is seen in its aim to address some of the worries of the Southern partners, such as a fear that the EU does not consider them equal partners, that they are not granted full participation in the decision-making process, and that the issue of development is often sidelined in the cooperation proposals. The documents outlining the Union for the Mediterranean stress on the principle of equality between its future members and the involvement of all in the implementation of its common policy.\(^{134}\) Such worries remain ones of a procedural nature, and essentially there is nothing to suggest that within the framework of a Union for the Mediterranean things will improve unless a Mediterranean identity becomes its core. The next section explores the opportunities of enhancement of a socio-cultural dimension within the new framework as it becomes the main instrument of values transposition in the absence of a clear vision on territorial conflicts and the spread of democracy.

### 3.2 Building a Mediterranean Identity and a Mediterranean Security Community

Sarkozy’s initial project was based on the integrationist aspirations, where the focus was on creating a union that would permit a form of political integration and building of a Mediterranean security community. The desire of powerful European states for re-equilibrium reframed the project, by explicitly pursuing logic of cooperation over the integrationist logic a tendency confirmed following the adoption of the project as continuity to the Barcelona Process.\(^{135}\) A Union for the Mediterranean is built on the domains where progress is already in evidence; however, the most sensitive issues are not reflected on its agenda. Despite of their interest in the project, analysts from the Southern Mediterranean countries stress the failures of the Barcelona Process that should

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\(^{134}\) Ibid.

be addressed: lack of means, lack of structures, deficiencies in the area of governance, and shortcomings in trans-Mediterranean market integration. On the other hand, serious conflicts persist between some southern partners, heavily influencing public opinion and the government, and preventing them from accomplishing the process of integration of the region that Fernand Braudel called “a crossroads... a heteroclite and coherent image into which everything emerges and settles back into an original unit”\textsuperscript{136} – a necessary condition if private investors and corporate capital are to be offered a leading role, as is predicted for the project.

Understanding of the region as a coherent unit is necessary for the new initiative to move the Barcelona Process forward. However, the present political trend aims to separate the region: a North side that is expected to be European and “western”, and the South one that include, in the “Oriental” meaning of Edward Said, the uneasiness of the diversity and the underdeveloped status.\textsuperscript{137} The EU itself is not built on what is common for European people, but on what distinguishes them from the “other”, both within (the immigrants, above all the Muslim one) and outside, exactly the south Mediterranean region. So the region is drastically broken in two parts, and centuries of common history seem to have lost meaning. As Ada Lonni suggests we have to start thinking in terms of multiple belonging (circulatory identities): as every person can carry out different role without losing his identity or specificity. In this context the Mediterranean identity is not a static, but a growing one based on centuries of Mediterranean exchanges, ending in the contemporary migrations landscape.\textsuperscript{138}

The identity building process suggests that the sense of “otherness” existing in the relationship between the partners should be substituted with common understandings and interests. In the vision of the Union for the Mediterranean normative dimension of values transposition is not actively present as these issues divide the region rather than bring it together, instead it offers the

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\textsuperscript{136} Fernand Braudel, \textit{Il Mediterraneo. Lo spazio la storia gli uomini le tradizioni} (Torino: Bompiani, 1985).
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
}
partners an opportunity to solve common problems (ecological, energy supplies) and to build common understandings based on strengthening scientific, cultural and youth exchanges. The Commission and the Slovenian Presidency act as promoters of the cooperation in the fields related to socio-cultural dimension of the Barcelona Process. Recent EuroMed Ministerial Meeting on Culture and Cultural Dialogue, organised by the Slovenian Presidency with support of the government of Greece, adopted the Euro-Mediterranean cultural strategy, which covers cooperation in the fields of intercultural dialogue and cultural policy. In his address, the President of the EU Council, Slovenian Minister of Culture Dr Vasko Simoniti, highlighted the fact that

the question of intercultural dialogue is an essential question; last but not least, it is a question of survival in the global sense. It is a matter of the system and the world we will live in. Exceptional technological development, social changes, migration flows, new ethnic communities, encounters between cultural, religious and social patterns and finally globalisation bring challenges which pose new questions that must be answered by politics and civil society. Therefore, it is necessary more than ever – particularly in the area of culture – to encourage dialogue on the possibilities of understanding humanity today, and on the values of humanity that give meaning to the world.\textsuperscript{139}

The rhetoric of cultural dialogue is meaningless if there is no actual interaction between people; the opportunity for the Union for the Mediterranean to build a macro-region’s identity lies in complex solution of issues related to migration. Cognitive uncertainty about social reality in the region persuaded member states and the European institutions to reframe the nature of EFP towards the Mediterranean from the one based on the rhetoric of political liberalisation to a more flexible approach of fighting common problems and strengthening of socio-cultural ties. The advancement of normative ambitions of the EU is problematic while its cooperation with the Southern partners remains to be a settlement with the elites; the inclusion of civil societies is an essential condition for the formation of a security community. As Adler argues “the development of a security community depends on communication through which common meanings are sought and social learning takes place”.\textsuperscript{140} The process of a security community building is constrained by the fact that logic of cooperation dominates logic of integration that is necessary for a Mediterranean identity to be built.


