Democratic Regime Types and the International Risk-taking of Democracies: Comparing the United States and Great Britain

By Eszter Simon

Thesis submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Political Science, Central European University

Supervisor
Tamás Meszerics, Central European University

PhD Committee
András Bozóki (Chair), Professor, Central European University
Paul Roe, Associate Professor, Central European University
A. Cooper Drury, Associate Professor, University of Missouri-Columbia

Budapest, Hungary 2008
Abstract

It is almost a commonplace to claim today that democracies, at least, vis-à-vis each other, are more peaceful than autocracies. But are all democracies equally peaceful? This dissertation contends that parliamentary and presidential systems do differ in their international risk-taking propensity and offers a new institutionalist explanation for why it is so.

The explanation is based on two assertions: the first is that the differences in the logic of accountability between the two democratic regime types determine how they behave at the international scene. After throwing light on the lack of attention paid to the actual constellation of political forces in the characterization of regime types in comparative politics, accountability of the executive is conceptualized along two dimensions: the separation of powers, that is, static dimensions of democratic institutions (term of office, executive-legislative relations, authority of the chief executive in the cabinet); and the separation of purpose, which is an approximation of actual political circumstances.

The second point of departure in the explanation is that the relationship between accountability and international risking-taking (operationalized as war fighting) is non-linear. While both the democratic peace and diversionary theory literatures have previously linked accountability to risk-taking behavior, their claims are contradictory with respect to the direction of the relationship. Whereas democratic peace asserts that more executive constraints lead to more peaceful behavior, the diversionary literature finds that constraints on the executive (or the negative domestic standing of executives) make them want to divert attention and rally public support by engaging in wars. Resolving the dilemma between these opposite claims, I suggest that some constraints make states behave in a risk-averse manner, while other constraints propel international risk-taking. In other words, accountability to the electorate reduces risk-taking, while combining it with indirect accountability through the political elite – the cabinet and the legislative branch – encourages risk-taking.

It is prospect theory that helps clarify the conditions under which this curvilinear relationship occurs. In short, prospect theory predicts risk-taking behavior when people see things as losses and risk-aversion when things are seen as gains. I argue that presidential systems are less likely to find themselves in the domain of losses because periodical popular accountability at fixed elections, the lack of executive dependence on the legislature in between elections, and the non-threatening character of the cabinet for presidential survival in office makes presidential executives less sensitive to the existence of the separation of purpose. That is to say, presidents are less vulnerable to adverse political conditions at home. Hence, I hypothesize that when presidents take the risk of war, they are likely to do so on the basis of a loss frame induced by international conditions – as predicted by realism – and not on the basis of adverse domestic conditions.

As opposed to this, prime ministers are constrained by the cabinet, the legislature and the public since a substantial opposition in either could lead to their immediate loss of office. Hence they are much more sensitive to domestic political problems. Therefore, I expect that under conditions of separation of purpose, parliamentary regimes behave differently than presidential ones and are likely to base their war decisions as much on domestic as international factors.

The approach taken is qualitative. The empirical analysis is limited to the period of the cold war and examines only the necessary conditions of risk-taking. It controls for the influence of personality, party ideology, and conflict intensity and includes wars under both domestically safe and adversarial conditions. It examines three American (Korea 1950-1953, Dominican Republic 1965, and Grenada 1983) and three British (Malaya 1948-1957, Kenya 1952-1956, and Suez 1956) wars to trace the causes of international risk-taking.
Case studies provide support for the hypotheses, but minor modifications appear to be in order. American presidents indeed base their decision on international factors, but the picture in Britain is more nuanced. First, besides unpopularity and/or a precarious majority in the House of Commons, a credible challenger must emerge in the cabinet so that the prime minister risks war to preserve his job at home. As opposed to expectations, the emergence of a credible challenger in the cabinet is rather the consequence of than the prerequisite for a divided cabinet. Low-intensity conflicts do not appear to be adequate for a rival to risk his career and emerge to challenge the prime minister.

All in all, the findings support the claim that the relationship between accountability and regime type is curvilinear. Moreover, the present conceptualization of accountability can be expanded to explain the difference in risk-taking among autocratic and democratic regimes, and, thus, resolve the dilemma of the existence of some constraints on non-democratic leaders. In autocracies, the leader faces accountability through the political elite that propels risk-taking, but not accountability to the electorate through free and fair elections, which would discourage international risk-taking. The findings also suggest that the lack of unequivocal findings in the diversionary literatures may be, at least in part, due to the literature’s strong focus on the United States. In other words, diversion has been examined most in a context where it is least likely to occur.
Acknowledgments

As this dissertation is finished at last, it is time to take stock and express my gratitude to everyone who, in one way or another, helped me in the process of researching and writing this dissertation. Most importantly, I would like to convey my heartfelt thanks to my supervisor, Tamás Meszerics. He patiently read my often-clumsy thoughts and murky arguments, pointing out where I went astray and suggesting improvements. He also deserves my thanks for taking all the jokes I have made at his expense with good humor. It certainly added fun to the perspiration and misery of researching and writing this dissertation.

An equally enthusiastic thank you is due to my sister, Ágnes Simon. She provided me with shelter in the United States for two months in the fall of 2006, which made it possible for me to research my American case studies. She was ready for a dialogue about this work whenever I got stuck in the process but was too proud to bother my supervisor. I am also grateful to her for reading the first full draft from cover to cover and commenting on it. I am only hoping that when her time comes to submit her PhD dissertation, I will be able to pay her back. Above all, I want to thank her just for being my sister: critical and a source of competition, but also witty and always a great company.

I also would like to express my thanks to Central European University that provided me with a scholarship, employment when the scholarship ran out, and various grants. The doctoral research grant was particularly instrumental in researching my British case studies at the Public Records Office in London. I must also mention the Institute of International Relations and European Studies at Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia for offering me a generous full-time position for the last year of my dissertation project. It was a particular joy to work with my colleague, Gabriela Pleschová.

Finally, I thank my parents for tolerating my long hours and irritability; András Bozóki for all the support and help he has given throughout the years; Valentina Dimitrova-Grajzl and Alex Fischer for being the greatest bosses one can have; Marvin Overby, who showed me that political science was a worthy pursuit; Barbara Falk for always asking the dreaded question of “Have you finished it, yet?”; and my friends at home and around the world for not getting too angry with me when I appeared to ignore them in the pursuit of my PhD.
Table of Contents

List of Figures and Tables ........................................................................................................ vi
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................ vii

Chapter 1: Introduction............................................................................................................. 1
  1.1 Puzzle and Research Question ....................................................................................... 1
  1.2 Analytical Approach: New Institutionalism ................................................................... 3
  1.3 Plan of the Dissertation ................................................................................................. 7

Chapter 2: Literature Review and the Dependent Variable...................................................... 9
  2.1 Literature Review ......................................................................................................... 9
    2.1.1 Democratic Peace ................................................................................................. 9
    2.1.2 Diversionary Use of Force ................................................................................ 18
  2.2 Dependent Variable: Risk Attitude .............................................................................. 28
    2.2.1 Expected Utility Theory and Risk ......................................................................... 29
    2.2.2 Risk and the Sociocognitive Approach ............................................................... 35
    2.2.3 Prospect Theory ................................................................................................. 36
    2.2.4 Operationalizing the Dependent Variable .......................................................... 42

Chapter 3: Independent Variable, Hypotheses and Case Selection ........................................ 52
  3.1 Independent Variable: Democratic Regime Types ....................................................... 52
    3.1.1 The Normative Debate ....................................................................................... 52
    3.1.2 Definitions of Regime Type in the Literature ....................................................... 58
    3.1.3 Re-conceptualizing Regime Type ....................................................................... 61
  3.2 Hypotheses ................................................................................................................. 67
    3.2.1 Assumptions and Limitations ............................................................................. 67
    3.2.2 Hypotheses ....................................................................................................... 68
    3.2.3 Presidentialism and Foreign Policy .................................................................... 71
    3.2.4 Parliamentarism and Foreign Policy ................................................................. 75
    3.2.5 Investigating Risk-taking ................................................................................... 80
  3.3 Case selection ............................................................................................................. 83
    3.3.1 Country Cases .................................................................................................... 83
    3.3.2 Constraints Due to Differences in Power Status ................................................. 84
    3.3.3 Time Frame: The Cold War .............................................................................. 86
    3.3.4 The Population of Cases ..................................................................................... 87
    3.3.5 The Sample ....................................................................................................... 88
    3.3.6 Selected Cases .................................................................................................. 104

Chapter 4: Low Intensity Conflicts and Presidential Decision-making: Interventions in the Dominican Republic and Grenada ......................................................... 105
  4.1 Dominican Republic ................................................................................................. 105
    4.1.1 A Short History of the American Intervention in the Dominican Republic .......... 105
    4.1.2 The Domestic Political Situation ....................................................................... 109
    4.1.3 The Decision to Intervene in the Dominican Republic ........................................ 110
    4.1.4 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 120
  4.2 Grenada ..................................................................................................................... 121
    4.2.1 A Short History of American Intervention in Grenada ........................................ 121
    4.2.2 The Domestic Political Situation ....................................................................... 125
    4.2.3 The Decision to Intervene in Grenada ............................................................... 126
    4.2.4 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 134

Chapter 5: A High Intensity Conflict and Presidential Decision-making: The Korean War ........................................................................................................ 136
  5.1 A Short History of the Korean War .............................................................................. 136
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>The Domestic Political Situation</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>The Decision to Intervene</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.1</td>
<td>Reasons to Intervene</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.2</td>
<td>The Role of Domestic Politics</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>The Decision to Go North</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.1</td>
<td>Reasons for Crossing the 38th Parallel</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.2</td>
<td>The Role of Domestic Politics</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.1</td>
<td>A Short History of British Presence and the Emergency in Malaya</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.2</td>
<td>The Domestic Political Situation</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.3</td>
<td>The Decision to Fight in Malaya</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.4</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.1</td>
<td>A Short History of British Presence and the Emergency in Kenya</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.2</td>
<td>The Domestic Political Situation</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.3</td>
<td>The Decision to Fight in Kenya</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.4</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>A Short History of the Suez Crisis</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>The Domestic Political Situation</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>The Decision to Fight Egypt</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.1</td>
<td>Catering for the Preferences of the Whole Cabinet</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.2</td>
<td>The War Coalition Unravels</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.3</td>
<td>Convincing the Cabinet to Fight</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.4</td>
<td>Cabinet Rebellion and the Emergence of a Challenger</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Figures and Tables

Tables

Table 1  Percentage of wars fought in the light of all military conflicts  p. 3  
Table 2  The death criteria in inter-, extra- and intra-state wars in the COW project  p. 49  
Table 3  Combination of separations of purpose and powers by Haggard and McCubbins  p. 64  
Table 4  Systemic effect on the number of wars fought  p. 87  
Table 5  British wars, 1945-1990  p. 87  
Table 6  American wars, 1945-1990  p. 88  
Table 7  British wars in the light of domestic factors  p. 89  
Table 8  American wars in the light of domestic factors  p. 90  
Table 9  British wars according to the party affiliation of prime ministers and conflict type  p. 93  
Table 10  American wars according to the party affiliation of presidents and conflict type  p. 94  
Table 11  Presidential (US) and prime ministerial (GB) leadership styles  p. 102  
Table 12  British wars classified according to conflict intensity  p. 103  
Table 13  American wars classified according to conflict intensity  p. 103  
Table 14  British wars in the light of leadership style and party affiliation of the prime minister, war intensity and type  p. 104  
Table 15  American wars in the light of leadership style and party affiliation of the president, war intensity and type  p. 104

Figures

Figure 1  Prospect theory’s subjective utility function  p. 37  
Figure 2  Separation of purpose and powers as continuous variables  p. 65  
Figure 3  The contended relationship between executive constraints and the degree of risk taken (~ number of wars fought)  p. 69  
Figure 4  The conditions of separation of purpose in parliamentary governments  p. 78  
Figure 5  Visual representation of cases regarding separations of powers and purpose  p. 92
## List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCOW</td>
<td>Behavioral Correlates of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIGS</td>
<td>Chief of Imperial General Staff (Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COW</td>
<td>Correlates of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOKA</td>
<td>National Organization of Cypriot Fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU theory</td>
<td>Expected Utility theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRUS</td>
<td>Foreign Relations of the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMG</td>
<td>His/Her Majesty’s Government (Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KADU</td>
<td>Kenya African Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAR</td>
<td>King’s African Rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAU</td>
<td>Kenya African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCA</td>
<td>Kikuyu Central Association (Kenya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>Malay Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIC</td>
<td>Militarized Interstate Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID</td>
<td>Militarized Interstate Dispute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPAJA</td>
<td>Malay People’s Anti-Japanese Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NJM</td>
<td>New Jewel Movement (Grenada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSDD</td>
<td>National Security Decision Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECS</td>
<td>Organization of Eastern Caribbean States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIG</td>
<td>Restricted Interagency Group (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCUA</td>
<td>Suez Canal Users’ Association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Puzzle and Research Question

As the Second World War ended and the primary issue in US executive politics became the reorganization of the defense and intelligence communities, then-Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal wished to stir the American system of presidential preeminence toward British type collegiality, which he believed to be superior to presidentialism. He seriously questioned President Truman’s competence in foreign policy and sought to counterbalance it by a move toward collegial decision-making.\(^1\) Accordingly, Forrestal proposed the creation of the National Security Council (NSC) out of his admiration for the British Committee on Imperial Defense. Forrestal hoped that, similarly to its British counterpart, the NSC would not only serve the president, but would also act “independently on many matters under the direction of a presidential assistant who enjoyed powers analogues to those of the British Cabinet Secretary.”\(^2\)

However, President Truman believed that such a body would not only restrict the scope of presidential prerogatives in (foreign) policy-making but was also contrary to the American tradition of presidentialism. As a result, Truman, who had a deep respect for the American political tradition, refused to take the NSC for more than a purely advisory body.\(^3\)

Regardless of the success of his propositions, Forrestal did not only express his distrust of President Truman’s abilities but touched upon the normative issue of what is the best form of democratic government. Forrestal was, however, not alone in concerns about the best form of government for the United States. While Americans generally believe that their system of government should be the example of democratic government adopted elsewhere, many – especially political scientists – hold the British parliamentary government in at least equally

---


\(^2\) Hoopes and Brinkley 1992, 353-354.

high esteem. For one, political scientist and future president, Woodrow Wilson, went so far as
to propagate the adoption of British style parliamentary or committee government in the US.\textsuperscript{4}
But while Wilson’s concern was more general, Forrestal’s did not look any further than the
realm of foreign policy.

This question has lost none of its relevance in the past fifty years since Forrestal
formulated his ideas. It is especially timely today when the present American administration
has already engaged in two wars. Current events, indeed, suggest a conclusion similar to that
of Forrestal. While at the outset President George W. Bush’s wars have found meager
opposition within the federal government (Congress included),\textsuperscript{5} his chief ally, British Prime
Minister Tony Blair’s political life has been rendered more difficult by ministerial
resignations and threats of backbench rebellion even if neither of these were serious enough to
prevent Blair from entering the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In addition, finding out whether different democratic institutional arrangements foster
different degrees of risk-taking, hence propel either more peaceful or more aggressive
behavior, internationally has its practical relevance in a world where democracy is routinely
exported. If various democratic institutions influence the international risk-taking behavior of
states in different ways, then it may not be entirely immaterial which specific democratic
institutional set-up is exported into countries that have been known for their aggressive or
threatening behavior \textit{vis-à-vis} other states.

Forrestal’s propositions are not without its ironies. To be sure, the underlying logic of
Forrestal’s idea is appealing: a single-headed executive should be more tightly controlled by
the introduction of more restrictive accountability mechanism on the chief-executive officer in
order to prevent foreign policy decisions be based on whims and skills of one person. Most

argument see, Lijphart 1992, 72-74, 105.

\textsuperscript{5} Opposition only started to build up slowly and only when the war appeared to be a futile effort.
strikingly, however, empirical evidence is counter-intuitive: after a quick glimpse at aggregate level data provided by the *Correlates of War (COW)* project, the presidential system – not cabinet government – is found more risk-averse in its international behavior, because the US fought a smaller number of wars than Britain ever since 1816. This conclusion holds even if data is divided by the date when there was a shift from the multi-polar international system to the bi-polar structure of the cold war (table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1816 – 1945</strong></td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1945 – 1989</strong></td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1. Percentage of wars fought in the light of all military conflict**

Data collected by Herbert Tillema on military interventions point to the same conclusion. Not taking into account the number of conflicts states had to face, he listed Great Britain with the greatest number of foreign military interventions – sixty one in the period of 1945-85. As opposed to this, the United States ranks only sixth with mere sixteen interventions.

### 1.2 Analytical Approach: New Institutionalism

In its approach, this study about the role of democratic institutions in international risk-taking falls within the broad framework of new institutionalism. While new institutionalism is not a "unified body of thought," incorporating a variety of different approaches, it nonetheless shares a common subject matter and a theoretical core. As for its subject matter, all sub-variants try to answer the questions what role political institutions play in the determination of

---

social and political outcomes; how and why institutions are formed; how and why they change; and explicitly or implicitly all approaches have a view of what a good institution is like. It is the first of these topics – how institutions influence social and political outcomes – that is relevant for the purposes of this dissertation.

What is common in all new institutionalist approaches is perhaps best understood by comparing them to those two approaches in reaction to which it was born – old institutionalism and behaviorism. First, as opposed to legalistic and descriptive old institutionalism, new institutionalism is “enthusiastic about developing theories” and start out its analyses from theoretical propositions. It does not require any one theory, only that analysis be grounded in some theoretical framework. As opposed to behaviorism, it calls attention to the role institutions play in determining political outcomes and the formation of individual goals, strategies and preferences. In addition, it insists that the state is not a neutral broker and through its web of institutions it influences individual preference formation, and, thus, collective outcomes cannot be equated with the sum of individual preferences. It claims more than that institutions are another factor or that institutions also matter. Rather it asserts that “political institutions are the variable that explains most in political life.” Yet, it does not believe that that other factors (e.g. class structure, group dynamics, socio-economic development, diffusion of ideas) play no role in political choice.

New institutionalism also represents a middle ground between behaviorism and old institutionalism, trying to find a way to analyze both formal political institutions and the

---

11 Lowndes 2002, 95 and 102.
Partly as a result of defining its mission in both formal and informal terms, it is no small problem for institutionalist approaches to determine what ‘political institutions’ are. To begin with, various new institutionalists prefer different definitions. Rational choice institutionalists go for the minimal definition, seeing institutions as equilibrium conditions in the pursuit of optimal social action. In contrast, social/sociological institutionalists represent the other end of the spectrum, including symbol systems, moral templates and cognitive scripts in their understanding of institutions. By doing away with the traditional division between culture and institutions and using an all-inclusive definition of institutions, sociological institutionalists run the risk of conceptual stretching.

Therefore a middle ground between these appears to be desirable, which is found in the widely accepted definition of Peter Hall. His definition also forms the basis of historical institutionalism. Opting for the historical institutionalists’ understanding of institutions is further justified given that this project shares many of the views of this particular subvariant of institutionalism. Hall defines institutions as “the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy.” That is, the task of the researcher is to unearth the explicitly or tacitly expressed specific rules of behavior that are usually followed by agents. These rules are distinct from habits and rules of thumb. Rules are there not only to be obeyed but also to be broken although rule breaking involves (a threat of) punishment.

Three additional features of historical institutionalism are relevant in the context of this dissertation. First, power is a central concept for historical institutionalists. Power and the

---

16 Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 3; Lowndes 2002, 98.
17 Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 2.
18 Peters 1999, 53-54; Hall and Taylor 1996, 944-945. Cf. Thelen and Steinmo (1992, 7) who claim that rational choice approaches see institutions as simply the context that influences and constrains behavior.
19 Hall and Taylor 1996, 949.
asymmetries of power play an important role in their studies that call attention to how institutions distribute power unevenly among social/political actors and how this uneven distribution of power influences social/political outcomes. One way to put the main assertion of this dissertation is that presidential and parliamentary systems represent different dynamics with regard to the power relations between relevant actors in foreign policy-making.

Second, this study shares the analytical tools of the rational choice variant of historical institutionalism. Rational choice carries over to historical institutionalism in its soft form, using the concepts of cost-benefit analysis, maximization and optimization but without engaging in any formal mathematical exercise. Where however this and many historical institutionalist accounts differ from rational choice institutionalism is that historical institutionalism is much more permissive with regard to the assumption about the instrumental rationality of human beings.

It treats individuals as boundedly rational – satisficers rather than utility maximizers. Such a view allows for suboptimal choices as a result of cost-benefit analysis and also leaves room for institutional inefficiencies and unintended consequences. It must however be stressed that it is not necessarily the task of this dissertation to see if one or the other democratic regime-type is more likely to produce ‘wrong’ decisions even if for the sake of the clarity of analysis it may be impossible to avoid a statement if the decision was ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in some cases. Third, the argument of this dissertation about the role of democratic institutions in international risk-taking is close to the path-dependency argument of historical institutionalism that claims that an institutional choice at one point in time influences subsequent choices.

Finally, unlike old institutionalism that aimed at the holistic comparison of political systems, new institutionalism works at the level of mid-range theory and analyzes cross-

\[23\] Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 2; Hall and Taylor 1996, 940-941.
\[24\] For more on this dissertation’s relationship to rational choice and individual rationality, see below in pages 29-34 below.
country differences through the use of intermediate-level institutions. It usually focuses on some component of political institutions, such as the electoral system, tax and benefit system, or cabinet decision-making. For instance, instead of analyzing how the British Ministry of Defense works, it is more likely to examine such things as decision-making, budgetary or procurement procedures.  

1.3 Plan of the Dissertation

I argue that under certain conditions parliamentary democracies are more risk-taking than presidential ones. To this end, the dissertation is structured in the following way. Chapter two reviews the two bodies of literature that form the theoretical starting point for this dissertation: democratic peace and the diversionary use of force. Chapter two also establishes the relationship and contribution of this dissertation to these research programs. Finally, the chapter finishes with the discussion of the existing approaches to dependent variable – international risk-taking - and the explication of the definition used here.

Chapter three provides the theoretical background of my analysis. First, it reviews the literature related to the independent variable – regime types – and suggests an alternative definition, which is indispensable in being able to state the hypotheses. Chapter two continues with the delineation of the hypothesis and the explanatory mechanism driving the relationship between regime type and risk-taking. It concludes with establishing the universe of cases, the selection criteria for case studies, and the actual selection of cases to be examined.

In chapters four and five I test my hypotheses on three instances of presidential risk-taking in the form of three American war involvements. In chapters six and seven, I trace the process of decision-making in three British wars, that is, in three instances of risk-taking by

26 Lowndes 2002, 97-8,100; Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 6, 10-11.
(majoritarian) parliamentary regimes. Chapter eight summarizes the findings, ponders over the conclusions and insights gained in the process of investigation.
Chapter 2: Literature Review and the Dependent Variable

2.1 Literature Review

2.1.1 Democratic Peace

Investigating the war-proneness of states is the subject of democratic peace theory. Democratic peace theory represents an alternative and a challenge to the realist school in international relations, claiming and investigating the relationship between a within-state variable and the international behavior of states, namely regime type and war. It contends that democracies are more peaceful than autocratic regimes. Although Immanuel Kant is credited to be the first to state the democratic peace hypothesis, ideas about the peacefulness of democracies had been present much earlier. Ironically, Thucydides, who is often seen as the father of realism, already speculated about the peacefulness of democracies albeit only when it came to fighting one another.

Nonetheless it took a long while until theoretical claims were investigated empirically. The first such article was published by Dean Babst in 1964, but its results were discarded by Small and Singer in 1976. Parallel to these pioneering works, a separate and more general research agenda on the foreign policies of states rather than only peace and war thrived in 1960s and early 1970s. These studies reported striking differences between the degree of conflict in the foreign policy of democracies and non-democracies. However, because of their generality these works were mostly ignored when research intensified in investigating the connection between war and regime type in the early 1980s. Ever since, democratic peace theory has been a widely popular area of research that has generated a huge body of literature in the last three decades.²⁷

A more general (monadic) and a more specific (dyadic) proposition have been investigated by this literature. The monadic version claims that in general democracies fight fewer wars than non-democratic regimes while the dyadic one postulates that democracies are more peaceful but only *vis-à-vis* each other. Of these, the latter found general support to the point that Jack Levy could write in 1994 that “the idea that democracies almost never go to war with each other is now commonplace.” The validity of the monadic version is much more disputed although a few authors, such as MacMillan, Leeds and Davis, and Ray, have not yet given up on this more general formulation. Yet, democracies have been found to be as war-prone as non-democracies when it came to fighting autocratic regimes. Moreover, not all democracies and wars fall within the scope of the theory: transition democracies are found extremely war-prone.

**2.1.1.1 Methodological Issues and the Causes of Democratic Peace**

Scholars studying the democratic peace phenomenon do not only investigate the mere correlation of the two variables, but also try to say something about how democracy leads to peace. In general, two groups of explanations have developed – a structural and a normative one. Researchers still debate which model is the superior. For example, Bueno de Mesquita et. al., Weitsman and Schambaugh, Prins, Ravlo, Prins and Sprecher, and Morgan and Campbell find more support for the structural model. Others, such as Owen, Dixon, Maoz and Russett, contend that the normative model performs better.

---


The structural model offers an explanation rooted in democratic political institutions. International action necessitates the mobilization of domestic public support, which is more difficult in democracies where the democratic political process must be respected. This process of legitimization may be overridden only in exceptional, emergency situations. The normative argument contends that democracies externalize their norms of competition and conflict-resolution, that is, compromise. However, in the anarchic international system when one party to a conflict is a non-democracy, the non-democratic norms prevail over democratic ones. In other words, survival enjoys priority over democratic norms. An alternative normative explanation assesses the influence of liberalism or liberal norms, rather than more general democratic values.

However, the causal mechanism is still heavily debated. Indeed, there are several issues that hinder theory development. To begin with, the democratic peace literature is overwhelmingly quantitative that does not serve theory development well. The small number of qualitative studies investigate the same handful of historical events: the Fashoda crisis, the Spanish-American war, American occupation of the Philippines, the Boer war and

References:


the participation of Finland in World War II. There are only a handful of more original case studies such as Muppidi’s analysis of India’s foreign relations with China, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the United States.

The overwhelmingly quantitative nature of the democratic peace research program not only makes theory development difficult, but also offers the opportunity to the critics to attribute findings to the specific definitions of democracy and war used by researchers. Some call attention to the fact that Kant appears to be a poor starting point: he theoretized about republics, which are states endowed with a constitution that guaranteed the separation of executive and legislative powers, freedom for citizens who were subjects to a single legislative body and equal before law, not about today’s more general concept of democracy. Democracy is often equated with the narrower category of liberal democracy. Moreover, democratic peace is ahistorical, because it fails to note that the meaning of democracy has changed over time, making the criteria stricter as decades passed. Because there were only a few countries that met the democracy criteria before the twentieth century or even before 1945, any studies examining the period of 1816-to-present, in reality examine the relations of the post-1945 era.

---

The definition and operationalization of war is not spared, either. The habit of using only inter-state wars but not colonial, civil and ethnic wars are also disputed.\footnote{Layne 1994, 40; Barkawi and Laffey 2001, 10; Barkawi 2001; Doyle 1996, 13. Mann, Michael. 2001. “Democracy and Ethnic War.” In Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, eds. Democracy, Liberalism, and War. Rethinking the Democratic Peace Debate. Boulder and London: Lyne Rienner Publishers, 67-86; Ravlo et. al. 2003 is the only study of democratic peace and extra-state wars.} Using militarized interstate disputes (MID) to examine wars requires that the “factors leading to a MID at any level of conflict are the same as those leading to war.” This is unlikely to be so.\footnote{Goldsmith 2006; 534-535.} Others assert that the correlation between regime type and war-pronness is due to limiting studies to overt military involvement, leaving covert action out of consideration.\footnote{Maoz and Russett 1993, 120-124.} Spiro calls into question the rationale of studying wars altogether. Despite realist claims that conflict and, its possible manifestation, war, is the natural state of affairs in international relations, war appears to be a rather rare phenomenon. So rare, he claims, that its probability is not distinguishable from zero. Consequently, the difference between democracies and non-democracies in their war-fighting is simply meaningless.\footnote{Spiro 1994. See also Ray 1995, 23; Owen 1994, 88; Layne 1994, 39; Farber and Gowa 1995, 137.} Although Layne and Oren dispute the direction of causation between regime type and war, Reiter’s statistical study did not support such a claim.\footnote{Layne 1994, 44. Oren 1995, 266,150-151; Reiter, Dan. 2001. “Does Peace Nurture Democracy?” The Journal of Politics 63 (3): 935-948.} Finally, poverty, international institutions, alliance patterns, power status, geographical contiguity, political stability, economic prosperity, and economic interdependence are plausible rival explanation for peace among nations.\footnote{Goldsmith 2006, 534; Russett et al 1993, 25-30; Maoz and Russett 1993, 626-627. On economic interdependence see for example Oneal, John and Bruce Russett. 1999. “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992.” World Politics 52 (1): 1-37.}

However, many of these criticisms are somewhat unfair or border on the extreme. First, quantitative studies do control for alternative explanations. Second, to claim that the probability of war approaches zero and, consequently, is not worthy of study stretches the argument too far even if it is definitely true that war is a rather rare occurrence. Of all dyads,
only 1% account for wars and the difference between the probability of war in all democratic and mixed democratic dyads is .1% but statistically significant.\textsuperscript{49} Moreover, the immense financial and human costs that are associated with wars make wars in themselves a worthy subject of research. Third, Ray argues that the similarity of democracy definitions is not due to the liberal bias but to the fact that “there is kind of a ‘core meaning’ to the term, the content of which is agreed upon by a rapidly increasing community of scholars.”\textsuperscript{50} Excluding covert action is reasonable since opting for covert operation is born out of the realization that neither institutional nor normative support can be received for the initiation of overt wars. More centrally for this dissertation covert action is simply the manifestation of the acknowledgement of trying to avoid the risk associated with open warfare.

\textbf{2.1.1.2 Diversity in the Literature}

Apart from the central theme of research and common methodological problems, substantial variation exists within the literature. Even though most studies examine the 1816-2000 period or its subset, Russett and Antholisi explore the applicability of democratic peace to ancient Greek city states. Their finding lends weak support to democratic peace in ancient Greece at best. Yet it is unclear if this is a reflection on the theory itself or a result of the incompleteness of the recoverable data.\textsuperscript{51} Starr argues that democratic peace lives up to Deutsch’s definition and requirements of a security community and, thus, conceptually, is a subset of integration theory.\textsuperscript{52} Others contend that democracy is a perceptual issue. In other words, the conflict

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{49} Ray 1995, 22-27 and especially 203-204. Figures, however, depend on the method of estimation. Restricting the universe of cases to MIDs where a war decision for or against had to be made, 9.5% of dyads fall under the scope of democratic peace theory. Morgan and Campbell 1991, 196.
\textsuperscript{50} Ray 1995, 88-89. See also Prins 2003, 68.
\textsuperscript{51} Russett et. al. 1993, chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{52} Starr 1997.
\end{footnotesize}
behavior of democracies is not a result of whether the other country is a democracy in objective terms, but whether it is perceived as one.\textsuperscript{53}

Russett, Ember and Ember find support for democratic peace in non-industrial societies.\textsuperscript{54} Morgan and Schwebach suggest that it may not be either norms or institutions but rather norms and institutions that explain democratic peace.\textsuperscript{55} Some studies extend democratic peace beyond wars: for example Hermann and Kegley, and Leeds and Davis analyze the democratic peace hypothesis with regard to the broader conceptual categories of foreign military interventions and foreign policy behavior, respectively.\textsuperscript{56} Rousseau et. al. conclude that while democracies are no more peaceful than autocracies once a crisis erupts, they are less likely to initiate international crises.\textsuperscript{57} Even other studies speculate that democratic peace may be a regional phenomenon of Western Europe and North America,\textsuperscript{58} but surprisingly, according to Goldsmith, the relationship between democracy and conflict proves significant with regard to Latin America only.\textsuperscript{59} Barbieri, Goldsmith, Oneal et. al. and Bruce and Oneal call attention to the fact that Kant did not only see institutions and norms, but increased economic cooperation between states as a reason for their peacefulness. However, results on the relationship between economic interdependence and war are mixed.\textsuperscript{60} Finally, Prins explains the democratic peace phenomenon within the framework of crisis-bargaining, arguing that the more peaceful international relations of democracies are due to the


\textsuperscript{54} Russett et al. 1993, Chapter 5.


\textsuperscript{58} Barkawi and Laffey 2001.

\textsuperscript{59} Goldsmith 2006, 544.

advantages of the more open democratic process that makes them signal their intentions more clearly.  

2.1.3 Risk, Democratic Regime Types and the Democratic Peace

There are two subfields of studies that are particularly relevant for this dissertation: the one that concerns risk and the other that differentiates among democratic regimes on the basis of their war-proneness. As for the former, Weitsman and Shambaugh examine “the effect that various aspects of democracy have on the security risks states are willing to bear.” They examine risk attitude by Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman’s security-independence indicator and treat it as an intervening variable between regime type and war. As for the latter body of enquiry, the fact that most studies use scale measures of democracy (albeit most often dichotomize it in the end) easily lends itself to the idea that not all democracies are equally peaceful. Nonetheless, only a handful of (quantitative) studies have investigated the issue. Morgan and Campbell found that the stronger the decisional constraint the more likely that structural constraints prevent war but only if power status is controlled for. The finding applies to major powers, but not to minor ones for whom the relationship is negative.

Schølset argues that majoritarian democracies are not only more war-prone than consensus democracies but their crisis behavior is even more conflictual than that of non-democracies. The effect of government type is somewhat disputed. Restricting the analysis to parliamentary democracies, Prins and Sprecher find that coalition governments – rather than single party governments – are more likely to fight. Meanwhile Ireland and Gartner find no distinction between coalition and majority governments in their propensity to initiate

---

61 Prins 2003.
65 Prins and Specher 1999.
conflict. Minority governments, however, are less likely to initiate conflicts. Reiter and Tillman find the majority-coalition government variable insignificant. They are also the only ones who tested presidential vs. parliamentary regimes, however, without finding anything conclusive.

2.1.1.4 Contribution to the Democratic Peace Debate

The contribution of this dissertation to the democratic peace literature is four-fold: To begin with, it further investigates the two sub-themes of risk and the variation in democratic regime type and the peacefulness of democracies. As for risk, it differs from Weitsman and Shambough’s approach in that risk is equated with the decision for war and seeks to improve upon some of the problems present in Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman’s risk indicator.

Second, it aspires to add to the examination of the possible differences in the war-proneness within the family of democratic regimes. Third, it extends the analysis of democratic peace into the domain of extra-state wars.

Finally, using the qualitative technique of process tracing, it primarily aims at disentangling the causal mechanism between democracy and peace. It intends to specify further under what conditions democracies do fight wars. A qualitative approach makes it possible to see politics as a process and see how various factors relate to each other. This is an improvement on the democratic peace literature and, specifically, on works dealing with differences within the democratic community by engaging in conceptual development, helping to disentangle the possible causal factors. Using a qualitative approach adds some variety to the historical studies within the democratic peace framework, using heretofore

---


68 Weitsman and Shambaugh 2002.

unexamined cases. Even though using the qualitative technique of process-tracing for analysis do not remedy the problem often hidden by large numbers, that is, the fact that stable, consolidated presidential regimes have been rather rare, it, at least, does not imply in any way that conclusions were drawn on the basis of a large number of cases.\textsuperscript{20}

2.1.2 Diversionary Use of Force

The other relevant literature that deals with the link between foreign and domestic politics is referred to as political or diversionary use of force. This body of literature is based on two general ideas. The first of these is that “political leaders embark on risky foreign ventures in an attempt to achieve diplomatic or military gains that will help solve their domestic problems.”\textsuperscript{21} Second, implicit in the diversionary idea is the decision-makers’ utilization of the rally-round-the-flag effect, that is, the belief that “in times of international conflict, public support for the leadership will increase,” which will in turn enhance their chance of political survival.\textsuperscript{22}

Researchers are divided over what may link diversion and rallying. The most commonly cited explanation is the in-group/out-group hypothesis from sociology, which claims that conflict with an external enemy increases in-group (domestic) cohesion. Another explanation is the self-censorship of the opposition in times of crisis out of the fear that they are not found patriotic enough. This leaves the leader’s view uncontested. This eventual support may,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Ireland and Gartner 2001, 549.
\end{itemize}
however, be withdrawn later on. Third, in times of crisis, the population is simply more likely to view domestic institutions, including the economy, more favorably than otherwise. Finally, use of force in a foreign crisis demonstrates the competence of the leadership, hence raises their approval ratings.  

2.1.2.1 Diverting

For this dissertation, however, it is more important to see what factors trigger diversion and the utilization of the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon than what connects these two. Implicitly or explicitly, studies find the explanation in the accountability of democratic leaders. This assertion is based on the assumption that foreign policy decisions are political in nature and take place in a political context. That is, as long as the survival of the political community is not endangered, leaders are primarily motivated to retain office, which forces them to use whatever means they can to preserve their support base.

Auerswald contends that executives are accountable to the public through elections and the legislative or both. Electoral accountability appears in the diversionary use of force by examining the role of public approval/presidential popularity, the state of the economy, relations with Congress or the legislative more generally. Researchers, however, are divided whether accountability forces American presidents to divert or to the opposite. A minority of scholars claim that presidents, as they lose control of the agenda, are increasingly reluctant to

---


75 Auerswald 1999, 469-470.
initiate conflict. In other words accountability prevents them from using force. On the contrary and, in harmony with the diversionary hypothesis, the majority of scholars hypothesizes that accountability pushes presidents to use force when their popularity and Congressional support are on the wane and when the economy is in shambles, because this way they are left with a chance to preserve their job.

Recognizing the inconsistency in statistical results, several refinements have been offered. To begin with, it may not be general public and Congressional support, but partisan support by the public and Congress that drives the issue. Attention has been called to the moderating effect of ongoing war involvement. If a government is already involved in a conflict it is less likely to get involved in yet another one. Although DeRouen assumes that presidents perpetually seek to maintain their popularity, many have pointed at the cyclical nature of the pursuit of popular support.

That is, the electoral cycle is hypothesized to be an intervening factor. Nonetheless, there is less agreement as to what the effect of the electoral cycle might be. The propositions on the effect of the electoral cycle are closely related to the assumptions about the nature of

---

79 Pickering and Oneal 1991; Fordham 1998. Rallying is also less likely when the government is already involved in a war. See DeRouen 2000; Baker and Oneal 2001.
80 DeRouen 1995, 674.
the public. The liberal idea of a pacific public sees the electorate as a restricting hand at elections. Studies that support this notion conclude that wars do not appear to be a favorable election strategy. That is, leaders will generally try to avoid war when elections are impeding, but are more willing to fight right after elections. As opposed to this, the perception of the public as passionate leads to the hypothesis that the rallying effect is at place, driving decision-makers to use force when elections are close and their domestic reputation is battered. A third alternative is the idea of the protean public. Approaching elections encourages the use of force only when the public is belligerent. Results are mixed. Neither Wang nor James and Oneal find public attitude significant, while Ostrom and Job do.

The controversy over the existence and the nature of the diversionary theory pertains to every variable that have been investigated. Of the variables not discussed elsewhere in this review, the economy is particularly illustrative. DeRouen comes to the conclusion that unemployment, public concern about the economy, and the general state of the economy (misery index) lead to diversion, but inflation does not. Mitchell and Prins contest this: high inflation leads to diversion if mediated through regime type. Both Fordham and Wang agree that the misery index is significant and Meernik agrees about the effect of inflation and unemployment. Fordham adds economic growth and Meernik adds the state of the stock market to the list of significant economic variables. Meernik and Waterman find the misery index significant but the relationship is positive and not negative as expected. Finally,

---

87 Meernik and Waterman 1996.
Meernik as well as James and Hristoulas deny the effect of general economic conditions on the use of force.  

2.1.2.2 The Rally Effect

If the diversionary hypothesis is strongly contested, so is the rally-round-the-flag effect. Decision-makers may erroneously believe and researchers may erroneously insist on the existence or the importance of the rally-round-the-flag effect. It may not exist at all or its effect is small and brief. It wanes quickly: it is estimated to last no longer than six months. As for its magnitude, rallying increases the popularity of the chief executive by seven percent at the most, but may not be bigger than three or five percent. DeRouen interprets the small size of the rallying effect as a sign of the leader’s preoccupation with elite support rather than with general popular support. Nonetheless, this does not call the existence of the rallying effect into question. The idea of rallying can be reconciled with the contention that elite support rather than popular support must be maintained.

Auerswald claims that rallying is most likely to occur immediately after elections and does not happen in pre-election periods, because this is the time when the society and the elite are most divided. He also points at the long-term consequences of accountability as a factor that decreases the decision-makers’ willingness to use force abroad and utilize the rallying phenomenon in the pre-election period. Even if diversion produces rallying on the short-run, a potentially prolonged or unsuccessful effort may bring the chief executive down in the not so distant future. Therefore, a calculating democratic executive does not risk conflict and, thus,

91 DeRouen 2000; Auerswald 1999, 471.
92 Levy 1989, 278. James and Hristoulas also agree about the role of executive division in policy change. Yet, their explanation based on bureaucratic stalling and manipulation is not convincing: these are techniques that are neutral enough to be used to encourage or discourage the use of force (1994, 329-330).
defeat immediately before the election.\footnote{Auerswald 1999, 472. See also Levy 1989, 273; Morgan, Clifton T. and Christopher J. Anderson. 1999. “Domestic Support and Diversionary External Conflict in Great Britain, 1950-1992.” Journal of Politics 61 (3): 803.} This is unconvincing, as it is based on the hidden assumption that wars would be finished by the time of elections. Yet, decision-makers have very moderate control over the length of wars and interventions. Unsurprisingly, the effect of the success of the use of force is far from uncontested, but there is, at least, agreement over the negative effects of failure on job survival.\footnote{Lai and Reiter 2005; Lian and Oneal 1993; Levy 1989, 275.}

Moreover, not all conflict events may affect executive popularity to the same extent. Morgan and Anderson profess that only the use of force short of war rallies the public, because of the possibility of failure is smaller or less obvious in these conflicts.\footnote{Morgan and Anderson 1999, 803.} Contrary to this, James and Rioux conclude that of cold war conflicts the rallying is smaller in US conflicts when the USSR is not involved.\footnote{James and Rioux 1998.} Levy, Lai, and Lian and Oneal agree with this, arguing that only sufficiently intense events cause an increase in presidential popularity, that is, the public only rallies when it “perceives a direct, serious, unprovoked threat to the national interest.”\footnote{Lai and Reiter 2005, 268.} However, there is disagreement about what those conflicts may be: according to Lian and Oneal nothing short of a crisis propels rallying. According to Lai, only certain crises – wars – lead to rallying. Consequently, rallying should not be expected in low intensity uses of force, because these events carry the danger of failure without the benefits of short-term surge in public opinion. Yet, the good news is that the need for a direct, serious, and unprovoked threat makes it difficult for leaders to engineer conflicts with an eye on domestic gains.\footnote{Lai and Reiter 2005.}
Looking for the defining causes of conflict intensity, Baker and Oneal as well as Brody stress the importance of media coverage. Lian and Oneal concur, but DeRouen contests its decisive nature. He finds media attention to be characteristic of all American uses of force.\textsuperscript{99}

Davies calls of the direction of the relationship between domestic strife and public support into question. He proposed that domestic conflicts do not lead to rallying or diverting but to encapsulation. Domestic dissatisfaction could decrease the likelihood of external conflict, because the leadership is too encapsulated in handling domestic discontent and does not want to aggravate problems by engaging in yet another conflict. This is in harmony with Morgan and Anderson’s argument that certain constituents can be better mollified and rallied by domestic programs than the use of force.\textsuperscript{100} However, in his study Davies finds support for Hazelwood’s proposition. He claimed that the relationship of an inverted U-shape connects domestic strife and foreign policy. That is, low-level of strife raises the likelihood of international conflict, but high level of strife leads to low-level of external conflict engagement. Gelpi, however, could not support the curvilinearity hypothesis.\textsuperscript{101}

Nonetheless, after looking at measurement issues, it becomes obvious that neither the encapsulation hypothesis nor high level of domestic strife is particularly relevant for this dissertation. The rallying and the encapsulation propositions are driven by the difference between US-centered and cross-national studies. Since investigating the influence of domestic strife is ridden with difficulties because of the lack of data (e.g. public opinion polls), cross-national studies usually turn to variables measuring domestic violence, regime turbulence, elite unrest (jailing the opposition, martial law), mass hostilities (strikes, anti-


\textsuperscript{100} Morgan and Anderson 1999.

government demonstrations, riots, assassinations, and armed attacks. However, many of these – especially in their most extreme forms – are hardly characteristics of stable democracies. Therefore, even though the encapsulation hypothesis draws attention to an interesting problem, studies of encapsulation in their present form can offer little that is of relevance for this study.