\textsuperscript{140} Emmanuel Adler, \textit{Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations} (London: Routledge, 2003), 219.
On the one hand, the EU seeks to achieve peace and security through cooperation with the governments of the Southern countries, emphasising sharing its values and commitment to political and economic reforms. On the other hand, there is mistrust on the EU side on their willingness and ability to do so; therefore, the construction of a Mediterranean identity shall be complimented by the parallel dissolution of the image of the partners as "others". As John Borneman points out:

The foreign is not something that has meaning in and of itself, nor is it territorially fixed. It is an unstable counter concept, opposed to the native and constitutive of the human. Our task is to stipulate ourselves more clearly in relation to the foreign and to justify our position more rigorously. Such positions... provide the grounds on which foreign policy is made and on which distinctions between us and then are drawn.\(^\text{141}\)

The EU’s othering of the Mediterranean in modern political context is presented in the table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EUROPE</th>
<th>MEDITERRANEAN</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>civilised</td>
<td>uncivilised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>developed</td>
<td>underdeveloped</td>
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<tr>
<td>industrialised</td>
<td>industrialising</td>
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<tr>
<td>postmodern</td>
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<td>stable</td>
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<td>peaceful</td>
<td>conflictual</td>
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<tr>
<td>subject</td>
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<td>centre</td>
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Table 2. The EU’s Othering of the Mediterranean\(^\text{142}\).

Europe’s own identity for a long time has been formed in reference to the Southern Mediterranean as an underdeveloped conflict zone. The division between Europe and the Mediterranean is not necessary but contingent. As Pace argues, “the Mediterranean is not a neutral reality but a “contested concept”, the meaning of which is not fixed but fluid... and consists of individual member states’ discursive practices.”\(^\text{143}\) There are numerous ways to construct an area of peace, security and stability, one of the most efficient is cooperation in the matters of “low politics” such as education and culture aiming at establishment of a shared identity on the basis of which the EU will be able to address and manage political and economic transition of the region.


\(^{142}\) Pace, *The Politics of Regional Identity*, 117.

\(^{143}\) Ibid.
Conclusion

The evolution of a European policy initiative towards the Mediterranean from the Barcelona Declaration to the Union for the Mediterranean is an ideational process in which member states and EU institutions converge towards a common definition of problems and solutions. My research has revealed that individual discursive practices of member states in the situation of cognitive uncertainty are redefined to a common discourse of EFP. However, the EFP approach towards the Mediterranean for a long time has been defined by the sense of otherness and logic of asymmetrical power relations. Understanding of the region as a coherent unit is necessary for the Barcelona Process to move forward.

Through an analysis of the EU as an international actor, the present research has shown that the EU is deeply rooted in multi-institutional, multi-procedural nature of its foreign policy. For identity reasons the EU is bound to express normative dimension in its external relations through promoting the establishment of European norms for the practice of international community. Utilisation of political conditionality has a strategic instrumental impact on projecting core values of the EU within the Mediterranean macro-region. Success of political conditionality depends on its linkage to the financial assistance. So far the EU has put strategic objectives in front of concerns for human rights and democracy; therefore, undermining core objectives of the Barcelona Process. The biggest challenge of EFP in the region is to deepen the bottom-up socialisation on the level of local civil society groups and to compliment it with the involvement of top level governmental officials in social learning process.

The EMP was perceived on the part of the EU as an instrument to ensure stability of its southern frontier and prevent security risks related to illegal immigration, organised crime, trafficking in drugs and human beings, and terrorism. However, the thesis has illustrated that the idea of bringing the region divided by conflicts together under the EMP is too ambitious due to its instrumental nature hindered by lack of structures, deficiencies in the area of governance, and
shortcomings in trans-Mediterranean market integration. Complementarity of two dimensions of the Barcelona Process can be contested as “one size fits all” approach is not applicable in the Southern Mediterranean due to tremendous differences in political, economic and social conditions among different countries of the region. The question of an enhanced co-ownership of the process has repeatedly been brought up over the last years and is vital for the Barcelona Process not to be perceived as serving European interests. However, textual analysis of the EU documents and interviews with the EU officials shows that the rationale behind the Barcelona Process is to address European problems, and than the concerns of its neighbours.

In the context of contemporary history the region is perceived through the prism of negative discourses of “Islamic threat”, “fortress Europe”, and the “clash of civilisations”. Contested nature of the local (authoritarian) political traditions constantly comes up in the European political discourse, and prevents cultural rapprochement. In recent years the European Commission with support of some member states is acting as an agent of cultural rapprochement between North and South emphasising the role of the Mediterranean as a “cradle of great civilisations” trying to overcome stereotypes of the region as a politically unstable “conflict-ridden zone”.

The vision of the new launched Union for the Mediterranean represents a shift to the more coherent strategy of the EU towards the region. The process of making foreign policy initiative at the European level could evolve because of two main factors: active involvement of France acting as a “believer”, and presence of common understanding of interests between all member states and EU institutions. The analysis of the nature of EFP making demonstrates the following logic: the articulation of new political and security perceptions pushed the region up on the EU agenda; the most effective entrepreneurship is provided by a single member state, though working in conjunction with the Commission and other member states. Content analysis has shown that public discourse around the project is compounded of two main streams: the EU’s rhetoric of “deepening and upgrading” the relations and uncertainty of analysts on how innovative the new approach will
be. Almost equal distribution of positive and negative characteristics is evidence that the press on both shores of the Mediterranean sends mixed messages creating confusion to the public.

The division between Europe and the Mediterranean is not necessary but contingent. The identity building process suggests that the sense of “otherness” existing in the relationship between the partners should be substituted with common understandings and interests. In the vision of the Union for the Mediterranean normative dimension of values transposition is not actively present as these issues divide the region rather than bring it together, instead it offers the partners an opportunity to solve common problems (energy, ecological) and to build common understandings based on strengthening people-to-people contacts through scientific and cultural exchanges. The socio-cultural dimension is the missing link between the normative approach and the security considerations of the EU. In the light of these findings, one of the most efficient ways to construct an area of peace, security and stability is cooperation in the matters of “low politics” such as education and culture aiming at establishment of a shared identity on the basis of which the EU will be able to address and manage political and economic transition of the region.
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