### 2.1.2.3 Methodological Shortcomings in the Diversionary Literature

The debate over diversion and encapsulation also throws light on a more general problem in quantitative studies. Statistical investigations do not improve upon single country case studies in terms of generalizability. Since most variables are not available across nations, the remaining quantitative studies are generally single-country studies, investigating the phenomenon primarily in the United States. There are only a few exceptions. Sprecher and DeRouen studies Israel and finds modest support for diversion. More importantly to this study, Morgan and Anderson as well as Lai conduct their studies in the British context. Results are as ambiguous as in the rest of the literature. Morgan and Anderson find support for diversion and rallying, while Lai questions the existence of rallying in Britain.

Methodological problems are generally found to be the cause of the inconclusiveness of research so far. Even though many researchers acknowledge the problem, only a minority of them ascribes the controversial results to the non-existence of any relationship between domestic political problems and diversion/rallying. The majority of researchers attribute the

---

104 Sprecher and DeRouen 2002.
105 Morgan and Anderson 1999; Lai and Reiter 2005.
mismatch between theory and quantitative studies to the methodological shortcomings that plague such statistical studies.\textsuperscript{107}

Such problems are numerous. First, researchers most often study the same limited time period. Second, the reciprocal effect of variables are only noted and examined by a small number of researchers.\textsuperscript{108} Many of the variables used are highly correlated and, thus, are not independent measures.\textsuperscript{109} Third, analysis is guided by data availability rather than strict adherence to a theoretical framework. Therefore, the theoretical underpinnings, scope conditions and linkages, are insufficiently defined.\textsuperscript{110} Studies use statistical techniques (factor analysis, regression analysis) that expect a linear relationship and, thus, make linearity an implicit assumption without pondering over the possibility of a non-linear relationship.\textsuperscript{111}

Finally, despite some dialogue over what level of conflict may be more prone to diversion, relatively little attention has been paid to the conceptualization of the dependent variable. Research is based on the assumption that crises or opportunities to use force are constant features of the international system to which decision-makers can react at any time. Unfortunately, however, crises occur in a rather unpredictable pattern. A more general problem is the omission of non-events, as if non-use of force were equal to non-consideration.\textsuperscript{112}

2.1.2.4 Democratic Regime Types, Diversion, and Rallying

Variety in regime types is a marginal issue in the study of diversion. Only a handful of studies have investigated the differences among democracies and autocracies. Some studies come to the conclusion that democracies are less likely to divert than autocratic regimes, reaffirming

\begin{itemize}
  \item Levy (1989, 265) calls attention to the documentation of the phenomenon in numerous case studies as evidence for the existence of the relationship.
  \item Meernik and Waterman 1996, 585.
  \item Levy 1989, 266; Morgan and Bickers 1992, 27-28; Levy 1989, 270, 276-277; DeRouen 2000; Sprecher and DeRouen 246.
  \item Levy 1989, 272; Morgan and Anderson 1999; Morgan and Bickers 1992, 30; Hazelwood 1975, 225.
  \item Levy 1989, 281; Meernik and Waterman 1996, 575-577; Meernik 1994, 122-123.
\end{itemize}
the monadic version of democratic peace. Others conclude the opposite. Pickering and Kisangani’s conclusions are more nuanced: mature democracies, consolidating autocracies, and transitional polities are the regime types that divert and consolidating democracies do not.

Only Auerswald studies the possible differences within the democratic family. Agreeing with those who believe in the constraining power of democratic accountability structures, he argues that the likely success and failure of the use of force weighs more heavily on decision-makers who face constant threat to tenure in office. Thus, they are more careful to engage in conflict. Decision-makers under threat of legislative removal, he claims, are also reluctant to use force in non-election periods. He contends that the executive in strong presidential regimes (such as the French Fifth Republic) are the least accountable and, therefore, the most likely to engage in war for domestic political ends. They are followed by majoritarian parliamentary regimes, weak presidential regimes (such as the US), and coalition governments in parliamentary regimes, respectively. Analyzing the Suez crisis of 1956 and reactions to the Bosnian crisis in 1995, he finds that accountability in itself is an inadequate predictor. Just as I argue below, he comes to the conclusion that the particular domestic institutional setting at the time of decision must be taken into account.

Auerswald’s conceptualization of democracies suffers from the same shortcomings as the literature on democratic regime types. As I argue in the following chapter, these are the ignorance of actual political constellations and the denial of the possibility of conflict when it comes to the executive branch of a majoritarian parliamentary government. The latter problem is also present in the selection of the principal actors in various democracies. While it is clear

---

114 Davies 2002; Gelpi 1997.
that in the American context the president is the relevant actor, it is less obvious in the British context. Morgan and Anderson assume that the cabinet is the principal actor, which suggests that cabinet members have identical interests.\footnote{Morgan and Anderson 1999. See also Auerswald 1999, 478.}

### 2.1.2.5 Contribution to the Diversionary Literature

The most important contribution of this dissertation to the diversionary literature is primarily theoretical, as it refines the causal mechanisms between domestic imperatives and the international use of force. It does not question but assumes the existence of diversion and rallying and tries to find the conditions that lead to diversionary use of force or to the utilization of rallying. It does so by putting these phenomena into a wider comparative context with the use of the addition of another factor – democratic regime types – that has largely been ignored in the literature. As for the dependent variable, it introduces the concept of risk, which has only been examined by Richards et al. \textit{albeit} in a game-theoretic framework.\footnote{Richards et. al. 1993.} Levy and DeRouen allude to the possible usefulness of using Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory to the analysis of diversion especially when the political elite is its target, but do not investigate the connection between diversion and risk within prospect theory.\footnote{Levy 1989, 274; DeRouen 1995, 674.}

### 2.2 Dependent Variable: Risk Attitude

So far the words risk-taking and war were used interchangeably and in a rather cavalier fashion. It is time to define their meaning and relationship to each other. The dependent variable here is governments’ risk attitude in the international arena. War is used as a proxy to measure risk-taking behavior, because war as a choice by decision-makers is able to capture the inherently probabilistic nature of risk assessment: outcomes decision-makers weigh may or may not occur, their effect may be more or less devastating than anticipated, factors not
That is, war always introduces a random shock – although not always of the same magnitude – into the international system whose consequences are difficult to foresee. Correspondingly, a government’s decision not to opt for war but for some other solutions – negotiations, economic pressure, the sending of military advisors, providing weapons, covert action etc. – to impeding crises is equated with risk-averse behavior, precisely because these outcomes are expressions of the desire to avoid all the dangers associated with war and, thus, minimize risk.

2.2.1 Expected Utility Theory and Risk

The most common measurement of risk-attitude of states is Bueno de Mesquita and Lalaman’s risk indicator. Relying on expected utility (EU) theory, they examine the importance of risk and decision-making. In order to construct the utility function to see the expected utility of pay-offs for various options available for decision-makers in the international arena, they start out from the assumption that the chief aim of a state’s existence is to guarantee security for their citizens. Therefore, one can make inferences about decision-maker’s risk attitude by examining their willingness to trade security off for other objectives. That is, risk-taking leaders are ready to sacrifice more security for achieving some other – ideologically or domestically motivated – objectives while risk-averse decision-makers cultivate higher level of security at the expense of other objectives.


121 Boettcher takes a similar approach, identifying humanitarian interventions as risky options in absolute terms. His reasoning is slightly different though: he explains that the risk of humanitarian interventions is in that “the benefits of interventions may be unclear and/or widely distributed among free-riders and the monetary and human cost of intervention may be substantial. Boettcher, William A. III. 2004b. “Military Intervention Decisions Regarding Humanitarian Crises: Framing Induced Risk Behavior.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (3): 333.


123 Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, 293.
Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman’s approach is appealing as it makes risk-taking directly (numerically) measurable. Alliance portfolios (formal military alliance agreements) are used as revealed choices of national preferences on security issues, and risk attitudes are recovered from alliance decisions (preference orderings). This use of alliance portfolios to measure security preferences is based on the general understanding of alliances as trade-offs between security and autonomy: more security, that is, more alliance, results in less autonomy and vice versa. That is, risk-averse nations sacrifice more autonomy for security than risk-takers. In other words, risk attitudes are treated as national attributes rather than those of the individual decision-makers.

In nations’ alliance portfolios, three kinds of formal alliances are ranked according to their implied reduction in autonomy/cost: listed from the most costly to the least costly they are defense pacts (require military support of attacked ally), non-aggression and neutrality pacts (promise of non-support for the aggressor of an ally), and ententes (require consultation when ally is attacked). The least (or zero) commitment is when no promise whatsoever is made to another nation. To measure “the shared pattern of commitments,” the authors correlate the alliance portfolios of states, assuming that the more similar the revealed security preferences of two states (= alliance portfolios), the smaller the utility of a demand (the difference between winning and losing) between the two states, and consequently the less preferred is a confrontation. Large differences between alliances are thought to reveal large differences in goals. To allow for change over time in the alliance patterns of nations, correlation of portfolios are assessed on a year-by-year basis.

In accordance with expected utility theory, decision-makers are seen as rational actors, who aim at maximizing their utility. Decision-makers of a state are collapsed into a unitary actor and the units of analysis are states.¹²⁴ Interaction in the international system takes the

form of a game between two states that starts with a chance move by nature.\textsuperscript{125} In *War and Reason*, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman analyze dyads – interaction between two countries. This assumes that dyadic interaction is the chief form of interaction in the international system, which excludes third party participation from the model, but this conceptualization of international relations fits well the game theoretic model the authors apply.\textsuperscript{126}

### 2.2.1.1 Problems with the Bueno de Mesquita-Lalman Risk Indicator

Such an approach is problematic both because of the measurement/operationalization used and on theoretical grounds. As for measurement problems, while viewing international relations as dyads may be desirable from a modeling point of view, it creates a wide gap between theorizing and reality as the international system is “one network of international relations and not […] a set of dyadic interactions between nations.”\textsuperscript{127} Any state actors have to deal with numerous other states at the same time and evaluate the expected utility of foreign policy choices targeted toward another country not only in the light of that dyad but also taking into account the reactions of several other actors.\textsuperscript{128} All in all, decision-makers have to evaluate the expected utility of outcomes with regard to the wider international context not just the actual dyad.

Second, as the authors themselves acknowledge, formal military alliances only capture a small aspect of how nations relate to each other. It is not sensitive enough to follow the fluctuation in the relations of states, because not all changes in security relations will manifest themselves in a change in the alliance portfolio. Alliances portfolios only measure desire for security, and through it risk, as long as all alliances are assumed to be honored, but it is

\textsuperscript{125} Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, 31-32.
\textsuperscript{126} Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, 16, 280-281.
\textsuperscript{128} Faber 1990, 308.
clearly not so. Moreover, nations make alliances for other reasons than strictly security considerations.

Alliances as indicators of risk suffer from the limitation that follows from the small number of potential allies. Morrow also calls attention to the influence of the existing alliance patterns, geopolitical location and the distribution of power among states in a state’s ability to conclude alliances. As a result, alliances formed will not be the optimal ones but ones that improve a state’s security position *albeit* not necessarily to the desired degree. This results in an inaccuracy in the measure: the smaller the number of allies, the greater the inaccuracy.

Quite often a change in the alliance portfolio (making of new alliances or dissolving old ones) are necessarily a decision made by the country whose alliance portfolio is under scrutiny, but by one of its allies. The simplest way to demonstrate this is to imagine a situation where countries A, B, and C, are bound together by an alliance. Country A may decide to terminate the alliance as part of its mounting conflicts with B. However, such a decision by country A will also affect country C’s alliance portfolio who did not sacrifice its security but whose security was sacrificed by another country.

In addition, the status quo is conceptualized as the mid-point between winning and losing. In other words what can be won equals with what can be lost. This produces some incredible results: for instance, the Third Reich is measured as mildly risk averse whereas in reality Hitler’s Germany was extremely risk-acceptant in that it sought extreme changes in the status quo. Such unlikely results occur, because the “risk indicator […] is incapable of separating” the security and autonomy benefits that result from alliances with other revisionist nations.

130 Weitsman and Shambaugh 2002, 293.
132 Morrow 1987, 436.
There are also some problems concerning the fact that Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman equate the risk attitude of a state with the risk-attitude of the chief decision-maker. This unitary actor assumption includes the postulate that “each nation’s chief executive […] acts as if his or her welfare and the preferences of those whose support is needed to retain power were the same.” In other words, the authors postulate that domestic politics can be ignored. This position is tenable under one of two conditions. First, if the preferences of actors are homogenous. Yet, in foreign policy decision-situations where the issue to be decided is not a simple vote for or against but a complex decision problem, the likelihood of homogenous preferences are so small that it is negligible. Second, if preferences are not homogenous, they can still be treated as producing a unique preference ordering as long as the aggregating mechanism is known. However, this makes it impossible to avoid saying something about those aggregating mechanisms, that is, political institutions.

2.2.1.2 Problems with the Expected Utility Understanding of Risk

By principle, expected utility theory could accommodate the opening up of the black box of the state. Yet, some theoretical problems call into question the usefulness of the effort to incorporate domestic politics into the EU framework. It is an “as if” theory when it comes to human motivations. It assumes certain things about the behavior of people, which people often do not conform to in real life. For instance, Kahneman and Tversky demonstrate in numerous experiments that people systematically violate the transitivity, dominance, and invariance assumptions of EU theory when they make actual choices. This is unproblematic as long as our concern is predicting aggregate choices, for despite its inaccuracies the theory

---

133 Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, 16-17.
has significant predicting power, but when one wishes to say something about how people actually make decisions, it is of little help.\textsuperscript{135}

A more powerful counterargument against using expected utility theory is its conceptualization of risk. Given the concave shape of the function, EU theory predicts risk-averse behavior for everyone.\textsuperscript{136} This may be overcome by changing the shape of the utility function but even then risk-attitude must be assumed or known \textit{a priori}.\textsuperscript{137} Worse, risk is treated as if it was independent of outside circumstances.\textsuperscript{138} Yet, as Kahneman and Tversky have shown, problem presentation has a major influence on the choice people make.

To demonstrate the importance of the verbal representation, let us consider the result of an experiment made by Kahneman and Tversky. People had to make a choice between two alternative policies that were design to contain a flue epidemic that was expected to killed people. Policy A was expected to save 200 people for sure and policy B to save 600 with a probability of one-third. In the next experiment people were asked to choose between policy C that will cause 400 people to die and policy B where there was a one-third chance that no one will die. The expected value of the four options presented was the same (200 to survive or 400 to die). However, more than 70% of people choose the policy A in the first experiment and policy B in the second. The only difference between options was in the way the choice situation was framed. In the first problem set people usually opt for the sure thing, but in the second most people are willing to take the risk of the lottery. Thus, depending on how the problem was represented, people arrived at different choices.\textsuperscript{139}

This has been the point of departure for both Vertzberger’s sociocognitive approach and Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory.


\textsuperscript{136} McDermott 1998, 16.

\textsuperscript{137} See e.g. McDermott 1998, 20.

\textsuperscript{138} Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 239.

\textsuperscript{139} Kahneman and Tversky 1984, 343.
2.2.2 Risk and the Sociocognitive Approach

Vertzberger asserts the socially determined status of risk. Rather than using the economists’ distinction between risk and uncertainty, he likens the meaning of risk to that of danger, seeing risk and uncertainty as two faces of the same phenomenon. Moreover, risk-judgments are very often not congruent with the real or objective risk in the situation due to the effect of the cognitive task in the process of risk assessment, through which people arrive at an understanding of perceived risk.\(^{140}\)

After describing the attributes of risk, Vertzberger goes on to name the groups of variables that influence the outcome of risk-assessment. The first group of contextual variables contains the objective characteristics of risk. These variables are present in any rational choice models as inputs (the problem, potential solutions, probabilities and utilities of solutions). The other four groups of variables are factors that influence or distort the assessment of risk. These are cultural, personality (style, affective factors, and past experience or cognitive availability etc.), group (group hierarchy, group composition, the decision-rule etc.), and organizational variables (such as standard operating procedures of organizations etc.).\(^{141}\)

However, the methodological flaws of the sociocognitive approach never allowed this direction of research to develop beyond its explication by Vertzberger. First, while it is important to keep in mind that many other factors may influence risk-attitude than regime type or institutions, trying to incorporate too many factors is rather a liability. Worse, Vertzberger does not flash out the mechanism of causation between the groups of variables. He treats it as a positive sign of flexibility comparing his theory to lego blocks that can be arranged in myriads of ways at will. However, such a theory can account for any event, that


is, it is not falsifiable. Second, as Vertzberger acknowledges himself, the more parsimonious prospect theory has at least the same predictive power as his sociocognitive approach.[142]

Therefore, the sociocognitive approach could not offer more than prospect theory, which serves as the background theory of this dissertation.

2.2.3 Prospect Theory

Starting out from the observation that the linguistic representation of the outside environment influences the way people make sense of it, prospect theory contends that people do not evaluate choices in absolute terms but compare options to a reference point. A reference point is essentially a heuristic device that helps the decision-maker process information quickly but, at the same time, also biases the decision. While Kahneman and Tversky defined the reference point as the status quo, it may also be the status quo ante or some future expectation.[143]

Options will take up a value with regard to this reference point, depending on whether they mean an improvement (gains) or deterioration (losses) toward this reference point. This is suggestive in two ways. First, should a shift in reference point occur, a reversal of preferences among equivalent option may follow. Second, the utility function is S-shaped: in the loss domain, it is convex and in the gain domain it is concave (figure 1).

Moreover, gains and losses have different psychological effect on people. Losses always loom larger than gains as the oft-quoted statement from Jimmy Connors, the tennis player, demonstrates this point very well. “I hate to lose more than I like to win.”[144]

Consequently, people value what they have more than what they might gain and will take larger risks and make a bigger effort to avoid losses than to secure gains. This is also true in

the sense that once a risky option has been selected, decision-makers are likely to stick to it longer than the success of the chosen course of action would warrant.

![Figure 1. Prospect theory's subjective utility function](image)

However, people do not make an equal effort for every additional loss or gain: losses and gains closer to the reference point are seen as more important. Furthermore, losses stay with people longer than gains, giving them a greater level of dissatisfaction over time than the satisfaction they draw from gains. A consequence of the persistence of gains is that those who could not make peace with past losses will display a preference for risk. Hence the preoccupation with losses also influences the shape of the utility curve: it will be asymmetrical – steeper in the domain of losses.\footnote{Adopted from Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 279.}

Unlike EU theory that assumes that the evaluation of alternatives is a one-phase process,\footnote{Masters, Daniel. 2004. “Support and Non-Support for National Rebellion. A Prospect Theory Approach.” \textit{Political Psychology} 25 (5): 704-705.} prospect theory divides the decision making into a two-stage process of an editing or framing and an evaluation phase. The editing phase is where manipulation may take place in the decision-making process.\footnote{Schoemaker, Paul J. H. 1982, “The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence and Limitations.” \textit{Journal of Economic Literature} 20 (2): 532.} In the editing phase, six mental operations take place that help

define the decision situation. These are *coding* (definition of the reference point and then casting the options in terms of gains and losses), *combination* (the tendency to add together the likelihood of events that present identical outcomes), *segregation* (decision-makers focus on the aspects they find most relevant to the problem, ignoring others), *cancellation* (decision-makers ignore the dimensions in the evaluation of two alternatives that are identical), *simplification and dominance* (probabilities are not only rounded, but outcomes with small probabilities are discarded and highly likely outcomes are treated as certainties) The results of editing prospects vary, depending on the order in which the editing procedures are performed. Finally, once the editing is done, people tend to accept the formulation of options, making it quite unlikely that they would recast the situation in other terms. In the evaluation phase, the preferred option is selected after examining the edited prospects.\(^\text{149}\)

2.2.3.1 The Applicability of Prospect Theory to Politics

In spite of all the improvements on EU theory, prospect theory suffers in three respects, which are especially problematic when it comes to applying prospect theory to political phenomena. However, these may be eliminated by further research. First, a theory of framing effects is missing. The development of such a theoretical addition is helpful in seeing how alternatives are framed and option defined. If editing processes are used as assumed, because they are quick and efficient means in coming to a decision, there may be a general rule how the process of editing – if not the content – of choices emerge. Second, prospect theory was created as a theory of individual decision-making, and, in its present form it is not applicable to group decisions. This is of special importance in foreign policy, where decisions are often the results of group deliberations.

Third, although prospect theory was an improvement on EU theory as it was able to accommodate cognitive information-processing mechanism, it says nothing about the role of emotions. This is a serious shortcoming, since cognitive psychologists have already called attention to hot cognition – the fact that cognition takes place within the context of emotions. Moreover, experiments seem to suggest that emotions are not only an unavoidable nuisance in decision-making, but they also perform vital tasks in the process. Neuroscientists discovered that people who are cut off from emotional referents because of illness and accident have difficulty in making the simplest decisions about their lives.  

How much prospect theory is applicable to international relations is a matter of dispute. Even Kahneman and Tversky disagreed on this point: Kahneman believed that trying to apply prospect theory to international relations was futile while Tversky often used examples from international relations in his own work. Besides the general problems of prospect theory, importing it to areas other than economics or psychology raises several questions. Boettcher argues that prospect theory has often been applied to international relations without testing its applicability to contexts with substantial differences from the experimental conditions used in developing prospect theory. First, prospect theory is a theory of decision under risk, while foreign policy decision-situations are characterized by conditions of both risk and uncertainty. Second, unlike experimental situations, which are highly structured, foreign policy problems are (in)famously ill-structured.

In addition, there are some methodological issues that plague research. The analysis of historical case studies often avoids eliminating competing explanations such as the one provided by subjective expected utility theory. Furthermore, analyzing historical cases often

---

involves the aggregation of international and domestic costs and benefits, which is a very complex task, producing vague results. Also, researchers are “forced to interpret verbal expressions of probability,” since decision-makers almost never use numerical estimates of probability. This is a problem inasmuch as the psychological literature on verbal probability expressions has already discovered that individuals tend to interpret the same frequency terms differently, and use frequency words imprecisely and without any discernible pattern.\textsuperscript{153}

2.2.3.2 Prospect Theory and International Relations Research

In order to fill the gap of testing prospect theory against expected utility and verbal probability theories, Boettcher experiments with foreign policy and economic problem sets. He concludes that prospect theory performs better than the other theories. However, prospect theory displays the expected outcome most when the experimental situations closely resembled ones used by Kahneman and Tversky. It also performs better in foreign policy problem sets than in economic problem sets, suggesting that respondents take the stakes more seriously when the issue was about life and death rather than about financial gains and losses.\textsuperscript{154}

In another study, Boettcher focuses on the more general problems of the theory, namely its application to group settings and framing or the lack of a framing theory. Experimenting with problems from the domain of politics, he finds that the framing effect with regard to group decisions is only weakly supported, but apart from group settings, “framing may, under certain conditions, produce clear and robust preference reversals.”\textsuperscript{155} In another article, he examines what conditions may help politicians sell humanitarian interventions to the general American public and concluded that the location of the conflict, the race/ethnicity/religion of

\textsuperscript{153} Boettcher 1995.
\textsuperscript{154} Cf. Levy 1992, 304 who argues that risk-seeking behavior maybe reversed in situations, such as wars, that are characterized by the prospects of catastrophic losses.
\textsuperscript{155} Boettcher 2004a.
conflict participants, and the prospects for casualties influence the public’s willingness to consent to the risk of intervention, while foreign policy frames (the situation presented as gains or losses), the framing source (official vs. nonofficial), the type of humanitarian crisis (human rights violation by regime or as a result of the breakdown of central government) either have an insignificant impact or their effect points to the opposite direction than predicted.\textsuperscript{156} Masters found a connection between the framing of ethno-national conflicts as territorial struggles and people’s willingness to support rebellion.\textsuperscript{157}

A more traditional international relations approach has been taken by a variety of scholars. Taliferro engages in theory development by molding defensive realism with prospect theory. He generates four testable \textit{albeit} often banal and problematic hypotheses with regard to great power intervention on the periphery. For instance, he hypothesizes that loss aversion makes the status quo the reference point for decision-makers whether they expect losses or gains in relative power status.\textsuperscript{158} It appears that Taliferro failed to note that the combination of the gain and loss frameworks with realism does not so much support defensive realism and undermines the notion of offensive realism, but through gains and losses in power status, the loss/gains framework could help him define the scope of the two realisms. Offensive realism is a function of the loss framework and the defensive one is that of the gains frame.

Berejikian used prospect theory to improve on the empirically problematic aspects of deterrence theory and developed a model, starting out of the assumption that deterrence is more likely to be effective when both states are in a gains frame, and less likely to be effective when either or both are in a loss frame. His model, however, still needs to be tested.\textsuperscript{159}

\textsuperscript{156} Boettcher 2004b. \\
\textsuperscript{157} Masters 2004. \\
\textsuperscript{158} Taliferro 2004. \\
Haas tests the predictive power of prospect theory as opposed to expected-utility based deterrence theory on the outcomes of the Cuban missile crisis. By examining the frames of Kennedy and Khrushchev, the utility of various courses of action and the weighing functions associated with alternatives, he finds that both leaders operated in a loss frame, took extremely risky steps but as the (negative) consequences of high probability outcomes, such as starting a war, was weighted as if their outcomes were certain, both leaders shrank from their consequences. All in all, he interpreted his findings as evidence that prospect theory was a better predictor of the final outcome than the theory of deterrence.\footnote{Haas, Mark L. 2001. “Prospect Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” *International Studies Quarterly* 45 (2): 271-270.} Last but not least McDermott engages in a parallel demonstration of theory, showing the utility of prospect theory in explaining historical foreign policy decisions such as the Iranian hostage rescue mission or the American side of the Suez crisis.\footnote{McDermott 1998. Case studies are quite numerous. See for example, Farnham, Barbara. 1992. “Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: Insights from Prospect Theory” *Political Psychology* 13 (2): 205-236; McInerney, Audrey. 1992. “Prospect Theory and Soviet Policy toward Iran, 1966-67.” *Political Psychology* 13 (2): 265-282.}

### 2.2.4 Operationalizing the Dependent Variable

While it has already been established that war is used as a proxy for risk-taking, little has been said about its definition or the overarching concept of the dependent variable. The dependent variable is risk attitude operationalized as crisis outcome, which maybe war or any other non-war or risk-averse options such as negotiations, economic pressure, or covert action. Crises are used for analysis in order to differentiate a situation from ordinary politics. This is necessary so as to ensure that information always reaches the top of the executive branch and decision is made at the highest level.\footnote{Holsti, Ole. 1989. “Crisis Decision-making.” In Philip E. Tetlock et al., eds. *Behavior, Society and Nuclear War*. Vol.1. New York: Oxford University Press, 17.} While in crises, the decision problem always reaches the top – if for nothing else, then at least to have the top decision-maker(s) cast a positive or negative vote on the recommendation of lower level officials –, in non-crisis situations, lower-
level political appointees or bureaucrats have the authority to make decisions. Consequently, decisions often remain at the departmental/agency level not necessarily making it into the agenda of the top of the executive hierarchy. Crises are thus used to make sure that the decision problem was certainly referred to the top of the decision hierarchy in order to determine that the presidential/parliamentary divide is indeed meaningful in influencing risk attitudes.

Furthermore, analyzing crises also have certain additional analytical advantages: as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, the starting point and end point of a crisis can be fairly unambiguously defined. As I show below, crises are associated with a rather limited time-period, whether it is a week or half a year, while non-crisis decisions may comprise years, or sometimes even decades, of deliberations. Taking into account that several case studies need to be carried out in the course of this project, non-crisis situations may be unfeasibly time-consuming.

Finally, settling on crises as the universe of cases begs the question if a crisis still displays the relevant characteristics of everyday policy-making, that is, whether the selection of crises biases against the hypothesis. After all, one likes to believe that when the stakes are high, politicians disregard their petty selfish concerns – policy disputes, political and bureaucratic rivalries etc – and consider developments only in light of what is best for the survival and security of the nation. If so, then it is hopeless to find any trace of domestic political influence in the selected crisis or war cases. There seems to be ample reason to believe that no substantial bias will be introduced by such a selection. Fortunately for this project, contrary to folk theories, crises will not make statesmen out of politicians: policy disputes, political and bureaucratic rivalries – the pursuit of such interests – do not cease but are present during crises as much as during everyday policy-making, so there may remain a
chance that they actually influence decisions.\(^{163}\) Neither will crises make politicians more cool-headed than they are at other times. In essence, as G. H. Snyder argues, crises are “international politics in microcosm. [...] A crisis is a concentrated distillation of most elements which make up the essence of politics.”\(^{164}\)

While there has always been an interest in the terms of crisis and war, the necessity of precise definitions for them became especially pressing in the 1960s and 1970s when researchers started to comply databases in an effort to make statistical testing possible in the process of finding the reasons of war. As a consequence several definitions (and databases) were born\(^ {165}\) which pointedly signal a lack of agreement between researchers about the meaning of these terms.

2.2.4.1 Crisis

Of the two terms, crisis is the less problematic and the less contested. Until the late 1970s, scholars worked with C.F. Hermann’s definition that identified a political-military crisis as a situation that

1. threatens high priority goals
2. restricts the available response time (~short time)
3. involves an element of surprise.

However, as further empirical research proved this definition unsupportable, certain modifications have been introduced. To begin with, crisis usually appears as a result of change in the outside environment that threatens basic values rather than high priority goals as the earlier definitions suggested. Basic values are understood as consisting of core values (that


are usually constant in time and space e.g. survival of the society, political sovereignty, territorial integrity or independence) and high priority values (that are defined by those in power at a given moment in time)\textsuperscript{167} While in definitions threat to values came to replace threat to goals, I treat both as part of the crisis definition. It would be a fallacy to treat decision-makers as only value-oriented and ignorant of more practical considerations.

Once threat to values (and goals) appears, it generates two additional features: finite time for response and a high probability of military hostilities.\textsuperscript{168} Note that the latter category is entirely new to the old definition and is used in order to separate crises from other situations where the possibility of war is remote and abstract and not real and immediate. As such, this criterion helps most in linking crisis and war on the same continuum, where crisis precedes war. War is a possible outcome of a crisis and does not eliminate but accentuates crisis.\textsuperscript{169} In addition, shortness of time has been replaced by finite time, acknowledging that sometimes the time limit is far from being short. Rather, decision-makers perceive that there is a deadline to reach a decision.\textsuperscript{170}

So far crisis has been defined on the micro level and in perceptual terms: not only does the definition concentrate on the reactions of one single state, crises are limited to what decision-makers of a given state view as such. In other words, it is up to the individuals in power to decide whether high probability of war, finite time, and threat to values and goals were present.\textsuperscript{171} Consequently, crisis is seen as foreign-policy crisis or in general falls under the decision-making definition of the term. As opposed to this, there exist ‘systemic’ and ‘international’ crises that involve a threat to the breakdown or transformation of the structure.

\textsuperscript{167} Brecher 1978, 7-8.
\textsuperscript{168} Brecher 1978, 6-8.
\textsuperscript{169} Richardson 1994, 11-12; Snyder, Glenn H. and Paul Diesing. 1977. Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-making, and System Structure in International Crises. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 6. Brecher (1993, 4-7) questions this sequencing by calling attention to the existence of intra-war crises (IWCs). However, since my dissertation measures risk-taking in a dichotomous variable (war/no-war), IWCs conceptually do not fit the present framework where war measures risk-taking and where crisis is a situation where decision-makers have to make a decision about risk.
\textsuperscript{170} Brecher 1978, 7. See also Brecher 1993, 3; Richardson 1994, 10.
\textsuperscript{171} Brecher 1978, 6, 7, 8.
of the international system. However, systemic definitions are too restrictive for the purpose of this study.

Viewing crisis in terms of foreign-policy crisis may still allow for system-level analysis. Many of the factors that are present in system-level analysis are present in the micro-level analysis of foreign policy crises even if these factors appear differently in the two kinds of analysis. For instance, interaction between states appears in microanalysis through the considerations of the crisis actor about the adequate response to a threat in such a way that the expected response of the adversary is taken into account. They appear to have the advantage of defining crisis without invoking an additional actor in the definition as conceptualizations of war do (see below). A one-state definition is problematic as long as only one party sees the crisis as such. While a crisis may start and end at different points in time for two countries, unless there is a time overlap when both adversaries perceive a situation as a crisis, the likelihood that the developments lead to war as defined above diminishes. Consequently, crisis must be more than a foreign policy crisis for one country. Rather, two adversarial states must perceive a situation in terms of crisis.

The definition used by the Correlates of War project comes close to seeing crisis as a foreign policy crisis of one state. Its crisis database contains militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), that is, situations when “one state threatened, displayed, or used force against another.” Leng and Singer find the definition too broad as MIDs may be resolved before they could become interstate crises (e.g. through clarification of misunderstanding). Therefore, they argue, the indication of the willingness to resort to force must be part of the definition. On this basis they constructed the category ‘militarized inter-state crisis (MIC)’

174 On the latter problem see Most and Starr 1983.
175 Richardson 1994, 11-12.
and construct the crisis database of the *Behavioral Correlates of War (BCOW)* sub-project. While they pride themselves that the definition of MICs excludes the perceptual aspect and, thus, offer an alternative definition, they could not successfully avoid the perceptual criteria. Not only does such a definition closely resemble the perceptual prerequisite of a dangerously high risk of war, but also an indication to be ready to resort to arms will only bring the necessary environmental change about if the adversary takes it as a threat. Nonetheless, what their definition does is that it successfully operationalizes a perceptual and often evasive definition.

### 2.2.4.2 War

There exist a dazzling number of war definitions. Yet, as Most and Starr point out, all war definitions share some common features. Accordingly, the essence of war can be summarized in seven points:

1. there are at least two states involved – one on each side,
2. participants have conflictual goals/values,
3. are aware of the conflictual nature of these wars,
4. are willing to attain their goals,
5. have the opportunity and capacity to pursue their goals,
6. are able to resist overt use of force to avoid immediate defeat (which suggests the appearance of casualties in war)
7. goals cannot be achieved by a single use of force or a series of single uses of force over a dispersed period of time.

On this basis, war can be defined as a particular type of outcome of the interaction of at least a dyadic set of specified varieties of actors in which at least one actor is willing and able to use military force against some other resisting actor and some number of fatalities will occur. The *Correlates of War* project was based on Small and Singer's standard war definition, which uses more simplified definitional criteria that work reasonably well to account for most of the conditions named by Most and Starr. For a conflict to qualify as a war there has to be at

---


178 Most and Starr 1983, 139-41.
least one active participant that was part of the international system (i.e. states with a population over 500,000 and satisfying legal, military and economic independence) and there has to be at least 1000 battle-related death incurred by all state actors involved. Finally, to be an active participant a state has to sustain at least 100 deaths. To account for borderline cases where a state by a stroke of luck or as a result of wise military planning suffered less than 100 death, they introduced an alternative qualification, that is, at least 1000 troops had to be committed to active combat. They argue that these parameters work reasonably well to take care of many elements of the more abstract definition.\footnote{Small, Melvin and J. David Singer. 1982. \textit{Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980}. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 50-51, 55-56.}

However, the \textit{COW} project also recognizes that there are other wars than those fought by state actors on each side. Besides inter-state wars, they draw up separate databases for – and, thus, work out the selection criteria for – extra-state and intra-state wars. Extra-state wars require one state actor on one side and an external non-state actor on the other. Imperial and colonial wars typically fall into this category. Intra-state wars are civil wars and are not relevant here unless an outside third party got involved, which makes the war into an internationalized civil war – a war where an outside power intervenes into a civil war on the side of the government. Such wars fall into the category of extra-state wars. However, this project measures international risk-taking and, hence, civil wars fall outside of its interest.\footnote{Small and Singer 1982, 50-56, 210-211.}

The death criteria differ for inter-, extra-, and intra-state wars. As table 2 shows, the death criterion is unreasonably strict for extra-state wars where each state participant has to sustain 1,000 battle deaths and, if the war stretches longer than a year, an average of 1,000 battle-deaths must be achieved annually. As opposed to this, the inclusion of both battle-deaths and civilian deaths into the intra-state war definition makes it considerably easier to meet the definition. As I discuss this below with regard to extra-state wars, the rationale for...
including civilian deaths in the intra-state war definition but not in the extra-state and inter-state war definitions is not convincing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties minimally involved</th>
<th>Inter-state</th>
<th>Extra-state</th>
<th>Intra-state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two states</td>
<td>One state and an external non-state actor</td>
<td>Two internal state actors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of deaths</td>
<td>At least 1,000 battle deaths among all participants</td>
<td>At least 1,000 battle deaths by each state actor</td>
<td>1,000 deaths including both battle and civilian death. Weaker actor must sustain at least one-fifth of the death suffered by the stronger actor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period in which deaths must occur</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>If the war lasts longer than a year, battle deaths must reach 1,000 per year on average</td>
<td>Per year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. The death criteria in inter-, extra- and intra-state wars in the COW project

The number of deaths as a unit of measurement creates other problems. The COW project treated the number of battle deaths rather flexibly, thus defying its own selection criteria: it registers the Falklands conflict as a war even though battle related deaths remain under 1000. Indeed, 1000 is an artificial cut-off point that may not match the nature of wars fought with limited means on limited territory that make up a substantial part of the wars in the cold war. If a war is limited in nature, one also expects its effects, including the death toll, to be more restricted as well. Moreover, the additional criterion for extra-state wars is questionable in the sense that the intensity of fighting in such wars may be similar to that of an inter-state war.

In addition, in some extra-state wars, body counts register only those of the state actor but not those of the non-state actor. One such case is the British war in Indonesia in 1945. Excluding civilian deaths in case of non-state participants in extra-state wars results in the different treatment of state and non-state participants. Had civilians who provided food, 181

---

181 Small and Singer 1982,50-56, 210-211.
material, logistical support etc. for active fighters been members of a conventional army providing supplies for the fighting soldiers, their activities and deaths would have counted as battle-related. In addition, excluding civilian deaths is impractical because (military) strategy may aim at intimidating the population by undermining their feeling of security and their trust in the existing government’s ability to govern and keep order. Similarly, on the part of the government a similar effort may help reduce active popular support for the insurgents. Thus, psychological warfare is a possible military strategy to pursue in all types of wars.

To overcome this problem, I propose to replace the death-toll criterion with the criteria that (1) the government decision must involve the introduction and use of (additional) ground troops. The purpose of such a move can vary from the goal of helping the police to keep order to destroy or drive the enemy out of the given area. However, to actually face a war situation, (2) it is essential that troops be involved in active combat with the enemy which involves tracking down, destroying or driving the adversary out of a given territory – in short, the engagement of the adversary in fighting. This definition would effectively exclude border disputes or an occasional exchange of fire between two sides.

Finally, to be able to clearly state what the subject of the analysis is, the starting point of wars must be defined. Unfortunately for researchers, many wars do not start with one single easily identifiable decision, but is a result of a sequence of decisions. Based on Starr and Most’s definition of war, I understand the decision to commit ground troops with a mandate to engage in combat in order to achieve a specific – predefined – task as the decision initiating a war. Note that a decision has two elements: commit ground troops and commit them with a pre-defined purpose. This means that it may become necessary to examine more than one decision points in case decision makers dealt with the two elements separately. Even if the two criteria were handled together, decision-makers may arrive at troop commitment at the end of a series of decisions rather than as a result of one single decision, which would also
make it necessary to examine a longer period of time and more than one decisions leading to troop commitment with a specific purpose.
Chapter 3: Independent Variable, Hypotheses and Case Selection

3.1 Independent Variable: Democratic Regime Types

3.1.1 The Normative Debate

Most of the literature on democratic regimes types is built around the question of whether parliamentary and presidential regimes are better with regard to such criteria as democratic durability, regime and governing stability, responsiveness, accountability, identifiability and political violence. The early consensus was based on the importance of deadlock in leading to the reauthorization of presidential systems and, thus, pointed at the superiority of parliamentary systems with regard to regime durability.

Observing that the United States has been the only stable presidential regime, Juan Linz argued that certain features of presidential government are responsible for the low survival rate of presidential systems. His reasoning focuses on four main aspects of presidentialism: dual legitimacy, rigidity, the zero-sum nature of presidential elections, and lack of support of the chief executive in legislative matters. Because both the legislative and the executive branches are popularly elected, their relationship is openly or latently conflictual, which often leads to deadlock. As a result of being independently elected from the legislature, presidents tend to overestimate their popular mandate, which makes them frustrated with democratic politics. The direct, popular election of the president also leads to the election of outsiders who enjoy little legislative support, thus exacerbating conflict and deadlock. The separation of

---


the two branches and the fixed term of office hinder responsiveness to the popular will. Finally, term limits make incumbents unaccountable to the public. 184

Parliamentary government seems to be advantageous especially in the period of democratic transition. Stepan and Skach argue that correlational analysis suggests that in democratic transitions parliamentary regimes enjoy an advantage over presidentialism and the institution of the presidential system in new democracies, where civil society is flat, only invites trouble. When explaining their finding, they question the popular myth of the efficiency of presidential regimes, pointing to the fact that more than half of the time presidents do not enjoy a majority in the legislative branch and that in 83% of the time the governing party enjoyed a majority in the legislature of parliamentary regimes. Their points are rather similar to those of Linz: divided government leads to deadlock and presidential frustration in office that makes it more likely that presidents will turn to extra-constitutional means. Deadlock endangers existing presidential democracies in an additional way. It leads to unpopular presidents, who cannot be thrown out of office before their term expires, thus, political crisis is more likely to lead to regime crisis, increasing the likelihood of military coups. 185

Finally, judging parliamentarism and presidentialism in light of their majoritarian and consensual tendencies, Arend Lijphart reasons that presidentialism may be better than the Westminster model because the separation of powers points toward the need for consensus


seeking. Yet, elsewhere he contends that dual legitimacy causes problems in presidential regimes, because the president is the only office holder elected by the whole people (Congress is only elected by the whole people as a collective body), he has a much stronger claim to legitimacy than Congress. Consequently, presidents are “righteously unwilling to compromise.” Thus, it follows, Lijphart concludes, that presidential systems are inherently majoritarian in all cases, as opposed to parliamentary systems that may or may not be.

Shugart and Carey go beyond theoretical arguments and engage in an empirical study of the strong and weak points of presidentialism. They imply that presidential regimes may reduce political conflict in cabinet appointments: it is pointless for the Senate to fight on political grounds for a candidate closer to its preferences, since presidents would dismiss a minister who leans too much toward the Senate. Therefore, objection to presidential appointments goes on other (moral, ethical, professional etc.) grounds. While term limits are present in many presidential systems, the prohibition of term limits agrees most with the spirit of presidential government. Such a solution would not only increase accountability but also increase assembly cooperation as assembly members could utilize presidential election success for their own reelections only when the president is not a lame duck.

As for regime survival, the most problematic presidential regimes are those where presidents have considerable (legislative) power. But systems with a great deal of non-legislative presidential powers (e.g. cabinet composition) and a low degree of separation of survival of the assembly and executive branches are also troubled types. Safer combinations are presidential systems that take up low values with respect to the separation of the branches and to presidential power over the cabinet. Finally, a high degree of separation of

---

186 Lijphart 1999, 139.
188 Lijphart 1994, 102-103
190 Shugart and Carey 1992, 107, 90.
survival of the branches combined with little presidential legislative powers is also a successful setup. Successful presidential regimes combine either a great degree of separation of powers with a low-level of presidential legislative powers or low separation of powers with low authority over the cabinet.\textsuperscript{191}

However, the superiority of parliamentary regimes over presidential ones is not so obvious.\textsuperscript{192} First, historical developments are called to the witness’s stand to substantiate the lack of superiority of parliamentarism. If in the 1960s and 1970s democratic breakdowns involved presidential regimes, in the previous wave of democratic breakdowns (the 1920s and 1930s), it was overwhelmingly parliamentary regimes that failed to survive.\textsuperscript{193} There were twelve presidential and twenty-one parliamentary regimes that broke down in the course of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{194} But while more than half of the presidential regimes in the less developed world would surface as democracies later on, the same cannot be said about any of the failed parliamentary regimes.\textsuperscript{195} Academic consensus over which is the better regime type sharply differs from practitioners’ judgment: some parliamentary regimes turned into presidential ones, but no presidential regime has ever turned into a parliamentary regime.\textsuperscript{196} Moreover, divided government does not suggest irresolvable deadlock. In the US, there is no difference between the legislative records (major legislations passed successfully) of presidents who operated under united or divided government.\textsuperscript{197} The cases of Argentina and Brazil, where the performance of majority and minority legislatures are very similar, warrant

\textsuperscript{191}Shugart and Carey 1992, 148.
\textsuperscript{193}Mainwaring and Shugart 1997b, 20.
\textsuperscript{194}Shugart and Carey 1992, 40. See also Mainwaring and Shugart 1997b, 29. The ratio is 50% to 44% in favor of parliamentary regimes.
\textsuperscript{195}Shugart and Carey 1992, 41.
\textsuperscript{196}Shugart and Carey 1992, 3.
the same conclusion.\textsuperscript{198} That is to say, presidents whose party is in legislative minority are as likely to have an influence as presidents under united government.\textsuperscript{199}

In some cases the defense of presidentialism follows Linz’s theoretical argument about the combined effects of various characteristics of presidentialism and parliamentarism. If accountability is problematic because of term limits of presidents, it is equally unclear in parliamentary democracies when the government is replaced between two elections. In presidentialism the fact that the survival of the executive does not depend on the support of the legislature makes it possible for assembly members to judge a bill on merit and not in light of cabinet survival. Majoritarianism is not a consequence of presidentialism but depends on the electoral and party systems and the federal or unitary nature of the given system. Moreover, disciplined parties, enjoying a majority in a parliamentary system are much more apt to promote a winner-takes-all approach than any presidential system, where presidents often name multi-party governments to reward election-time support or ensure future support of these parties.\textsuperscript{200} In addition, as far as identifiability – voters’ ability to identify the potential governments in electoral campaigns – is concerned, parliamentary regimes with proportional representation present serious problems.\textsuperscript{201} The fixed term of presidents may not be so disadvantageous as it prevents cabinet instability that could and did lead to systemic crises in parliamentary regimes as much as deadlock could and did in presidentialism.\textsuperscript{202} Finally, electing outsiders in presidential democracies with institutionalized party systems is rather the exception than the rule.\textsuperscript{203}

In addition, as Sartori observes, the failure of presidentialism does not automatically ensure the success of parliamentarism. After all, there are hybrid regime types, such as semi-
presidentialism, that are also candidates for the best performing regime award. In addition, to be able to argue that where presidential government broke down parliamentary regimes would have been more effective, a large number of counterfactual studies should be performed. These studies, however, should not only prove that parliamentarism would have been able to survive the crisis where presidentialism failed but that it would have weathered all the preceding crises that presidentialism successfully resolved.

It is also unclear if the failure of presidential democracies is due to regime type or some other factors; the most often mentioned ones are regional clustering, colonial heritage, country size, culture and economic development. To begin with, parliamentarism is only present in Europe and former British colonies, which raises doubts whether parliamentarism would operate adequately outside these settings. Mainwaring and Shugart suggest that the survival of parliamentary regimes in British colonies are due to the British training of civil servants, British creation of post-colonial political institutions, pre-independence experience in local self-government, which was always based on the parliamentary model, and the lack of local land-owner control of the colonial state. Stepan and Skach doubt if colonial heritage could explain regime survival in the face of serious domestic tensions. They note that the five British colonies that started out as presidential democracies and eleven others that started out as monarchies did not survive. This, however, does not question the logic of colonial influence: parliamentarism may have a higher survival rate in post-colonial states, because they had pre-independence experience in the working of British institutions at the colonies but none with presidential ones.

---

205 Mainwaring and Shugart 1997b, 19.
207 Mainwaring and Shugart 1997b, 23.
208 Stepan and Skach 1994, 125.
Regionalism also plagues presidentialism, since apart from the United States presidentialism mostly appeared in Latin America and only in the developing world, which makes it difficult to disentangle regime type from socioeconomic, cultural and other factors. Small nations have an advantage in democratic stability, because they tend to be more homogeneous in ethnic and religious terms. Here parliamentarism has “a built-in advantage simply because Britain colonized many small island territories,” not giving researchers a chance to see how presidentialism might have operated within such settings. It may well be that parliamentarism operates better in developing countries: stable democracies with low and medium income are all parliamentary regimes. They, however, are also former British colonies, which again points toward the importance of colonial heritage.

3.1.2 Definitions of Regime Type in the Literature

As this dissertation is not concerned with regime survival, the most interesting aspect of this debate is concept formation and the problems associated with it. Definitions are rather similar and built around the same factors. Mainwaring and Shugart find the popular (direct or quasi-direct) election of the chief executive (i.e. separate origin of the executive) and fixed terms of office for both the executive and legislative branches (i.e. separate survival) as the defining features of presidentialism. Bingham Powell believes that presidentialism requires fixed term of office for the executive and the legislative branches, direct election of the president and the separation of powers between these branches. Arend Lijphart originally defined a parliamentary system as one in which the executive depends on the legislature for survival.

---

209 Mainwaring and Shugart 1997b, 23.
210 Mainwaring and Shugart 1997a, 460.
211 Mainwaring and Shugart 1997a, 459-460.
212 Mainwaring and Shugart 1997b, 14, 16.
and the prime minister is selected by the legislature. Later he added a third criterion: parliamentarism requires a collective or collegial executive.\textsuperscript{214} Shugart and Carey note that most contemporary definitions are very much alike, stressing the popular election of the chief executive, fixed term of office for the legislature and the chief executive, the chief executive’s selection of and authority over the cabinet\textsuperscript{215} They argue that all these aspects capture the same phenomenon, that is, the separation of powers. The two systems differ in this aspect, that is, with regard to the origins and survival of the executive. Thus while presidentialism is built on the idea of maximum separation of powers, parliamentary democracies lack this feature.\textsuperscript{216} Shugart and Carey find Lijphart’s collective vs. single-headed executive criterion redundant, citing the empirical reality of Uruguay between 1919-1933 and 1954-1964, which suggests that presidential democracies may have collective executives. However, they believe that in spite of the necessity of separation of powers, presidents must be granted some law-making authority – at the least, veto power – constitutionally, because otherwise they are nothing more than mere executors.\textsuperscript{217}

Despite the general agreement between researchers about the defining difference between parliamentary and presidential regime types, seeing regime type by the parliamentary-presidential dichotomy is not without problems. First, Jones asserts that current definitions of presidentialism deceptively direct too much attention to the role of the president in the system; therefore he seeks to replace ‘presidentialism’ with the term, ‘separated system’.\textsuperscript{218} Second, what is worse, arguments in favor of one or the other system of government often have different regime types in mind: presidentialism is sometimes measured

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{215} Shugart and Carey 1992, 20.
\item \textsuperscript{216} Shugart and Carey 1992, 15.
\item \textsuperscript{217} Shugart and Carey 1992, 20-21.
\end{itemize}
against majoritarian (Westminster) parliamentarism and, at other times, it is contrasted with parliamentary regimes with coalition governments – whichever serves the point to be made better. This points to a more general problem, that is, if parliamentary (and presidential) regimes are capable of such diversity they do not form a single type. In other words, intra-class variation is bigger than inter-class variation. According to Rockman, this makes it necessary to reformulate the presidential-parliamentary differentiation.

Third, separation of powers may be present in parliamentary regimes in the form of coalition governments, federalism, or bicameral legislatures (if the two houses have reasonably symmetrical powers). Definitions cannot tell much about the relative strength of presidents and prime ministers vis-à-vis the legislative or each other, either. The presidency in America is sometimes described as being very strong; at other times, as very weak. To be sure, presidential strength may vary by issue area, depending on how much power the president has constitutionally or delegated by Congress. However, variation in power and influence exist within one issue area even across and within presidential administrations. Sartori notes something similar with regard to prime ministers: a government’s dependence on the legislative branch for ‘election’ and survival says little about why a government is strong or weak. Jones observes the same about presidents whose power depends on their resources, advantages, strategic position and opportunities. This suggests that while structural features are a good starting point in investigating the workings of various democratic executives, deduction from institutional features alone results in misleading

---

219 Rockman 1997, 60.
220 Rockman 1997, 60. See also Sartori 1997, 105 on definitional problems.
224 Jones 1997, 2.
conclusions. In other words, changes in political conditions must also be taken into account. All this suggests that despite its problems the presidential-parliamentary division remains the most fundamental distinction between democracies. While pure types are rare and some intermediate regime types exist between these two, most regimes fall within these two categories. Moreover, the separation of powers is a viable concept to separate one from the other. However, minor modifications in the content of separation of powers are in order and, to be able to take the political dimension into account, the introduction of an additional dimension is necessary. The next section starts with the explication of this distinction so as to provide a starting point to describing the hypotheses about the effect of regime type on risk-taking.

3.1.3 Re-conceptualizing Regime Type

Shugart and Carey’s definition serves as the starting point in the redefinition of regime types. They differentiate among regime types on the basis of the separation of powers, which is made up of three components: the mode of the election of the executive, executive dependence on the legislature for survival, and the degree of autonomy the chief executive enjoys over the cabinet. Even though Shugart and Carey go at length to discredit Lijphart’s third criterion – single-headed vs. collective executive –, their own third criteria embodies exactly this dimension under a different name. That is to say, Lijphart’s third criterion is an integral part of the definition.

And it should be, because it captures meaningful difference between presidential and parliamentary democracies. The single-headed vs. collective executive differentiation is not

227 Lijphart 1992, 6 (figure 1).
228 Shugart and Carey 1992, 19.
only identical with Shugart and Carey’s third criterion, but is also related to the first and second aspect of Shugart and Carey’s definition: why presidents can have a high degree of authority over their subordinates is precisely because constitutionally they face no competition for power within this branch of government and they are untouchable from the outside, because they are directly elected. Hence, they are masters of their house. However, this principle is upset by the idea of collective executives in (pure) presidential systems. Accordingly, it is not by chance that parliamentary democracies usually go by collective executives and, except for abortive attempts in Uruguay, presidential regimes have single-headed executives.

As opposed to this, not only prime ministers but their whole cabinet is responsible to the assembly, which even under strong – prime ministerial – parliamentary government makes the game different from presidential ones: unlike presidents, prime ministers cannot survive without maintaining the support of the parliament and their colleagues. As for the cabinet, its support must be maintained, because cabinet members can remove the prime minister without endangering the party’s or coalition’s majority in parliament. All they have to do in order to outfox the prime minister is to build an alliance among themselves in opposition to the premier. The needs to maintain backbench and cabinet support in parliamentary regimes are two manifestations of the same thing, i.e. executive dependence on the legislature. All in all, prime ministers need some measure of consensus within the executive branch and, thus, are required to bargain within that branch the way presidents must bargain with the assembly.

In this respect, the nature of the political dynamics within unitary and multi-party coalition governments in parliamentary democracies differs only to a negligible extent. One-party governments are generally described as harmonious and united. Exceptions are made for

229 Hybrid/intermediate regime types are, of course, possible, but the notion of collective/collegial executive does not conform to pure presidentialism.
political systems with a dominant party (e.g. Japan). Dominant parties are described as parties made up of different factions. However, the unity of every other type of one-party governments is fallaciously overestimated. In other words, because one party governs the country, no natural agreement between members of the governing party should automatically be assumed.

Neither are coalition governments necessarily factional: unity of opinion is possible even among coalition partners over, at least, some issues. Regardless of whether the prime minister leads a one-party or a multi-party government, his job is to maintain support of his coalition. The difference is in the nature of the coalitions. In one party governments an intra-party and in coalition governments an inter-party coalition has to be maintained. How much disagreement may manifest itself within a governing party or among governing parties depends on the factionalization of the party in the former case and in the policy differences among coalition partners in the latter.

Moreover, factionalization is a feature that varies across time and is defined by temporary political constellations. In other words, an additional dimension must be introduced to account for variation due to factors beyond those dealing with formal institutional features. This – additional – dimension takes care of actual political constraints. Although institutions define the general framework for operation, they leave a lot of room for maneuver. The variation within the institutional framework is better understood by also taking the political constraints into account.

The introduction of this aspect would resolve the difficulty of handling coalition governments as part of the concept of the separation of powers as Peters suggests. The nature and internal dynamics of coalitions belong to the temporary aspect of political life.

---

to the less dynamic, formal political structures that are depicted under the term of separation of powers. Consequently, to include coalition governments into the definition of the separation of powers is stretching the concept too far. Coalition governments and their inner dynamics – rivalry and the instability created – become one particular constellation of the temporary aspect of politics, that is, the amount of division present in a government. It is important to note that it is the division created by coalition governments that is of concern here and not the presence or absence of a coalition, which is due to the electoral formula, and which is part of neither of the two dimensions discussed here.

This second, temporary, dimension corresponds closest to Haggard and McCubbins’ concept of the separation of purpose, that is, the idea that “different parts of the government are motivated to seek different goals.”\textsuperscript{234} The separation of purpose is related to both parliamentary and presidential democracies. It may manifest itself between branches that are formally separated or it may rise in parliamentary regimes when the governing party or the governing coalition is divided. Similarly, the separation of purpose may be absent when an assembly and a president work in agreement or when parliamentary governments do not suffer from inter-, or intra-party division.\textsuperscript{235}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Powers</th>
<th>Separated</th>
<th>United</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Separated</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Great Britian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{234} Haggard and McCubbins 2001, 3.
\textsuperscript{235} Haggard and McCubbins 2001, 3-4.
\textsuperscript{236} Haggard and McCubbins 2001, 4.
Some modifications must, however, be made to Haggard and McCubbins’s use of the concept of the separation of purpose. What is surprising in their conceptualization is that while their description of the separation of purpose is dynamic, in their categorization of different regimes they apply the concept statically. For instance, they describe Great Britain as unified in both respects and the United States as separated in both respects (table 3). As opposed to this, this dissertation sees both of these dimensions as dynamic.

The relationship is visualized in figure 2. On the horizontal axis (separation of powers) each presidential and parliamentary regime occupies one quasi-permanent position, which may change if constitutional/legal/formal elements relevant to the separation of powers (e.g. nature of veto power) are altered. The particular constellation of factors that make up the separation of powers – the electoral term, executive-legislative relationship, authority over the cabinet – are nothing else than a given accountability structure.

Thus, the separation of powers/accountability is a matter of degrees in that, depending on the constitutional configuration, regimes may be placed at different points of the scale, i.e.
they may demonstrate a constellation of features less or more presidential until the point where presidential features are in minority. In such a case the given regime is defined as primarily parliamentary. But to what degree such a regime is parliamentary is determined by how close it comes to the ideal-type definition of a parliamentary democracy, which is represented at the far right of the horizontal axis and where the executive and the legislative are united. Semi-presidential regimes – regimes with dual executive – would fall in the middle of the scale.

Both presidential and parliamentary democracies have been criticized for the concentration of power in the hands of the chief executive. In the United States, the experience of the Vietnam war era raises scholarly concern over what Arthur Schlesinger called the “imperial presidency”. That is, a permanent shift in the balance of power toward the president and out of the hands of Congress in presidential democracies. In Britain, a similar debate has been going on about the transformation of collective cabinet government into prime ministerial government where the prime minister is no longer first among equals but directs the executive branch as a quasi president. The same debate with regard to parliamentary democracies in general appears as a lamentation over the presidentialization of these regimes.237 It is not the task of this dissertation to decide whether these arguments are substantiated by evidence. I merely wish to point out that such permanent increase in the powers of the executive in both presidential and parliamentary regimes can be integrated into the present conceptualization of regime types. As embodiments of institutional change, presidentialization of parliamentary democracies and the imperial presidency would appear on

the horizontal dimension as a change in the separation of powers, making regimes shift to the left on the horizontal axis.\footnote{If evidence supports Jones’ claim (1997, 26) that the imperial presidency is merely a temporary power constellation that would correct itself by a swing toward increasing Congressional power in the long run, the imperial presidency should be represented in the separation of purpose dimension.}

As for the separation of purpose, depending on the actual political situation, each presidential and parliamentary regime may move on the vertical axis. This axis represents the temporary aspect of political life.\footnote{The relevant political variables are listed on pages 80-81 and detailed on a case by case basis on pages 89-91 below.} Overall, separating permanent and temporary features of regimes helps, for instance, overcome the dilemma concerning semi-presidential systems such as France, where depending on whether the government is unified – the president and the prime minister come from the same party – or divided, they are often seen as less or more presidential. According to the present conceptualization, the party identification of presidents and prime ministers falls into the temporary domain, not influencing the long-term semi-presidential characteristics of the regime that would place France around the center of the horizontal axis.

### 3.2 Hypotheses

#### 3.2.1 Assumptions and Limitations

Before outlining the hypotheses, several notes are in order. First, the background assumption here is the same that rings through in all the bodies of literature discussed so far. That is, elected officials are self-interested and their source of motivation is to get re-elected. Of course, it is not unimaginable that politicians are policy-seekers rather than office-seekers, but office-seeking is a reasonable assumption as much as most politicians appear to belong to the latter group. Not to mention that most often policy-seekers can best achieve their policies by
remaining in power or accumulating more power. At any rate, office-seeking may propel politicians to use different strategies under different political circumstances.\footnote{Shugart and Carey 1992, 14.}

Second, as in social science theories, the relationship outlined below is probabilistic in nature. Unfortunately, conditions described here should not be expected to trigger risk-taking automatically. Nonetheless, without them, no risk-taking behavior is projected.

Third, the ideal approach of hypothesizing about and investigate risk attitude would be to analyze both war and non-war cases. However, such a broad study necessitates more space than is available in this dissertation. As a result, only wars – instances of risk-taking behavior – will be subjected to scrutiny and, thus, only necessary but not the sufficient conditions will be analyzed\footnote{On the general problem of using only wars, see Most and Starr 1983, 155.}.

Finally, when the importance of domestic politics in foreign policy is considered, it is perhaps wise to keep in mind that no matter how uncompromisingly the diversionary or democratic peace literature may put their claims about the role of domestic politics, domestic factors alone are not expected to drive the use of force, but they are expected to be substantial factors that, together with international imperatives, drive risk-taking\footnote{DeRouen 1995, 674; Morgan and Bickers 1992, 28, 35.}.

### 3.2.2 Hypotheses

The structural explanation of democratic peace and a small part of the diversionary literature contend that the more constrained executives are, the less willing they are to take the risk of war.\footnote{See for example Maoz and Russett 1993, 626 and Morgan and Campbell 1991; Auerswald 1999, 470; Ostrom and Job 1986.} Most of the diversionary literature claims the opposite: the more unpopular decision-makers are, the more likely they are to use force to divert attention from domestic troubles and/or increase their popularity. Even though one contends a positive, the other a negative relationship, they share the assumption over the linear nature of the relationship.
What I suggest here, however, is something different. Instead of seeing the relationship between accountability and risk-taking (war-fighting) as linear, I contend that it is curvilinear. The possibility of a non-linear relationship has already been suggested *albeit* not explicated in detail in the diversionary literature.\(^\text{244}\) The only studies that hypothesize about the exact nature of the curvilinear linkage are those of Hazelwood’s and Gelpi’s.\(^\text{245}\) But the variable that drives their models is domestic dissatisfaction. Instead, here I claim that the independent variable is regime type – democratic accountability combined with temporary aspects of political life. Depending on particular constellations, regime type pulls decision-makers to act differently to preserve their job.

In other words, some level of constraints are necessary to limit the risky behavior of states, hence democracies on the whole are more peaceful than autocracies. However, when decision-makers – and here the focus is on the perceived incentives of the chief executive – face too many constraints, that is, when their perception of being ejected from office drastically increase so that it approaches certainty, they simply opt for the gamble that wars bring about, seeing it as their best chance to stay in office (figure 3). These additional constraints may appear as the result of indirect accountability to the legislative branch and the cabinet.

![Figure 3. The contended relationship between executive constraints and the degree of risk taken (~ number of wars fought)](image)

\(^{244}\) Levy 1989, 272; Morgan and Anderson 1999; Morgan and Bickers 1992, 30.

\(^{245}\) Hazelwood 1975; Gelpi 1997.
As mentioned above on page 36, prospect theory offers an adequate description of this change in risk propensity, and is treated as a background theory – an assumption that is not tested in this dissertation.

Accountability on the executive takes three forms. First, the public keeps the decision-makers accountable through elections. This constraint is present in every democracy in the form of direct accountability to the electorate and this is what differentiates their behavior from that of autocracies. Second, accountability may take an indirect form through the other two features of separation of powers. Between elections the legislative branch and/or the cabinet may control the behavior of the chief executive.

This differs from the conceptualization of accountability in the democratic peace or diversionary literature in two ways. First, the principal agent in both presidential and parliamentary democracies is the chief executive. While the president has always been seen as the principal actor in the United States, Morgan and Anderson argued for the cabinet being the principle actor in Britain. Second, Auerswald also assumed an identity of interest within the governing party. \(^{246}\) I have already argued above about the untenability of this assumption on the basis that in one-party government factionalization takes another form (intra-party factionalization) than in coalition governments (inter-party factionalization). Therefore, the principal actor is the prime minister in parliamentary regimes. In the present framework, the cabinet, instead of being the principal actor in parliamentary democracies, is a means by which the chief executive is kept accountable.

Much has been made about the two-dimensional differentiation among democratic regimes. The effect of the second dimension, separation of purpose, which has been introduced to depict the temporary aspect of politics, depends partly on the particular constellation in accountability structure. When only electoral accountability is present, the

\(^{246}\) Morgan and Anderson 1999; Auerswald 1999, 478.
given regime will be insensitive to temporary changes. That is, it will behave the same way when there is a separation of purpose within the elite or the society and when these are united in purpose. However, when the indirect features of accountability are present, the separation of purpose has a differentiating role in risk-taking. How this plays out with regard to risk attitude and within the framework of prospect theory is depicted in detail below.

3.2.3 Presidentialism and Foreign Policy

Of presidential and parliamentary democracies, the former have fewer constraints when it comes to foreign policy-making. It only faces indirect accountability through regular elections. The lack of dependence of the executive branch on the legislative branch for survival, fixed term of office, and unequivocal authority of the president over the cabinet creates insulation from the effects of everyday politics. Presidents serve fixed terms in office and no matter how unpopular they are or how much opposition they face from the legislature, they remain in office for their full electoral term. That is, they face only electoral accountability in foreign-policy-making but not the other two – legislative and cabinet – that would pull them toward diversionary behavior.

The existence of direct accountability at elections and the lack of indirect accountability through the cabinet and the legislature make presidential regimes insensitive to the separation in purpose. Regardless of domestic politics – whether the president is troubled at home or not –, presidential preeminence in foreign policy-making gives presidents incomparable freedom to consider decisions solely on the basis of merit. That is, domestic politics is unlikely to influence their decision-making. Phrased in terms of prospect theory, this adds up to the following: a domestically induced loss framework is unlikely to appear and propel risk-taking.

(H1) Presidential democracies are not likely to be sensitive to the separation of purpose (domestic politics), which results in risk-averse behavior internationally.
Therefore, presidents are expected to base their foreign policy decision on *realpolitik*, attempting to select the alternative that is most likely to further the power and security of their country in the international arena.

### 3.2.3.1 Elections

Because of the fixed term of office, presidents are free of popular constraints during their term. Because they are held accountable only at elections, they do not have to maintain high popularity throughout their term in office as DeRouen suggests. This leads to the conclusion that within the election cycle presidents are likely to divert at the end of their term if they are unpopular then. This is the only time when diversion makes sense. Since the popularity of every president slumps during their terms, they all face the diversionary incentive by the time they come up for reelection. However, because of the shortness of the rallying phenomenon (even the more optimistic estimates put it to six months), diversionary use of force should occur close to the election. Even though it would be a fallacy to assume too much from the public, the fixed term makes diversionary intentions too obvious and, hence, ineffective. Moreover, as Auerswald argues, the pre-election period is the time when the elite and the society are most divided, hence diversion is unlikely to produce the rallying effect.

(H1A) Public opinion (approval) is not likely to influence presidential foreign-policy choices.

---

247 DeRouen 1995, 674.
249 Auerswald 1999, 472.
3.2.3.2 The Legislature

The legislature has limited means to control the president. It has no short-term weapon to curb presidential decisions in foreign policy making. Their law-making, possibly impeachment, and budgetary powers need some time to wield. In other words, as long as countries need to respond swiftly to international events, presidential preeminence is ‘guaranteed’. Declarations of war by the legislative branch may upset this relationship, but after World War II declarations of war lost their power by going out of fashion or becoming mere formalities. Even in the post-Vietnam war era when Congress tried to curb presidential power, American presidents preserved enough freedom of action.250

Consequently, there is only one situation when presidential preeminence wanes: when presidents utilize their treaty-making prerogatives. Treaties must be ratified by Congress and it inevitably makes presidents sensitive to the preferences of the Senate. Treaty-making, however, figures proportionally low among foreign policy problems and conflict termination.251 Even then, if they can, presidents opt for executive agreements/executive orders rather than formal treaties, which effectively prevents Congressional interference.252

Such a conceptualization of presidential power only represents one of the two alternative approaches to presidential power. For example, Reiter and Tillman argue that an additional and contradictory conceptualization of presidential power is possible. This second approach posits that separation of powers and multiple and competing popular legitimacies results in that both the legislative and the executive have power to constrain certain agents

250 Stoll 1984, 233. For example, despite passing the War Power Act in 1973, which limited presidential troop commitments to sixty days without Congressional authorization but allowed for an additional thirty-day extension upon a written report from the president, Congress never invoked it.


(such as the military). Consequently, presidents are weak as they are under strong constraints.  

The problem with such an approach is that the domestic limitations on presidential power are automatically projected to foreign policy making, which leads to false expectations about the action or the likely risk-taking behavior of American presidents. That is to say, when discussing presidential preeminence, it must be done in consideration of the policy area in question. As Aaron Wildavsky argued with regard to the United States, there appears to be two presidencies – a domestic and a foreign one. Of these, the foreign policy presidency is characterized by strong presidential power, whereas the domestic presidency limits presidential power substantially.

Therefore, with regard to international risk-taking I expect that

(H1B) Executive relationship with the legislature/legislative foreign policy preferences is/are not likely to influence presidential foreign-policy choices.

3.2.3.3 The Cabinet

The cabinet does not have a constraining role either. Ideal type presidential regimes are characterized by single-headed executives. That is, cabinet members depend on the president for their job entirely. They are there to advise, but the decision and the responsibility are of the president’s. The power of cabinet members or subordinates in general depends on the quality of advice they give. It does not matter whether they may be individually popular, they cannot mean a threat to the president since they cannot remove him from office. Ironically, this inability also limits the amount of independent following they can generate.

Any challenges in the executive branch are hardly credible. The most credible challengers would be the vice presidents, who are the only executive officials likely to contest

---

253 Reiter and Tillman 2002, 815. Such conceptualization of the power of the American president is quite common. See for example, Auerswald 1999.

the presidency, but disloyalty rarely pays dividends for them. First, because disloyalty rarely goes down too well with the public, and when it would have a public rationale, the president is an influential party member and can successfully divert funds and support from a disloyal vice president’s presidential bid. In fact, in the United States, no vice president could benefit from disloyalty to the president under the current system in which the president and the vice president run together. Even unpopular presidents preserve enough power and prestige to block the presidential ambitions of possibly disloyal vice presidents.

The presence of any contending rivals in the cabinet is quite unlikely although not unheard of. For example, Truman’s second Secretary of Defense, Louis B. Johnson, made no secret of his coveting of Truman’s job and often worked at cross-purposes. However, even Truman’s patience ran out after a year and a half when Johnson was replaced with George Marshall.\textsuperscript{255} All in all, instead of catering for Johnson’s opinion so as to pacify him, the president used his superiority over the cabinet and simply fired him.

\textsuperscript{(H1C)} The preferences of the cabinet are not likely to play any role in presidential foreign-policy choices.

\textbf{3.2.4 Parliamentarism and Foreign Policy}

Just as in presidential democracies, the principal actor in parliamentary democracies is the chief executive. Like presidents, prime ministers face long-term accountability to the electorate. However, similarities end there, because prime ministers have a more immediately pressing threat to their survival in office, which enjoys primacy over accountability to the electorate. This is manifested in their short-term interests forced upon them by indirect accountability. Unlike in presidential democracies, the legislature and the cabinet also hold the prime minister accountable. Thus, the executive depends on the legislature for survival,

the prime minister do not have unqualified authority over the cabinet, and only the outer limit of electoral terms are defined, which forces prime ministers to maintain all three of these for staying in office.

All in all, life is much more of a battle for survival for prime ministers than it could ever be for presidents. They are not insulated from any of the actors that may hold them accountable. This puts them constantly on the watch. Thus, they are sensitive to the existence of the separation of purpose whether it appears at the mass or elite level. At the same time, prime ministers are not expected to demonstrate siege mentality all the time. After all, when there is unity of purpose, there is no institutional factor that would propel them toward seeing the world in terms of losses instead of gains.

(H2A) When there is a unity of purpose domestically, parliamentary democracies are expected to behave similarly to presidential democracies, i.e. avoid domestically induced international risk-taking.

However, when a separation of purpose appears, prime ministers live under the threat of losing their job. In such situations, accountability encourages them to see things in term of losses.

(H2B) When there appears a separation of purpose among domestic actors, parliamentary democracies are likely to demonstrate domestically induced risk-taking abroad.

What follows below is the hypothetical explication of how or in what particular constellation the separation of purpose dimension may lead to risk-taking behavior internationally.

3.2.4.1 The British Political ‘Story’ and the Separation of Purpose

Domestic political turmoil may present itself in three forms. When it comes to the electorate, it appears as the unpopularity of the prime minister and the government. In the parliament, it is not the opposition, but the dissatisfaction of the backbenchers that may make the life of
prime ministers difficult. Finally, division may manifest itself in the cabinet. As I will show below, the operation of these three accountability variables are not entirely independent of each other. They need to operate in certain constellations to bring the separation of purpose about.

Governing parties are unlikely to tolerate unpopular prime ministers whose occupation of the top position threatens with removing the party’s electoral chances. The only exception is when the party is so unpopular that it believes that it is going to lose the next election no matter who leads the party. In that case, the party uses the prime minister as a scapegoat. In every other case, the parliamentary party in government is likely to try to unseat the prime minister. Here I am not suggesting that the parliamentary majority will bring down the government as whole, although on rare occasions it may happen. However, this would also be self-defeating, because members of the governing party would also run the high risk of relegating themselves to opposition status. Therefore, such a move suggests strong ideological policy commitment.

Otherwise, the ability of a party to bring down the government is more likely to be used as a bargaining instrument than a blatant exercise of power. Parties that can easily remove their government from power have a higher chance or better bargaining position to enhance prime-ministerial insecurity by the threat of backbench revolt. The chances for the conditions of such a revolt to appear are especially high when the government has a small majority and/or the party or the governing coalition is ridden by disagreements, i.e. factionalized. These two factors individually or together may create a precarious majority.

Moreover, a precarious majority and/or low popularity may give rise to the emergence of a credible challenger. A credible challenger is a cabinet member who has an independent power base in the party and is ready to use it in order to gain the premiership for himself.
The possibility of such rivalry flows from the collective nature of the executive. The prime minister needs to seek out unanimity in the cabinet for a decision. However, cabinet support is not automatic, because the necessity for unanimity and the dependence of the executive on the legislature allows ministers to develop an independent power-base.

It is at this point that the interest of the cabinet diverges from the prime minister’s. While the whole cabinet wishes to see the government popular among the electorate and in the parliamentary party, because they know they need both to keep the government in office, the very same features also present cabinet members with the opportunity to advance their bid for the premiership. Unlike in presidential democracies, cabinet members may have an independent power-base within their governing party (or parties) in the parliament. This makes it possible for them to remove a prime minister from office without necessitating new elections.

Credible challengers, of course, do not appear out of the blue. Their ability to master party support is no secret before they would appear to be credible challengers and, as heavyweights in their party, they are likely to hold one of the influential government positions. Under a popular prime minister, such parliamentary factions and potential rivals give their (tacit) support to the premier. Nonetheless, such tacit support may be withdrawn in more difficult times, when a credible challenger may have a chance to unseat the prime minister. But as soon as there is open division in a party in the form of a threat of backbench revolt and a credible challenger appears, less enthusiastic or loyal ministers are likely to start taking sides, dividing the cabinet.

Small parliamentary majority and/or Strong factions → precarious majority and/or low approval rate → government vulnerable to backbench revolt and/or → divided cabinet → credible challenger in cabinet

Figure 4. The conditions of the separation of purpose in parliamentary governments
Figure 4 provides a visual representation of the conditions leading to the separation of purpose, that is, government vulnerability to backbench revolt or a divided cabinet. None of the sets of conditions are necessary or sufficient in themselves. In other words, either of a pair might lead to the outcome. For the underlined outcomes the set of antecedent conditions are meant to be jointly sufficient. That is, the presence of the two will produce the outcome. Government vulnerability to backbench revolt (without a challenger) and divided government are both unstable situations that may lead to risk-taking behavior.

In such situations, it is the prime minister’s ability to lead that is questioned and that threatens his job. Good performance in a crisis, however, could help save his job. Good performance necessitates that he shows decisiveness, which predisposes him toward tough action internationally.

Once committed to war, there is little difference between presidential and parliamentary democracies: in the long run, they all need to pursue war with resolve and success. However, chief executives rarely commit themselves immediately to war (after all, no one wishes to acquire the image of a thoughtless war-monger) and this is where things diverge for presidents and prime ministers. Presidents may decide to display resoluteness in their approach, but if in the long run they judges war too high a price, they have the power to accept (and sell) less favorable deals or simply negotiate so long that the crisis loses its importance. Similarly, popular prime minister may afford some loss of prestige and still preserve their job.

As opposed to this, for a battered prime minister, it is necessary to project resoluteness and make an unequivocal policy commitment. His tough stand decreases the likelihood that he will be able to negotiate an international agreement with the adversary, since what he asks for is quasi-acquiescence. Worse, being constantly held accountable in parliament and in the
cabinet makes it difficult for him to settle for less without removing the last doubts of incompatibility. At the same time, these conditions allow rivals to simply wait at the wings.

Under the conditions of separation of purpose, a prime minister is likely to be challenged when he does not honor earlier tough policy commitment or when he does but his policy fails. This is so, because in both situations he demonstrates his (perceived) lack of leadership skills either by softness or failure. As for the first, should the prime minister choose to continue to work toward a peaceful solution when most options appear to be exhausted, he will risk losing his job by doing so and not honoring his commitment. If instead he marches down on the path toward war, he still has a chance to preserve his position at home. He might win or lose, but at least there remains a chance that he remains in office. If he wins, his position at home is likely to be solidified and party opposition silenced – at least for a while. If he loses, he will probably be ejected from office but this outcome is no worse than the perceived consequences of not taking the risks involved in war.

3.2.5 Investigating Risk-taking

To be able to investigate the relationship of democratic regime types and risk-taking, three not entirely independent questions must be answered. The first of these questions is how to demonstrate the presence or absence of the separation of purpose. This must be based on a somewhat different tally in presidential and parliamentary regimes. In case of parliamentary democracies, the variables are defined on the basis of conditions described in figure 4. These conditions are: small majority, strong party factions, low popularity, presence of a credible challenger, and divided cabinet.

In presidential democracies not all of these factors can be expected to play a role. Public opinion is unquestionably part of the equation. Because presidential survival does not depend on the executive the president’s party is not a useful indicator of problems with the assembly. Neither is the existence of party factions, because even an adverse majority does not necessarily influence the productivity of the government very much.\textsuperscript{257} A better indicator of an adversarial legislature would be the kind of foreign policy Congress prefers: whether it is close to or far from the policy the president prefers. Adversarial congressional foreign policy is a sign of presidential difficulties with the legislature. Incidentally, Congressional dynamic is also a better indicator of future – election time – challenges than cabinet dynamics, since Congress is a more likely recruitment base for the presidency than the cabinet, including the vice president.\textsuperscript{258} (Nonetheless, the behavior of the cabinet will be traced in the case studies to ascertain it did not hold the president hostage.)

The second issue to resolve is how to ascertain the presence of a gain or loss framework when the presence of domestically adverse conditions do not necessarily lead decision-makers to invoke the loss frame? This is crucial, because the presence of domestically adversarial conditions does not guarantee that these factors actually had an effect on the given decision. To be able to claim an effect, first it must be ascertained that the chief executive officers in both systems were aware of their domestic problems. This only takes us one step closer, since being aware of adverse conditions and acting according to them are not the same thing. Therefore it must be shown that these conditions had an effect on the actual decisions.

\textsuperscript{257} Jones 1994, chapter 6.
Since 1945, only Bush Sr. was elected with the help of the president he had served. The other three post-war vice president who became presidents – Truman, Johnson, and Nixon – came into power under different circumstances. Truman and Johnson acquired the office upon the death of their predecessors, i.e. never contested the office as vice-presidents. Nixon, who lost to Kennedy when he contested the office as vice president, won only eight years later. The rest of the post-war presidents were most likely to be either former members of Congress (e.g. Kennedy, Ford) or former state governors (Carter, Reagan, Clinton, G. W. Bush).
Unfortunately, researching the motives of decision-makers is particularly difficult. Judgment must be made on the basis of what they actually said not what they necessarily had in mind. Worse, even when they did say something relevant, the researcher can only hope that their views were recorded in government documents. On top of all this, since decision-makers do not want to be accused of unstatesman-like behavior, they “can be expected to go to great length to conceal these motives.”

Cramer believes that the best way of trying to find domestic political motives is to concentrate on the presence or absence of the following factors: the decision-makers involved are kept to a minimum, use of force appears premature, after using force, the opposition criticizes the chief executive’s decision to use force and foreign states criticize the country for using force. Unquestionably, these may indicate domestically driven behavior. But they can be the symptoms of many other things – need for secrecy, groupthink, misperception, etc. All in all, these are inadequate guides in deciding whether domestic politics did play a role. Thus some other methods must be found.

Instead, first, explicit references to domestic political factors must be sought during the decision-making process. The questions to be answered are: what factors did decision-makers consider when evaluating the possible alternatives? Did they make any explicit references to the domestic political factors? Did these factors point toward a decision for war? If yes, did decision-makers embrace domestic factors or openly rejected them? That is, did they believe that risking war would enhance their domestic political standing? If domestic factors were mentioned, were they mentioned prior to the decision or only as its rationalization *ex post*?

Yet, it is possible that no references will be found to domestic politics. However, this may not necessarily indicate the lack of their influence. It is certain that domestic politics did not bias the decision in favor of risk-taking when decision-makers choose war contrary to

260 Cramer 2004, 4-6.
domestic incentives regardless of whether domestic factors were mentioned. There, of course, remains the possibility for situations when domestic factors were not explicitly mentioned but would pull the government toward action internationally. In such situations, the question to be answered is whether international imperatives themselves provide a compelling rationale to fight. If not, whether misperception may be responsible for the incongruence of international imperatives and risk-taking rather than domestic factors. If none, it is sure that domestic politics stood behind the decision.

The third question is how does one go about investigating a hypothesis of domestically defined risk-taking if one only analyzes wars – proxies for risk-taking? In other words, how is it possible to differentiate between wars started as a result of the domestically induced loss frame or risk-taking or, say, as a result of a loss frame born out of the consideration of purely international factors? The answer to the previous question already provides some hints about this. Where risk-taking was not motivated by domestic factors, I expect that decision-makers based their choice purely on international political factors. That is risky behavior was not domestically motivated.

### 3.3 Case selection

#### 3.3.1 Country Cases

While investigating the influence of regime types could involve more than the two countries that have given rise to the original puzzle, the analysis will still be limited to the United States and Great Britain for the following reasons. First, these two countries come closest to the ideal types of presidential and parliamentary democracies. Second, they have been consolidated democracies with stable institutional history for long. Thus, they fall within the scope of democratic peace theory. Third, in the examined period, the cold war, both of these countries were at least mid-range powers. Power status is a necessary prerequisite inasmuch
as only countries with sufficient military capabilities are able to act – threaten and carry out the threat of war – effectively in the long run.

### 3.3.2 Constraints Due to Differences in Power Status

To make sure that war involvement does actually measure risk-taking, a few additional constraints must be set. These constraints on selection are based on the idea of winnable wars. This concept is capable of dealing with problems flowing from the power difference between the United States and Britain. Below I shall detail what wars are winnable and what must be excluded.

First, winnable wars are those to which a state has enough power to fight. That is, the decision to fight is a real one and was not solely determined by constraints in capabilities and resources. This is the reason why the study is only extended to countries that were, at least, mid-range powers in the cold war.\textsuperscript{261}

Ironically, the asymmetry in the power of the two states presents problems and not only when it comes to the weaker of the two states – Great Britain. While both the US and Britain qualify as major powers, the United States also belong to the more elite circle of superpowers. The superpower status of the United States may very easily bias the sample in favor of the outlined hypotheses. After all, it is reasonable to expect that the US – the primary actor of the West in the cold war – demonstrated more risk-averse attitude simply by the fact that it faced a greater number of direct confrontations with the Soviet Union, which threatened with mutual destruction in a conflict. In other words, super-power conflicts fall into the category of conflicts that cannot be won, thus they prejudiced states toward risk-aversion. Accordingly, they are excluded from both the American and British sample.

\textsuperscript{261} On the difference between the behavior of major powers and small states, see for example Morgan and Bickers 1992, 29.
Of course, the asymmetry in power status also creates a problem on the British side. That is, the US faced decidedly weaker adversaries in all its wars. Accordingly, cases where Britain faced an adversary of an equal – major – power should not be included in the sample either. In the cold war two other major powers existed: France and China. In practice, this means only the exclusion of conflicts with China, since France was Britain’s ally. To exclude relevant British-Chinese conflicts, it is necessary to identify the date when China actually became a major power.

Different sources identify different dates. The COW project names China as a major power from January 1, 1950, that is, the victory of the Communists in the Chinese civil war. Huth talks of China as a major power only from 1953, probably feeling the demonstration of such status (in the Korean War) as a necessary condition. Another possible date could be China’s rise to nuclear power status in 1964. Of the three, the cut-off point of 1950 seems the most adequate, because the potential international engagement of China (given its manpower and resources) is sufficient to perceive it as a member of the group of major powers.

Finally, the asymmetry in power status also creates a problem when it is perceived in the light of entering conflicts with allies. This problem cannot be taken care of with the application of the concept of winnable wars. Oftentimes crises are entered into together with allies. This is no source of concern in American crises, because in whatever role the US entered such conflicts, its superpower status guaranteed that it could play the major part in crises. For Britain, crises where the United States was also involved are an issue, since American involvement drastically reduced the risk that entry into war meant for Britain. Therefore, such crises will be removed from among the British cases.

---

262 COW 2007.
3.3.3 Time Frame: The Cold War

As it has been implied above, the time frame of the analysis is the cold war period (1945-1990). While the number of cases could be somewhat increased by covering other periods and, thus, other international system structures, lack of reliable data, the change in the nature of the meaning of democracy over time, and American isolationism makes such an extension problematic. First, systematic data collection in the executive branch started in the late 1910s in Britain and even later in the United States. As a result, a longitudinal extension of the dataset could mostly produce additional cases that cannot be thoroughly examined. Second, as I have already pointed it out in chapter 1, no matter what period researchers aim at covering, when examining democratic peace, they only cover the post-1945 period, because the set of stable democracies were very small prior to 1945.\(^{264}\)

Finally, the cold war is the only period when both of these countries were ready to carry the burden of international involvement. Before the cold war and apart from the two major wars – Word Wars I and II – the United States simply withdrew from international/global politics as much as it could.

Nonetheless, limiting analysis to the cold war is an acceptable strategy only if the outlined difference in war-proneness persists in this period. A quick check with the *Correlates of War* database shows that war-proneness of states generally dropped. As table 4 shows the number of wars per year as well as the number of wars per MIDs both show a significant decrease (the latter is both the result of decreasing of the number of wars and the increase in the number of MIDs). Even though, there was an overall reduction in the number of conflicts in the cold war as compared to the 1816-1944 period, this did not eliminate the difference in the war-proneness of Britain and the USA in the 1945-1989 period (see table 1 in chapter 1).

---

\(^{264}\) Barkawi and Laffey 2001, 4, 14, 16; Farber and Gowa 1995.
Table 4. Systemic effects on the number of wars fought

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>MIDs</th>
<th>% of Wars and MIDs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1816 - 1944</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945 - 1989</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3.4 The Population of Cases

Even though no one database fit all the criteria of war defined in chapter 1, the Correlates of War datasets come closest to it. Therefore, it was the initial starting point for constructing the population of American and British wars between 1945 and 1990.\(^{265}\) However, besides inter-state wars, extra-state wars are taken into account. The rationale for this is that they do carry similar international risks – random shocks to the system – as inter-state wars. This is especially true in an age when anti-colonialism was widespread and colonial matters did not remain within the confines of the colonized-colonizer relationship. Moreover, when making my selection the COW civil war database was also scrutinized, since regardless of the selection criteria, some internationalized civil wars remained in this database. One example is the war in the Dominican Republic in 1965 that did start as a civil war but became internationalized when the United States intervened.

Table 5. British wars, 1945-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of War</th>
<th>Start of War</th>
<th>End of War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Indonesia</td>
<td>11/10/45</td>
<td>10/15/46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Malaya</td>
<td>6/18/48</td>
<td>8/31/57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Kenya</td>
<td>10/20/52</td>
<td>?/?/56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Cyprus</td>
<td>4/1/55 (^{267})</td>
<td>02/01/56 (^{267})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Cameroon</td>
<td>6/?/55 (^{268})</td>
<td>?/?/60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Borneo</td>
<td>12/?/62</td>
<td>8/11/66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Falklands</td>
<td>3/25/82</td>
<td>6/20/82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{265}\) Small and Singer (1982) used the same approach building the COW database starting out from earlier databases.

\(^{266}\) Start of the military campaign of the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA).

\(^{267}\) Agreement on the conditions of independence and end of EOKA’s anti-British efforts.

\(^{268}\) Information on Cameroon is scant. The start date indicated here is the beginning of the civil war, which is used as the closest substitute for the exact date of the beginning of the British involvement.
However, since the death criteria have been replaced, the number of potential cases had to be checked against other – historical – sources. All this together yields the following wars for Britain (table 5) and the US (table 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of War</th>
<th>Start of War</th>
<th>End of War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Korea</td>
<td>6/24/50</td>
<td>7/27/59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Vietnam</td>
<td>2/7/65</td>
<td>4/30/75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dominican Republic</td>
<td>4/28/65</td>
<td>6/2/65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Grenada</td>
<td>10/24/83</td>
<td>11/7/83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Panama</td>
<td>12/21/89</td>
<td>1/3/90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. American wars, 1945-1990

3.3.5 The Sample

Of the population of American and British wars in the cold war, two guidelines were used to select cases for process tracing. First, only wars where domestic politics was most likely to play a role were chosen for analysis. That is to say, crucial cases where the hypothesized relationship is most likely to appear are selected. If the hypothesized relationship between different democratic regime types and war do not occur in cases where they are most likely to appear (British wars decided on in the midst of political trouble for the government, that is, when there was a separation of purpose), then it is not reasonable to expect such difference in other cases. Alternatively, the hypothesis is also disconfirmed if domestic factors play a role where they should have no influence, i.e. in American wars with domestic political turmoil.\footnote{Note that selecting crucial cases leaves room for multi-causality. On the crucial case studies approach, see King, Gary et. al. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 209-211.}

Second, such potential confounding factors are controlled for as the party affiliation of the government, the personality of chief executives and the intensity of a given crisis. In order to account for their possible influence and, thus, enhance measurement validity, cases selected
should vary on these factors as much as possible. All in all, these add up to four criteria in selecting the cases.

3.3.5.1 Scope Conditions

In the selection of wars for analysis, the scope conditions provide good guidance. In order to be able to meaningfully test my hypotheses, it is necessary to examine both wars where there were adverse domestic political variables present and, thus, a loss framework might have been invoked by the decision-makers, and cases where domestic political factors pointed toward risk aversion. In determining the presence or absence of these indicators, the following factors were taken into account with regard to Britain: small majority, strong party factions, low popularity, presence of a credible challenger, and divided cabinet.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War Name</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>Small Majority</th>
<th>Strong Factions</th>
<th>Low Popularity</th>
<th>Credible Challenger</th>
<th>Divided Cabinet</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Indonesia</td>
<td>11/10/45</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>T1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Malaya</td>
<td>6/18/48</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>T1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Kenya</td>
<td>10/20/52</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y/X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>T2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Cyprus</td>
<td>4/1/55</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>T2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Cameroon</td>
<td>6/7/55</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>T1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Suez</td>
<td>10/29/56</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>T2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Borneo</td>
<td>12/7/62</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>T2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Falklands</td>
<td>3/25/82</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>T2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. British wars in the light of domestic factors (Y = factor is present; X = factor is absent)

270 The Labour Party is by definition made up of rival factions. During Cyprus, Cameroon and Suez, the Conservative Party was divided between the radically pro-imperialist Suez group and the more moderate party faction. Both the party and the cabinet were divided or, at least, the prime minister believed so. See Horne, Alistair. 1991. *Macmillan 1957-1986. Volume II of the Official Biography*. London: Macmillan, 332-350. In 1982, the Tories were divided over economic policy between the more free-market oriented Thatcherites and those favoring the post-war economic consensus.

Popularity information is established on the basis of party popularity.\textsuperscript{272} The ideal would have been to use job approval ratings for prime ministers or use prime ministerial job approval ratings in combination with party popularity data, but regular approval data is only available from 1979.\textsuperscript{273} Low popularity is defined as a government at least five percentage points behind in the polls or a government with sharply and continuously dropping popularity (ten percentage points in six month).\textsuperscript{274} Small majority is twenty or under.\textsuperscript{275} All other information was recovered from history books. Cases were selected with a small number (one or two) of the factors present (and in particular without a credible challenger in the cabinet) and where a large number of the factors were present (three or four). For the sake of simplicity, the former were named as Type1 (T1) and the latter as Type2 (T2) conflicts. Table 7 shows that in Britain there were three T1 and five T2 conflicts in the cold war.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War Name</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>Trouble with Congress</th>
<th>Low popularity</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>6/24/50</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>T2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>2/7/65</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>T1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>4/28/65</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>T1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>10/24/83</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>T2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>12/21/89</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>T1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. American wars in the light of domestic factors  
(Y = factor is present; X = factor is absent)


\textsuperscript{274} The five percentage point benchmark is used to hopefully get around the error term. Unfortunately the database does not include the size of the statistical error.

Some of the variables that are important in Britain are not relevant in America. The two relevant variables are popularity and trouble within the legislature (the latter roughly equates the small majority and/or strong faction measures in Britain). While history books were the source for the latter, presidential popularity polls were used for the former. Low popularity here is defined as popularity below 45% or sharply and continuously dropping (ten percentage points in six month). As for legislative troubles, anti-Communist hysteria and McCarthyism was in full swing before the start of the Korean War, targeting the Truman Administration, especially the State Department for the loss of China. The Reagan Administration faced an adversarial Congressional majority that tried to tie the hands of the president in foreign policy making. The Reagan Administration had already clashed over policy toward Nicaragua and El Salvador with Congress prior to intervention in Grenada. T2 conflicts in the American context are those where at least one of the variables were present. As shown in table 8, this yields three T1 and two T2 conflicts.

Finally, figure 5 depicts wars according to regime type on the axes of separations of powers and separation of purpose. The first represents the institutional dimension. Since there were no major institutional changes that influenced the relevant institutions of the American presidential and British parliamentary democracies, wars from the same country take up the same values on this axis. Since both are configurations close to the ideal type definitions of presidentialism/parliamentarism, the two regimes are placed to the two extremes of the X-axis. Axis Y or the separation of purpose represents political or temporal dimensions of political life. A great deal of variation appears in this dimension.

3.3.5.2 Party Affiliation

As it can be seen from table 9, the overwhelming number of wars in Great Britain came under Conservative prime ministers. This agrees with the traditional view that Labour pursued a markedly different foreign policy from that of the Conservative Party. While the Tories are seen as the party of the Empire whose main purpose was to preserve the colonies, Labour is often credited to be the party of anti-colonialism, entertaining sympathy with colonial nationalist movements. This suggests that what party was in power may be a confounding factor. However, a more thorough analysis raises doubts about this. First, there exists a rather unfortunate historical coincidence: the Tories were in power in the fifties and the first half of the sixties when colonial retreat took place. By the time of Callaghan’s Labour cabinet, the Empire, apart from a few small territories, was practically gone, making it impossible to draw further conclusions about Labour’s attitudes toward the colonies than those of the Attlee government.

Second, under any government only a minority of the cases was contested in military terms. This and the liquidation of the Empire by 1964 also point to the fact that conservative

---

Morgan 1984, 189.
governments parted with a large number of territories peacefully. For instance, while Macmillan started the war in Borneo, his Colonial Secretary Ian McLeod granted independence to many African colonies. Third, whatever foreign policy Labour might have preferred in theory, as it were thrown into power in 1945, it pursued pro-Empire policies. In 1945-1946, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin proposed to expand British colonial presence in Africa. Although, the Attlee government decided to let India and Pakistan go without hostilities and did not believe that Palestine was worth spilling British blood, in Indonesia and Malaya it opted for a military solution. That is to say, a similar combination of retreat and firmness can be depicted under Labour and Conservative governments. Nonetheless, as a precaution, party-affiliation is taken into account in case selection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Labour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T1</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Malaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Borneo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Falklands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. British wars according to the party affiliation of prime ministers and conflict type

Out of five American wars in the cold war, three were initiated under Democratic and two, under Republican presidents. Although the difference is meager, it still follows the traditional division between the Democrats and Republicans, the former being more interventionist and the latter more cautious in the cold war. However, this division also comes from the rather unfortunate situation that an eight-year-long Republican control of the executive branch were characterized by détente and the relaxation of tensions between the two superpowers, which presupposes fewer opportunities for war. Excluding this period (1969-1975), the difference between the war-proneness of Democratic and Republican presidents

---

280 See, for example Horne 1991, 173-213 and 384-427.
281 Morgan 1984, 188-232 especially 193-203.
substantially shrinks: twenty years of democrats in power resulted in four wars while
seventeen years of Republican rule lead to two wars. Without the period of détente, only one
president from each party – Eisenhower and Carter – did not initiate war. Nonetheless, the
examined cases will include wars both under Democratic and Republican presidents. Table 10
depicts T1 and T2 conflicts according the party affiliation of presidents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T1</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2</td>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>Korea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10. American wars according to the party affiliation of presidents and conflict type

3.3.5.3 Leadership Style

While few deny that the person in power does count when a given decision is to be made, the
agreement over the magnitude of the influence of the personality is less unanimous. Even
researchers focusing on the role of individuals in decision-making are not necessarily
convinced that individuals are the most important single variable influencing decisional
outcomes. Although it would be unreasonable to deny its influence, this dissertation relegates
the effect of personality secondary to that of institutions. Nevertheless, the possibility that
personality plays a role cannot be entirely ignored, since institutions allow for some leeway
for chief executives to define their role and behavior within the institutional framework.282

Research on the influence of the personality of political leaders has a particularly
important position in the United States where the sophisticated analysis of leaders’
psychology became prominent in the 1970s. The popularity of leader-centered executive
research may be in part a result of the unequalled importance of the president in American

282 Helms 2005, 18-19
politics: he is both directly elected and the sole executive official to be held accountable.\textsuperscript{283}

Particularly influential were Neustadt’s 1960 study of presidential leadership styles and James Barber’s discussion of presidential character.\textsuperscript{284}

Richard Neustadt, who examined leadership style by concentrating on informal power and persuasion, used the dichotomous distinction between circular and pyramid structures. The former provides relatively open access to the president because no gatekeeper is employed. The latter is a highly hierarchical structure where usually the president employs a chief of staff to limit traffic to the Oval Office. Communication is primarily top down in nature.\textsuperscript{285}

Meanwhile, Barber classified presidents by orientation toward life (i.e. character). His study was based on the assumption that character is defined by experience from childhood to early adulthood. He differentiated between presidents by two dimensions: how much presidents invested into their jobs (active-passive) and how much satisfaction their profession brings into their lives (positive-negative).\textsuperscript{286}

It was Neustadt’s more restricted approach that became the basis of further studies in the more recent literature that attempted to classify presidential leadership styles with special emphasis on the foreign policy process. That is, these works enquire about the way leaders manage the task at hand, mobilize information, and deal with and coordinate their advisors.\textsuperscript{287}

Studying the influence of personality on the basis of leadership style is rooted in either the assumption that background factors – past experience – shape presidential character as well as

\textsuperscript{283} Helms 2005, 18.
\textsuperscript{285} Neustadt 1990 , 58-59.
\textsuperscript{286} Barber 1992 [1972].
their leadership style or that personality will shape leadership style directly.\(^{288}\) That is, leadership style is the result of the same process and, thus, captures the same phenomenon as the rather elusive concept of personality. Moreover, operationalizing personality as leadership style is especially useful in analyzing institutions, because it helps explicate the structurally relevant aspects of a president’s personality.

Alexander George differentiates between three presidential management styles on the basis of presidents’ informational needs, sense of efficacy and competence, and attitude toward conflict among advisors. Formalistic management is built on hierarchical lines of communication, orderly structure and discouragement of conflict and bargaining among agencies. The competitive style thrives on conflict among advisors while the collegial model utilizes policy making in groups in order to benefit from competition by avoiding parochialism.\(^{289}\)

Hermann and Preston noted the relevance of five variables – involvement in the policy-making process, willingness to tolerate conflict, motivation for leading, management of information and conflict resolution technique – and ordered them via two dimensions: hierarchy (control) and focus of centralization (coordination). While their typology yielded four subtypes by the formal/informal control and process-focused/problem focused dimensions, they came to recognize that certain presidents would end up as mixed types.\(^{290}\)

In contrast to the thriving of executive leadership research in the United States, similar works with regard to parliamentary regimes or those that aim at an internationally relevant comparative conceptualization of leadership style are rather rare.\(^{291}\) This is problematic.


\(^{289}\) George 1980.


because most of the American literature is tailor-made to analyze presidential regimes and is not useful in classifying executive leadership styles in parliamentary democracies.\(^{292}\)

Yet, Juliet Kaarbo notes that while one-to-one adaptation is undesirable, Hermann and Preston’s five variables are general enough to fit parliamentary regimes if they are operationalized differently.\(^{293}\) Drawing on these five variables and the insights on organizational leadership, she adapts their typology to parliamentary regimes with a focus on Germany and Britain. However, unlike Hermann and Preston, Kaarbo refuses to collapse the five dimensions, claiming that this would avoid the appearance of mixed types.\(^{294}\) Even though this may be true, the result is the creation of so many analytical categories that no small-N study could cover all the variation.

In Europe, the primarily institutional and constitutional-legal focus in the field of leadership research was a hindrance to examine the influence of personality and leadership style.\(^{295}\) As a result of this and the considerably fewer opportunities in parliamentary regimes for innovation, systematic and comparative studies of prime ministerial leadership styles are lacking.\(^{296}\) Those that actually look at cross-country or within-country variation of prime ministerial leadership style, often attribute the variation to structure – constitutionally defined dimensions of prime-ministerial power across countries, nature of the cabinet (single or multi-party), coalition type etc.\(^{297}\)

A rare exception is Helms’ *Presidents, Prime Ministers and Chancellors*, which is a comparative study of leadership styles, discussing the styles of American, British and German

---

294 Kaarbo 1997, 571.
297 Kaarbo 1997, 556.
chief executives after 1945 both in relation to the core executive and the legislative branch.\textsuperscript{298}

As for Britain, Hennessy’s \textit{The Prime Minister} offers a discussion of the leadership styles of post-war prime ministers from Attlee to Blair.\textsuperscript{299} However, both of these works are narrative descriptions and, thus, lack a systematic classification of leaders on the basis of their leadership style.

In order to gain comparable results but limit variation to two dimensions, leadership style in Britain and the United States is understood here along two dimensions: (1) formal substructure and (2) informal operation. The former seeks to answer the question of what structure the leader preferred or set up to operate in and the latter, how he actually operated within that framework. Although ideally these two aspects should correlate,\textsuperscript{300} they do not do so in all the cases, which suggests that there may be a gap between the politically possible and desirable or that certain chief executive lacked an adequate knowledge of their own needs and personality.

While the questions over leadership styles are relevant in both democratic systems, they must be operationalized differently. To answer the question of what structure presidents generally draw up, I will rely on the traditional dichotomous distinction of presidential studies: circular and pyramid structures. Such a differentiation is more adequate to examine the relations of the president and the White House staff than that of the chief executive and the cabinet. The relevance of the White House staff – in which I also include dealings with cabinet ministers on an individual basis but not as a collective body – is given by its involvement in policy-making. The cabinet as a policy-making institution is foreign to the American system. Despite the wishes of several presidents to rely on their cabinet, it never came to play an influential part. Even presidents (i.e. Eisenhower and Carter) who had a higher regard for the cabinet only used it for brainstorming or as a sounding board.

\textsuperscript{298} Helms 2005.
\textsuperscript{299} Hennessy 2000.
\textsuperscript{300} Jones 1994, 58.
Three presidents employed the pyramid/top down communication method. Eisenhower used Sherman Adams as his chief of staff to limit traffic in the Oval Office. President Nixon had a tendency to delegate to his ministers (especially in domestic politics) and recommendations were demanded in writing to allow the President to decide things without even consulting his senior advisors. Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s national security advisor then also Secretary of State, acted as Nixon’s gatekeeper when it came to foreign policy issues. Finally, Ronald Reagan used the troika of James Baker, Michael Deaver and Edwin Meese who collected information from subordinates and decided both on policy recommendation to the President and on what information was to be forwarded to Reagan. Replacing the troika, Reagan employed a single chief of staff during his second term: first Don Regan, then Howard Baker. Quite logically, these three presidents were the least involved in detailed policy-making.

Three Democratic Presidents, Truman, Kennedy, and Carter used the circular structure. Although Truman started the institutionalization of the policy process and was a super delegator, the degree of access to the President remained remarkably open. As opposed to this, Kennedy had little regard for formal committees and operated in the midst of informality. A great number of advisors were consulted in the policy process: the President did not hesitate to ask for the opinion of lower level officials in various departments. While all presidents using the circular structure were very much involved in the decision-making process, Carter’s concern with detail was rather excessive. After two Republican presidents, he moved back to the circular structure and was the last president to operate without a chief of staff.

Presidential practice and the instituted structure were mismatched in three occasions. Lyndon Johnson, who inherited the presidency from the assassinated Kennedy, was deprived of a ‘new beginning’ because of the circumstances of his coming into power. Thus, he used the open-access structure but his personal style that lacked tolerance for rivalry or dissent hindered the working of the circular structure. George H. W. Bush came to power as the second best
alternative after a popular President Reagan who was constitutionally deprived of a third term. The challenge of living up to the expectations of continuing in Reagan’s shoes tied Bush’s hands in innovation. Bush used the pyramid structure, which only partly worked in practice: not only could a number of close associates of the President never be forced to operate through his chief of staff, Bush’s good relations with his cabinet ministers also encouraged informal consultations with the President. Ford, who was pressured for an open style by the failure of Nixon’s highly authoritative pyramid structure, stands in between the two categories. His personal style was rather informal, ensuring open access, which correlated with the early set-up of his administration but he later moved toward a more closed, chief of staff driven system.

In the British context, where the cabinet has traditionally served as the forum of policymaking, the crucial element of prime ministerial leadership style is his/her attitude toward the usage of the cabinet. Thus, here the question of what structure the leader has drawn up is operationalized according to how much a prime minister was willing to play out things in the cabinet. In other words, it measures how much respect they had for the traditional cabinet system. However, not discussing everything with the cabinet is not disrespect for the system per se: the role of cabinet committees grew with time out of the recognition that somehow the excessive burden on the cabinet should be reduced while preserving some element of collegiality by having the relevant (and often the interested) ministers involved in cabinet committees.

Accordingly, discussing things in cabinet committees is equated with discussions in the cabinet. This leaves the following as signs of disregard for the cabinet-system: one-to-one dealings with ministers, inner cabinets, the complete disregard for the cabinet in decisions, and meaningless cabinet meetings where ministers had no space to express their opinion. As a consequence the second dimension of leadership style is measured on the bases of how prime

---

301 The classification of presidents is based on Jones 1994, 52-112 and Helms 2005, 36-54.
ministers operated in their preferred systems. In other words, the question is whether prime ministers engaged in democratic (circular) and authoritarian (top-down) relationship with their staff.

In many cases these two dimensions heavily correlated. Perhaps, Callaghan is the best example of prime ministerial preference for the circular system. He not only believed in taking things to the cabinet, but left ample space for ministers to play issues out in that forum. Despite all accusation of presidentialism, Harold Macmillan also had a great appreciation for the cabinet and did use it as a sounding board, forcing ministers to come up with their own ideas and criticism. The cabinet also determined the general policy outlines. Douglas-Home exercised strong collegiality and delegated a lot to his ministers, which was a result of his inexperience in most policy areas and the fact that he became prime minister as a compromise candidate that no one in particular preferred in the party as their leader.

As opposed to this, neither Margaret Thatcher nor Harold Wilson during his first premiership really believed in working through the cabinet. Both of them saw the cabinet as a necessary burden. Accordingly, Thatcher preferred policy-making through her Downing Street staff and as soon as opponents were entirely purged from the cabinet around 1983, she ditched even the appearance of collegiality. Wilson brought together small, inner-cabinets of trusted advisors that were augmented with bilateral dealings with ministers.

Churchill also used the top-down approach. In spite of his deep but theoretical appreciation for the cabinet, he never aimed at any levels of collegiality. He introduced overlords to coordinate various departments, which somewhat resembles the American chief of staff approach of the Reagan’s triumvirate. Although cabinet meetings were frequently called, they had little to contribute to policy-making as cabinets were only places where time was taken up by Churchill’s ramblings on his pet issues. 302 His only interest lay in foreign

---

302 One-to-one discussions were also used by Callaghan but it was a method to acquire information on problems and not one to define policy.
policy where his involvement left little space even for his Foreign Secretary to meaningfully contribute to the direction of policy.

Some prime ministers ended up in mixed systems. Edward Heath was a firm believer of the cabinet mechanism and set out to deal with the cabinet with exemplary collegiality. Yet, his brusque, authoritative manner prevented the cabinet from working as effective a forum of discussion as he had hoped. He also used an inner cabinet to discuss and, on occasion, decide major policy issues. Similarly, Anthony Eden was torn in between his willingness to lay things before the cabinet and his own personality. His constant worrying made him interfere too much with the job of his ministers and his tantrums discouraged colleagues to express their views. Wilson during his second premiership gave considerable freedom to his ministers but policy was essentially made through the Wilson-Callaghan axis.\footnote{303}

On this basis, three leadership styles are differentiated. The pyramid structure in America and the ignorance of the cabinet in Britain are classified as the ‘top-down’ approach to leadership, while respect for the cabinet in Britain and the circular decision-making style in the United States are classified under the concept of ‘circular’ leadership style. Presidents and prime ministers who showed ambiguity in preference and practice belong to the third category of ‘mixed’ leadership style. Table 11 classifies all post-war presidents and prime ministers into these three categories:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidents</th>
<th>Top-down</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Circular</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Truman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kennedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reagan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Carter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Ministers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churchill</td>
<td></td>
<td>Eden</td>
<td>Attlee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson I</td>
<td></td>
<td>Heath</td>
<td>Macmillan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thatcher</td>
<td></td>
<td>Wilson II.</td>
<td>Callaghan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Douglas-Home</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Presidents} & \textbf{Top-down} & \textbf{Mixed} & \textbf{Circular} \\
\hline
Eisenhower & Johnson & Truman \\
Nixon & Bush Sr. & Kennedy \\
Reagan & & Carter \\
\hline
\textbf{Prime Ministers} & & & \\
\hline
Churchill & Eden & Attlee \\
Wilson I & Heath & Macmillan \\
Thatcher & Wilson II. & Callaghan \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Presidential (US) and prime ministerial (GB) leadership styles}
\end{table}

\footnote{303}The classification of prime ministers is based on Hennessy 2000 and Helms 2005, 70-86.
3.3.5.4 Crisis Intensity

Although there is an agreement in the diversionary literature that crisis intensity is an important mediating factor, researchers are divided over the nature of its effect. However, some of these arguments become mute with the removal of direct superpower confrontations: naturally these conflicts produce higher rallying than less intense conflicts. Since I am examining wars only, it is not necessary here to take sides in the debate whether crises or only wars are high-intensity events that may rally the public behind the chief executive.

I agree with Levy, Lai, and Lian and Oneal that decision makers only expect high intensity conflicts to rally. Both domestically and internationally the pressure and the stakes are greater for decision-makers in high-intensity than in low intensity conflicts. Crisis intensity is defined on the basis of media coverage devoted to wars. The classification of wars according to conflict intensity is shown in tables 12 and 13. Of American wars, two qualify as high-intensity conflicts: the Korean and Vietnam wars, while of British wars only the Suez crisis and the Falklands war meet the criteria of high-intensity conflicts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Malaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suez</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Falklands</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Borneo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12. British wars classified according to conflict intensity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T1</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13. American wars classified according to conflict intensity
### 3.3.6 Selected Cases

Tables 14 and 15 show the four dimensions in combination in Britain and the United States, respectively. Even though there is large variation among cases, history has not produced a number of combinations. Given the four dimensions and the relatively small number of wars in either country, this is hardly surprising. Aiming at the greatest diversity among the four factors, the following wars were selected for analysis: Malaya, Kenya, and Suez (GB), and Korea, Dominican Republic, and Grenada (US).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership style</th>
<th>Conflict type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top down</td>
<td>Cameroon ('55)*,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Falklands ('82)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circular</td>
<td>Indonesia ('45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malaya ('48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Borneo ('62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Wars under Conservative (indicated in blue) or Labour (indicated in red) government.  
  ** High intensity conflicts are indicated in bold.

Table 14. British wars in the light of leadership style and party affiliation of the prime minister, war intensity and type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership style</th>
<th>Conflict type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top down</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circular</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Panama ('89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vietnam ('65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dominican Republic ('65)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Wars under Democratic (indicated in blue) or Republican (indicated in red) president.  
  ** High intensity conflicts are indicated in bold.

Table 15. American wars in the light of leadership style and party affiliation of the president, war intensity and type
Chapter 4: Low Intensity Conflicts and Presidential Decision-making: Interventions in the Dominican Republic and Grenada

4.1 Dominican Republic

4.1.1 A Short History of the American Intervention in the Dominican Republic

The Kennedy-Johnson national security policy was based on a mixture of idealism and anti-Communism. Administration officials believed that their task was the same as what President Truman faced in 1947, i.e. to contain Communism. But in the 1960s the East-West struggle was shifting to the poorer half of the world where the United States, as a status quo power, faced the danger of falling behind. Therefore the United States also had to make sure that it supported representative, democratic government, and was not against reform, only Communist revolutionarism. Reform was to be achieved through foreign aid. The use of force was not ruled out, but was limited to situations where a Communist takeover had to be prevented.

President Johnson focused his strongly anti-Communist outlook on one struggle, Vietnam, believing that any other struggles around the globe were only diversions from the fight in Vietnam and his domestic political program, the Great Society. At the same time, he could not ignore the more than 130-year long, political, economic and social presence of the United States in Latin America. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which established American dominance in the Western Hemisphere, was supplemented with the Roosevelt corollary in 1904, turning it into a justification of the American intervention in the region. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s good neighborhood policy in the 1930s served as a


moderating effect on the American interventionism and focused on more cooperative means to solve the problems of the Hemisphere. In the early 1960s, the United States committed itself to the economic development of Latin America within the Alliance for Progress, which promised a comprehensive social, economic and political program of cooperation for ten years in exchange for reformist – but not Communist revolutionary – change. This program also had an in-built discrimination against countries with dictatorial regimes, which were temporarily ineligible to participate.

While committed to the Alliance for Progress, President Johnson moved away from the discriminative clause, making the support of American policies the only prerequisite for aid. Moreover, regional order and stability counted with more weight than financial aid in his strategy to fight Communism in Latin America. Johnson unified Latin American policy under the direction of Thomas C. Mann, who in March 1964 made it clear that private US investments would be protected, economic growth furthered while social reforms would not be stressed too much. More importantly, the United States was to refrain from intervention except when Castro-style Communist factions threatened to take over a country. Such an approach was especially important in the Caribbean, which was in the immediate proximity of the United States and where the US had already failed to prevent the establishment of a Communist country, Cuba.

Judging by its history, which has been characterized by instability, the inability to govern and intervention by outside powers, the Dominican Republic was an unlikely target of either Communist penetration or American intervention. The country, which shares the island of Hispaniola with Haiti and had approximately four million inhabitants in 1965, was

---


claimed by the Spanish upon Columbus’s first voyage in 1492 and subsequently ruled by Spain until 1821. However, instead of gaining its independence in 1821, the Dominican Republic fell under Haitian rule for twenty-three years. Finally, it became independent in 1844. In 1861, the Dominicans invited the Spanish back only to win independence from Spain again in 1865.  

American involvement started in 1869 when President Grant wanted to occupy it. The plan, however, failed when Congress voted against it. The first time the United States intervened militarily was in the course of the 1904 revolt, supporting the ruling Morales regime. A year later, the US overtook custom collection in order to use it in part to finance the country’s large international debts and, thus, prevent European meddling in hemispheric affairs. The United States intervened again in the 1913 revolution to engineer an armistice. Finding the Dominicans unable to govern their country, President Wilson ordered the occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1916, which resulted in eight years of American military control. Although no more intervention occurred until 1965, the United States remained involved in Dominican affairs by diplomatic and economic means.  

After the Americans left, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo managed to consolidate his authoritarian regime in 1931. It took three decades for the international community to condemn his corrupt and ruthless rule, which was finally done by the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1960. The United States started to distance itself from the Trujillo regime under President Eisenhower and the process accelerated under President Kennedy. On May 31, 1961 Trujillo was assassinated by Dominican army officers. After a show of naval force in the vicinity of the Dominican Republic to prevent the return of the Trujillo family, the Kennedy Administration lent covert American financial support and helped elect the Social  

311 Schoonmaker 1990, 2-5.
Democratic Juan Bosch as president in December 1962. Bosch, who was very aptly perceived by the US as a man of good intentions but with no administrative skills could nonetheless maintain American support. Yet, he quickly alienated the Dominican society and was ousted in August 1963 by the military.

Bosch was succeeded by a junta under the leadership of a triumvirate. Bosch and opposition politicians were deported off the county. The US took a harsh line against the triumvirate, denying official recognition, recalling its Ambassador, and suspending economic and military assistance. Lyndon Johnson recognized the junta in December 1963, which added one more supporter besides the Dominican Army to Donald Reid Cabral’s regime. On April 24, some members of the Dominican army joined forces with the pro-Bosch activists and started to execute a coup against Reid. Lacking support, Reid resigned on the morning of April 25 and was arrested by the rebels led by Colonel Camaño. Under General Molina the regime forces gathered strength and what started as a coup turned into a civil war.

The Johnson Administration wished to engineer a cease-fire, but realizing that it will not happen soon, the President authorized the sending of 400 marines on April 26 to evacuate American citizens. At the Ambassador’s request, additional troops were sent on the 28th and the 29th to help the evacuation and protect the Embassy. The President formally authorized massive American landings on April 30th to avoid a Communist take-over. The 22,000 American troops were neutral in name only. In reality they supported the regime forces both logistically and in the actual fights. Operation Power Pack ended with 26 American lives lost.

Such a controversy may follow from the fact that troop increases were the result of a series of decisions. As I argue later on, this confusion is likely to be the result of the fact that formal commitment was made a day after the president made up his mind.

COW 2007. No reliable information is available on the total number of casualties.
Meanwhile, several attempts were also made to find a diplomatic solution. On April 30 former Ambassador John Bartlow Martin went to Santo Domingo to negotiate a deal about the establishment of an interim government led by Antonio Imbert Barrera, but the interim government quickly collapsed at the resistance of the pro-Bosch forces. In mid-May 1965, an American delegation was sent to the Dominican Republic. Yet, the mission led by National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy failed to achieve any agreement due to internal division within the US delegation and a constant hardening of the US negotiating position. Subsequently, an OAS mission – also known as the Bunker mission – took over the negotiations. It helped organize a multi-national OAS peacekeeping force, negotiated an interim government, and set elections by June 1, 1966. In the elections, with substantial American help and most likely a result of election fraud, Trujillo’s former puppet president Joaquin Antonio Balaguer Ricardo, became president.314

4.1.2 The Domestic Political Situation

American intervention in the Dominican Republic has been characterized in chapter 3 as a T1 conflict where neither unpopularity nor troubles with Congress plagued the President. Lyndon Johnson became president in 1963 upon the death of President Kennedy. He won his mandate a year later in the 1964 presidential election where he defeated his Republican opponent, Barry Goldwater with the greatest plurality of votes in history. It translated into 486 electoral votes for Johnson and 52 for Goldwater. Democrats performed equally well in Congressional elections gaining 37 seats in the House and two in the Senate, resulting in a majority of 155 in the former and 36 in the latter. Due to large majorities and Johnson’s legislative skills, the 89th

Congress passed historic legislations, including the 1965th Civil Rights Act, Medicare, Medicaid, aid to education, and anti-poverty bills.\textsuperscript{315}

Minor problems were appearing on the horizon, but nothing really substantial. His approval rating fell eleven points in a year, but it was still substantially high at 64\%.\textsuperscript{316} Riffs appeared in the Democratic Party in Congress and over foreign policy, but the President was not to lose much of his strength with Congress until 1966. After Johnson ordered the bombing of North Vietnam in February 1965, fifteen Democratic Senators asked him to stop the bombing and a similar protest was made by Democrats in the House of Representatives.\textsuperscript{317} However, because of the size of the majorities and because of the general approval of the policy-line he was taking, and because the next election was more than three years away, Johnson had little to fear at home.

Therefore, as in case of both T1 and T2 American conflicts, domestic policy is not expected to play a role. Presidential foreign policy decisions should be based on international factors alone.

4.1.3 The Decision to Intervene in the Dominican Republic

4.1.3.1 Reasons to Intervene

The most important factor behind the President’s decision was to stop the advancement of the expansion of the Communist world – a purely international consideration. From the moment the President was notified of problems on April 24, events were viewed within the framework of the ideological struggle against the Communists. When the White House got wind of the resignation of the regime’s leading man, Reid, they set the unification of the Dominican armed forces to be their objective so that it could win the fight against rebels before elections.


\textsuperscript{317} Hammond 1992, 25.
could be called. It was predicted that Balaguer would win such an election. Despite Balaguer’s demagoguery and close identification with the Trujillo regime, this was seen as a favorable development, because “he is firmly anti-Communist,” enjoys the support of the elite, and as in the past the United States could cooperate with him. Furthermore, the President was told that there appeared to be some Communist involvement in the revolt; even though neither the official Communist Party nor the one oriented toward Chinese Communism (Popular Dominican Movement) was involved in the conflict, the pro-Castro 14th of June movement and two members of Bosch’s Dominican Revolutionary Party, who “have been suspected of ties to the extreme left,” took part in the revolt.

Nevertheless, American involvement started with what looked like a strict rescue mission of American citizens. When the decision to evacuate American citizens was made on the evening of April 26, the United States still did not wish to side openly with either of the warring parties regardless of its preference for the junta. When it became clear that no cease-fire would happen, the concern of the decision-makers was strictly limited to the well-being of American citizens. It was the fear that a firefight might erupt in the vicinity of Hotel Embajador where American citizens were gathering, waiting for the projected rescue that gave the final push for ordering evacuation.

The preferences of the administration were clear. Although American troops entered the Dominican Republic strictly to evacuate Americans, Secretary of State Dean Rusk informed the Embassy on April 27, just 24 hours after the evacuation decision, that American objectives were to restore law and order, prevent a Communist takeover and protect American

320 Chester 2001,62.
Still, the United States did not yet want to intervene. The rules of engagement of the evacuating forces strictly forbade the Marines to engage in the civil war – they were allowed to shoot only if they were attacked. In addition, Ambassador Bennett was not empowered by Rusk to get involved in the civil war. Accordingly, he denied both the rebel leader Molina Urena’s April 27 request to help him negotiate with the regime and the junta’s request for 1200 Marines to land and “restore peace” on April 28.

However, it is difficult to miss where the thoughts of the Johnson Administration were. Describing the delay in the start of the evacuation procedures (it was not started during the night of April 26-27), Mann blamed it on “all the Communists running around at night.” In response the President asked if it was another Castro government. “Not yet,” Mann replied, but added that if the pro-Bosch forces won, Bosch might be swept away by the Communists. The break-in of armed rebels into Hotel Embajador in search for junta supporters on the morning of April 27 was one more reason for the White House to doubt the rebels’ intentions.

The argument, that is, the Communist nature of the revolt, that Ambassador Bennett used in lobbying his superiors in Washington for intervention also reveals what factor the White House was sensitive about. Bennett presented Molina’s request for American intervention in a way that implied that there were no doubts about the Communists’ hijacking of the revolt. Seven hours later Bennett judged the situation as critical from the point of view of the regime and requested communication equipment for them. Denying the equipment, he said, would most likely lead to Communist takeover by “Castro-type elements” and would

---

322 Schoonmaker 1990, 36.
325 Chester 2001, 62.
326 Cf. Schoonmaker 1990, 36 who states that the decision to land was 99% motivated by saving nationals.
make the landing of the Marines necessary in the long run. Barely four hours passed when Bennett warned Washington that Marines might be necessary but only “to protect American lives.”

Early afternoon, the ambassador forwarded the junta’s repeated request for intervention to avoid a second Cuba. The message described the revolt as Communist inspired: it was directed by Communists and bore the stamp of Communism as deciphered from excesses committed against the population, mass assassinations, sacking of private property and radio broadcasts to encourage the continuance of the fight. Then he immediately followed it up with his own message, in which he talked of a rapidly deteriorating situation – indeed the junta was losing out to the rebels on the battlefield –, claimed that American lives were in danger, and in the name of the whole Embassy team (including military attachés) recommended “immediate landing” to protect Hotel Embajador and the Embassy. However, the fact that there was more than this to the message is revealed by the Ambassador’s claim that “If Washington wishes, they [troops] could be landed for purpose of protection of American citizens.” That is, he had a broader operation in mind but understood the difficulty of selling it publicly.

How much the administration’s thinking concentrated on the ideological battle against Communism is also well-illustrated by the fact that neither the decision about the first troop commitment nor the one about massive intervention was based on actual evidence that the junta faced a Communist inspired rebellion. Surely, some attempts were made to go out for additional information and assess the quality of information at hand. NSC staff member

331 Chester 2001, 79.
William Bowdler suggested to National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy on the 27th that information should be collected about Communists so that the junta could act against them. Yet he hastened to make it clear that with this he was not to question the Communist nature of the revolt. A day later President Johnson expressed some worries about the reliability of the information they were receiving. He told Thomas C. Mann that it must be made sure that “we were right on our predictions.” In addition, one occasion Johnson explicitly asked about the source of information.

Nevertheless, not much happened in this respect: the administration unquestioningly relied on the Ambassador’s evaluation of the situation, when they must have been aware that he had good contacts with the regime but none with the rebels. When the administration needed those rebel contracts they had to bring in President Kennedy’s Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, John Bartlow Martin, in the process precisely because he had those links. Only once was Bennett’s appraisal of the situation questioned but even then Mann worried that the Communist forces were much stronger – not weaker – than the Ambassador claimed.

Intervention and the use of overwhelming force against the Communists were important internationally for the possible long-term, international repercussions of not acting. Johnson clearly operated in an internationally motivated loss framework, when he expressed his fear that the United States would not be considered a good enough ally if it failed to act in its own sphere of influence when he asked John Bartlow Martin, “What can we do in Vietnam if we can’t clean up the Dominican Republic?”

---

334 FRUS 1963-1965, Vol. 32, “40. Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and President Johnson, April 29, 1965, 9:48 a.m.”
335 Schoonmaker 1990, 42, 109; Chester 2001, 90.
He considered the Dominican revolt to be part of a global Communist conspiracy and, thus, he saw it as a factor that affected America’s position around the world, including Vietnam. Such evaluation prevailed despite the decision-makers’ awareness that the immediate international reaction would be negative. President Johnson himself worried that an intervention, especially without consulting hemispheric allies, may isolate the United States in the Americas if he moved against the rebels, but believed that it came only second to preventing a Communist takeover in the Hemisphere.

Once the last telegram of the ambassador reached Washington, D.C. on April 28, the decision was quickly made to follow the ambassador’s recommendations. During an afternoon meeting, Mann summed up the general consensus of aides that the advice in the ambassador’s last telegram should be taken. Despite sporadic evidence (see below) by the morning of April 29 everyone talked about the influence of the Castroists in the Dominican Republic. When Ambassador Bennett made his request for armed intervention beyond the protection of citizens in the very evening, both Mann and CIA Director Admiral Raborn recommended intervention immediately. The President clearly preferred this alternative, but the decision was put off until April 30 so as to get some international legitimacy.

The President’s reaction on April 30 unequivocally conveyed presidential preference. He cast events in the Communist frame, saying that “we know the rebel leaders are

340 Felten 1999, 103.
341 Chester 2001, 79.
343 See, for example, FRUS 1963-1965, Vol. 32, “40. Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and President Johnson, April 29, 1965, 9:48 a.m.”
345 Felten 1999, 103; Johnson 1971, 201.
Communist[s],” and declared his determination to fight Castro in the Dominican Republic. He also found it hard to be held back by the slow-moving nature of the OAS, fearing that Castro might “take over right under our nose.” Realizing that the junta was doing worse on the battlefield than they had thought, Johnson stressed that America had not been doing enough. According to Mann, LBJ already exhibited similar restlessness the day before, but limited himself to strengthening the Marines contingent with an additional 1600 troops.

The President was also convinced that to avoid a Communist takeover, intervention would be the best option. He had some doubts about it on April 29, when Bundy suggested that there were plenty of alternatives available and intervention did not necessarily have to be the first thing to do. In response, LBJ brooded that “I do not think we could have been wrong yesterday, I think we will be wrong when we don’t do enough, or we go in and do too much.” Ironically, it was also Bundy who removed the President’s last doubt about a large-scale intervention. Bundy soothed presidential worries by saying that the commitment of 22,000 troops may be advantageous, as it would turn the situation in the favored direction by the mere presence of these troops.

This was the point when the President made up his mind in favor of intervention. From then on, he ignored alternative options. He disregarded warnings that lower scale action may be enough. He simply left Dean Rusk’s remark that his aims could be achieved by diplomatic means without an answer. Bundy’s cautioning was not received more favorably either. When Bundy suggested that they could perhaps slow down and wait one more day with intervention, LBJ’s reaction was to turn to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and ask how many

---

348 Chester 2001, 71, 77, 84.
350 Chester 2001, 84. See also Felten 1999, 103; Schoonmaker 1990, 39.
351 See, for example, FRUS 1963-1965, Vol. 32, “40. Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and President Johnson, April 29, 1965, 9:48 a.m.”
352 See, for example, FRUS 1963-1965, Vol. 32, “40. Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and President Johnson, April 29, 1965, 9:48 a.m.”
troops were needed to take over the Dominican Republic.\footnote{FRUS 1963-1965, Vol. 32, “42. Editorial note.”} Jack Vaughn’s doubts about N intervention were met with rejection.\footnote{Schoonmaker 1990, 36; Ball, George. 1982. \textit{The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs}. New York: Norton, 303.}

4.1.3.2 The Role of Domestic Politics

Decision-makers considered the possible effect of the invasion on public opinion. Yet, in harmony with theoretical expectations, they did not perceive it as an incentive to fight, for the public reception of the invasion was not expected to be positive. Yet, decision-makers appeared to believe that if they could convince Americans that intervention strictly served the purpose of the evacuation of American citizens or that the rebellion was Communist inspired, they could ride in public opinion. When Mann suggested intervention to the President, he also acknowledged the difficulty of selling it at home, suggesting that for better domestic reception they could say they were evacuating some 2000 Americans.\footnote{FRUS 1963-1965, Vol. 32, “31. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, April 28, 1965, 5:45 pm.”} That is to say, even though public opinion was not expected to be favorable, the administration at least was ready to manipulate public reception of the invasion in their own favor as much as they could.

The evacuation of Americans was only intended as a cover from April 28 on. Bundy was informed the day before that evacuation of Americans from Hotel Embajador was “virtually completed.”\footnote{FRUS 1963-1965, Vol. 32, “25. Memorandum from William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), April 27, 1965.” See also Chester (2001, 257), who argues that foreign nationals who were to be evacuated were not under siege. 6500 citizens of forty-six countries had been evacuated by the evening of April 28 without any incident, therefore, further commitments \textit{in order to} help evacuation were hardly necessary.} The United States seems to have kept evacuating but foreign nationals – not Americans – who desired to leave. The President knew before the decision to land the first 535 marines was made on the 28\textsuperscript{th} that the evacuation of Americans finished and the 1000-1300 Americans still in the Dominican Republic did not desire to leave.\footnote{FRUS 1963-1965, Vol. 32, “33. Transcript of Teleconference Between the Department of State and the Embassy in the Dominican Republic, April 28, 1965. 22:30Z.”}
evacuation was nearing to its end during the night of April 28, Mann warned the President that they would be in serious trouble to explain American presence in the Dominican Republic as soon as the evacuation of the 4000 individuals finished that night. To solve the dilemma, Mann suggested that the Americans who chose to remain in the country could serve Washington with the adequate rationale.\(^{358}\)

However, the convincing argument of Carl Rowan of the United States Information Agency, who warned that sending large number of troops would give trouble at home if it were only explained by saving American lives, made the White House modify its original strategy\(^{359}\). Instead, the White House chose to prove the Communist nature of the revolt in order to legitimate its troop commitment domestically.

However, evidence was scant, which seemed to register little with the decision makers. The CIA was able to uncover eight Communists in Dominican Republic. CIA Director Raborn informed the President that these eight individuals were hard-core, Castro-type guerillas who pushed the Bosch people aside and took command. He said this was a real struggle mounted by Communism\(^{360}\). So by April 30\(^{\text{th}}\), the administration – with the help of the CIA – could identify fifty-four Communist and Castroist individuals in the Dominican Republic but could only link seven to the actual revolt and fighting\(^{361}\).

When in the morning of April 30 John Bartlow Martin voiced his doubts that even the Communist link the CIA could establish may not exist, President Johnson was unwavering about the Communist nature of the intervention. He claimed that he was not going to let the island to be taken over by Castro\(^{362}\). Knowing how little evidence existed, Rowan also lobbied executive officials – unsuccessfully – not to disclose it, because it would be ridiculous to say


\(^{359}\) Felten 1999, 103.


\(^{361}\) Felten 1999, 105.

that thousands of soldiers were sent to route out about fifty Communists not all of who were even active.  

If the Johnson Administration had little hard evidence prior to the decision, it also had difficulty of shoring up such proof *ex post*. Unsurprisingly, when Johnson’s *alter ego*, Special Assistant Jack Valenti wanted to back the President’s statement on the reason to send 22,000 soldiers to stop a Communist takeover with evidence, but he soon had to realize that such evidence did not exist. The President ran into the same problem on May 6 when in his speech he wished to mention that rebels were trained by Castro. McNamara lobbied the President to take the phrase out of his speech because not even the CIA could prove Castro’s involvement. Johnson appeared to be surprised but did not dwell on the issue.

As expected, Congressional opinion did not appear to play any role in the final decision. No documents or memoirs mention that the opinion of Congress was given any consideration. They were informed about the decision to send Marines with evacuation purposes on the evening of April 28, i.e. after ground troops had already committed to protect the Embajador Hotel and the Embassy. The Congressional leadership – caught by surprise – supported the decision on the spot, only asking for closer consultation with the OAS in the future.

Dallek, Felten, and Martin claim that, as every democratic president after the era of McCarthyism, Johnson’s intervention was motivated by the fear of domestic political fallout from another successful Communist revolution in the vicinity of the United States, but such

---

363 Felten 1999, 106. Even though public support was not overwhelming, it would come forth regardless of the administration’s fears about the opposite.
364 Felten 1999, 105.
Congressional support, however, was not unanimous or long lasting. Despite the immediate backing of Congress, the chairman of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Fulbright, soon turned against Johnson and the revolt of liberal Democrats in Congress started as a result of the Dominican intervention. See Felten 1999, 106; Martin, John Bartlow. 1978. *U.S. Policy in the Caribbean*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 96-97.
an assertion is not substantiated by documents. First, not allowing Communist expansion in
the vicinity of the United States could be a concern of international factors not just domestic.
While documentary evidence provides proof of international concerns, domestically driven
reasoning are not supported by government documents.

In his memoirs, President Johnson refuted such a claim, arguing that he knew that
domestic reception would be mixed and, thus, he disregarded it.\footnote{Johnson 1971, 195, 204.}
While presidential memoirs should be treated with caution, as it could be seen above, the administration was
aware of the possible problems with the reception of the invasion. The only archival
document that would substantiate the influence of domestic political variables is dated April
30 when Johnson had already made up his mind. Jack Valenti wrote to the President that a
second Castro regime “would be the worst political disaster we could possibly suffer.”\footnote{Felten 1999, 103; 130 (note 24).}
McGeorge Bundy said the same about the possible domestic repercussions during the April
30\textsuperscript{th} meeting.\footnote{FRUS 1963-1965, Vol. 32, “42. Editorial note.”} All in all, while such a factor may have contributed to Johnson’s impatience
that day, it appeared to play little role in the actual decision.

\subsection{4.1.4 Conclusion}
The decision to send ground troops to the Dominican Republic substantiates theoretical
expectations. It was motivated by the fear of Communist takeover in the neighborhood of the
United States. However, that fear or the loss framework was motivated by the worry of not
being a good ally and not setting a good example with regard to the war in Vietnam and not
by domestic political concerns. Decision-makers did anticipate the domestic reactions to be
mixed at best. They attempted to minimize the negative public reaction but it did not keep
them back from invading the Dominican Republic. Domestic politics in favor of intervention
was mentioned only after the President had already made up his mind.

\footnote{Johnson 1971, 195, 204.}
\footnote{Felten 1999, 103; 130 (note 24).}
It was expected that in T1 American conflict not only the public reception would not bias the decision for intervention, but that presidents would also pay similarly little consideration to Congress and their cabinet. President Johnson and his advisors did not take Congressional reaction into account even though they dutifully informed Congress about developments and the course of American policy. The cabinet as a whole did not play any role. No cabinet meetings were called and the President resolved the issue using only the relevant foreign and defense policy advisors of the cabinet in the deliberations. All in all, the fact that the administration gave detailed consideration to public opinion, even if refused to act accordingly, suggests that this is the relevant factor for an American president, not so much Congress and least the cabinet.

4.2 Grenada

4.2.1 A Short History of American Intervention in Grenada

With the inauguration of Ronald Reagan in January 1981, the strict cold war principles of the 1950s – the Truman Doctrine, the domino-theory, containment and the belief that the world was organized on a bipolar basis – move backed to the White House after the more ‘lenient’ years of the 1970s. Reagan disapproved détente, because it weakened the United States internationally, and criticized Carter’s foreign policy, because it disregarded the fact that the cold war was not yet over. What is more, Reagan went even further and put the stress on the rollback of Communism rather than its mere containment. Accordingly, the Reagan doctrine prescribed overt and covert aid to support anti-Communist movements around the globe.

371 Paterson 1988, 256.
In practical terms it meant that the Soviet Union, “the evil empire” in Reagan’s words\textsuperscript{374} had to be looked at again as a source of threat. It was seen as a revolutionary power whose aim was to spread Communism. Although the preferred means of ‘fighting’ the USSR was deterrence, the United States should not shrink from confrontation but avoid negotiated settlements. To prevent overextension of the available resources, the United States should not let itself be drawn into every conflict. Instead, it carefully had to choose the regions where it was ready to get involved militarily. The Reagan Administration significantly increased the defense budget so as to be able to carry out such a policy\textsuperscript{375}.

The Caribbean enjoyed special importance in the global struggle. The Reagan Administration resurrected the view of the Caribbean as a US lake, which was considered to be America’s “backyard” and, as such, the United States had vital stakes in the region\textsuperscript{376}. The long-term influence of the United States in the Caribbean and Central America made it possible for President Reagan to start the fight against Communism immediately, i.e. before the completion of rearmament\textsuperscript{377}. The CIA was authorized to supply arms for and train the contras in Nicaragua who were fighting the Sandinistas. In El Salvador, Reagan supported the unpopular Duarte regime against the leftist guerillas who received arms-supplies from Cuba and Nicaragua. Economic aid was also put in service of the global struggle: in 1982, President Reagan announced its mini-Marshall plan, the \textit{Caribbean Basin Initiative} to help overcome the economic problems of the region through free-market solutions\textsuperscript{378}.

By 1983, Grenada had been a trouble spot at the Caribbean for several years. Grenada gained self-governance in 1967 and independence from Britain in 1974. In the first general election in 1967, the Grenada United Labour Party was elected and its leader, Eric Gary,\textsuperscript{379}

\textsuperscript{374} Scott 196, 17-18.
\textsuperscript{375} Brown 1983, 569-570 and 593-594.
\textsuperscript{376} Vertzberger 1998, 175.
\textsuperscript{377} Brown 1983, 575.
became Prime Minister. The Gary government was plagued by corruption and economic depression, and political opposition was dealt with through the curtailing of democracy. However, the restrictive measures only united and radicalized his opposition – mostly young, unemployed intellectuals and professionals – who increasingly sympathized with leftist policies and formed the New Jewel Movement (NJM), which ousted Gary in 1979, instituted a one-party government, suspended the Constitution, and banned democracy.

Not knowing much about Maurice Bishop when he came to power and increasingly dissatisfied with Eric Gary, the Carter administration recognized the Bishop government. Only later – at Bishop’s defiance of the democratic process and after the institution of closer ties with Cuba – did President Carter start to have second thoughts about the People’s Revolutionary Government of Grenada. Concerns about the Grenadine government were emphatically shared by President Reagan upon coming into office in January 1981. No ambassador was accredited to Grenada and the country was cut off from all aids. American verbal threats as well as the conduct of regular American military exercises in Grenada’s vicinity did not miss Bishop’s attention and created a feeling of insecurity in Grenada.

Yet, Bishop refused to be intimidated, accusing the US of wanting to invade Grenada. However, the lack of support for Communism among Grenadines, the petering out of the short-lived economic success and, consequently, the mounting threat from the extremist wing of the NJM forced Bishop into a more accommodating position. Seeking international approval to mend his troubles at home, Bishop was surprisingly cooperative during his June 1983 visit to Washington. He agreed to the prerequisites of better US–Grenada relations: restoration of democracy, stopping anti-American propaganda and, at the least, real non-alignment internationally.  

Even though the visit ended on a happy note, the domestic political compromise and power sharing with his chief rival, the ideologue Bernard Coard, prevented Bishop to keep his promise. Moreover, on October 12, 1983, upon his return from a visit to the Communist block, Bishop was ousted from his party and put under house arrest. Popular unrest, popular support for Bishop, and opposition to the allegedly Communist Coard resulted in the freeing of Bishop on October 19. He proceeded to seize Fort Rupert, which he was soon forced to surrender. Subsequently, he and his closest allies were murdered. The following day the leader of the Revolutionary Military Council General Austin – with Coard pulling the strings in the background – was rocketed into power.

The State Department-led Restricted Interagency Group (RIG) and the National Security Council closely monitored developments in Grenada from October 1, 1983. Three days after Bishop was killed, on October 25, President Reagan made the invasion decision, sending American troops to combat for the first time since the War in Vietnam. The decision was carried out in another three days, ousting General Austin from power by November 2. The United States committed about 8000 troops in total and the adventure resulted in 19 dead and 115 wounded American soldiers. The financial cost was $ 134.4 million. American troop withdrawal started immediately after reaching the objectives of Operation Urgent Fury and ended by December 15. A contingent of 300 non-combat forces was left behind to insure internal security and train the troops of neighboring Caribbean nations who arrived to help maintain law and order. The government was dissolved and power was put in the hands of the Governor-General. By mid-November a nine-member advisory council was named to help the government in administering the island in the interim period, lasting until the elections in

---

General elections were held on December 8, 1984, where the New National Party won 14 out of 15 seats in the legislature.

4.2.2 The Domestic Political Situation

The crisis in Grenada was described in chapter 3 as a T2 conflict, because one of the two relevant factors – Congressional-presidential relations – was adversarial for President Reagan. His standing with the public was not particularly high at the time when troubles started in Grenada, but was not so low as to give reasons to worry. When President Reagan came into office in January 1981, he enjoyed the support of 51% of the electorate and then his roller coaster with voters started. By May 1981, his approval ratings rose with seventeen percentage points only to slide to 35% by January 1983. In October 1983 his approval ratings were on the rise although not particularly high at 45% and would rise above 50% only after the invasion of Grenada.

Opposition from Congress, however, was a much more serious factor. It was especially strong in the House of Representatives that was still under the control of the Democrats. While most conservative Congressmen – 115 in all – supported Reagan’s activist foreign policy, the majority of liberal Congressmen – 127 – opposed it and, as their votes suggest, their opposition was consistent. The Reagan White House ran into trouble with Congress already over its El Salvador and Nicaragua policies. Neither could Reagan find much approval toward his Middle-East policy when he sent Marines to Lebanon in 1982. Congress threatened to invoke the War Powers Resolution and recall troops in ninety days but finally a compromise solution was reached with the White House. Congressional opposition including

---


Speaker Tip O’Neill believed that Reagan’s foreign policy was a recipe for supporting unpopular right-wing regimes and, hence, risking another Vietnam. Accordingly, they favored a shift away from military solutions to social and economic justice.\footnote{Arnson 1993, 58, Farrell 2001, 612-614}

Congressional opposition was certainly more than just verbal bantering. In December 1982, Congress passed the first Boland Amendment, which prohibited the CIA and the Pentagon to use funds for the purpose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan government. In June another Boland resolution was passed in the House to cut off covert aid to El Salvador and the contras in Nicaragua by September 30 but failed in the Senate. In October, yet another Boland amendment was passed by both Houses, limiting aid to the contras to $24 million.\footnote{Farrell 2001, 612-5; Arnson 1993, 53-146}

Even though popular support for interventionism might have overturned Congressional opposition, on the basis of the hypotheses it is expected that Reagan’s decision to intervene was not much influenced either by Congressional opposition or the popularity of his actions with the general public, simply because neither were necessary to remain in office in the short run. That is to say, the separation of purpose is not expected to influence the decision-making process. Thus, decision in the T2 conflict in the Grenada should have much in common with T1 conflicts, such as intervention in the Dominican Republic.

4.2.3 The Decision to Intervene in Grenada

4.2.3.1 Reasons to Intervene

Just as in the case of the Dominican Republic, the loss framework of decision-makers in Grenada was based on international motivations. Troubles were cast in the mould of a worldwide struggle against Communism. Even before troubles turned into crisis, it is not difficult to see that the United States saw developments in Grenada in Communist terms. Accordingly, President Reagan asserted that Grenada “now [April 1982] bears the Soviet and
Cuban trademark, which means that it will attempt to spread the virus amongst its neighbors.”

Thus, Grenada was seen as a security threat in which the new airport with a 10,000-foot runway featured prominently. In March 1983, the President claimed that the runway was a sign of the “Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada,” or, in other words, it was evidence of Communist “power projection into the region.” In other words, Grenada was not seen as a tiny, underdeveloped and unimportant island with a new albeit leftist regime, but as a “salient link in a chain of events that, if allowed to continue, could threaten vital American interests.”

Evidence, however, were only circumstantial or scant. The runway construction was not a singular event in the Caribbean: many countries opted for it to boost the tourist industry and not in order to host Cuban airplanes. Financial support for it only partially came from the Communist block. Eighty percent of the money came from American, Canadian, and European companies. Moreover, the United States could only rely on technical intelligence but not on human intelligence or diplomatic channels in collecting information about Grenada. All in all, the Reagan Administration needed a great deal of luck so that its appraisal would prove right ex post. Documents confiscated during the invasion supported the supposed Communist connections of Grenada: it had mutual agreements of military assistance both with Cuba and North Korea.

As events in Grenada started to accelerate, the global struggle against Communism and its local consequences remained an issue with the decision-makers. The initial concern for the safety of about 1000 American citizens – including 600 medical students – was also framed in

392 Vertzberger 1998, 177.
393 Beck 1993, 30 and 48 (note 144).
394 Shultz 1990, 329; Weinberger, Caspar. 1990. Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon. New York: Warner Books, 181-182. Lack of American agents in Grenada was due to austerity measures at the CIA initiated by President Carter, diplomatic channels were non-existent, because Reagan did not accredit any ambassadors, and the American ambassador to Barbados disobeyed orders from Washington to talk to Bishop.
anti-Communist terms. National Security Assistant for Latin American Affairs Constantine Menges argued that American citizens (medical students) in Grenada were in danger, because they were situated in the middle of an unstable political climate. He saw such a climate as the result of the tactical quarrel between Cuba – and the pro-Cuba Maurice Bishop – and the Soviet Union, that is, Bernard Coard. The same day – six days before Bishop’s murder – Menges composed his memorandum in which he suggested to use the opportunity not only to evacuate the students but to restore democracy in the Caribbean.\(^{396}\)

During an October 17 meeting in the Defense Department, he repeated his views and argued that restoring democracy in Grenada would demoralize Communists in Central America. However, the State Department was not convinced. First, most decision-makers were less concerned with Soviet intervention. They interpreted the Communist threat in somewhat narrower terms. For them, the problem was only possible Cuban involvement and the fear from the establishment of another Cuba in the Caribbean.\(^{397}\) Accordingly, he was told that the plan had “no chance whatsoever within this administration” but certainly not with the new national security advisor, Bud MacFarlane. He was not only advised to do nothing about Grenada but was warned that if he did, he might lose his job.\(^{398}\) In harmony with this view, on October 14, the State Department started planning for a strictly non-combatant evacuation of students without any involvement in the domestic power struggle of Grenada.\(^{399}\)

Yet, there were hardliners in the administration such as Ambassador to the UN Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.\(^{400}\) Therefore, diplomatic measures never were given much of a chance to succeed. Some discussions were initiated with the Coard regime in order to peacefully resolve the concern over the safety of the students. This entailed either Grenadine power holders giving the US the opportunity for the peaceful

\(^{396}\) Beck 1993, 59 and 72 (note 19), Williams 1997, 144
\(^{397}\) Williams 1997, 149 and 152; Vertzberger 1988, 187.
\(^{398}\) Williams 1997, 151.
\(^{399}\) Beck 1993, 95-96; Williams 1997, 147.
\(^{400}\) Brown 1983, 573.
evacuation of students or a guarantee that assured the students’ safety. Their October 18 inquiry about the safety of American citizens was answered the next day. Grenada replied with the assurance that “the interest of US citizens [is] in no way threatened by the present situation in Grenada.”  

The loss framework brought on by the worldwide struggle against the expansion and for the rollback of Communism made it impossible to accept any guarantees from the junta. The Reagan Administration interpreted the Grenadine assurance as a blunt rejection to safeguard the interest of American students. The administration set an impossibly high benchmark for Grenada: the United States was ready to accept only a 100 percent assurance to allow students to stay on the island, but in the chaos that characterized the situation in Grenada no government would have been able to give a credible guarantee. In addition, Coard’s ideological commitment also seriously limited the credibility of his assurance.

Neither did the United States try too seriously. In an interview on October 26, 1983 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger never tried to deny for a minute the interviewer’s assertion that the US did not exercise “all diplomatic efforts available,” because, he said, Grenada’s neighbors had already exhausted those means. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) opposed advanced military planning on October 17 on the basis that peaceful alternatives had not been exhausted, which points toward the same conclusion. Thus, in spite of Grenadine assurance, the Reagan Administration remained unconvinced and went ahead with the planning of an operation to bring the students home from Grenada.

By October 19, the day Bishop was murdered, the tide was clearly turning in favor of a more grandiose operation in Washington, D.C. By then Menges was not the only person who

---

403 Shultz 1990, 328.
404 Williams 1997, 154.
405 Weinberger 1990, 128.
406 Beck 1993, 98. See also Williams 1997, 151.
pressed the administration for a full-scale invasion instead of a limited evacuation operation. On October 17 the Prime Minister of Barbados advanced similar views, citing an argument identical to that of Menges. He stressed the opportunity that the Grenadine situation offered for the U.S to scale back Soviet influence in the Caribbean. Finally, Bishop’s murder fitted well with the decision-makers’ perception of the situation in Communist terms. It also made clear which faction won the fight in Grenada.

Most importantly, the President himself favored a military solution. At each critical point in the decision-making process, the President endorsed options that revealed preference for active policy-making. For instance he ordered the reluctant JCS to start planning the evacuation operation and also authorized the rotational forces en route to Lebanon to change course and sail south toward Grenada. Despite the assertion of the Secretary of State George Shultz that presidential preference was a consequence of the inability of the President to sit still while American citizens were in danger, this alone cannot account for the decision for a large-scale intervention. Had safety been the only concern, a limited evacuation operation would have perfectly sufficed. The conduct of the invasion also casts doubt on whether the students were still the primary concern on October 25. The first group of students was not rescued until the second day of the invasion and some others were only taken care of on the fourth day of the invasion, leaving about a 96-hour vulnerability gap, when the Grenadine government could have easily taken hostages.

By October 19, the administration clearly started to consider “more extreme military options” than the evacuation of the American students and a day later planning started for wide-scale action. The JCS came down on the side of intervention, arguing that taking the

---

407 Beck 1993, 98.
408 See for example Shultz 1990, 327.
409 Shultz 1990, 328.
island was safer militarily than a surgical operation. It appears that most administration officials, including the President, arrived at a conclusion similar to that of Constantine Menges. High level officials started to perceive the importance of Grenada in a global rather than regional light: from that point of view Grenada was nothing else but a golden opportunity to demonstrate the administration’s commitment to fighting Communism. For example Shultz warned his colleagues, “To think of Suriname, too,” hoping that an intervention in Grenada would send the right message to Suriname’s dictator to scale back the Cuban connection. In similar vein, his deputy – Lawrence Eagleburger – wanted to warn Nicaragua and El Salvador.

Nonetheless, the decision depended solely on and was made by the President and he decided for a mission that encompassed much more than saving nationals. At 3.30 a.m. on October 22, the President had unequivocally expressed his intention to go beyond an evacuation mission. Answering the Vice President’s question if he agreed with the threefold objective of action against Grenada, Reagan answered in the affirmative. That is, he agreed that “to ensure the safety of American citizens” was only one of the aims of the mission. In addition, it was also to serve the more general purposes of “restor[ing] democratic government to Grenada” and “eliminat[ing] current and future Cuban intervention on the island.” Only an invasion could achieve all those objectives.

He made the initial decision during a telephone conference between Augusta, Georgia – where the President was staying on an official engagement – and the White House on Saturday morning (October 22). The subject of the meeting was to discuss the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) drafted by Constantine Menges, which was based on Reagan’s intention expressed at 3.30 a.m. that he wished to accept the invitation of the

---

413 Shultz 1990, 328
414 Beck 1993, 106.
415 In fact, Reagan arrived at similar conclusions as his subordinates independently of them. Vertzberger 1998, 192.
416 Beck 1993, 134.
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) – engineered by the Americans – to invade. By signing the NSDD on October 22, “the President signed orders to prepare for a broader mission to restore order in Grenada in cooperation with Caribbean forces.”

4.2.3.2 The Role of Domestic Politics

Decision-makers discussed possible public reaction as well as Congressional reaction to American intervention, but as the hypotheses would predict, neither factor influenced the decision in favor of intervention. As both were perceived to be hostile to intervention, domestic politics was not responsible for invoking the loss frame with decision-makers. As for domestic political repercussions, the administration considered them rather late in the process and, finally, rejected them. First, the administration perceived the situation in such a way that it saw no domestic gains in an invasion: they only considered them as factors that could inhibit rather than foster it. Decision-makes were aware that Reagan’s foreign policy principles were strongly contested by many in America and were not sure how the public would receive the intervention in Grenada. However, to minimize a possible adverse reaction, the administration was careful to assess the likely reactions of the Grenadines. The aim was to make sure that those whom the administration wished to help would find such help desirable. This raised no special worry, as the Caribbean states – correctly – forecast Grenadine public support for US intervention.

Furthermore, Congress – especially the House of Representatives – was outright hostile to the aggressive foreign policy of the White House. Reagan acknowledged that he was aware of “the resistance of many in Congress to the use of force abroad for any reasons,” and thus he

418 Vertzberger 1998, 177. Domestically, the success of the invasion was saved by the gesture of one of the evacuated students who, stepping on American soil, kissed the ground. The importance of this event was not lost on decision-makers. Speakes, Larry. 1988. Speaking Out. The Reagan Presidency from Inside the White House. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 159-160.
419 Vertzberger 1998, 185.
ordered tight security measures so that nothing would leak about policy deliberations. This did not, however, deter him to pursue the policy he favored. He simply made sure that Congress would not be able to act at cross-purposes. To elude immediate and strong opposition, Reagan ordered tight security, but no measures could be taken to avoid criticism once the invasion started. In the long run, they were concerned not so much with verbal criticism, but whether Congress could torpedo presidential policy. Therefore, they discussed the 1973 War Powers Resolution, which required the president to seek Congressional authorization if troop involvement exceeded sixty days. They concluded that Congress could mean no practical obstacle, because they judged that by the time the War Powers Resolution could be invoked, the Grenada adventure would be over (as it indeed was).

Finally, when Reagan was warned by one of his staff members that the invasion of a small island would incite harsh criticism at home, the President expressed his willingness to take the domestic political heat, saying, “I know that. I accept that.” In other words the President recognized that an invasion may cost him politically at home, but did not change his mind despite the expected negative consequences.

The White House had the opportunity to reconsider the wisdom of the invasion when on October 23 241 US Marines on peacekeeping duty were killed in Lebanon. Nonetheless, the President did not change his view. While Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill was not alone in his conviction that the real point of the Grenada invasion was to divert attention from Lebanon, this was not the case. The President made the final decision for intervention the day before events turned sore in Lebanon.

All through the crisis in Grenada, Lebanon was considered an obstacle to intervention. Before the massacre of the Marines, Lebanon diverted a substantial amount of the quickly

---

420 Vertzberger 1988, 185.
421 Beck 1993, 134.
422 Beck 1993, 134.
deployable forces to make the execution of an invasion in Grenada more problematic. But now that the massacre occurred, Lebanon was threatening with negative domestic repercussions. The death of the Marines could easily reflect back on the President’s leadership abilities as a not very astute judge of where and how to involve American forces. But just as expected theoretically, this aspect did not worry decision-makers in the context of Grenada, which could have served as the kind of diversion Tip O’Neill accused the President of.

Instead of seeing Grenada as a chance for diversion, advisors feared that their hands might be tied and the President might have to reverse his earlier decision as a result of the events in Lebanon. It was thought unwise domestically to execute an operation that would inevitably result in further American casualties. Decision-makers spent most of October 23 to deliberate on this issue. Whatever his advisors feared or how unwise they perceived an intervention in Grenada, it was presidential preference that settled the issue. Disregarding the domestic imperatives, President Reagan put an end to discussions when he decided to go ahead, saying, “If this was right yesterday, it’s right today” and signed the relevant National Security Decision Directive.

4.2.4 Conclusion

As expected, the decision unfolded in a fashion rather similar to the intervention decision in the Dominican Republic. Although President Reagan faced troubles at home in the form of Congressional opposition to his activist foreign policy, he never perceived the conflict in Grenada as his chance to shore up electoral support and, thus, try to quiet Congress. First, the President and his advisors acted according to the perceived strategic interest of the United States, not allowing the development of a Communist state at the backyard of the United States. This imperative even overrode another classic international function of the state, that

---

425 See for example, Weinberger 1990, 109.
is, the defense of its own nationals. Concern with Communist expansion was first viewed in regional terms, and later it was expanded to global proportions.

In harmony with the hypotheses, neither anticipated Congressional opposition nor expected public disapproval deterred the President from his preferred course of action. Nonetheless both of these factors were discussed and then discarded as guides for decision by President Reagan. This, of course, did not mean that the administration did not try to minimize the damage at home. Thus, Reagan ordered strict secrecy of the deliberations. More interesting is the consideration of the War Powers Resolution. In the light of the questioned constitutionality of the Resolution, officials could have decided to ignore it entirely. They did not, but it did not influence troop commitments either, because they believed rightly that military action would be over by the time Congress could assert itself. This, however, leaves an interesting question: Would the administration have made the same decision, had they judged action to last long enough so that the President would have had to go to Congress for authorization? Had the shortness of the American action in Grenada been fallaciously overestimated in our case, it would be possible to argue that such a misperception was a result of the desire to go ahead regardless of Congress. Yet, since this is not the case, the question remains.
Chapter 5: A High Intensity Conflict and Presidential Decision-making: The Korean War

5.1 A Short History of the Korean War

The early post-war expectations of cooperation with the Soviet Union quickly collapsed. Kennan’s long telegram in February 1946 provided the first coherent analysis of Soviet expansionist ambitions. For about a year the United States chose the policy of tough talk, which soon proved inadequate. British inability to fight Communism in Greece and the fear that if Greece fell to Communism, Turkey would follow suit resulted in seeking an activist policy. The Truman doctrine was declared in March 1947, promising American support to free peoples in order to fight Communist subversion by minority groups and outside forces around the globe.\footnote{“The Truman Doctrine: President Harry S. Truman’s Address Before A Joint Session of Congress, March 17, 1947.” 2006. Avalon Project at Yale Law School. Available: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm. Access: November 30. See also, Record, Jeffrey. 2002. Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam and the Presidential Use of Force from Korea to Kosovo. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 36.}

At the same time, a bipartisan agreement over the nature of the Soviet threat was born. The international system was perceived as polarized toward two poles between which lay an unbridgeable ideological hostility. American commitment to individual liberty and a pluralistic international system were seen to stand in opposition to Soviet totalitarianism, perceived Soviet desire for a monolithic world system, and alleged Soviet intention to impose the Soviet way of life on the rest of the world. In addition, any concession to Soviet territorial claims was believed to make the USSR not less but more aggressive. Therefore, America had to strive to maintain the existing balance-of-power and contain Russian expansion.\footnote{Brown 1993, 36–41.} With the passing of the Vandenberg Resolution in Congress in the summer of 1948 these principles became the basic tenets of an internationalist American foreign policy.
However, the means of executing such policy remained in doubt. The President believed that the only language the Soviet Union understood was force, but he was not yet willing to sacrifice the balanced budget that was positively received at home. Therefore, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson faithfully executed Truman’s order for major cuts in defense spending.

Nonetheless, within a short period of time the United States had to face several international problems, including the Berlin blockade in 1948-1949; the fall of China to Communism, which necessitated the reversal of American regional policy; the Soviet acquisition of nuclear technology, and military commitments required by NATO. To meet the Soviet challenge, a review of American foreign and defense policies started in January 1950. It resulted in the birth of the rather apocalyptic NSC-68 that put military planning into the focus of policy, requested more resources for the purpose, and resulted in the coordination of already existing military programs. Although the document was delivered to Truman on April 7, 1950, it was only accepted after the outbreak of the Korean War.

Korea did not figure prominently in the cold war strategy of the Truman Administration. After all, Kennan’s strategy of containment originally referred to Europe only. Countries with no industrial capacities to be used in the event of war were not considered part of the cold war struggle. That is, places like Korea or Vietnam were not deemed important in the fight against Communism. In harmony with this, the JCS report of 1948 considered South Korea as strategically unimportant and favored military withdrawal even if it resulted in the victory of Communism on the Korean peninsula. Accordingly, once free elections were held in South Korea, the United States recognized it, helped build up an army of 50,000, and withdrew.

429 Until the fall of China to Communism, China was the traditional partner of the United States in regional security matters. The loss of China necessitated the reversal of such policy in favor of making Japan a reliable regional partner.
President Truman approved military withdrawal at Christmas in 1948 and the last troops left in June 1949.

Quite apolitically, American disinterest in Korea was also communicated in public. In January 1950 both Secretary of State Dean Acheson and President Truman defined South Korea outside the US defense perimeter in Asia. Although it was in the interest of the United States to build up a strong government in South Korea, Acheson only promised security guarantees if South Korea was attacked. Even then, help was to be expected under the aegis of the United Nations.\(^\text{432}\)

Regardless of Soviet discouragement but with Chinese backing, North Korea invaded South Korea on June 24, 1950. The American position took a 180-degree turn immediately. In the first days of the crisis, President Truman and his advisors hoped that air and naval aid to South Korean troops would be enough. Otherwise American action was limited to evacuating American citizens. But when it became clear that the collapse of South Korea was imminent, the President ordered the sending of ground troops on June 30. American troops entered Korea on July 5, 1950 under the authorization of the UN Security Council in order to repel the attack and restore the situation prior to the attack. However, the UN troops were on the retreat and pushed back to the southeastern part of the Korean peninsula until after a daring amphibious landing was executed at Inchon. By mid-September North Koreans were pushed back behind the 38\(^{\text{th}}\) parallel, that is, the dividing line between the two Koreas.

What started as a police action to protect South Korea, turned into a campaign to try and unify the two Koreas. Under a new UN authorization, Truman allowed General MacArthur’s troops to cross the 38 parallel on September 27. MacArthur advanced north quickly. Pyongyang was taken on October 19 and in November UN troops reached the Yalu River – the Chinese border of Korea. Seeing the inflow of man and material from China, MacArthur

ordered a bombing campaign that included the bombing of the Korean side of the bridges over the Yalu. MacArthur acted without presidential authorization and any communication with the JCS. When the President learnt what happened, he commanded MacArthur to stop the bombing, fearing that attack might lead to a wider war. In the end, Truman gave in to MacArthur’s appeal.

In reply to American troops entering North Korea, China intervened on the side of North Korea. Following the MacArthur’s bombing incident, the 40,000 Chinese troops in Korea were augmented so that a Chinese army of about 300,000 attacked MacArthur’s UN troops in mid-November 1951. Fortunes on the battlefield changed once again, putting the Americans on retreat. They were pushed back as far as Seoul. By January 1951, however, the Eighth Army under the its new commander, Lieutenant-General Ridgway – who would come to replace MacArthur as the commander of UN troops after MacArthur was fired because of insubordination –, stopped Chinese advancement and started pushing the Chinese back behind the 38th parallel. By late 1951, UN troops held a line slightly north of the 38th parallel and fighting continued only on a small scale afterwards, with little change in the frontline.

In May 1951, negotiations started in order to put an end to the war. They were prolonged because of disagreements on two issues. Unlike North Korea and China, the United States wanted a demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. Knowing that some of the soldiers to be returned were forced to fight for their countries, President Truman refused to agree to exchange the 150,000 Chinese/Korean prisoners of war, arguing for voluntary repatriation. While the final cease-fire agreement was favorable for the United States, it was only concluded during Eisenhower’s presidency on July 27, 1953. It put an end to the war that, according to the more optimistic estimates, resulted in about a million deaths, including more than 30,000 American soldiers.\footnote{For a comprehensive account of the Korean war, see Carver 1990, 151-171; Hess 2001, 8-75. The COW project indicates 54,266 battle death for the United States. COW 2007.}
5.2 The Domestic Political Situation

The Korean War was a T2 conflict in every sense. President Truman enjoyed neither peace with the public nor with Congress. He became president upon the death of Franklin Roosevelt in 1945 and, defying expectations, won a term on his own right in 1948. Truman’s early popularity in 1945 quickly gave way to more sober approval ratings. By the end of October 1946 – just a few weeks away from Congressional elections – Truman’s popularity stood at 32%, which was fifty percentage points below his approval ratings a year earlier. Unsurprisingly the result was “mortifying” election losses for Democrats and a Republican Congress in 1946.\footnote{McCullough 1993 [1992], 523-524.}

He won reelection in November 1948 when his popularity ratings temporarily surged only to drop back to its pre-election level of 40s and high 30s.\footnote{“Presidential Job Approval,” 2004; Hess 2001, 16.}

His low standing with the electorate had many reasons. To begin with, he could never shake off the shadow of Franklin Roosevelt and the image of being too small for the presidency.\footnote{McCullough 1993 [1992], 521-522, 525.} Truman’s unwillingness to fire old friends and administration officials when they became only a burden did not help his reputation, either.\footnote{McCullough 1993 [1992], 744-745.}

There were also impeding troubles at home. Even if the expected economic depression never materialized, demobilization had its negative effects: a large number of industrial workers was dismissed, there was housing shortage and shortage in goods people wanted, and hundreds of thousands of soldiers in need of jobs were arriving home. All this resulted in labor unrest and strikes. Lacking Congressional cooperation to enact more New Deal legislation, the President appeared inapt to handle the situation.\footnote{McCullough 1993 [1992], 470 and 520.}

This was coupled with an increasing red scare and anti-Communist hysteria in the United States. Republican accusations that Truman and his advisors were too soft on Communism grew stronger and gave fertile ground to the Communist witch-hunting of
Senator Joseph McCarthy. The attacks were especially strong against Truman’s most influential advisor, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who was blamed for losing China to Communism. In January 1950 a purge started in the State Department in order to find the Communists McCarthy believed were working there. Three months before the Korean War Truman’s standing with the public was as low as 37% while half of the Americans had a favorable view of Senator McCarthy. All in all, if anybody, President Truman could only gain domestically by a war. Nonetheless, theoretical expectations suggest that President Truman was driven by international imperatives and not by domestic politics in his entrance to the Korean War.

5.3 The Decision to Intervene

5.3.1 Reasons to Intervene

The story that investigates the reasons of American intervention could be a very short one. According to his diary, the President made up his mind on June 25 when it became clear that the North Korean attack was an all out invasion of South Korea. He made the decision on the plane as he flew back from his hometown to Washington D.C. He reasoned that

“I remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act, it encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen and twenty years earlier. […] If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go unchallenged, it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the Second World War.”

In other words, his reasons were twofold. First, the President saw the world in cold war terms: the West fighting against a monolithic Communist block. The historical analogy weighted

even more heavily on the President’s mind. Identifying North Korea as an aggressor, Truman compared the invasion to the defining historical event of his generation as he concluded the lesson of his contemporaries: appeasement should not be allowed and aggression must be met with aggression, because there was no way to lessen the Soviet appetite for further territorial expansion. Both of these fit well with realpolitik, that is, the maintenance of the balance of power. Clearly, the threat of international aggression was the source of Truman’s loss frame.

Accordingly, he was ready to risk a lot in Korea. When he arrived in Washington, D.C., he left no doubt whether the United States would help South Korea. To a group of his advisors, he said, “By God, I’m going to let them have it.” He brought up the lessons of appeasement with his advisors. He was convinced that the US must act, which he explained by drawing a parallel with German, Japanese, and Italian aggression in the 1930s. He also reflected on the success of this view so far: he made the point that a firm stance in Berlin and Greece made the USSR back down.

Many of his advisors shared his view of international politics, that is, the lessons of Munich, which, thus, had a “profound influence” on the decision. General Bradley, head of the JCS, was thinking along the same lines as the President. The line for Russia must be drawn somewhere, he said, and Korea was as good a place as anywhere else. Secretary Finletter of the Air Force, who believed that the lesson of the world wars was to take a calculated risk early on to keep the peace, also stressed the need for standing firm in the face of challenge. John Foster Dulles made the same point in a telegram to the President after the meeting. After all, aggression was directed against a country that enjoyed US support.

---

441 Hess 2001, 9; McCullough 1993 [1992], 776.
442 Hess 2001, 2.
443 Record 2002, 41.
Failure to act would not only lead to further aggression as the lesson of Munich predicted but would jeopardize the credibility of the US as an ally.\(^{445}\)

Several advisors pointed to the strategic imperatives of fighting. For them intervening in Korea was a strategic necessity. Admiral Sherman argued that, just as he had argued in World War II, South Korea was not important in itself, but because in enemy hands it could mean a threat to Japan.\(^{446}\) This view was also shared by Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, who saw the North’s occupation of South Korea as a “dagger pointed at the heart of Japan.”\(^{447}\)

Acheson shared Truman’s anti-Communist views as well. In a memorandum that Acheson also read out in the course of the meeting, he stressed that the invasion of South Korea was not an isolated act, but as a first step in a chain of events by the Communists, which “alters the strategic realities of the area.”\(^{448}\) The next move from the Soviet Union, which was not involved in the conflict in reality, was expected at the Formosa straight and, therefore, the seventh fleet was ordered to move there. In addition, calculations of the probable place of following Soviet attacks were commissioned.\(^{449}\) In other words, Soviet intentions were considered in a strategic light.

Perhaps somewhat surprisingly for a realist and more in the vein of liberalism, the President considered one more international factor, the United Nations. He saw the United Nations endangered by North Korean aggression. He finished his thinking while returning to Washington by concluding that “the foundations and the principles of the United Nations were at stake unless this unprovoked attack on Korea could be stopped.”\(^{450}\) That is, in the early 1950s the President and many officials in Washington still entertained some hope that

\(^{445}\) Hess 2001, 22.
\(^{447}\) McCullough 1993 [1992], 778. See also, Rusk 1990, 162.
\(^{450}\) Truman 1957 [1955-1956], 333; Hess 2001, 23.
the UN would be able to fulfill its role, so they wished to act through it. The President also expressed this view early in the Korean crisis when he said, “We cannot let the UN down.”

On June 25 Truman expressed his desire to hold any action back until the UN would vote. Truman did respect the UN and tried to work through it rather than just using it to legitimize American action, as many of his successors would do. He went back to the UN each time the course of American policy had to be changed. Yet, involvement in the UN did not influence the decision to fight. The decision to remove any restrictions on the use of air and naval forces in Korea went out to General MacArthur on June 26 – a day before the new Security Council resolution that legitimized it was accepted. When Truman first met Congressional leaders in the morning of June 27, he left no doubt that the United States preferred working within the UN, but would go ahead even if a favorable resolution could not be obtained. The previous evening, he voiced similar views when he was warned that the Soviets might veto his plans of working with the UN. He said he “rather wished they would veto,” because it would be clear indication of who was behind North Korean action and would help justify US action in defending Formosa.

5.3.2 The Role of Domestic Politics

The view that domestic politics weighed heavily on the mind of the decision-makers is shared by many sources on the war. However, evidence suggests that it mattered little for Truman.

457 See for example Hess 2001, 13-14 and Record 2002, 42.
To begin with, to commit troops, decision-makers either had to play at using the rally effect in the short run or aim at success or avoid failure in the long run.

As for the long-term prospects of victory, Truman and his advisors had few illusions about the certainty of victory once ground troops were committed. That is to say, the decision was not based on catering for favorable public reaction in the long run or furthering their survival in their jobs by judging and influencing the prospects of a re-election bid by Truman. On June 26, Acheson suggested that “it was important for us to do something even if the effort were not successful.” This view was seconded by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson. The bleak view of a war effort expressed by Acheson was not unfounded on the basis of forces that were available immediately. General Bradley judged that if the US committed ground forces in Korea, it could not carry out its other international commitments without mobilization at home.

Although Truman was ready to shoulder the chances of a disastrous war effort, he was not willing to do it before he was convinced that it was necessary. On June 26, the President still entertained hopes for a less violent settling of the conflict. He said that every effort must be made to meet the situation, but still shrank back from the idea of mobilization of the National Guard or the reserves, because he said “he did not want to go to war.” Although his reasons are not entirely clear, he appeared to identify such a move with personal failure: he said that the situation at hand was what he tried to prevent in the last five years. Yet, he did not coach failure in terms of its possible domestic repercussions. Finally, he decided to

---

commit ground troops on a limited scale on June 29 and full troop commitment was made a
day later when collapse was imminent.\footnote{“Teletype Conference between Washington and Tokyo, ref. CX –56812,” June 26, 1950 in “The Korean War” 2006; Hess 2001, 29-31; Truman 1957 [1955-1956], 341; for the authorization of a limited number of troops see, “JCS Message no. 84681 to CINCFE (Command), Tokyo, Japan,” June 29, 1950 in “The Korean War” 2006.}

However, Truman’s policy of delay was not influenced by short-term domestic political
calculations, either. If they had been, Congressional criticism of softness should have
predisposed the President to full-scale intervention early on, which clearly he was not.
Truman also appeared not to be too worried about anti-Communism in the US. Although he
directly referred to general problems with Congress by discussing McCarthyism on the plane
back from Independence on June 25, he did not sound alarmed and did not connect it to
developments in Korea. Rather he expressed his opinion that McCarthy would soon destroy

Even when the President was warned on June 28, 1950 that current Congressional
support might evaporate before long if the military situation became troublesome, he did not
display concern. As I have shown already, such an eventuality was far from being a remote
possibility. As Acheson pointed it out, instead of making any progress, problems in Korea
only increased so far. Thus, standing firm in Korea might not be an easy victory march for the
US.\footnote{“Meeting of the NSC in the Cabinet Room at the White House,” June 28, 1950, in “The Korean War” 2006.} The President was “unmoved by, indeed unmindful of, the effect upon his or his
party’s political fortunes of action that he thought was right and in the best interest of the
country, broadly conceived.”\footnote{Acheson 1970, 535.} Accordingly, thinking that the Secretary of State wanted to
talk him out of the chosen course of action, the President replied with some irritation that the

\footnote{463 “Meeting of the NSC in the Cabinet Room at the White House,” June 28, 1950, in “The Korean War” 2006.}
\footnote{464 Acheson 1970, 535.}
danger involved was obvious, but the United States should only back down in Korea if a military situation elsewhere, that is, strategic considerations, demanded so.\footnote{Acheson 1970, 535; Truman 1957 [1955-1956], 340, 346; Hess 2001, 26-7. Cf. the official minutes of the meeting that does justify Truman’s comment but does not contain Acheson’s warning. “Meeting of the NSC in the Cabinet Room at the White House,” June 28, 1950,” in “The Korean War” 2006.}

If the President was not worried about the backing of Congress in the short run, he was not mindful of it in the long run, either. Had he been, he could have foregone future criticism by biding Congress in the war decision by simply asking for a declaration of war. He most likely would have gotten such a declaration. Congress, as well as the press and the nation, supported his policies.\footnote{Hess 2001, 32. As for the view of the general public, 890 telegrams received in the White House until June 29 overwhelmingly supported intervention and letters were running 10 to 1 in favor of presidential action. See “Memorandum for Mr. Ross,” June 29, 1950, in “The Korean War” 2006.} Senator Lucas foresaw the possibility that Senators would engage in a lengthy debate and a renewal of past criticism against Truman, but he believed that the declaration would not be denied.\footnote{Hess 2001, 26-7. Cf. the official minutes of the meeting that does justify Truman’s comment but does not contain Acheson’s warning. “Meeting of the NSC in the Cabinet Room at the White House,” June 28, 1950,” in “The Korean War” 2006.}

Acheson described the stakes in terms of evaporating support should the war not prove to be an unconditional success. Such a possibility was all the more likely, because although supportive, Congress left the backdoor open for diverging opinions in the future. In the course of the meeting with Congressional leaders, the expression of Congressional support was mixed with criticism over not consulting Congress before such an ominous decisions as sending ground troops.\footnote{Hess 2001, 35; Acheson 1970, 538-539; Paterson 1988, 87-94.} In addition, as early as June 28, influential Republicans challenged the constitutionality of Truman’s actions on the floor of the Senate\footnote{“[Meeting with the Cabinet and Congressional Leaders],” June 30, 1950, 11:10 a.m., in “The Korean War” 2006.} which was not without legal basis. Under a law that the President signed in 1945, US troops could only be committed to support UN action after Congressional authorization. In addition, the Constitution made it clear that only the Senate could declare, that is presumably start, wars.\footnote{Hess 2001, 26.}
Yet, Truman did not seek a declaration of war even in light of Congressional pressure to do so. The question whether one was to be requested was not dealt with before the second week of the crisis on July 3 – only after troop commitments had been made.\footnote{Hess 2001, 31.} When the declaration of war was considered, Averell Harriman repeated Acheson’s earlier warning, which Acheson no longer shared, about its usefulness if they ran into trouble. But the President was of a different opinion.\footnote{The stand of Acheson and the State Department is somewhat dubious. Different sources claim them on different side in this conflict. Hess (2001, 35-36) claims they found Congressional authorization a useful \textit{albeit} unnecessary contingency measure while Acheson (1970, 539) describes himself as adamantly opposed to a resolution. Archival material confirms neither. In meetings, Acheson simply laid drafts before the president. See “Meeting at Blair House, July 3, 1950, 4:00 p.m.,” in “The Korean War” 2006.} He dismissed the request in a way that appears to be politically shortsighted, but expressed very well the balance of power between the president and Congress with regard to foreign policy. He asserted that asking Congress for a declaration of war was unnecessary when “they are already with me.”\footnote{Hess 2001, 35-36; Record 2002, 43.} Moreover, he believed that the request could not be fit into the short-time, would tie the hands of future presidents in being responsive to international developments, and that being Commander-in-Chief and working under the cover of the UN did not necessitate Congressional declaration of war.\footnote{“[Meeting with the Cabinet and Congressional Leaders],” June 30, 1950, 11:10 a.m., in “The Korean War” 2006. See also Hess 2001, 35. McCullough 1993 [1992], 789; Acheson 1970 539.}

## 5.4 The Decision to Go North

### 5.4.1 Reasons for Crossing the 38th Parallel

The decision for war has been defined as one involving the commitment of ground troops with a particular purpose. These two decisions were done separately in Korea. Therefore, the decision over objectives and its causes must also be examined. Although the decision to go to war was made on June 30, American objectives were set but not fixed at the time. This was a mistake that the President paid a heavy price for in terms of the length of troop involvement, casualties and public approval ratings. As for the latter the President’s popularity would never
again exceed 32% after February 1951. In the period of June 26-30, the aim of the US campaign was implied to be what was declared in the UN resolution: to return to the status quo prior to the North Korean attack. That is to say, the division line along the 38th parallel was to be restored. Publicly, the war was put into similar light as a police action.

Within the administration, however, there existed some controversy over objectives. Even the President himself encouraged the view that the initially agreed upon aims were not to be treated as final. On June 26, at the inquiry of Secretary Pace and General Vandenberg about the limits of US action, the President said, “no action should be taken north of the 38th parallel.” But he added, “Not yet.” A part of the restriction was lifted three days later, when the Air Force was allowed to bomb purely military targets in North Korea. Yet, a full reversal of objectives only happened in September when UN troops started pushing North Koreans back behind the 38th parallel.

To begin with, the decision to go north was based on its expected positive effects on regional stability. The unification of Korea, it was argued, could bring about stability on the peninsula that a divided Korea could not assure. Furthermore, the 38th parallel had no strategic or political significance. Such an objective was also in harmony with earlier UN resolutions about Korea’s future, proclaiming the aim of a unified Korea. This could now be achieved, giving a unique opportunity for victory over Communism.

The second driving principle was the prevention of appeasement, which was expressed in strongly moralistic terms. A State Department memorandum argued that the moral dimension was compelling and, thus, compromise should be avoided. It failed “to see what advantage we gain by a compromise with clear moral principles and a sinking of our duty to make clear once and for all that aggression does not pay. […] When all moral right is on our

---

478 “JCS Message no. 84681 to CINCFE (Command), Tokyo, Japan,” June 29, 1950 in “The Korean War” 2006. See also Truman 1957 [1955-1956], 341.
side, why should we hesitate?” Not everyone agreed. Soviet expert George Kennan warned Acheson unsuccessfully to pay no attention to those “indulging themselves in emotional and moralistic attitudes.”

However, if China or the Soviet Union decided to directly intervene as a result of American presence on North Korea’s territory, the objective of regional stability could not be attained. Accordingly, the NSC clearly stated that even the rumor of Chinese or Soviet intervention would be among the reasons that would result in canceling the extension of the war to North Korea so as to avoid all out war. Warning signals were present. The State Department received several warnings that China would not tolerate UN troop movements north of the 38th parallel. Soviet experts in the State Department predicted Soviet and Chinese intervention. Waning support in UN circles for a second resolution so as to extend the war beyond the 38th parallel may have also been a warning sign. Yet, National Intelligence Estimates that reached the President’s desk, and served as the basis for presidential policy unequivocally forecast no Chinese involvement. They interpreted Chinese warnings and troop movements as a sign of bluff. Thus, it appears that Truman and his advisors based their decision on the desired balance of power in the region, a great deal of moralism to back that argument up, and a misperception of Chinese intentions.

479 Hess 2001, 44-45. See also Truman 1957 [1955-6], 359; Rusk 1990, 167.
5.4.2 The Role of Domestic Politics

McCullough suggests that the decision was a result of President Truman and his advisors were caught up in the spirit of the moment and allowed for pressure from the press, Congress, and the public who demanded such a move.\footnote{See McCullough 1993 [1992], 799.} Had it been true, it might have been an example of domestically inspired risk-taking, but not as a result of a loss framework. Even then, it is more likely that the situation was based, as it was in reality, on a mistaken evaluation of Chinese intent.

Yet, the situation in which Truman made the decision was quite different. He ordered preparations for crossing the 38th parallel on September 11 – four days before the war turned to America’s advantage. Domestic euphoria and pressure on the President to enlarge the war was not born as a consequence of battlefield success. Even so, euphoria did not translate into substantially high approval, staying at the same precarious level as it was before American troops were on the advance.\footnote{Hess 2001, 46.} In August 1950, before the decision to extend the war, Truman’s popularity with the electorate stood at 43\%.\footnote{“Presidential Job Approval,” 2004.} Contrary to McCullough’s argument, instead of actually being popular, the President was still quite unpopular when he (re)defined the aims of the war.

However, things did not look so unequivocal from the White House. While polls showed overall support for the President’s policies in Korea, letters pouring in the White House showed a different picture. They were twenty to one against sending American boys to fight overseas so soon after the end of the World War.\footnote{McCullough 1993 [1992], 790-791.}

Truman’s discussions with British Prime Minister Clement Attlee in December 1951 after China entered the war also suggest that domestic politics had been divided and, thus, gave little guidance to presidential policies. After mentioning his problems with Congress,
Truman willingly acknowledged that domestic forces were pulling him in every direction. Some wanted a wider war, others believed in isolationism, even others thought that the US should stay the course in Europe, but abandon Korea.\footnote{Truman 1957 [1955-1956], 409-410 and 414.}

If anything, Truman’s approach to the war appeared to be remarkably apolitical.\footnote{Hess 2001, 16.} It appears that he stood by his own dictum that “a president must not be influenced by […] the distortion of opinion” at home.\footnote{Truman 1957 [1955-6], 414.} I have already showed that he ignored domestic political views when he made the two most important decisions of the war and he continued to pursue his Korean policies that way until the end. When cease-fire negotiations started in May 1951, he chose to stand by his insistence of voluntary repatriation of the 150,000 Chinese/North Korean prisoners of war on moral grounds. He stated publicly that forced repatriation “was unthinkable. It would be repugnant to the fundamental moral and humanitarian principles which underlie our actions in Korea.”\footnote{Hess 2001, 72. See also McCullough 1993 [1992], 872.}

Some in Washington, D.C. also judged compulsory repatriation contrary to US interests, because returning soldiers could be used to rebuild North Korean/Chinese armies that might destabilize the situation.\footnote{Hess 2001, 70.}

Despite domestic support for such an attitude, domestically, a quick cease-fire would have been more advantageous to the President, whose popularity suffered immensely after Chinese entry in the war. At the time the State Department judged the American public believing that leadership in the country was “utterly confused and sterile.”\footnote{Hess 2001, 72. See also McCullough 1993 [1992], 872.} Acheson and the Commander of the UN forces, General Ridgway advised Truman accordingly, recommending a quick cease-fire agreement, which would have allowed for the earliest return of American POWs. A quick cease-fire agreement could have helped Truman stand a chance with the electorate in the 1952 presidential election by putting the war, which more than 50% of
Americans considered a mistake\textsuperscript{494} behind and focusing on other issues in the next one and a half years until the election, which Truman finally decided not to contest.

**5.5 Conclusion**

Being involved in a T2 conflict, President Truman had every domestic incentive to use the war in Korea to escape his calamity at home. Nonetheless, fully in harmony with theoretical expectations, he based his decisions solely on international considerations. Drawing the lessons of power politics from the failed policy of appeasement, Truman and his advisors were adamant to stop what they saw as an act of Soviet expansion.

Domestic politics was evaluated as a force that would pull the administration back from engagement. Decision-makers were pessimistic about the possible success of their effort in Korea. Acheson’s mentioning of adverse conditions at home was seen by the President as a means through which Acheson wanted to deter him from action and refused to comply. The President dully informed Congress but did not seek a declaration of war, which would have been great help when congressional opinion turned against him.

The decision to pursue the war north of the 38\textsuperscript{th} parallel was similarly motivated by international concerns. It was seen as a decisive opportunity to turn the strategic situation in America’s favor. This was also backed up by a great deal of moralism. While low popularity might have predisposed the President to fight, his evaluation of the situation rather showed that there was no clear pattern at home to guide him in his decision, so he was left to do what he thought best for the United States. Consequently, what explains the sub-optimal foreign policy choice is not the President’s priority for his personal good standing with the public, but the misperception of Chinese interests and intentions.

\textsuperscript{494} Hess 2001, 70-71.
Chapter 6: Low Intensity Conflicts and Decision-making in Parliamentary Democracies: The Cases of Malaya and Kenya

6.1 Malaya

6.1.1 A Short History of British Presence and the Emergency in Malaya

Malaya spread over a territory that was slightly larger than England without Wales and was dominated by the jungle. British control over the region started in 1805 when the East India Company took over a trading post in Penang and continued with the acquisition of Singapore two decades later. By 1874 the whole area was under British control and, by the end of World War II, there were about 12,000 British in Malaya. British rule was based on treaties of friendship with the sultans of the nine Malay states\footnote{Jahore, Kedah, Kelantan, Negri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak, Perlis, Selangor, Trenganu.} whereby each sultan remained a ruler in name only, being subtly directed by a British advisor. Administrative centralization followed and, thus, more direct British rule was instituted at the end of the 19th century, as the British administration slowly took over state functions that were not directed by treaties.

The British colonial administration suffered a blow when Singapore and subsequently the area of the Malay states fell to Japan in 1942. Resistance and preparation for the return of British rule was started by British officers remaining behind in the jungle. While additional officers were parachuted in the region later on, Britain desperately needed assistance and found that only the Malayan Chinese, who hated the Japanese, were ready to give it. The British accepted their offer even though they had no illusions that with training the Malay People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) they were essentially teaching guerilla warfare to the cadres of the Malay Communist Party (MCP).

After Japanese capitulation the British returned to Malaya in September 1945 and started setting the country on the road toward independence. First, to create a more united and firmer administrative unit, while preserving the member ‘states’ as separate entities, colonial
administration was centralized. As a result, the nine Malay States and the directly ruled settlements of Penang and the Provinces Wellesley and Malacca were united in the Federation of Malaya in 1948 – only a few months before troubles began. The Federation of Malaya agreement included provisions for constitutional developments that while respecting the individuality of its constituting states/settlements, centralized the administration under the control of the high commissioner who was directly responsible to the Colonial Secretary in London and had reserved powers over internal security, defense, and foreign relations. In addition, a Federal Executive Council and a Federal Legislative Council were created whose membership was appointed by the colonial administration but with the intention that in the long run the Legislative Council would be made up of elected members.

As of 1948, Malaya was one of the most prosperous possessions of Britain. It was a dollar-earning colony with thriving tin and natural rubber industries. The country was made up of three races: the Malays, who constituted a slight majority of the 5,734,000 inhabitants. There were about half a million Indians (or Tamils) most of whom came to Malaya to earn money so as to be able to buy their own land upon returning to India. Finally, there were 2.5 million Chinese. It was approximately 600,000 of the Chinese who saw very little of the economic prosperity. These squatters, who lived in huts on the frontier of the jungle on lands to which they had no title, formed a natural support base for the Communist cause, because of their economic plight, close location to the jungle and because the Communists, who were overwhelmingly of Chinese decent, could control them by inciting fear.

The Malayan Communist Party – a legal organization after 1945 – was initially too tame and without a policy to try and take over the country in the hiatus between the end of Japanese occupation and the return of the British administration. Moreover, in spite of sky-rocketing inflation, Communist control over the majority of welfare organizations and trade unions all legal attempts – i.e. strikes – to discredit the British and subvert Malaya so as to win
independence on Communist rather than British terms failed both in 1946 and 1947. Expecting the banning of the MCP by Britain, its leaders went into hiding before the party was banned and accepted a policy of terror in late May-early June of 1948. Consequently Malaya was to see Communist-inspired atrocities and a coordinated armed campaign against rubber estate managers in the first two weeks of June 1948. This forced the High Commissioner, Edward Gent, to first declare a state of emergency in parts of Perak and Jahore and extend it to the rest of Malaya two days later on June 18. On July 23, 1948 the British government banned the MCP and in August 1948 first decided to send additional Gurkha and British troops to Malaya.

The declaration of the emergency meant the beginning of a 12-year long military struggle in the jungle against the Communists and a political struggle for the hearts and minds of the people of Malaya that cost the British government £ 520 million. In the first three and a half years the war went badly for Britain. Troubles culminated in the assassination of British High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney on October 6, 1951. This and a change of government in London at the end of October made Malaya more of a priority in Whitehall. The speed of the war and the spending on it visibly increased despite the fact that the British economy was on the verge of bankruptcy. More attention to Malaya, the recognition of counter-insurgency tactics, a better execution of already existing political plans to win the Chinese squatters over, and the iron hand of General Templer – Gurney’s successor – led to a drop in terrorist incidents and casualties by the end of 1952. The situation steadily improved afterwards.

Although the British had promised independence to Malaya on the condition that first the war against the Communists had to be successfully finished, the date of independence was

\[496\] PRO WO 106/5990 “Review of the emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957.”

\[497\] Even though general elections in Britain took place on October 25, three weeks after the assassination of Gurney, it would be too farfetched to suggest that the latter had much – if any – effect on the outcome of the former.
moved forward. Malaya had its first free and general elections on July 31, 1955 and independence was achieved on August 31, 1957. With independence the Malayan government took greater responsibility for the war – thus, British troops were gradually withdrawn. It took three more years to clean the country of Communists entirely. The state emergency was finally lifted on July 31, 1960.

6.1.2 The Domestic Political Situation

The emergency in Malaya is a T1 conflict where only two of the five conditions – strong factions and a divided cabinet – leading to a separation of purpose were present. The decision of 1948 to fight in Malaya was made by Clement Attlee’s Labour government that came into office on July 26, 1945. Attlee became the first Labour prime minister with a majority in the House of Commons. Moreover, Labour did not just have a majority, but Attlee could command the largest majority a government enjoyed in the cold war. Labour had 393 MPs, which gave the government an advantage of 146 MPs over the opposition.

The post-election honeymoon within the party was over by 1947, when the party became strongly divided. Factionalization, however, amounted to little danger, because of the sheer size of Labour’s majority. That is to say, the chance to bring down Attlee through a backbench revolt was very slim despite the fact that continuous albeit small-scale rebellion of backbenchers against the Cabinet was a regular feature of Labour politics. For example, the vote on conscription in peacetime counted forty-five Labour votes against the government (with large absention from the rest of the Labour MPs) in November 1946, and seventy-two

in April 1947. Even though the latter caused serious alarm in the Cabinet, the size of the revolt did not even equal half of Labour’s parliamentary majority. Interestingly though, foreign policy was the main source of backbench revolt.\footnote{On backbench revolt in the Attlee era, see Morgan 1984, 61-65.}

Because of the large majority in the Commons, the only challenge to Attlee’s power could come from within the Cabinet. While the size of the majority made it highly unlikely that the government would be brought down in the Parliament, intra-party bickering – if modest by Labour standards – were quite substantial to cause trouble for the Prime Minister and give a power base to possible challengers. The Prime Minister had four rivals in the Cabinet who could be possible challengers: Hugh Dalton (Chancellor of the Exchequer until 1947), Herbert Morrison (Leader of the House of Commons), Strafford Cripps (President of the Board of Trade and successor of Dalton as the Chancellor in 1947), Aneurin Bevan (Minister of Health) and Ernest Bevin (Foreign Secretary).

The year 1947, which Hugh Dalton rightfully described as the \textit{annus horribilis} for the government, created substantial unpopularity for a challenger to emerge. Events that year hurt the prestige and popularity of Labour. There were plenty of foreign policy-related problems. The government sent confusing signals: on the one hand, it withdrew from Turkey, Greece, and India and was on the retreat in Palestine. On the other hand, it failed to downscale the size of the army. Nonetheless, the troubles were primarily domestic. It started with the government’s reluctance to face in time the coal and energy shortage created by an exceptionally long winter. Finally it had no choice but to cut power to the population and industries.

Crises culminated in troubles over the convertibility of the pound, which had been demanded by the US in exchange of a loan, in the late summer of 1947. After convertibility was introduced the pound came under more intense pressure than the government had
anticipated. Consequently it had no choice but suspend convertibility.\textsuperscript{502} Not only was the financial crisis serious, but the government also handled it exceptionally badly. The chancellor’s warnings about the gravity of the economic situation had not been taken seriously, and once the crisis erupted even Hugh Dalton, the chancellor, reacted meekly to the grave situation, thinking that the problem could be handled by a few import cuts. His colleagues, either ill or otherwise occupied, did not do much better, either.\textsuperscript{503} Worse, in the hour of crisis, the government flew without direction and reacted with panic.\textsuperscript{504}

As a result, the popularity of the party suffered badly. In August 1947 the first time since the general elections, the Conservative Party overtook Labour in the polls. In November, the government was 12.5 points behind the Tories. The local elections of November 1947 only gives further evidence to the popular discontent with the Labour government. Labour suffered severe losses, conceding local leadership to the Conservatives even is the industrial towns of Birmingham and Manchester.\textsuperscript{505}

Such a situation could lead to an emergence of a challenger because, to begin with, Attlee’s support from the party had never been equivocal. Herbert Morrison, as many in Labour, had had doubts about Attlee’s ability to lead even before the 1945 elections. However, up until 1947 the landslide and Ernest Bevin’s backing had given Attlee enough leverage to shove off Morrison’s bid.\textsuperscript{506}

But in the wake of the convertibility crisis, Attlee’s situation was precarious. The Prime Minister’s crisis performance was deemed ‘catastrophic’ and, as the News Chronicle observed, that he left “the impression that the situation was beyond his grasp.”\textsuperscript{507} Dalton and Morrison could not have agreed more and even the loyal Bevin rumbled in anger. In addition

\textsuperscript{502} Jeffreys 1992, 25-8; Morgan 1984, 336-345.
\textsuperscript{503} Morgan 1984, 334, 345; Jeffreys 1992, 28.
\textsuperscript{504} Morgan 1984, 345.
\textsuperscript{505} Morgan 1984, 334.
\textsuperscript{507} Morgan 1984, 351; Jeffreys 1992, 28.
to his indecisiveness in the crisis, Attlee’s inability to cut down on the defense budget and disasters in Palestine were now held against him as well. On August 11, even the Parliamentary Labour Party mounted an orchestrated attack on the Prime Minister: MPs of all shades of opinion criticized the Prime Minister for his lack of grip on events. Serious policy disagreement on issues such as the reduction of the armed forces or nationalization of the coal and steel industries aggravated the situation by dividing the Cabinet. All this culminated in an attack of the most prominent Cabinet members on Attlee, which Attlee withstood but not without a sufficient loss of his bargaining power. He yielded control of the economy to Stafford Cripps and foreign policy to Earnest Bevin.

By 1948, however, the situation slightly improved for the Prime Minister. Labour’s popularity with the electorate was on the mend. The 12.5 percentage point disadvantage was minimized to a four point Tory advantage a month before the emergency was declared in Malaya. Low as it is, that level of popularity remained below the five percentage point benchmark.

As a result of the aborted cabinet coup, the number of challengers drastically dropped. Although division prevailed in the Cabinet, Ernest Bevin was the only member who could preserve enough power to be a possible challenger. However, a challenge from Bevin was highly unlikely: in 1947 he had already refused to shoulder the task of challenging the Prime Minister because of his loyalty. Moreover, Attlee worked at keeping Bevin happy by making sure that Bevin got enough room for maneuver in foreign policy.

As a consequence, Attlee’s position was relatively safe. Therefore, it is expected that reasoning in the decision-making process will not be based on domestic political factors but

---

508 Morgan 1984, 351-352.
509 Morgan 1984, 335, 345, 351.
510 Pearce 1997, 142-3; Morgan 1984, 331-334, 335.
511 “Gallup Polls [Britain]” 2004. For comparison, the mean government lead between 1945 and 2000 was -3.2. See also Morgan 1984, 336; Jeffreys 1992, 32.
512 Morgan 1984, 352-354.
the decision will be made on the basis of an estimate of the international stakes. As opposed to American cases, I expect a much more substantial role for the cabinet and real effort from the Prime Minister to keep his Cabinet and his party satisfied.

6.1.3 The Decision to Fight in Malaya

6.1.3.1 Reasons to Fight

Labour’s foreign policy had two competing pillars and it was unclear which one would take primacy when the government considered the situation in Malaya. On the one hand, the Soviet Union and, thus, Communism had already been recognized as the chief enemy of the coming years. Yet, Bevin felt much more strongly about the issue than Attlee who saw the Soviet threat but was hopeful of British-Soviet Relations.\(^{513}\)

On the other hand, Labour’s pre-World War II preferences for liquidating the Empire strongly correlated with the financial impossibility of maintaining it. Nevertheless, in practice, policy was made on a colony-by-colony basis, rather than as a result of strong adherence to the pre-war principles. First, of all, the Empire could not be liquidated as a whole. Second, Labour leaders were more attached to the imperial ideal than they had appeared to realize: Attlee, Bevin, and Morrison all entertained some fondness for the Empire. Bevin thought that the Empire was essential for Britain to survive as a great power, while Morrison sent a shockwave down the Labour Party when he referred to “the jolly good Empire.”\(^{514}\)

British interest in Malaya was also ambiguous. It was important economically as a dollar-earning colony, but its value in strategic and defense terms was much less substantive.\(^{515}\) Thus, it was unclear whether the government would fight in Malaya or not.

Even though the Cabinet did play a role, which is of little surprise since a separation of purpose was not present. To begin with, it took almost a month after the declaration of the

\(^{513}\) Pearce 1997, 161-162.

\(^{514}\) Morgan 1984, 190-194.

emergency before the full Cabinet was informed about the situation. The state of affairs in Malaya was laid down in a cabinet paper by the Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech-Jones. He informed his colleagues that a state of emergency had been declared. He acknowledged that there had been only circumstantial evidence to prove that the MCP was responsible for lawlessness: trade unions had been infiltrated, violent crimes had broken out in the last few weeks, and armed bands were being trained. He added that the terrorists aimed at economic disruption and the undermining of the government’s authority. He described the importance of Malaya for Britain in economic terms: “it was the most important source of dollars in the Colonial Empire and it would gravely worsen the whole dollar balance of the sterling area if there was serious interference with Malayan exports.”

In two weeks, the Cabinet was informed of the developments but not consulted. On the July 13, 1948 cabinet meeting, Creech-Jones reported on the steps taken: the Army and Royal Air Force were giving full support to the police, any request for military assistance was being met and the issue was being dealt within the British Defence Co-ordination Committee. The Colonial Secretary was optimistic that the situation was being brought under control. The Cabinet had no other role than to take note of the situation.

That is, both before and after the emergency, events were followed and most policies were made at sub-cabinet level. Policies were worked out in cabinet committees (primarily in the Defence Committee) and in the relevant departments (the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, and the War Office) and in the form of direct communications between ministers and the Prime Minister. In the pre-emergency period, Malaya had last made the Cabinet agenda in 1947 with regard to constitutional matters, but brewing troubles were not mentioned prior to the declaration of the emergency. In the first three years of the emergency, the Malaya

---

516 PRO CAB 129/28 C.P. (48) 171, July 1, 1948, “The Situation in Malaya.”
517 PRO CAB 129/28 C.P. (48) 171, July 1, 1948, “The Situation in Malaya.”
campaign was discussed in the Cabinet six times (four times in 1948, and once in both 1949 and 1950) and resulted in six Cabinet papers (two in 1948, one in 1949 and three in 1950).

Neither was the Cabinet consulted at the time of the two major decisions: the removal of the commissioner-general and the sending of troops to reinforce troops available in the region. The former decision was made between Creech Jones and the Prime Minister, and was only mentioned in a Cabinet paper. As for the latter, the Cabinet was told on July 1 that His Majesty’s Government (HMG) was assessing if and what reinforcements may be necessary, but the decision was made in the Defence Committee based on military appreciation and the direct request of the commissioner-general. Of this the Cabinet was informed ex post on August 16.

Although in the light of the lack of separation of powers, the meager cabinet involvement is not surprising, it is somewhat more appalling when one considers ministers’ awareness of the strategic risks of sending additional troops to Malaya. The commissioner-general asked for reinforcement late, because he was aware of the tightness of Britain’s military position. Similarly on August 12, the Chiefs of Staff were reluctant to send reinforcements, since such a move would have left Britain without reserves for a year. While the Defence Committee agreed on the magnitude of the risk, of the three most problematic theaters (Western Europe, the Middle East and the Far East) they judged the situation in Malaya (and Burma) to be the most troubling and the only place where Britain was actively fighting Communism and British subjects were being killed. All this is noteworthy, since such evaluations were done in an international context where the cold war was shifting to full gear with Communist takeovers in Central and Eastern Europe. Even more

---

520 PRO CAB 128/13, 56 (48), August 16, Item 6.
521 PRO CAB 21/2626, August 10, 1948, “No. 184, From Commission-General, South East Asia to Secretary of State for the Colonies.”
522 PRO CAB 21/2626, August 12, 1948, “D.C. Stapleton to Minister, Item 3: Reinforcements for Malaya.”
523 PRO PREM 8/1406, part 1, and PRO CAB21/2626, July 13, 1948, DO (48) 16th meeting, Minute 3.”
importantly, such an evaluation was made after the Soviet blockade of Berlin had started and
during which Britain was considering the possibility of war with the Soviet Union, which it

In harmony with the expectations in the case of T1 conflicts of parliamentary regimes,
the decision was based on international considerations. Regardless of whether the issue was
discussed in cabinet committees, the Colonial Office, the Cabinet, or among individual
ministers the tone reflected the Colonial Secretary’s security’s evaluation as a conflict with
Communism. The Colonial Office first got wind of the nature of the dangers in March. The
difficulty of the situation in Malaya had been no secret before, but earlier intelligence reports
had been unable to name the sources of atrocities. Finally, in March 1948, the danger was
judged to lie in growing Communist agitation and its success especially among the
peasantry.\footnote{PRO CO 537/3751, “Malayan Security Service: Political Intelligence Journal No. 3 (February 15, 1948).” News of these intelligence estimates reached London with four-six weeks delays. See PRO CO 537/3751, May 6, 1948, “Morris to Williams” and May 3, 1948, “Morris to Palliser.”}

Bevin’s request for fortnightly intelligence summaries was first met in May 1948
and the tone was no different: they called attention to the Communist infiltration of the Malay
organizations, Communist control over the trade union movement, and the MCP’s
connections with other Communist parties around the world.\footnote{PRO CO 537/3755, “Malaya – Political Intelligence. Summary for May 1948.”}

At the July 13 cabinet meeting, ministers agreed that there was little doubt that the
Communists stood behind the atrocities.\footnote{PRO CAB 128/13 50 (48), July 13, 1948, Item 3.} In the same vein the only major decision where
the approval of the Cabinet was sought concerned the banning of the MCP. This was the legal
decision that made the upcoming military engagement possible. Before the issue was raised in
the Cabinet, Creech-Jones consulted the Foreign Secretary first, who agreed with the position
reached. They also decided that they needed the support of their cabinet colleagues and,
accordingly, would raise the issue in the Cabinet after a “few minutes’ conversation with the

Prime Minister.” The Cabinet received a memorandum on the appreciation of the situation – mostly unchanged – and the steps taken since Creech-Jones’ previous cabinet memorandum (on July 1) over Malaya. The banning of the Communist Party and its three puppet organizations was raised orally in the cabinet and approved.

Then in September, the Chiefs of Staff Committee argued for troop engagement by highlighting the strategic advantages of fighting in Malaya. It did so by casting events in the framework of global fight against Communism. Clearing Malaya of Communists, the Chiefs of Staff Committee argued, would show to other nations in South-East Asia that Britain took the Communist menace seriously. At the same time, a Communist-free Malaya would be a good springboard to fight Communism elsewhere in Asia. The only slightly divergent voice was the Defence Committee. While it did not question the existence of the Communist threat, it advocated the sending of additional troops because Malaya was British Empire territory and, more importantly, British nationals had been attacked there.

6.1.3.2 The Role of Domestic Politics

Domestic political repercussions were almost never mentioned. Ironically, the only time when the domestic reception of the issue was a concern was during the pre-emergency constitution-making process. In 1946 when the constitutional arrangements were prepared for Malaya, the Attlee government still judged the issue top priority because of the strong public reactions and parliamentary questions. Accordingly, the Prime Minister was advised to keep his Cabinet informed. Later on, the only short-lived concern in the Colonial Office was raised at the

528 PRO CO 537/4246 and PRO PREM 8/1406, part 1, July 17, 1948 “N.D. Watson to J.L. Pumphrey.”
531 PRO CAB 21/2626, “Chiefs of Staff Committee Memorandum of the Colonial Office on the Security Situation in the Federation of Malaya, April 1949.”
532 PRO CAB 21/2626, “Extracts from the minutes of DO (48) 16th meeting held on 13th August 1949.”
533 PRO PREM 8/459, May 31, 1946, “TWR to Prime Minister.”
time of the discussions over the banning of the Communist Party in Malaya. Public uproar was feared as a result of the proscription of the MCP.\footnote{PRO CO 537/4246, August 12, 1948, “JBW to Mr. Seel.”}

Contrary to the expectations of the Colonial Office, public reaction was meager if any.\footnote{PRO CO 537/4246, August 12, 1948, “JBW to Mr. Seel.”} This did not change in the course of the war years, either. Newspapers – even those that had reporters in Malaya for a shorter or longer period of time – considered the issue sparingly and with little vehemence.\footnote{Barber 2004 [1971], 42.} The uninspired nature of the Malaya debate in the Commons also point toward the low salience of the issue. The government dutifully informed the House on decisions (declaration of the state of emergency, the banning of the MCP, committing further troops to the region, the recalling of the High Commissioner). The July 23, 1948 debate after the proscription of the MCP produced neither great emotions nor unexpected criticism. An opposition backbencher suggested that the government was not doing enough, while a Labour MP argued that the Labour Party seemed to be acting against the interest of workers in Malaya. On the whole, the government’s ability to handle the situation was not questioned by the government’s side and the opposition’s criticism was not important enough so as to be made by any members of the shadow Cabinet.\footnote{PRO PREM 8/1406, part 1, “Hansard extract. House of Commons debate, Friday, 23. July 1948 on the Malayan Communist Party (Ban).”}

Discussing the following week’s schedule on September 16, shadow Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden asked his counterpart in the government for a statement on the situation in Malaya to make the latest information available – a request that Herbert Morrison complied with. While such parliamentary statements and the subsequent debate could potentially turn rough for the government if the opposition saw it fit, the September 22 session was short and uneventful. The only slight criticism was a suggestion that the situation in Malaya could be perhaps solved by “top level negotiations on all sides” before Malaya turns into a major war. The Colonial Secretary categorically refused negotiations, which suggests that the
government never really considered it as a solution. The Communist theme was unmistakable. Before Creech-Jones could reply, an MP interrupted, asking “Who, with Stalin?” His message was received with sympathy in the Commons. After all, Stalin was no longer considered as a negotiating partner and finding a negotiating partner locally would have been equally difficult.

The rather hectic international situation provides some reasons for low saliency of the Malaya emergency. Since Malaya was relegated to the background by more stressing international problems, Britain could avoid being accused of not caring for democracy but acting in the worst imperialist fashion that the Colonial Office had feared when it discussed the proscription of the Malayan Communist Party. But an equally important reason was that low saliency was not simply a fortunate occurrence for the government, but the Attlee Cabinet consciously worked at maintaining it. To play down the situation, government officials were instructed that the enemy should be called “bandits” rather than insurgents so as not to give the impression that a popular uprising was brewing against the government. Before Creech-Jones’ successor, James Griffiths, visited the colony in 1951, he was warned not to refer to the operations as “war” but as “emergency.”

One reason for this was to remove obstacles from the recognition of Red China, which was effected in the first week of January 1950. Finally, particularly interesting were the circumstances surrounding the sending of further and rather heavy reinforcements in early April 1950. It was an urgent decision that the Minister of Defense, the Colonial and Foreign Secretaries and the Prime Minister agreed to execute before formal authorization from the

---

539 PRO CO 537/4246, June 15, 1948, “G. F. Seel to Gimson” and PRO CO 537/3755 and PRO FO 1110/8, “Communist Influence in Malaya.”
540 Barber 2004 [1971], 112.
541 PRO CO 537/4762, November 1948, “H.D. Higham to Mr Backburne.”
542 Barber 2004 [1971], 126.
Defence Committee. More to the point is that they also agreed in maintaining minimum publicity, presenting the introduction of reinforcements as routine movements of troops.

While the war in Malaya is a non-story with regard to a domestically induced loss frame and risk-taking, several factors suggest that the predicted processes did exist. For one, a revealing sign was the decision to keep the less than smooth conduct of the war out of the limelight. It suggests that the ministers making the decision were aware that they were potentially risking much if the public mood turned against them. Similarly telling is the behavior of the Cabinet when it was asked to authorize the banning of the MCP. It took the evidence presented orally at face value, but to cover itself, requested the Colonial Secretary to lay further the evidence against the MCP before the Cabinet. Attlee employed similar methods in 1950 when the Cabinet gave up the hope of solving the Malaya situation under civilian leadership. Attlee authorized the sending of General Briggs to oversee military developments, but given the doubts of the Minister of Defence he made the decision conditional on the support of the Colonial and Foreign Secretaries (their support was granted).

6.1.3.3 Unfulfilled Opportunity for the Emergence of a Credible Challenger

Had it not been for the lack of a credible challenger and low intensity, the war in Malaya could have been turned into a job threatening issue for the Prime Minister by echoing earlier doubts about his ability to lead firmly. Two points support this. First, even if the Cabinet may not have been the most important player in the decision to fight, it took ample interest in the development of the war and was consulted at major decisions after the war was started. It also

\footnote{PRO CAB 21/2626, March 9, “Ref.:COS. 294/9/3/50: Malaya.”}

\footnote{PRO CAB 21/2626, March 10, “Draft telegrams from Ministry of Defense to G.H.Q. Far East Land Forces,” and PRO DO (50) 14, March 9, 1950.}

\footnote{PRO CAB 128/13 52 (48) July 19, 1948, Item 5. It is worth noting that while there was some uncertainty among the civil servants of the Colonial Office whether ministers were not entirely convinced of the responsibility of the MCP or whether they only wished to cover themselves, a draft cabinet paper was prepared. However, it was not shared with the cabinet. See PRO CO 537/4246, August, 12, 1948, “JBW to Mr Seel.”}

\footnote{PRO PREM 8/1126, March 27, 1950, “Emanuel Shinwell to the Prime Minister” and PRO CAB21/2626, March 8, 1950, “J.L. Pumphrey to Richard F. Wood.”}
requested regular reports and approved or deferred decisions. Ministers were also ready to draw unpleasant conclusions and confront each other over the issue. For instance, the Minister of Defence did not fail to point out that Creech-Jones’ report on the situation in Malaya, which was complied at the Cabinet’s request in March 1949, showed an apparent deterioration in the situation. Creech-Jones could only defend his position by a letter from High Commissioner Gurney to the effect that the war was not going as badly as it might have been feared.

Second, from the Cabinet’s deliberations it becomes clear that the war was far from being a glorious affair. It was Secretary of State for War Emanuel Shinwell, who was most critical. On the one hand, as Secretary of State for War – a non-cabinet position – this could be seen as part of his job. On the other hand, the troubles in Malaya gave the opportunity to Shinwell to continue his vocal post-convertibility crisis criticism of the Prime Minister. In a letter to Attlee, Shinwell asserted that facts do not collude with the optimistic atmosphere about improvements in Malaya and doubted if Britain was “making a firm hold” on the situation. Therefore, he requested a meeting with the Prime Minister, the Colonial Secretary and the Minister of Defense. The facts that Attlee granted the meeting the same day and that it took place in the absence of any other officials or civil servants are telling about the sensitive nature of Shinwell’s criticism. Shinwell did not fail to point out his dissatisfaction with developments a year later, either. This time, he requested the establishment of a Malaya Committee to oversee the situation, which he called “grave.” His appeal was supported by the Colonial Secretary and approved by Attlee.

---

548 For evidence, see e.g. PRO CAB 128, (49) 18, March 8.
549 For evidence see e.g. PRO CAB 128/17 C.M. (24) 50, April 24, 1950.
550 PRO CAB 128, (49) 18, March 8 and PRO CAB 129/33 C.P. (49) 50, March 5, 1949.
551 Morgan 1984, 334.
552 PRO PREM 1406, part 1, March 24, 1949, “The Secretary of War to the Prime Minister.”
553 PRO PREM 1406, part 1, March 24, 1949, “The Prime Minister to Emanuel Shinwell” and April 2, 1949, “Meeting of Ministers on Malaya.”
554 PRO PREM 8/1126, March 27, 1950, “Emanuel Shinwell to the Prime Minister,” and April 22, 1950, “Cabinet: Malaya Committee: Revised terms of reference. Note by the Joint Secretary.”
It was at this point, when the war was clearly recognized as not going too well, that a credible challenger could have emerged and confronted the Prime Minister with a reasonable chance of winning. However, as a result of the earlier challenge to the Prime Minister’s power, by 1948-49 no credible challenger remained. In 1947, in the wake of the convertibility crisis Cripps, Morrison and Dalton had already challenged Attlee. Although Morrison hoped that he could succeed Attlee, both his and Dalton’s popularity was badly marred by the convertibility crisis. Therefore, Cripps finally suggested to Attlee that he abdicate in favor of Foreign Secretary Bevin.

Cripp’s efforts failed, however, because Bevin refused to jump at the opportunity to win the premiership for himself. When the idea of challenging Attlee was put to him, he simply refused to engage in an act of disloyalty. Subsequently, Cripps lost much of his strength when he accepted Attlee’s offer of control over the economic policy of the government. This meant that although Cripps did not give up criticizing Attlee (for instance he claimed publicly in September 1948 that Attlee’s continuing leadership could only result in a general election disaster in 1950), he had no power to remove the Prime Minister even though Attlee’s power weakened substantially. The Prime Minister continued to depend on Bevin’s support. In exchange for this, Attlee gave Bevin free hand in the conduct of foreign affairs and supported him on such issues as the defense budget against other cabinet members even if it meant that Attlee had to make a U-turn compared to his earlier preferences. All in all, there was no one left to call out the Prime Minister by the time the war in Malaya was going badly.

557 Morgan 1984, 357; Jeffreys 1992, 31, 32; Pearce 1997, 130
558 Jeffreys 1992, 34.
6.1.4 Conclusion

The story of Malaya is consistent with the expectations. The domestic political situation in light of a large parliamentary majority and the absence of a credible challenger kept Attlee’s job secure enough despite other negative domestic conditions. As expected in such domestically non-threatening situations, the causes of risk-taking were overwhelmingly due to the appreciation of the situation according to the necessities of the bi-polar world systems, i.e. a fight against Communist expansion. Domestic political repercussions were mentioned sparingly and they did not influence policy choice. This and such other reasons as the protection of the country’s own nationals are identical with causes cited by American decision-makers. Containment of Communist expansion was the main argument in all the American conflicts examined, and the Reagan and Johnson Administrations were just as likely to worry about the safety of its own citizens as Britain.

Several factors also pointed toward the fact that British decision-makers were keenly aware of their uncertain job situation. To cover themselves, the Cabinet requested further proof of facts presented to it about the role of the MCP in the atrocities and Attlee made the potentially sensitive move of openly militarizing the conflict only after he had gotten the backing of the foreign and colonial Secretaries. In addition, one of Attlee’s chief critic, Emanuel Shinwell, received impressively speedy reply from the Prime Minister when he cared to express his concern over the war that was clearly not going too well. This could have given the opportunity for a credible challenger to emerge. However, the only Cabinet member who still had the strength and popularity to be such a challenger, Bevin, refused to shoulder the task.

Finally, decisions concerning Malaya have also demonstrated that actors not only face a great deal of insecurity regarding their jobs, but that they can also actively contribute to
lessening that insecurity by closely following the situation, covering their bases, and acting to minimize the publicity of a potentially dangerous event.

6.2 Kenya

6.2.1 A Short History of British Presence and the Emergency in Kenya

The Kenya colony, whose territory was four times as large as that of Malaya, was created by decree in 1920 out of the larger area of the East Africa Protectorate, which was established after the arrival of the British to the region in the late 1880s. Kenya was brought into existence to help collect levies so that the London government could collect some of the money it had spent on building the Uganda railway that ran through Kenya. To this end, European settlers had already been encouraged to move in from the early 1900s on and occupied the most fertile lands in the country. 559

The arrival of the European settlers hit the Kikuyu of the African tribes the hardest: the Uganda railway cut their land into two and settlers took their best lands. The land issue was especially serious as the Kikuyu society was based on the land ownership and it controlled overpopulation by moving away and bringing still uncultivated land under cultivation. They were soon circled by the settlers, government forest reserves and urbanization (i.e. Nairobi) on all sides, making settling elsewhere impossible.

Nevertheless, they were skilled cultivators of the land and, despite hardships, could compete with European farmers, bringing prices down. Consequently, the Kikuyu were banned to sell their crop but was welcome on the farms as workers (squatters) and even small pieces of land were given to them to cultivate for their own benefit. In the 1930s there were 150,000 squatters who had given up their claim to land in the Kikuyu reserves. Soon giving up their

lands reflected on their regal status as they were declared landless wage laborers at the insistence of the white settlers.\footnote{Anderson 2005, 4-5, 23; Elkins 2005, 10-17.}

World War II brought a temporary change in the situation since British troops in the Middle East and North Africa needed agricultural supplies. Consequently, the ban on the Kikuyu to produce for the market was lifted. However, the economic boom that benefited both the white and native population soon made the Kikuyu squatters worse off than before the war, as settlers replaced about 100,000 squatters by machinery. These squatters returned to the already overpopulated reserves with exhausted lands or moved on to be landless urban workers in Nairobi. The few who were still employed had to make do with lower wages.\footnote{Anderson 2005, 24-26; Elkins 2005, 18, 22-24; Kyle, Keith. 1999. The Politics of Independence of Kenya. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 36.}

At the same time, the black population did not miss the political irony of the war: they fought for freedom, but returned to subjugation after the war. Although there were 5 million Africans (out of which the Kikuyu numbered about a million), 97,000 Asians, and 29,000 Europeans in Kenya by the late 1940s-early 1950s, the Legislative Council was under the control of the colonial administration (15 votes) and the settlers (11 votes). All other races on the Council were given 11 votes, including 4 representatives of the Africans.\footnote{Anderson 2005, 5; Elkins 2005, 20, 24-26.} However, they were not elected but nominated by the administration and, thus, they came from the loyalist lot of the native inhabitants.

To advance the causes of the Kikuyu the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) was formed in the 1920s. Under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta it called attention to their plight and lack of rights. During World War II the KCA was forced underground (it was banned in 1940) but resurfaced as the Kenya African Union (KAU) with Kenyatta still being the leader of the movement.\footnote{Anderson 2005, 24; Elkins 2005, 20, 24, 28.} However, it was not the moderate reformers of the KAU that found the way to mobilize the Kikuyu but the more militant members of the community, who used the
old custom of oathing for the purpose. Although the movement that was referred to as Mau Mau was banned in August 1950, it continued to have immense grass root support and did not cease targeting the black and white representatives of colonial rule.\footnote{Anderson 2005, 37-42, 44; Elkins 2005, 25-6; Carver 28.}

Sir Evelyn Baring, the new governor who arrived in early October 1952, found the colony to be a far cry from the peaceful place the outgoing Governor had described it. The murder of the loyal Kikuyu chief, Waruhiu, prompted the white settlers to demand action. Seeing the magnitude of the problem, Baring requested and received authorization to declare a state of emergency and introduce one British battalion to the colony in addition to the four battalions of the King’s African Rifles (KAR) already stationed in the Kenya colony. The state of emergency went into force on October 20, 1952. Jomo Kenyatta and 132 other KAU leaders were detained the same day. However, contrary to the expectations of the colonial government, Mau Mau violence escalated further.\footnote{Anderson 2005, 51-9, 62-67, 69; Elkins 2005, 29-36; Carver 1990, 28, 31-2. Carver (1990, 28-29) also presents Kenyatta as belonging to the more radical Kikuyu.}

General Erskine was sent from London to take control of the situation. He meticulously cleaned the country of Mau Mau supporters: first the reserves, then Nairobi, finally the forests. When Erskine left Kenya in April 1955, most of the job was done: he reduced the 12,000 terrorists to 5,000 and, while the campaign continued, British forces started to be withdrawn in September 1955.\footnote{Anderson 2005, 69, 178-179, 262-8, 284-286; Elkins 2005, 51-54; Carver 1990, 33-35, 37, 39, 40-42.}

At the same time punitive measures were put into force against the Kikuyu community. Between July 1954 and October 1955, more than a million of them were uprooted and resettled within the framework of the villagization campaign, which – unlike similar attempts in Malaya – only applied sticks but no carrots.\footnote{Anderson 2005, 294.} Furthermore, detention camps were opened to rehabilitate Mau Mau supporters. By 1959 more than 70,000 Kikuyu were subjected to “rehabilitation” in the camps, which were characterized by bad sanitary conditions, brutalities
and forced labor. It was only in 1959 that the camps became a liability for Macmillan’s conservative government after ten detainees were beaten to death.

Besides these measures, the fight also continued in the political arena. Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton announced constitutional changes on March 14, 1954 in order to give more space to Africans and Asians in politics and start progress toward a multi-racial society. The Lyttelton Constitution formally established the already existing Council of Ministers and introduced multiracial membership: three elected European, two Asian and one African ministers. Moving toward the popular election of the African members of the Legislative Council, political parties were legalized (except in the Mau Mau heartland of the Central Province) in June 1955 and the franchise extended so as to double the number of eligible voters. The first eight African Legislative Council members were elected in March 1957 – three years before the emergency was lifted in 1960.

The Lancaster House talks of 1960 resulted in the acceptance of universal suffrage and black majority rule. Elections were scheduled for February 1961. Although the British originally supported the KADU (Kenya African Democratic Union) as opposed to KANU (Kenya African National Union), the KANU victory at the first colony-wide elections achieved Britain’s aim to transfer power to conservative nationalists. To do so, however, London had to bow before the wishes of KANU and in August 1961 Jomo Kenyatta was freed, who then joined KANU as its leader and became the first president after Kenya became independent on December 11, 1963. All in all the emergency cost the British government £55-60 million, and resulted in the death of 10,527 Mau Mau activists, 1826 loyalist African civilians, thirty-two Europeans and 600 police and military personnel.

---

570 Anderson 2005, 278.
6.2.2 The Domestic Political Situation

The Conflict in Kenya is a T2 conflict where four of the five conditions – small majority, strong factions, low popularity and divided cabinet – leading to a separation of purpose were present. Emergency in Kenya was declared and the war started under Winston Churchill’s Conservative government. Winston Churchill formed his second and only peacetime administration on October 26, 1951 after winning the general elections the previous day. This victory, however, was with one of the smallest margins. As far as the popular vote went, the Labour Party had a 229,000 vote edge over the Conservatives. Nonetheless, when it came to Parliamentary seats, the Conservatives won 321 seats as opposes to the 295 Labour seats. Taking Liberals and others into account, Churchill’s government had a small majority of seventeen.\textsuperscript{573} Such a majority was certainly manageable, but too small to ignore Conservative backbenchers. In other words, if unpopular, Churchill did not only have to watch out for his colleagues in the Cabinet, but also had to ascertain that backbenchers were not so dissatisfied as to incite rebellion. By May 1952, backbenchers seemed less than happy. According to Macmillan, they disliked that there were too many peers in the Cabinet, ministers did not talk to them, government popularity was bad and was still on the decline.\textsuperscript{574}

Churchill did have reasons to be worried about both the Cabinet and his party, since the popularity of the party was quickly on the wane as a result of economic problems. There was a huge budget deficit, an alarmingly high balance of trade deficit, and, consequently, a rapid loss of reserves. To foster a recovery, Chancellor of the Exchequer Rab Butler raised the bank rate twice: in December 1950 from 2 to 2.5 percents and in March 1951, from 2.5 to 4 percents; and cut food subsidies by 160 million.\textsuperscript{575} Butler’s measures, however, cost the

government heavily in the polls: the Tories “did disastrously in the local government elections in May 1952.” At least, the economy started to correct itself with speed (although not necessarily as a result of Butler’s measures): the loss of reserves stopped by the end of 1952 and the balance of trade deficit dried up.

Public opinion was quick to plummet but slower to catch up with positive changes in the economic situation. The six percent Conservative lead in the polls in October 1951 turned into a ten percent Labour advantage by July 1952 and even in October the Tories lagged seven percent behind Labour. The lack of popularity did not go unnoticed in government circles. In May 1952, Colville – Churchill’s private secretary – recorded the fall in popularity, which he saw as a result of bad publicity, rising prices, and the policy of denationalization. Moreover, Churchill was personally blamed for these in the party, in the Commons, and around the country. In general there existed a gloom about the government’s prospects and Butler’s financial policy that was severely criticized by The Financial Times.

Not only were the Tories unpopular, the Cabinet could not help but notice Churchill’s deteriorating health, which was increasingly difficult to hide from the public. He was seventy-seven years old when he became Prime Minister in 1951 and had already suffered two strokes (and would suffer two more during his premiership) and was infirm of movement and short of hearing. Although it would be a fallacy to overestimate his incapacities, his age caused enough concern to his subordinates to complain that he was too old and out of touch with the post-war world, rambled on in cabinet meetings for hours without coming to the point, was not reading his boxes regularly and briefs of five pages had to be summarized in a paragraph

---

576 Jenkins 2001, 850.
578 “Gallup Polls [Britain]” 2004. For comparison, the mean government lead between 1945 and 2000 was -3.2.
for him. His memory was also increasingly failing him. Moreover, in February 1952 he suffered a small arterial spasm that gave further concerns about his health.

Churchill had a curious relationship with his Cabinet. On the one hand, he was reluctant to make solo decisions on his own and, if he could help it, he bound at least the relevant minister into the decision. On some occasions, however, he upset his ministers by ignoring them entirely. This, for example, resulted in an instance of outrage by ministers in July 1954 when Churchill called for a three-power summit to end the cold war without informing the Cabinet or getting the approval of his Foreign Secretary prior to the move. This led to a serious row in the Cabinet with several ministers threatening to resign. Similarly, the quiet disapproval of the Cabinet made it clear by 1953 that using the wartime overlord system will not work in peacetime: ministers insisted on dealing directly with the Prime Minister.

Moreover, the heir apparent named by Churchill a decade earlier, Anthony Eden, was impatient to take over Churchill’s place. Initially it was understood that Churchill would stay in office only for a year or at most two. Yet, Churchill had no intention to go regardless of a Gallup poll taken during the October 1951 election campaign that Conservatives clearly favored Eden over him as leader. Nor did he give in to the cajoling of the generally loyal Eden. Instead, he put tremendous effort into his public and parliamentary performances to demonstrate that he was still fit for office.

582 Gilbert 1990, 717; Colville 1985, 654.
583 Gilbert 1990, 702; Colville 1985, 642.
584 Hennessy 2000, 195-196.
585 Hennessy 2000, 203.
589 Jenkins 2001, 842.
This, of course, did not prevent Churchill’s ministers from trying to remove him from office. They had a formidable task before them: it was difficult to remove from office the man who was widely respected for leading Britain to victory in World War II. Accordingly, the means employed were similarly feeble: it essentially meant lobbying Churchill individually and jointly to go rather than engineering his removal from behind. Apart from one-to-one cajoling, there were at least two joint ministerial attempts to ask him to resign. For example, following Churchill’s minor stroke in February 1952, Lord Salisbury (the commonwealth secretary), Lord Moran (Churchill’s doctor), and Jock Colville (the Prime Minister’s private secretary) agreed that Churchill should remain Prime Minister but go to the House of Lords, which would ease the workload for him and make Eden de facto Prime Minister. Lord Moran put the idea to Churchill twice – both in February and March – it failed on Churchill’s unwillingness to go to the House of Lords.  

Another joint attempt was made on June 16, 1952 when Harry Crookshank (Leader of the House and Lord Privy Seal), Lord Salisbury, James Stuart (Scottish Secretary), and Patrick Buchan-Hepburn (Chief Whip) sought a change in leadership and decided to ask Churchill to go or set a date for resignation. Although their conspiracy was picked up by all the major papers, which took note of rumors that Churchill was about to resign, when Buchan-Hepburn put the ultimatum to Churchill, he refused to agree to his ministers’ suggestions.

All in all, Churchill’s tactics of delay could work as long as his ministers were not impatient at the same time, that is, he did not outrage his ministers by policy failure. This was also true, because while the Cabinet wished Churchill to go, enthusiasm in the Cabinet

---

592 Gilbert 1990, 703-704, 711-712; Colville 1985, 642.
593 Gilbert 1990, 736.
for Eden was less widespread than in the party or the public.\footnote{Jenkins 2001, 846, Thorpe, D. R. 2004. *Eden. The Life and Times of Anthony Eden, First Earl of Avon, 1897-1977*. London: Pimlico, 433. On Eden’s position in the party, see also page 202 below. Cf. Macmillan 2003, 180 (August 13-15, 1952) that suggests that Eden was popular with the public.} Moreover, as long as Eden saw his future hinging on Churchill’s will and not on the Cabinet, the Prime Minister could also be safe, as a failed leadership struggle would have removed Eden from his sure front-runner positions for the premiership. Eden appears to have been aware of this, as his policies were cautious so as not to upset the Prime Minister or possible rivals and guarded his privileged position with jealousy. He did clash in views with Churchill, especially when Churchill interfered into foreign office business but did not plan plots to remove him.\footnote{On clashes, see for example Macmillan 2003, 122 (December 7, 1951); Colville 1985 635.} Consequently, in the absence of a credible challenger, attacks on the Prime Minister are expected to surface through the parliamentary party.

6.2.3 The Decision to Fight in Kenya

6.2.3.1 Reasons to Fight

The coming to power of the Tories meant only moderate changes in foreign policy. The stress was still on Anglo-American relations and the Empire also was high on the government’s agenda. Naturally, the Conservative Party was more pro-Empire than Labour and while it did not wish to reverse decolonization, it certainly slowed it down. Not only the pro-Empire Churchill, but the more progressive members of the Cabinet – among them Eden and Churchill’s second Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd – believed that decades or one more generation were necessary until colonial subjects would manage their affairs. For example, only three territories – the Gold Cost, Nigeria and the Central African Federation – were projected to achieve independence as early as the next two decades.\footnote{Elkins 2005, 139; Hennessy 2000, 203; Colville 1985, 652; Kyle 1999, 54; Louis, Wm Roger. 1999. “The Dissolution of the British Empire.” In Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis, eds. *The Oxford History of the British Empire. The Twentieth Century*. Vol. 4. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 339.} However, the Conservatives also had to face economic realities, war in Malaya, rearmament as a result of
the Korean War and the cost of nuclear weapons that Attlee had decided to acquire, which had sobering effects. This limited the government’s options, making Eden and the more progressive cabinet members’ position prevail in colonial matters on many issues.598

Reaction to troubles in Kenya started according to this choreography. However, Churchill’s pro-Empire views explain his behavior only partially. Sensitivity to the domestic political standing of the government appears to account for the rest. To begin with, London first got wind of the deteriorating situation in Kenya from Acting Governor Henry Potter on August 17, 1952. The reaction of the Colonial Office was supportive but action was limited to introducing legal restrictions. The idea of sending the new Governor, Evelyn Baring out, was considered, but Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton finally rejected the idea.599 Not a month passed and Churchill himself suggested sending Baring earlier. From his letter to Lyttelton, it is obvious that he was primarily motivated by negative press coverage of Baring staying in London too long when “alarming tales” were arriving from Kenya. In his reply Lyttelton unequivocally put it to the Prime Minister that he was not making policy on the basis of Daily Mail criticism. Moreover, he did not find the situation too alarming, so Baring was not sent.600

Churchill’s letter is also telling in another respect. His chief source of information appeared to be the press rather than his own government. His letter suggests that he was not included in much in the discussion over action in Kenya. The letter of the Cabinet Secretary, Norman Brook on September 26 allow for a similar conclusion. Brook requested information on repressive laws introduced in Kenya for the Prime Minister. It is clear that the subject was mentioned on the September 11 cabinet meeting, which Churchill did not attend.601 Neither was it the cabinet minutes that prompted Churchill’s reactions but the leading article of the

*Daily Express.* However, his lack of knowledge of this situation as a result of his absence is a lame explanation. It took him two weeks to enquire about the details of the cabinet meeting he missed, which may well indicate his general lack of participation in a great number of political decisions. His illness, old age and reluctance to read his boxes and keep track of events fostered his exclusion, which served the Cabinet right: it had a Prime Minister whose wartime reputation made it impossible to get rid of him, but it could operate quite independently of him so his premiership made little impact on certain policies.

Such an interpretation is supported by Macmillan’s notes. Churchill appeared to miss cabinets after his return from the US, i.e. most of January. The Cabinet appeared to be efficient in Churchill’s absence. However, when he was present, he appeared to ramble on too long, which kept postponing decisions. When he was there he did not seem to have a general grip on the situation and failed to understand some issues. As a result, the Cabinet seemed to loose grip on events.

The public nature of the crisis may be one reason for excessive attention to press coverage. Newspapers of all shades – both Labour and Conservative – got wind of the disturbances in Kenya at about the same time as the government did in London. Newspapers were writing about rising violence, anti-white conspiracy of secret societies, white settlers’ resolve to fight Mau Mau, the condemnation of atrocities by the religious missions in Kenya and a curfew introduced as a result of violence. Openly or not, all of them hinted at the necessity of strong government action. Such news started to appear in the *Sunday Dispatch* on August 22 and was carried in the following two weeks by the *Daily Telegraph*, *News Chronicle*, *The Times*, *The Daily Mail*, *The Daily Express*, the *Evening News*, and the

---

604 For the articles see, PRO CO 822/436.
Manchester Guardian\textsuperscript{605} Although officials in London tried to counter criticism by publishing their facts and counter-arguments, they quickly understood that they had very limited means to change the prevailing mood in the press. As one Colonial Office official wrote on September 12, “We must resign ourselves, I am afraid to the fact that there is little or nothing we can do to prevent the situation […] in Kenya being depicted in a sensational manner.” \textsuperscript{606}

As expected, the place of real trouble for the government was the House of Commons. It was receiving parliamentary questions over Kenya already in October 1952 and the flow of questions did not cease. As a Colonial Office note reveals, the government was flooded with questions over Kenya by March 3, 1953: “There were 20 [questions] for Kenya alone for Wednesday and Thursday.” \textsuperscript{607}

Nonetheless, it was not the members of the radical backbenchers of the governing party but the opposition that criticized the government. Unlike the press, Labour criticized the government for too harsh a reaction at the end of September 1952. Neither was criticism as benign as the opposition criticism in the course of the Malaya conflict. Fenner Broackway, a Labour MP, voiced his views in a letter to the Foreign Office, saying that the government overreacted to the situation, the importance of the Mau Mau was exaggerated, thus, nothing could explain the Kenya legislature’s drastic measures to deny essential human rights (such as freedoms of speech, press, and assembly). \textsuperscript{608} In late November 1952, the government was criticized for curtailing political activity in Kenya and for not using moderate Africans for political solutions. \textsuperscript{609} In November 30, 1953, Leader of the Opposition Clement Attlee asked the Prime Minister about a rather embarrassing issue, that is, the fact that Captain Griffiths of

\textsuperscript{605} The Daily Mail article Churchill referred to is available at PRO PREM 11/472, September 6, 1952, “Colony Calls for A Strong Man.”
\textsuperscript{606} PRO CO 822/436, September 12, 1952, “G. H. Hall to C.H. Hartwell.”
\textsuperscript{607} PRO CO 822/450, March 3, 1953, “Rogers to MacKintosh.”
\textsuperscript{608} PRO CO 822/437, September 19, 1952, “Fenner Brockway to O.L.”
\textsuperscript{609} PRO CO 822/450, “Note, November 28, 1952.”
the KAR was court marshaled because of beating up and murdering inhabitants. Two days later, Fenner Brockway asked Churchill if he knew that there was a competition between military units in Kenya fuelled by the fact that they were paid head-quotas after the number of Mau Mau terrorists killed. Just four month into the crisis, Fenner Brockway accused the government of racism over the designated membership of the Royal Commission on land tenure that was designed as a positive step toward doing away with the causes of Mau Mau.

In the light of such detailed press coverage and heavy criticism from the opposition, it is not surprising that the event enjoyed much more cabinet attention than Malaya ever did. In the first three years of the emergency, Kenya was on the agenda of the Cabinet twenty-seven times (nine times each year) and was the subject of five cabinet papers. While the Cabinet was mostly used for rubber stamping decisions, it was much more a forum of real discussion than in Malaya. Not only did the Cabinet make the major decision of declaring the emergency, the banning of KAU and sending additional troops that Baring requested on October 10, but it had also been the forum where the idea of sending troops had been suggested probably not knowing that it had already been considered and quickly discarded by the Colonial Office in early September. It was the Cabinet that authorized the sending of a commander familiar with guerilla tactics and further reinforcements.

Only once did the Cabinet drag its feet: in August 1953 it refused to make a decision on sending three additional battalions at the oral request of the Colonial Secretary. It requested a review of the situations before a decision. When it was done, the Cabinet agreed to send two battalions and, finally, consenting to sending a third if the Prime Minister sees it necessary.

---

610 PRO CAB 21/2906, November 30, 1953, “Private Notice by Mr. Attlee.”
611 PRO CAB 21/2906, December 1, 1952, “Parliamentary Question by Fenner-Brockway to Prime Minister.”
612 PRO CAB 21/2906, Excerpt from Hansard, February 25, 1953, 2080.
614 PRO CAB 128/25, 81 (52), September 26, 1952, Item 1 and PRO CO 822/437, September 10, 1952, “T. Lloyd to [Unknown official].”
615 See for example PRO CAB 128/26, 18 (53), March 10; CAB 128/26, 33 (53), May 21, 1953.
This suggests that the Cabinet itself was a great deal less enthusiastic about providing reinforcements than the Prime Minister or the Colonial Secretary, but its bargaining powers were also limited.

There was only one decision that the Prime Minister and the ministers concerned did not take into the Cabinet. This was the most important decision from the point of view of the success of the military campaign, namely unifying the command of the armed forces under General Erskine. The idea for such a move appeared after another request for troops had already been approved by the Cabinet. As neither Lyttelton nor the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) nor the Secretary of State for War (Anthony Head) were particularly satisfied with the developments in Kenya, they proposed sending General Erskine to Kenya as commander-in-chief East Africa. This discussion entirely ignored the Cabinet and it was the Prime Minister who approved the decision.

Although pressure in the press might have predisposed the government toward war, Britain’s reason to send troops to Kenya was primarily strategic. It wished to make sure that when Britain would leave Kenya for good, Kenya would be left in pro-British hands. In other words, Britain’s main concern was to ensure its strategic interest in the region when its formal colonial rule would end. Baring’s reason for requesting further troops and the authorization of the declaration of the emergency are in line with ensuring British control of the region. He feared that without such measures the trouble would spread further and the outburst of a civil war was not unlikely either.

Throughout the emergency, just as in Malaya, an important problem was troop availability without compromising other commitments. On September 29, 1952, it was made clear that troops could only be diverted from Egypt at the expense of other duties. The KAR troops were judged adequate and it was stressed that the problem was a police problem rather than a military one.


than a military one.\footnote{PRO COS (52) 138, September 29, 1952, “Dispatch of British Troops to Kenya,” PRO CO 822 437, October 1, 1952 “Minister of Defense to Colonial Secretary,” and October 8, 1952, “Oliver Lyttelton to Minister of Defense.”} It took the government six months to realize the scale of the problem and acknowledge in the Commons that the situation in Kenya was indeed war terrain.\footnote{PRO PREM 11/472, Excerpt from Hansard, March 31, 1953. 1036-1064.} Such realization was, in part, hindered by the fact that colonial officials in Kenya were keenly aware of the cost of further troops requests. This prompted them to make modest requests, not therefore conveying the seriousness of the problem in clear terms. Consequently, the chief of staff had to make it clear that requests should be made on the basis of need “without feeling restricted by any question of costs.”\footnote{PRO CAB 129, C.P. (53) 92, March 7, 1953.}

What, however, did not figure in the decision was the worldwide struggle against Communism. Neither the Cabinet nor the Colonial Office saw any connection until the idea surfaced in November 1953 when the Foreign Secretary inquired into the matter. However, the only evidence that could be unearthed was Kenyatta’s ten-month long visit to Moscow in 1932-1933 when he shortly studied at the Lenin Institute. In the end the Colonial Office unequivocally rejected the existence of any Communist connections.\footnote{PRO CO 822/461 especially [no date] “Is Mau Mau Communist Inspired?” and October 17, 1952 “Situation in Kenya: Possibility of Communist connexion in the Mau Mau.”}

White settler influence is less obvious than the number of settlers or general scholarly views on British colonial policy\footnote{Louis 1999, 352; Elkins 2005, 47, 59. Newspaper articles in PRO PREM 11/472 suggest the same.} – i.e. strong action in favor of the settlers where there were large settler communities – might predict. Settlers had a prominent role in calling attention to atrocities in the crisis. They did not only lobby the Governor and the Colonial Office, but were, in a large part, responsible for media attention to developments in Kenya.\footnote{Elkins 2005, 42. See also PRO CO 822/436, September 12, 1952, “G. H. Hall to C.H. Hartwell.”} They pressed the Colonial Office for the emergency and measures against the native population\footnote{See for example CO 822/437, [no date], “John Whyatt to Rogers.”} This, and especially media attention, made it impossible for the government in London to ignore the issue. However, HMG was less than enthusiastic in the settlers having their way.
They advised the Colonial Secretary against sending Baring earlier, because it would only strengthen the hands of the white settlers. In November, the Colonial Office was dismayed that Baring had not taken a “stiffer line against Europeans.”

The pattern would be upheld throughout the emergency. Civilian military command was unified in May 1953 and strict security measures were introduced a month later despite the opposition of the white settlers. In a similar vein, constitutional changes, election of black Council members in 1954, black majority rule and an open franchise in 1960 were all carried through in the face of settler protest. Finally, from the earliest moments on, the government also made efforts to tackle the discrimination of the native population rather than uphold settler supremacy.

6.2.3.2 Unfulfilled Opportunities for Cabinet and Backbench Revolt

Kenya cast a threatening shadow over the Prime Minister and the government throughout, that is, backbench revolt or open cabinet dissatisfaction could have easily arisen. In particular, there were two points in the history of the Kenya campaign that could have resulted in problems for the government or the Prime Minister: the Lari massacre in 1953 and the Hola massacres in 1959.

6.2.3.2.1 The Lari Massacre

As for the former, on March 26 1953, Mau Mau terrorists captured a large amount of weapons and, diverting the loyal Kikuyu Home Guard, burnt down 40-50 huts and massacred 97 loyalist Kikuyu near Lari. This brought the perilous nature of the war in Kenya home to Britain, making it clear that things were not going too well for Britain in Kenya. The Lari

---

625 PRO CO 822/544, August 30, 1952, “Lloyd to Corell-Barnes.”
626 PRO CO 822/443, November 12, 1952, “Lloyd to Colonial Secretary.”
629 See documents in PRO CO 822/544.
massacre led to an overheated debate in the House, which was nothing but a very public bantering of the government by the opposition. The government was accused of failure. It was said to have committed every mistake that could further alienate the people in a colony where there was already a popular uprising. Collective punishment, inciting fear, ignoring poverty, indifference to the plight of the Africans, letting Mau Mau demonstrate its capabilities, and corrupt legal proceedings were not to win the hearts and minds of the people. The Lari massacre was called “the most shocking in the history of the Commonwealth and the Empire.”

Responsibility was seen to be shared between the white settler community, the Kenya administration and the Conservative government in London, concluding that “the government have failed and they should be removed.” All in all, by mid-1953, with “a slim majority in parliament,” “the embarrassment of the Kenya campaign posed an increasing political threat” to the government.

Suggestions about the government’s mishandling of the problems in Kenya had surfaced in November and December but by the end of March 1953 events clearly supported accusations that things were not going well in Kenya. Even Lyttelton could do nothing but meekly agree that it was a new situation asking for new action and for the first time acknowledged that the situation had a semi-military character and “is more like a war than an emergency.”

To save face the government finally hastened to initiate changes. To be fair, the review of the situation had started earlier – in November 1952 when Lyttelton had already acknowledged in the Commons that the situation in Kenya had changed for the worse. As

630 PRO PREM 11/472, Excerpt from Hansard, March 31, 1107.
631 PRO PREM 11/472, Excerpt from Hansard, March 31, 1114.
632 Anderson 2005, 278.
634 PRO PREM 11/472, Excerpt from Hansard, March 31, 1953. 1036-64. The government still insisted on the police-action nature of the Kenya emergency as late as January 28, 1953. See Lord Swinton’s (Secretary of State for War) statement in the House of Lords, PRO CAB 21/2906, Excerpt from Hansard, January 28, 1953, 48.
635 PRO CO 822/450, November 24, 1952, “Sir Evelyn Baring to the Colonial Secretary.”
Baring had also reported in November 1952, the situation was “dark” and not improving much. He also warned London that the police operation was being replaced by “a small scale guerrilla war.” Baring also suggested that a soldier with experience in fighting guerilla warfare should be sent out to be director of operation. The government agreed to send General Hinde but changed nothing else. At the end of February 1953, the CIGS’s report on his visit to Kenya concluded that if the emergency was not finished quickly, the government was facing another possible Malaya. With quick action and further reinforcements the problem could be rooted out in a few months. To this effect he suggested to send military reinforcements again (two infantry brigades, one signal troop, one infantry headquarters, and a small number of aircrafts). He also found the creation of a small emergency council and the extension of the police and intelligence forces desirable. 636 To this, first the Defence Committee then the Cabinet gave its support. 637

Things, however, did not change for the better fast enough. When Lyttelton returned from his visit to the colony in May, he suggested that further reinforcements were necessary, telling the Cabinet that if a few more troops could be provided, order could be fully restored in a few months. Speed was judged important to prevent the development of further atrocities in Africa for which a potential was forecast. 638 The Cabinet dutifully agreed. 639 More battalions were sent after General Erskine’s request in August 1953. However, it took until October 1953 for the Cabinet to realize that the crisis will not be over in a few months but was “likely to be a long one.” 640

Nonetheless, the Lari massacre was not the only skeleton in the closet. Ongoing criticism pointing to cruelty by the armed forces or restricting political freedoms were

---

636 For the report by the CIGS, see Annex to PRO PREM 11/472, D (53) 12, February 27, 1953, “Defence Committee, Kenya, Report by the Chiefs of Staff.” See also PRO CAB 21/2906, March 5, 1953, “Alexander to Prime Minister.”

637 PRO PREM 11/472, D (53) 12, February 27, 1953, “Defence Committee, Kenya, Report by the Chiefs of Staff” and PRO CAB 128/26, 18 (53), March 10, 1953.


639 PRO CAB 128/26, 33 (53), May 21, 1953.

640 PRO PREM 11/472, October 9, 1953, “Oliver Lyttelton to Prime Minister.”
certainly bad publicity and drew public awareness to the issue.\footnote{Elkins 2005, 99.} One such issue – that of Captain Griffiths – surfaced at about the same time as the Lari massacre. It was apparently serious enough so that it made the agenda of the Cabinet. But unlike the massacre, this was handled by rebuffing criticism, stalling, and making some concessions. First, the Cabinet felt it necessary to deny the implication of the opposition that this was the tip of an iceberg (which it was) rather than an exceptional incident.\footnote{PRO CAB 128/26, 73 (53), November 30, 1953. The Griffiths case was also discussed at PRO CAB 128/26, 79 (53), December 15, 1953.} In addition, to avoid further bad press, the Cabinet decided not to publish the Griffiths records in a white paper as the opposition requested although it made copies available in the libraries of both Houses.\footnote{PRO CAB 128/26 77 (53), December 8, 1953.}

The Cabinet also decided on an enquiry into the matter, but made sure to do it in a way to cause as little trouble for the Cabinet as possible. While they believed an independent public enquiry would yield the most reliable results, they found it impolitic and chose the less risky internal army enquiry with the greatest secrecy instead. Although the review found no widespread misconduct, it brought light to a few other cases: six policemen were under proceedings for intimidating witnesses and perhaps murder, and two more cases of misconduct were already discovered in the armed forces. This was, however, quite a liability. General Erskine started court martial proceeding, and, Lyttelton warned the Cabinet, the officers to be tried behaved with nauseating brutality and consequently the proceedings would bring “unwelcome publicity.”\footnote{See PRO CAB 128/26 77 (53), December 8, 1953 and PRO CAB 128/27, 4 (54), January 21, 1954. Cf. Elkins 2005, 307 who argues that government documents suggest mass brutalities.}

The government handled the resignation of Colonel Young, whose letter of resignation clearly indicated that the Griffiths’ case was indeed the tip of the iceberg of atrocities, similarly. Young resigned his post as commissioner of the police in Kenya after less than a year in the position. In his letter of resignation he provided the Governor with an exhaustive

---

\footnote{Elkins 2005, 99.}
\footnote{PRO CAB 128/26, 73 (53), November 30, 1953. The Griffiths case was also discussed at PRO CAB 128/26, 79 (53), December 15, 1953.}
\footnote{PRO CAB 128/26 77 (53), December 8, 1953.}
report of the “many serious and revolting crimes” committed by the Europeans and the loyal Africans often with the tacit understanding of the colonial administrations. Young was convinced that had his report been published to Parliament, it would have reflected badly at least on the Governor and the Colonial Secretary if not on the whole government. However, Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd (Lyttelton’s successor) simply denied the publication of Colonel Young’s report when it was demanded in the House by Labour.  

Yet, the government made some minor concessions but on its own terms. Attlee’s suggestion to send a bipartisan parliamentary delegation to look into alleged atrocities in detention camps was ignored for a year. But with growing criticism the government gave way to the opposition’s wish. Nevertheless, the government was still in control: it could and did take care that the Labour members chosen were no experts on the issue. All in all, opposition criticism amounted to little, since backbencher’s support for the government did not waver.

6.2.3.2.2 The Hola Massacre

The Hola massacre threatened with rift within the ranks of the government in Parliament. It took the Labour Party about five years until it could successfully use publicity to incite differences among the Tories. By then it was the third consecutive Conservative government and the third successive Tory Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, in office and the political dynamic was much different from the Churchill days. While the Conservatives had a parliamentary majority of fifty-two, the rift especially over foreign policy issues – e.g. the existence of the Suez Group – made the size of this margin less comfortable than it appears. The party was more factionalized than under Churchill, and Macmillan had to handle
resignations from notable and influential cabinet members such as Lord Salisbury and Chancellor of the Exchequer Peter Thorneycroft.

Moreover, he won the premiership in 1957 to the surprise of many, since Rab Butler was expected to succeed Anthony Eden. It must have been a serious disappointment for the ambitious Butler who, nonetheless, remained an influential figure throughout Macmillan’s premiership, preserving his front-runner status in the party until 1963 when Macmillan’s successor was sought. Despite the fact that Butler had little love lost for Macmillan and had “every grievance against the man,” he “paradoxically was to remain credibly and, incredibly loyal to him.” Macmillan trusted the whole domestic front to Butler, who voluntary and without the hint of a coup substituted Macmillan in the Cabinet, sending the Prime Minister onto short vacations when depression would overcome Macmillan. Thus, despite the rivalry, Butler’s loyalty prevented the emergence of a credible challenger in troubled times.

The Prime Minister made the most out of a government that was thought in its first week in 1957 to last no longer than six weeks, rebuilding British foreign and domestic politics after the shambles following the Suez crisis. By the summer of 1959, the government managed to catch up with the opposition in the polls, being in parity with Labour after two years when government popularity fluctuated prominently but remained mostly in the negative compared to Labour figures. For six (non-consecutive) months between 1957 and 1959, the government lagged behind Labour by more than ten percentage point. By the end of 1958 the government, however, was in lead – even if marginally – except for minor slumps in February (-4 percentage point) and March (-2) 1959. All in all the difference between the parties were too close to call, so any blunders could cost the government the next general elections, which had to be contested sometime before May 1960.

---

650 Horne 1991, 2, 4-61, 70-75.
In March 3, 1959 ten detainees in the Hola detention camp in Kenya were beaten to death, and the news were quickly made into a political scandal. Ever since 1953/1954, a handful of Labour MPs – mostly Fenner Brockway and Barbara Caste – had been constantly calling attention to the detention camps, which in their description showed little difference from Soviet Gulags. They were instituted as rehabilitation camps for the Kikuyu, where with cabinet approval about 70,000 Kikuyu people were subjected to ‘resocialization.’ Not only were sanitary conditions bad, rehabilitation included detainees undertaking ‘useful employment.’ This was recommended and accepted by the Cabinet in 1954 even though it was made clear that forcing the detainees to work violated the Forced Labour Convention of 1930 and the Human Rights Convention of the Council of Europe. The Cabinet was, however, convinced that they could escape on a technical detail, announcing work in the detention camps as employment related to the emergency.\(^\text{652}\) Just like in the police, armed forces, or the Home Guards, violence in the detention camps were not rare, of which Castle and Fenner Brockway were arguing and collecting evidence for years.\(^\text{653}\)

Thus, even though the general public must have been aware by 1956 that the war in Kenya was a dirty one\(^\text{654}\) the government could successfully cover up such incidents until the Hola massacres. Unauthorized information collected by Castle in Africa in 1954 to show that the atrocities mentioned in the past were only a few of the many committed made its way into both Labour and Conservative newspapers – *The Manchester Guardian*, *Observer*, *Daily Mirror*, *Daily Worker*, *New Statesmen* and *The Nation*. In the Commons it was no longer a few junior Labour backbenchers, but also prominent Labour MPs such as Aneurin Bevan who joined in the debate. In addition, Labour had started movements outside Parliament, such as the Kenya Committee or the Movement for Colonial Freedom, to raise awareness of the atrocities. However, Lyttelton’s successor, Alan Lennox-Boyd could repudiate accusations by

\(^{652}\) PRO CAB 128/27, 9 (54), February 17, 1954; Elkins 2005, 131, 304.


\(^{654}\) Anderson 2005, 326.
calling the evidence fabrication. Nonetheless, Labour kept the pressure on. In early 1959, 200 Labour MPs signed a motion to urge the Colonial Secretary to institute an independent enquiry into the conditions and the administration of prisons and detention camps.

It was against this background that the news of the Hola massacres broke. The official explanation according to which the ten detainees died because of the sanitary conditions rather than as a result of having been beaten collapsed quickly. The Prime Minister fully realized that not only could this case validate past rumors about brutalities in detention camps but could also bring down the government or split the Cabinet. He wrote in his diary that the “government was in a real jam.” He also foresaw a serious split in the Cabinet. It was also clear that if blame was apportioned, it would be impossible to control how far up it would go on the ladder, as violence was tacitly approved at the highest level.

Macmillan devised the way out of the ‘jam’: he created an Africa Committee to construct a forum where ministers could voice concerns; blames would not be distributed and the resignation of Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, was not accepted just weeks before the elections; instead of the independent enquiry urged by the opposition, an internal review would be staged to offer guidelines for the future; and in the Commons the few cases of extraordinary cruelties could be acknowledged but strictly in the light of achievements against insurgents.

With such policies Macmillan risked much, as there was strong resistance to this course of action among his ministers. Although the attorney general called for censure, Macmillan could finally drag the reluctant ministers along. Moreover, the Hola massacre coincided with the Devlin report over Nyasaland that blamed the colonial government with instituting a

police state and handling the situation on the colony too harshly over which backbenchers clearly threatened to vote against the government (the threat was not carried through). \(^{662}\)

The debate in June 1959 went reasonably well for the government, the opposition demanding answers while Lennox-Boyd dodging the questions. The subsequent debate brought outrage closer to the Conservative benches. One time Conservative MP, Enoch Powell, who resigned the whip over a dispute concerning the budget six months earlier, pressed that the Tories should be cured of the British Empire and, as the Labour Party before, demanded the resignation of the Colonial Secretary. \(^{663}\) In another debate on July 27, 1959 “neither Labour nor Conservative MPs could find any reasons” to support the brutalities, and Castle and Powell condemned the government on the immorality of its actions. \(^{664}\)

All in all, to the luck of the government, Labour arranged the debate as an appendix to an appropriation bill, which meant that the issue could not be put to vote. Although the government had a majority of fifty-two, such a procedural mistake saved the government from what could easily have been a disaster, since, as Macmillan later conceded, there “might well have been a number of Conservatives voting against the government or abstaining.” \(^{665}\)

### 6.2.4 Conclusion

Even though Kenya was a T2 conflict, in the absence of a credible challenger, the parliament was expected to be the only source of threat for the government. This threat never turned into reality. Nonetheless, some – if not overwhelming – evidence suggest that Churchill’s uncertain job situation, the small Conservative majority coupled with scandalous press coverage as a result of white settler activity did push the government toward militarizing the situation in Kenya. It was this, but even more importantly, Britain’s fear to lose its influence

\(^{662}\) Lamb 1995, 238, 240-241.


\(^{664}\) Anderson 2005, 327.

in the region that served as an important impetus to start the war. Thus, strategic interest played the most influential role and not the worldwide struggle against Communism, which was unequivocally discarded as a possible cause of the trouble.

In the absence of a credible challenger or backbench revolt, the expectation that the opposition would not mean much danger for the Cabinet found support. No matter how loud the opposition may be, it never threatened the tenure of the government. It does not mean, of course, that opposition criticism had no influence at all. When the government sent troops, parliamentary criticism of overreaction appears to have helped to contribute to a half-hearted effort by the government (which was also fueled by fear of too costly troop requests), which in the long run did not work, making the government more vulnerable to opposition criticism later on. The opposition could also have some influence by keeping the issue of the emergency on the agenda of the Commons. In the end, they at least achieved as much that some Tory MPs came to doubt the policy of their government by the time the Hola massacres were discussed in the Commons.

Greater publicity also saw to it that the government did not always have the luxury of controlling the presentation of events in Kenya. It could exercise damage control by stalling and avoiding a public enquiry, but it could not prevent the crisis being reported in hyperbolic terms at the beginning when less press attention could have helped the government to maintain the options and, perhaps, avoid turning the conflict into a military one.

In the 1950s, Churchill was more a liability than a positive force in the Cabinet, his wartime reputation made it close to impossible to stage a cabinet coup against him and force him into retirement. However, this was perhaps not that necessary, as in many respects the authority of the Prime Minister could be avoided due to his absence from cabinet meetings and his weakened desire to follow events and keep the Cabinet under his firm grip.
Despite the problems with the development of the war, the government in office could escape both events that had the potential of ending its time in office. The Lari massacre did not have an impact as the Tories remained united in Parliament and a larger damage out of the Hola massacres was avoided by the Prime Minister’s apt maneuvering, the baffling loyalty of Rab Butler, and the technical mistake of the opposition. The latter event also points to the fact that consecutive governments of the same party carry on the political baggage of its predecessors, being held responsible for actions not only under its time in office but, in this case, also for brutalities committed earlier.
Chapter 7: A High Intensity Conflict and Decision-making in Parliamentary Democracies: The Suez Crisis

7.1 A Short History of the Suez Crisis

Egypt was a British colony from 1882. It gained independence in 1922, but the British preserved much of their influence in King Farouk’s Egypt. The country remained important for post-war British governments all of whom reaffirmed their interest in good relations with Egypt. Post-war British policy in Egypt was influenced by four policy imperatives: ensuring free passage through the Suez Canal, which was an important strategic waterway, continuing British support for Israel, maintaining good relations with the Arab world in order to ascertain the flow of oil, which was essential for the British economy, and, increasingly by the mid-1950s, containing growing Soviet influence in the region.

This would have been a formidable task for any world power at the zenith of its influence, but it was close to impossible for a receding colonial power like Britain for whom these objectives were incompatible with the country’s financial realities. Moreover, Britain also had to accommodate to a quickly changing political climate in Egypt. Although Egypt was anti-British and anti-imperialist, King Farouk proved to be a reasonable negotiating partner. However, he was ousted from power by army officers in 1952 and in 1954 Gamal Abdel Nasser became both prime minister and president of the country. While Nasser was viewed with distrust, in late 1953 and early 1954 the Foreign Office judged Nasser to be Britain’s best, if not ideal, option for long-term stability.

Despite difficulties, Britain could still succeed in several matters. In 1953 it was able to negotiate a favorable settlement over the Sudan after Egypt gave up its demands of

---

sovereignty in the Sudan. When the military base in the Canal Zone was judged too costly compared to its strategic value, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden successfully negotiated a settlement with Nasser. Prevailing over Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who opposed withdrawal as defeatist and would have rather taught a lesson to Egypt, the Cabinet supported Eden’s settlement. The agreement postulated British withdrawal from the Canal Zone by June 1956, but guaranteed the reoccupation of the military base in case of outside armed attack.

However, amicable cooperation did not continue. Egypt refused to take part in a NATO-like defense pact for the Middle East, which Nasser saw as yet another manifestation of British imperialism. The defense pact, known as the Baghdad Pact of 1955, came into being nonetheless, with the participation of Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. Troubles with Nasser continued when in September 1955 the Foreign Office learnt that Nasser agreed to buy Soviet arms through Czechoslovakia. Britain worried that increasing Soviet influence in the Arab world may result in losing British access to Middle East oil supplies.

Therefore, when Nasser threatened to finance the building of the Aswan Dam from Soviet sources, frantic British diplomatic maneuvers started in order to recruit the US for outbidding the Russians in financing the Dam. An Anglo-American offer was made, but at Nasser’s hesitation, the Americans withdrawn support in mid-July 1956. However, Nasser’s regional ambitions, lack of willingness for good relations with Britain, and Communist leanings had turned the British against him. Even those in the Cabinet who saw Nasser playing out East against West started to lose their patience, agreeing that Egyptian-Soviet cooperation “must be stopped” and that Britain must prevent Nasser selling Egypt out to the Soviet Union.

---

Despite darkening shadows over Nasser’s reliability, his announcement of the nationalization of the Suez Canal came as a bombshell on July 26. To minimize damage, he promised compensation of the shareholders of the Suez Canal Company at market price and gave assurance that traffic would not be obstructed in the Canal. He explained his move in terms that he hoped would resonate with the Western world. He reasoned that the revenue generated from the operation of the Canal would be used to finance the Aswan Dam, which would allow him to disengage himself from outside influence, since he no longer needed either Soviet or Anglo-American financial support to build the dam.

This did not convince Britain that was the largest shareholder of the Suez Canal Company. Britain considered nationalization as a security threat. It immediately froze the Canal Company’s account and the release of loan payments to Egypt. With moderate success it also encouraged other nations to join in the economic embargo.

Throughout the summer and early fall of 1956, British policy-makers experimented with negotiations in order to prevent nationalization. First, the Eden Cabinet assembled the main signatories of the 1888 Convention, which regulated the use of the Canal, and the major users of the Canal in London in order to exert international pressure on Nasser. The London Conference, which met between August 16 and 23, 1956, concluded that a multi-nation body, the Suez Canal Board, should take the responsibility for the successful operation, maintenance and upgrading of the Canal’s facilities. At the same time, Egyptian sovereignty should be respected and Egypt should be guaranteed a sum for the international use of the Canal.

These terms were presented to Nasser by the Prime Minister of Australia, Robert Menzies. On September 9, Nasser refused to negotiate on the basis of these terms, partly because they were disadvantageous for him and partly because President Eisenhower’ letter

expressing doubts about the use of force was leaked to the press, which took the teeth out of Eden’s bluff.

In mid-September, Britain decided to take matters to the United Nations, where they received a favorable resolution (close to the terms of the London Conference). However, the plan failed on the implementation vote because of the Soviet veto. At the same time, the United States was determined to go on with negotiations and stir Britain away from military action. Accordingly, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles suggested a similar scheme, SCUA, whereby the Canal users would collect dues and operate the Canal. The British went along until mid-October, when it became clear that, because of American maneuvering, the negotiating position was irreconcilable with British interests.

Finally, at the end of October, military moves began. As a result of a secret agreement – known as the Sèvres protocol – between Israel, France and Great Britain, the Israeli attacked Egypt on October 29. Britain and France presented both Egypt and Israel with an ultimatum on October 30 to stop fighting and foreshadowed British-French action to restore peace in the region if the ultimatum was not respected. Britain and France started air bombardment on October 31. On November 2, with active American support, the UN Resolution 997 (ES-1) condemned the British and demanded all parties to cease fire. The United States, even though stayed out of the fighting, hindered the movement of Anglo-French troops by maneuvering the Sixth Fleet in their way. After serious financial pressure from the United States, Britain stopped fighting on November 6.

As a result of the Suez crisis, Britain came to the verge of financial collapse and was forced to abandon its dominant role in the Middle East. Anthony Eden remained Prime

---

Minister in name only until in January 1957 when he resigned on the grounds of ill health and was succeeded by Harold Macmillan.  

7.2 The Domestic Political Situation

The Suez crisis was a classic T2 conflict where there existed a separation of purpose in the Cabinet. Except for a small majority, all the other factors indicating trouble for the government and the Prime Minister were present. Anthony Eden became Prime Minister on April 6, 1955 – ten years after Churchill had openly announced that Eden would succeed him as the leader of the Conservative Party. Nevertheless, before Churchill left, he had mounting doubts whether his Foreign Secretary would be able to successfully follow him as Prime Minister. Churchill’s doubts were shared by some cabinet members, who worried about Eden’s lack of knowledge of economic and domestic politics, since he had spent his political apprenticeship almost exclusively in the Foreign Office. And the burden to carry was unusually great: Eden had to follow in the footsteps of one of the greatest British prime ministers.

Despite the formidable past of succeeding Winston Churchill and despite the doubts of his peers, Eden moved with a sure hand in the beginning. A month after taking office, he called a national election where he managed to raise the Conservative majority from sixteen to fifty-eight and his handling of the first difficult months of his premiership left a positive impression.

However, his honeymoon with the public and the political elite was short. His reputation in the House of Commons started to melt away. First, he embarrassed the government by miscalculation of backbench support in February 1956, allowing a ‘free vote’

---

678 Hennessy 2000, 209.
on hanging, an issue that concerned many of his contemporaries more than the precarious economic situation of the country. While the opposition voted in a block, many Conservatives disregarded the government’s advice to retain hanging and voted with the opposition. The consequence was a vote against the government and by a substantial majority. Not a month passed when the Prime Minister’s performance in Parliament was judged no less than a “calamity.”

Moreover, Eden had to face the potential of backbench revolt and over no other issue than foreign policy. The imperialist segment of the Conservative Party, known as the Suez group, was rather loud in the Commons. Disapproving British withdrawal, the Suez group had voted against the 1954 settlement with Egypt. The faction was also large enough to inflict troubles: although it had a core membership of only twenty-eight MPs, the size of the group with sympathizers (i.e. those who regularly attended their meetings) was equal in number to the size of the Conservative majority in the Commons. Yet, there also existed a liberal wing in the parliamentary party, the anti-Suez group of 25-40 MPs, who pulled the government to the opposite direction, making it difficult to choose a policy course that was not subject to substantial backbench criticism.

The Prime Minister did not do much better with the public, the electorate or the press, either. In December 1955, the realization that “everything [Middle East policy and the economy] is in a mess” started to sink in. In January 1956, a concentrated press campaign that included both the Tory and the Labour presses, started against the Prime Minister, accusing him of making cabinet changes too late, being indecisive, easily distractible, lost in

detail and internationally an appeaser. As a consequence, the government lost several by-elections, and the local election results in May 1956 were equally bad.

Disillusionment was general in Whitehall where civil servants and cabinet members were equally exasperated by Eden’s constant intervention into their daily work and his exaggerated respect for cabinet government that resulted in too much talk but few decisions.

The situation did not improve in the coming months. Six days before Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan wrote that “the Government’s position is very bad at present […]. The people are puzzled, the party is distracted; Eden gives no real leadership in the House […] although he is popular and respected in the country.”

But even Eden’s popularity was relative. A Gallup poll in the spring of 1956 showed that the Prime Minister’s approval rating was around forty percent, which registered a thirty percentage point drop vis-à-vis his approval rating the previous fall.

Eden, who was an avid reader of the press and public opinion polls and oversensitive to criticism, could not but notice his weakening position. Cabinet dynamics were not satisfying either. Selwyn Lloyd, Lord Home, Anthony Head, and Alan Lennox-Boyd supported him, but the camp of the “covert doubters” included two of his most formidable rivals for Tory leadership – Rab Butler and Harold Macmillan – as well as Walter Monckton and Heathcoat Amory.

---

688 Hennessy 2000, 212.
690 Thorpe 2004, 499-500.
His December 1955 reshuffle showed some wise political maneuvering and received praise in the press, but on the whole it hurt him more than it helped him. Foreign Secretary Macmillan was moved over to the Treasury. With this, Eden tied Macmillan’s fate to that of the fumbling economy. On the other hand, Macmillan saw it as demotion, losing control of his chief interest – foreign affairs. Now he could also claim apprenticeship in the two most important positions from which to contest the premiership. Chancellor of the Exchequer Rab Butler became Leader of the House and Lord Privy Seal and presided over cabinet discussions in the absence of the Prime Minister. He was admittedly the second man of the government, but due to Macmillan’s clever maneuvering he was not named deputy Prime Minister as had been planned and expected.

Of the two Macmillan was the more formidable rival to whom Butler was losing ground. Even though Butler was in charge of domestic issues during the 1955 election campaign and was treated as co-Prime Minister by many, just like Eden, he was famous for his hesitations and civil servants found it equally difficult to deal with him. His position in the party was weak and his popularity in the country low. Meanwhile Macmillan could not only outmaneuver Butler’s nomination as the heir apparent, but had already carved out a formidable career since his appointment as minister of housing in 1951.

In Macmillan’s quest for influence, two decisive events appear to stand out. To avoid failure, he aimed at total control over economic affairs. When he realized that many in the Cabinet, including Eden and Butler, were against his projected budget cuts, he created the only pre-Suez cabinet crisis of the Eden Cabinet. He threatened to resign if he could not

---

succeed. After frantic negotiations, where cabinet colleagues served as envoys, a compromise was reached whereby Macmillan could push four-fifths of his plans through. \footnote{Macmillan 2003, 535-9 (Feb. 11-23, 1956).}

Second, he managed to hijack the Cabinet’s foreign policy when the young King Hussein of Jordan sacked his British-born Head of the Arab Legion, General Glubb, thus, weakening Britain’s positions in Jordan. This was “serious blow to Eden,” and jeers were expected in the House. \footnote{Shuckburgh 1986, 340 (March 1, 1956). See also, Beloff 1989, 326.} In the midst of the problems the government was facing at home and abroad in March 1956, ministers were in a bellicose mood. Shuckburgh wrote in March that the “Ministers – led by the PM [Prime Minister] – were mad keen to land British forces somewhere to show that we are still alive and kicking.” \footnote{Shuckburgh 1986, 344 (March 5, 1956).} Eden’s inclination was to react forcefully to counterbalance this unexpected blow. \footnote{Shuckburgh 1986, 340 (March 1, 1956).}

Sanctions against Jordan, the denunciation of the Defense Treaty whereby Britain provided for Jordan’s defense and/or withdrawal of the rest of the British officials in Jordan were suggested. Seeing Hussein’s move as a sign of Egyptian influence, the Prime Minister even considered the reoccupation of the Suez Canal for a short time. That the measure did not go further than recalling the remaining British officials from Jordan was the consequence of Macmillan’s intervention who stood up to and prevailed over the Prime Minister, Butler and Lord Salisbury. \footnote{Shuckburgh 1986, 340-1 (March 1-5, 1955).} This may have saved relations with Jordan, but cost Eden dearly in the party where his reaction was deemed soft and not only by the Suez group. \footnote{Shaw 1996, 9-10; Bowie 1974, 19.}

The Prime Minister was aware of his precarious situation and his rivals in the Cabinet. Eden appeared to fear Macmillan more than Butler. Eden and Macmillan watched each other with caution and their relationship was competitive. Eden thought Macmillan was an intriguer
and after his job. Eden’s press secretary, William Clark, shared his boss’ views that Macmillan played at succeeding Eden. Therefore, Eden had to cope with low popularity and the threat of backbench revolt, a precarious majority, and the rivalry with Harold Macmillan. Thus, I expect that Eden risked war because of domestic rather than for international reasons.

7.3 The Decision to Fight Egypt

7.3.1 Catering for the Preferences of the Whole Cabinet

When the British government learnt about Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, it immediately started to evaluate the meaning of such an action. The Cabinet put things in the light of British strategic and national interest. They were shocked by nationalization, feeling that their worst fears were coming through. The waterway that carried much of Britain’s oil supply was in the hands of a man whom the British did not trust and who was thought to be leaning toward Communism at the least. Accordingly, Lord Home appraised the situations as one in which loss would mean the loss of British influence in the Middle East, resulting in Russia’s, India’s and China’s rule of Africa and the Pacific.

On July 27, the Cabinet reaffirmed the importance of the Suez Canal as vital to British (European and Western) interest both in regard of oil imports and British export to the East.

---

703 Pearson 2003, 33. Shuckburgh 1986, 270 (July 15, 1955); Thorpe 2004, 433, 456-457; Horne 1989, 374-376. As for Macmillan’s opinion of Eden, his diary records only one piece of personal criticism (although more about the performance of the government) of the prime minister. Macmillan wrote on July 5, 1956 that cabinets were too discursive and that Eden’s “mind is quick and versatile, but […] without great depth” (2003, 572).

704 Thorpe 2004, 505.


706 Hennessy 2000, 217.

Despite the fear from Communist advance in the Middle East, the reaction of the Soviet Union was a small part of the equation in defining Britain’s approach to nationalization. The cabinet did monitor Soviet behavior but without alarm, noting that the Soviet Union was not behaving too badly. See Pearson 2003, 54. The reason for such lack of concern was British estimation of Soviet strength, that is, the USSR could neither compete with the French and British fleets nor owned middle-range ballistic missiles that could have reached London. They were aware that Khrushchev’s tough words after military moves were started were only a bluff. Their evaluation was seconded by the Chester Cooper, the CIA station chief in London, on November 6, 1956. See Fursenko, Aleksandr and Timothy Naftali. 2006, Khrushchev’s Cold War. The Inside Story of an American Adversary. New York, London: W. W, Norton and Company, 133-136.
Nationalization was an untenable position for Britain, because the Egyptians were doubted to have the technical ability to manage the operation of the Canal and to own adequate financial resources to ensure its maintenance and upgrading in the future. In addition, they felt that Nasser’s recent behavior suggested that Egypt was unlikely to ensure unhindered passage of ships through the Canal. This, the Cabinet felt, made the issue into an international one that went beyond British national interest in its importance.  

What was not discussed in cabinet, but what everyone was keenly aware of, was the blow that nationalization meant for Eden. It was not only a loss of British influence, but also a very public failure of the 1954 Treaty that Eden fought for vis-à-vis Churchill. Thus, his past policy of cooperation with Nasser was in shambles. He certainly felt the weakening effect of his responsibility for British withdrawal from the Canal Zone on his political fortunes. Consequently, according to his private secretary, Guy Millard, the Prime Minister, believed that nationalization of the Suez Canal could potentially make him lose his job.

He was not alone in thinking that his future as Prime Minister hinged on his solution to the crisis. His press secretary, William Clark wrote on July 29 that, “It is certainly the gravest [moment] for Eden, for if he does not act strongly and effectively he will be out.” Moreover, action was not enough: results had to be produced. The press called for a demonstration of strength and cast the impeding negotiations in terms that implied that the government was seen as hesitant and ineffectual. Negotiations, the press feared, would again be a sign of “the government’s well-known weakness for regarding the calling of a meeting as a substitute for policy.”

The press also likened Nasser to Mussolini and Hitler, which could not have avoided Eden’s attention. Eden thought in the same terms as the press, believing that Nasser was

---

708 Pearson 2003, 140.
709 Shaw 1996, 33.
another Hitler and Mussolini. “Allowing for difference in scale,” Eden wrote in his memoirs, “[…] he has followed Hitler’s pattern, even to concentration camps and the propagation of *Mein Kampf* among his officers.” Although this was not discussed in the Cabinet, several ministers appeared to share Eden’s view of Nasser. But Eden went even further clearly wanting to get rid of Nasser. Four months before the crisis, Eden is alleged to have exploded to Anthony Nutting over the latter’s policy suggestions toward Nasser, saying, “I want him destroyed, can’t you understand? I want him removed…”

Further cabinet discussions seemed to favor Eden’s political interests. The Cabinet decided to take a tough stand. They defined their aim as achieving international control over the Canal. For this, they were ready to go all the way. Pondering over the options, the Cabinet agreed that economic sanctions alone would not achieve their aim, and taking the matter to the United Nations was judged counterproductive because of potential Soviet veto and the slowness of the UN. Further cabinet discussions seemed to favor Eden. The Cabinet defined its aim as achieving international control over the Canal. For this, they were ready to go all the way. Therefore, Britain was limited to options between a diplomatic deal reinforced by military threat and the use of force.

Of the two the government preferred diplomacy. First, as Eden argued, it could reach a lasting settlement over the Suez Canal that should be rethought in twelve years anyways. Second, attempts to negotiate could tame international criticism of too hasty use of force. Third, even if the government preferred military solutions, it would take several – four to six

---

weeks to transport the military equipment necessary to the Canal Zone. Therefore, negotiations could help fill in the time until then.\textsuperscript{716}

While the Cabinet did not shy away from using force if necessary, it was defined as a last resort.\textsuperscript{717} At the same time, ministers did not tie military moves to either American or French support. While they were desirable, British interests were to “be safeguarded by military actions” and “even if we had to act alone, we cannot stop short of using force to protect our position if all other means of protecting it proved unavailable.”\textsuperscript{718} As a consequence, the Eden Cabinet initiated what later was called a “dual-track policy.” Britain looked for a peaceful settlement but started considerable military build-up in order to be able to negotiate from the position of strength and use force if it came to that.\textsuperscript{719}

This policy of firmness gained general support. It was received positively in the House of Commons in both Conservative and Labour circles.\textsuperscript{720} Moreover, the press and the public were fully behind the government in its support.\textsuperscript{721} It also enjoyed unanimous backing in the Cabinet and the narrower circle of the Egypt Committee (Eden’s “war cabinet”). This was an acceptable first step for everyone: the pacifists (Defence Secretary Monckton and Leader of the House Rab Butler), who worried that they may “push the button” before having a moral basis to act; those who could be convinced either way (Lord Home, Lord Salisbury, and Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd); and the most dominant and most hawkish member (Harold Macmillan).\textsuperscript{722}

In the meantime, Macmillan was maneuvering for a more extreme definition of the situation. Engaging in private diplomacy with his old wartime friend, the American Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy, Macmillan conveyed a tougher British attitude than

\textsuperscript{717} CAB 128/30 Pt II, CM 54(56), July 27, 1956.
\textsuperscript{718} CAB 128/30 Pt II, CM 54(56), July 27, 1956.
\textsuperscript{719} Pearson 2003, 20.
\textsuperscript{720} Kyle 1989, 113-114.
\textsuperscript{721} Pearson 2003, 50.
\textsuperscript{722} Pearson 2003, 28; Thorpe 2004, 507
the Cabinet owned up to so far. He deliberately made Murphy believe that Britain was determined not to lose this game and British troops were about to sail. He added that Nasser had to be destroyed, hopefully by turning Egyptian public opinion against him. His motives were not sinister though: he only wished to enlist the United States behind the diplomatic maneuver by frightening them. That is, Macmillan was not against a peaceful settlement until British objectives were achieved.

Nonetheless, the chancellor only appeared to echo the mood in the Cabinet. The morning Macmillan was meeting with Murphy, the Egypt Committee came to the same conclusion, adding Nasser’s downfall to its immediate aims.

In early August, Macmillan continued to pressure Eden to use force. First, he kept the pressure on Eden for war by enlisting Churchill to the cause of collusion for military action with France and Israel. Eden, opposed to collusion with Israel and not liking the pressure from Macmillan, was close to vetoing Macmillan’s grand design, Operation Musketeer. The original military plan did not go beyond the proclaimed aim of the Cabinet, i.e. was constrained to the Canal area with landing at Port Said. It is true that Britain hoped that the occupation of the Canal might contribute to Nasser’s downfall, but that was hoped to be an indirect consequence of British action and not a direct war aim.

However, worried that it might not be feasible militarily and that it might not achieve the aims declared by the Egypt Committee, that is to remove Nasser, the chancellor wrote a paper suggesting a wider operation with landing at the seat of government in Alexandria. After some foot dragging which was more due to animosity toward Macmillan than disagreement with the plan, Eden allowed the paper to circulate at least in the Egypt

---

726 Eden also had to face pressure from Lord Mountbatten (the First sea Lord) and the French as well. Pearson 2003, 24, 41, 48-49.
728 See PRO CAB 134/1216, August 7, 1956, “S. Lloyd to G. Jebb.”
Committee. In the end, the new plan quietly replaced the old one. It had two consequences: first, the planning date had to be postponed, second, if the last resort had to be invoked it would be well beyond the Cabinet’s original intentions.  

All in all, with the starting of the London conference, Eden faced a tremendous task. He had to achieve a settlement that, with the bluff engineered by the military build-up, would do nothing less than lead to the downfall of Nasser. At the same time, Eden had to avoid being too tough to prevent Nasser from panicking and taking matters to the United Nations. Yet, he could not be too accommodating, which would not have only made the bluff against Nasser ineffective but also projected the image of a vacillating Prime Minister at home.  

Although it is questionable that any tactics or settlement would have been able to satisfy all these requirements, Eden was determined to succeed. He delayed the necessary – that is necessary to military action – reconnaissance flights over Egypt for the purpose. This pushed the earliest possible D-day back to September 19. Eden told the Egypt Committee on August 14th that it would be preferable to postpone any final decision until it was clear that military measures were necessary and that, while military planning should continue, nothing could be done that “would prejudice a decision to defer the actual date for any military operation.”

7.3.2 The War Coalition Unravels

After the settlement of the first London conference was put to Nasser and with the shadow of Nasser’s rejection of the agreement hanging over Britain, the Egypt Committee met to ponder over the next step. Although at this point Britain could have opted for war with a clear conscience, ministers were divided. Selwyn Lloyd expressed his concern to Dulles that if

---

730 Kyle 1989, 126.
Nasser rejected the eighteen-power proposal, the use of force would be “a very serious possibility.” Macmillan also appeared to believe that if Nasser refused to cooperate, war would be the next step. He said after an inconclusive meeting on August 20 that “[w]e shall soon have to make definite and tremendous decisions.” On August 27, Macmillan was clearly in favor of speeding up the military schedule and worried that putting D-day off again and again would mean that it never happened. Home, Salisbury, and Eden shared Lloyd’s and Macmillan’s hawkishness, believing that Nasser must be stopped and Britain had no other alternative than to fight.

However, Minister of Defense Walter Monckton reacted harshly and negatively to Macmillan’s speculation about how diplomatic moves and the parliamentary schedule could be adjusted to a fixed military schedule. It was now clearly recognized that Monckton, in Salisbury’s words, “had doubts about a firm policy over Suez.” It was more troubling from the points of view of the Prime Minister that the other heavyweight of the Cabinet, Rab Butler, also felt anxiety with regard to a military solution, because he doubted that parliamentary and public support would be forthcoming for the use of force. Although he agreed that Nasser should not be allowed to win, he urged for further diplomatic measures. This view was supported by several others: Lord Selkirk, Iain MacLeod and possibly by Lord Kilmuir, Heathcoat Amory and the Chief Whip Edward Heath.

Just like some ministers, the press, the country as well as the Parliament was moving away from bellicosity. As early as August 2, several newspapers – Liberal, Labour and

---

734 Pearson 2003, 64.
735 Pearson 2003, 55.
737 Kyle 1989, 117.
740 PRO PREM 11/1100, August 24, 1956, “Butler to Prime Minister,” and PRO PREM 11/1152, August 24, “Home to Eden” also provide evidence for division in cabinet and doubts about public and parliamentary support.
Conservative – gave only qualified support to the use of force: it was only acceptable if Nasser reverted to it first.  

Public support was on the wane, but in late August, the government could have rallied the undecided, and thus the country behind military action. A poll conducted about what the government should do if Egypt did not accept the terms of the London conference showed that 33% favored military action, 47% political and economic actions, and 20% was undecided.  

As opposed to this, the public was clearly against war five weeks later. Four-fifths of the population preferred taking the issue to the UN. What is more only 34% favored a military ultimatum if the UN mission failed, and 49% was against it.  

Support in the Commons showed a similar trend. The unconditional support of the opposition was withdrawn on August 2, 1956 when Leader of the Opposition Hugh Gaitskell suggested that matters should be taken to the United Nations. Nonetheless, the Conservative Party was united, so in the second half of the August, the government could have still easily obtained the support of the House for war. But on September 12-13, 1956, the government faced a potentially troublesome debate and a vote of confidence in the Commons, because some Tory MPs sided with the opposition in their demand to work through the UN. As Macmillan noted in his diary Eden was in a lose-lose situation: if he gave way to the public mood, the Suez group would have raised hell in Parliament. Worse, had Eden sacrificed too much of his early firm commitment, “it w[oul]d be fatal to his reputations and position.”  

742 Equally bad news was for the government that only 43% of the Conservatives supported military action. PRO PREM 11/1123, September 10, 1956, “Fraser to Poole: Public Opinion on Suez”; Shaw 1996, 63.  
745 Pearson 2003, 55.  
746 Macmillan 2003, 598 (Sept 13, 1956).
Yet, with a divided cabinet and a divided party, Eden could not insist on his earlier bellicose policy. In the end, he gave in to the demands of the opposition, agreeing to a policy that the otherwise dovish Rab Butler later described as “short of complete capitulation.” Thanks to Gaitskell’s slowness in pointing out the contradiction in the government’s policy and Eden’s harsher wind-up speech, the government survived the debate without mortal wounds. Appraising the situation on September 20, Macmillan felt that opting for war might leave the government in minority. In harmony with this, the Cabinet acknowledged that a military intervention could be difficult to sell both to the majority of the party and the public. Since Eden could not muster support for war, he chose further negotiations and referred the issue to the United Nations. Eden also scaled Musketeer back, limiting action to the Canal Zone once again so as to try to minimize civilian casualties and possible public outcries. Revision of the plan also necessitated putting war off albeit it also made it possible to mount operation later into the winter.

7.3.3 Convincing the Cabinet to Fight

At this point, Eden appeared to be caught between two threatening alternatives at home: no war and losing his job or fighting despite cabinet disagreement. He was facing two very risky alternatives internationally as well. Worse, it was Macmillan that was framing the

---

747 Apparently, the idea of going to the United Nations before using force was also divisive in the cabinet by late August. For example, Eden opposed but Lord Salisbury favored it. See PREM 11/1100, August 26, 1956, “Eden to Foreign Secretary”; August 27, 1956, “Salisbury to Prime Minister.” Selwyn Lloyd advised against the move as the lesser of two evils. PREM 11/1100, “The United Nations and Suez. Note by the Foreign Secretary.” The debate was decided in favor of the supporters of the UN referral. See, PRO CAB 128/30 CM 24(56), August 28, 1956.
748 Butler 1971, 190. Cf. PRO PREM 11/1125, September 13, 1956, “Butler to Prime Minister” where Butler praised Eden’s “splendid speech.”
751 Shaw 1996, 55.
alternatives. Informing the Cabinet, the chancellor said that Britain had lost 120 million pounds since the crisis started and the trend continued. That is to say, financially Britain could not survive the prolongation of the crisis indefinitely. On the other hand, war would mean an additional loss of 4-500 million pounds, which Britain could not afford without American financial help. Joining Macmillan, the Foreign Office and to some extent the Cabinet saw two unattractive positions. The present policy course was sure and slow death in the form of economic catastrophe, the possible fall of British allies in the Arab world and, thus, loss of influence in the Middle East. On the other hand, without American help, the alternative policy of military action offered a chance to preserve some of its international influence albeit at the price of financial ruin. Macmillan made it clear that he was for the latter.

He also did everything to stir the Prime Minister toward his preferred course of action. He played an active hand in removing Eden’s major concern, that is, American hostility. At the end of September, Macmillan traveled to the United States and was granted a meeting with President Eisenhower. Although Anglo-American relations were troubled over Suez, it was not mentioned during the meeting. It was only Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who raised the issue with Macmillan, asking him to postpone military action until after the presidential elections of November 6. Contrary to this, the chancellor painted a very different picture to Eden. He telegraphed to his Prime Minister that “although nothing specific

756 Macmillan says in his diary that Suez was mentioned and Eisenhower agreed with the British positions that would suggest American neutrality if Britain went ahead with military plans (Macmillan 2003, 603-605 esp. n. 65 (September 25, 1956)). Both Eisenhower and Ambassador Makins denied that Suez was discussed. While the president’s denial could be understandable on political grounds, Makins – who was Macmillan’s protégé – had no reason to deny it. Nevertheless, he was actually surprised by how the Chancellor did not bring the Suez crisis up. Pearson 2003, 106-108.
emerged, [...] I formed certain very clear impressions,” and then suggested that Eisenhower understood that “we cannot play it long,” gave the impression that he also wanted to down Nasser and accepted that “by one means or another we must achieve clear victory.”

However, Macmillan was not the only one pressuring Eden for action; many others reminded him of his early promise of tough action. On September 24, Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd reminded Eden of the stakes and warned him that the domestic and the international situation were such that “If Nasser wins [...] we might as well as a government (indeed, as a country) go out of business.” Churchill renewed his lobbying and suggested to Eden the he should go ahead with the military solution regardless of transatlantic relations. The Conservative Party conference in Lladundo in mid-October was also calling for action. The bellicose faction (the Suez Group) of the party led by Julian Amery and Captain Waterhouse managed to hijack the conference and use it to their benefit. The Prime Minister had no choice but cater for the party’s demand. The government – Anthony Nutting (minister of state in the Foreign Office who stood in for an ill Lord Salisbury) and the Prime Minister himself – expressed its stand with regard to Suez in the same tough words. On the positive side, the conference also showed that even if the party was not united, a majority might be mustered for war.

The hitherto mostly supportive Conservative press also joined those demanding action phrasing their claim in outright critical terms. The press started voicing its disappointment that firm rhetoric had not been followed by equally firm deeds. The press became increasingly critical of what they saw as Eden’s lack of policy and demanded action.

---

760 Pearson 2003, 94-95.
762 Shaw 1996, 64; Pearson 2003, 79, 81.
The public was not particularly satisfied with Eden’s handling of events, either even though it did not particularly desire war. By early September, public approval of the Prime Minister’s handling of the crisis dropped nine percentage points from 58% to 49%.763 Worse, if Eden wished to fight, he had to do it soon. Winter was approaching and if he postponed action yet again, the next chance for the use of force would not occur before the spring of 1957.764

At the same time, Macmillan, the Prime Minister’s press secretary, William Clark, and Eden’s staunchest supporter the foreign editor of the Times, Iverach McDonald, all worried that the government “missed the bus.”765 In other words, the decision for war should have been made in the immediate aftermath of nationalization. If anything, by mid-October the international rationales for going to war definitely evaporated. First, the Cabinet acknowledged as early as July 27 that legally Egypt had the right to nationalize.766 Moreover, by October, the two months that passed since the start of the crisis proved the Cabinet wrong in its worries that Egypt would not be able or willing to ensure free passage through the Canal. Egypt coped with the situation despite the fact that an unprecedented number of ships requested passage. The world simply learned to live with the new situation and the danger appeared to pass.767 Moreover, neither Commonwealth nor American support was forthcoming for war.768 Worse, the Cabinet was aware that initiating war would most likely result in its worst nightmare – the obstruction of free passage.769 All in all, by this time, apart perhaps from British pride, there was no reason internationally to initiate war.

The imperatives were domestic. Many of Eden’s advisors, including the Cabinet Secretary Norman Brook, were more and more for military action and those who were not,

763 Pearson 2003, 68, 79.
764 Thorpe 2004, 509; Pearson 2003, 139.
769 PRO CAB 21/3094, August 15, 1956, “Widdup to Odgers” and “Odgers to Brook.”
like Butler, could offer no alternatives. Thus, the Prime Minister ran out of all peaceful options, and his reputation not only failed to improve as a result of the crisis, but events strengthened his reputation for hesitation, indecisiveness, and softness. However, as the momentum passed, no _casus belli_ presented itself. It was at this point that Eden finally gave up his opposition to collusion with Israel and accepted the French offer of harmonizing action with Israel whose attack on Egypt could give a reason to French and British troops to move in the Canal Zone.

Despite popular myth, Eden did not leave his Cabinet in the dark entirely about collusion plans although he was somewhat economical with the truth. The first time the Cabinet was informed that Israel had “come up with an offer,” was on October 2. Eden was not particularly enthusiastic, but neither did he rule out accepting the plan. After discussions with the French on October 14, he asked the Cabinet about their views on possible British-French intervention if Israel attacked Egypt. Eden did not explicitly mention that Britain had a hand in the Israeli attack, but the facts could be easily put together. Although from mid-October he severely restricted the circulation of documents pertaining to the preparation of the execution of the collusion plan, Egypt Committee members were certainly aware of the plan.

The Prime Minister spent eleven days to shore up cabinet support for the plan. On October 14, 17, 18, 23, and 24 even those who raised some concern – Lloyd, Butler, Heathcoat Amory and Nutting – were either convinced by Eden or did not endeavor to dissent when their support was asked. There was only one casualty, Minister of Defence Walter Monckton, who left the Ministry of Defense on October 18 to take up the post of postmaster.

---

770 Pearson 2003, 142.
774 Pearson 2003, 146-147, 149; Thorpe 2004, 515, 518.
general. However, he agreed not to put his resignation in terms of the Suez crisis, but make the move on the basis of health reasons.  

The Cabinet was asked to make the final decision on October 25. Eden could only get his way with a substantial contribution from Macmillan. The minutes of the October 25 cabinet meeting testify about substantial doubts in the Cabinet. At this point, the chancellor threatened to resign if action was not taken. Moreover, he assured the Cabinet that, at the least the United States would remain neutral. This carried the day and Eden got the necessary support to start fighting.

7.3.4 Cabinet Rebellion and the Emergence of a Challenger

The plan, however, leaked on October 30. The outcry was severe at home but Eden appeared to have the support of those who mattered for staying in office. Emotions raged high in the Commons where Labour moved a motion of censure. Nonetheless, on November 1, 1956 the Party stood behind Eden, giving him a respectable majority about seventy on the censure motion. Only eight Conservative MPs abstained and the anti-Suez group of about 25-40 MPs voted with the government. The Cabinet evaluated this as a sign of solid support. Churchill voiced his support. Eden got wide support at the least from the Conservative press for finally acting forcefully. Despite the fact that a great number of people attended the protest organized by Labour at Trafalgar Square, the public reacted positively on the whole. The Conservatives improved their approval in the polls as a result of the Suez action. As for the

---

775 Pearson 2003, 102-103; Kyle 1989, 118; Thorpe 2004, 515. Eden only acknowledges that Monckton was released of the leadership of Ministry of Defence for health reasons (1960, 580).
778 PRO CAB 128/30 Pt II CM 24(56), November 2, 1956.
Prime Minister, his approval ratings showed a four percentage point surge. 48.5% of the population supported his policies while 39% opposed it and 12% was undecided.\footnote{Shaw 1996, 75-7. Eden’s standing with the public would culminate at 56% in December 1956. See Thorpe 2004, 503.}

What sealed Eden’s future was the change of heart of the Cabinet in the face of international opposition. On November 4, Eden could still muster the support of his colleagues to continue military action but support was not unanimous and he only engineered it by gambling all on a threat of resignation. Two ministers opposed continuing military moves but were ready to agree if the majority of ministers were to go on. Monckton, now paymaster general, preferred to postpone military action and threatened to resign if he was outvoted. While twelve ministers agreed to continue fighting, three cabinet members – among them Butler who seemed to have been a major force in keeping his more hawkish colleagues back from action in August and September but agreed to go along with the collusion plan in October\footnote{Beloff 1989, 330.} – suggested to postpone further military moves. Three other ministers – among them Salisbury who had been one of the staunchest hawks – and two of the three service ministers were for stopping action altogether. Yet, no one of the more weighty ministers – Macmillan or Butler – was willing to speak up and challenge the Prime Minister.\footnote{PRO CAB 128/30 Pt II CM 24(56), November 2, 1956; Beloff 1989, 330 n 42; Thorpe 2004, 528.} The Prime Minister, taken by surprise at the scale of opposition, told the Cabinet that if he cannot get his Cabinet’s support he must resign. Support was still granted that day.\footnote{Pearson 2003, 159; Shaw 1996, 76; Thorpe 2004, 528; Butler 1971, 193.}

However, on November 6 Eden did not have such luck. First, his press secretary William Clark, then Economic Secretary to the Treasury Edward Boyle resigned on grounds of not having been properly informed. (Anthony Nutting of the Foreign Office, who had indicated his intention to resign on October 31, would follow suit two days later).\footnote{Thorpe 2004, 503; Shaw 1996, 75; Lamb 1995, 23.}
More importantly, Macmillan changed his opinion the same day. He started to waiver on November 1 when he had acknowledged that he underestimated American opposition to the use of force. But when the Egypt Committee got news of the UN discussions of possible actions against Britain, Macmillan’s reaction was, “Oil sanctions! That finishes it.” Accordingly, on November 6 he was ready to defy the government policy openly. Exaggerating the magnitude of the losses, he told the Cabinet that in the last week reserves, due to American financial pressure, had fallen by 100 million pounds. (In reality it was no more than 32 million.) Finally, he threatened to resign if fire was not ceased. Seeing that the Cabinet was now leaning toward peace, the Prime Minister acquiesced and ordered an end to the military campaign.

7.4 Conclusion

The Suez crisis provides support for the hypothesis about the influence of domestically adverse conditions on international risk-taking. Prime Minister Anthony Eden and his colleagues were clearly aware that Eden’s position was at stake in the crisis. Eden tried to back down from his promise for tough action, but his own party and the Cabinet in particular, reminded him of his earlier commitment. In the end he decided for war when only his domestic position, but not a cost-benefit analysis could explain the decision. This is true even if American support is taken out of the equation, where the chancellor clearly misled him.

Although the Prime Minister was under fire on all fronts – he was unpopular with the electorate, a large part of his party and some Cabinet members – his fate was sealed when the division in the Cabinet gave rise to a challenger, Harold Macmillan. While neither the public nor Conservative MPs were united and presented some problems for the government, the

---

story of the Suez crisis demonstrates that their support can be shored up relatively easily. The existence of an open division in the cabinet appears to be a precondition, rather than a consequence of the appearance of a credible challenger. Macmillan emerged as a challenger only when the Cabinet was already divided. Yet, until Macmillan decided to challenge Eden, the Prime Minister could still gather at least latent support in the Cabinet. The challenger appeared when he was expected: when the policy pursued by the Prime Minister was clearly a political failure.

Cabinet struggles are not about being right or wrong. If it was about assessing factors domestic and international, Macmillan erred more in his judgments than Eden. However, he could change his policy preference without any detriment to his standing in the Conservative Party and did not hesitate to do so in order to advance his interests first and that of the country only second.

The Suez crisis also demonstrates that success is measured in terms of political and not military fortunes. The Eden Cabinet was successful in its military campaign, but engineered a political disaster when it came to the reputation of Britain. Moreover, the government’s policies clearly rallied the public in the short run. Public support only melted away in months later when the magnitude of the negative consequences started to sink in domestically. Eden failed to keep the Cabinet behind his policies and this caused his downfall.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

In this dissertation I argued that presidential democracies are more risk-averse in the international arena than parliamentary democracies. I hypothesized that this could be explained by the difference in the accountability structure of these two democratic regime types. I argued that some constraints on the executive are advantageous when it comes to internationally risky behavior, but a great deal of constraints encourages leaders to take the risk of war. In other words, direct accountability to the electorate through elections is a restraining factor but accountability to the electorate together with indirect – elite – accountability to the parliament and the cabinet encourages international risk-taking under domestically adverse conditions.

This runs counter to the present state of affairs in the democratic peace literature as well as in the diversionary theory of war. Both of these argue for a linear relationship between accountability even though they disagree about the direction of the causation. Democratic peace asserts that more executive constraints lead to more peaceful behavior, the diversionary literature finds that constraints on the executive (or the negative domestic standing of executives) make them want to divert attention and rally public support by engaging in wars. As opposed to this, I claim that the relationship is curvilinear.

I argued that characterizing democratic regimes only on the basis of their constitutional and legal characteristics is inadequate, because everyday political developments also influence political behavior. Thus, I characterized regime types by two dimensions. The dimension of separation of powers represents the relatively permanent institutional features of democratic regimes while the separation of purpose depicts the temporary aspect of politics.

The background theory providing the mechanism for the non-linear relationship is prospect theory that claims that when people perceive things as losses they exhibit risk-taking behavior. When they operate in the gains frame, they avoid taking risks. As long as
democratic leaders do not face conditions that threaten their jobs at home their only reason to operate in the risk frame comes from the evaluation of the international position of their state. However, presidents and prime ministers differ in their reactions to domestic political problems or the existence of a separation of purpose. When it comes to foreign policy, presidents are only responsible to the electorate at fixed points in time. Because they do not depend on Congress or their cabinet for survival, they are insulated from elite accountability. Therefore, they are not likely to be sensitive to domestic political conditions and, consequently, are likely to behave the same way when they are popular and when they are unpopular (i.e. when there exists a separation of purpose). In both cases presidents consider international conflicts the way realism projects.

Contrary to this, the timing of electoral accountability for prime ministers is not only less predictable, but their job also depends on maintaining the parliamentary majority and cultivating the support of the cabinet. That is to say, they face accountability to the political elite: to the parliament – or the parliamentary majority – and the cabinet. This makes them accountable throughout their terms. Therefore, they must maintain their popularity among their different constituencies at all times. Consequently when they are unpopular at home, they will see things in terms of losses and are likely to start wars to prove their competence and rally support.

To trace whether domestic or international factors were at the background of decisions, I examined six cases of international risk-taking, that is, six wars. This way I limited analysis to necessary conditions only. Cases were selected so as to control for the potential influence of personality, party ideology, and conflict intensity. I chose to analyze three American wars (Korea, Dominican Republic, Grenada) and three British (Malaya, Kenya, Suez) wars. Intervention in the Dominican Republic and the emergency in Malaya were conflicts where there was a unity in purpose of political actors (the chief executives were popular). These are
called type one (T1) conflicts. The other four wars are type two (T2) conflicts that represent decisions under domestically adverse conditions.

The cases examined provide support for the hypothesized relationship in general but minor modifications are in order. Both T1 and T2 American conflicts fit well with theoretical expectations. Decision-making in them shows little difference. All of the presidents – Truman, Johnson, Reagan – relied on international factors to commit American troops. During the conflict in the Dominican Republic, the loss frame of a domestically popular President Johnson was motivated by the wish to avoid Communist expansion in the immediate neighborhood of the United States and give a strategic gain to the Soviet Union this way. He was also worried that if the United States did not act in the Dominican Republic, the credibility of commitments in Vietnam and among American allies would be questioned. These factors weighted more heavily on the President’s mind than projected regional criticism in Latin America or at home. As for domestic factors, Johnson and his advisors considered only public opinion. Public reaction was perceived to be negative, but this did not discourage the President from acting. Instead, the administration only tried to minimize damage by some – not very successful – spin control of public reception.

In harmony with expectations, the legislative branch played no role in the decision. Congress was informed but their possible reaction to American involvement in the Dominican Republic was not even discussed. The only proof – comments by Jack Valenti and McGeorge Bundy – that domestic politics was on the agenda came a day after the President made up his mind. Therefore, at best, they served as rationalizations but not causes of the decision.

Dynamics in the Reagan Administration show a similar pattern in case of the T2 conflict in Grenada. President Reagan and his advisors perceived the power struggle in Grenada in terms of the regional balance of power against Communism. At later stages of the crisis, they
also saw it as an excellent chance to demonstrate America’s commitment to fight Communism.

Decision-makers discussed the possible domestic repercussions of an invasion and expected negative reactions both from the public and from Congress. They, however, were ready to go ahead despite both of these. The crisis in Lebanon gave the administration a second chance to discuss domestic factors. Despite the warnings of his advisors that in light of the death of American soldiers in Lebanon, the United States should not risk the death of more American soldiers, the President reaffirmed his earlier decision for intervention in Grenada. Similarly, Reagan made no bargain with his advisors despite the existing division among them. Similarly to American intervention in the Dominican Republic, the cabinet was a non-existent decision unit during the Grenada case. The President relied on his trusted advisors and those working at the defense and foreign policy establishment.

Korea was a classic T2 conflict. Before its start the President was very unpopular at home and, besides the consensus over general foreign policy principles, the President and Congress shared little in their views of political problems. Nonetheless, the President based his decision to commit ground troops in Korea on the lesson his generation drew from the failure of the policy of appeasement. Thus, he believed that he had to stop what he saw as the first step of Soviet expansion in Asia.

Domestic politics played no role in his decision. Domestic political conditions were evaluated as factors that would discourage – not encourage – American troop commitment. Congress was informed but not consulted and even the precautionary step of seeking a declaration of war was not taken.

The decision to cross the 38th parallel could have likewise flown from domestic politics, but it did not. Instead, the United States perceived a chance to tilt the regional balance of power into America’s advantage. Such a chance was supported by a strong sense of moralism.
Domestic conditions did not play any role. As the President acknowledged, domestic politics pulled him in no clear direction, giving him no guidance about the preferable policy to pursue. Indeed, throughout the crisis the president demonstrated an appallingly impolitic approach to the crisis. Thus, the sub-optimal choice was not due to the interference of domestic politics, but to a mistaken evaluation of Chinese interests and intentions in Korea.

The British cases show a more complex picture. The most convincing is the Suez crisis, where there existed a separation of purpose prior to the crisis. Prime Minister Eden did not only have to react forcefully at the beginning, but when he was ready to give in to opposition demands later on, politicians of his own party were upset with his softness. In line with the hypothesized mechanism, he made an early promise to act in a tough manner, but when he was wavering by giving in to the opposition, his party and many in the Cabinet, especially Macmillan, did not let him back down from his original commitment.

First of all, when Eden finally decided on war, a cost-benefit analysis of international factors clearly advised against fighting. That is, it was purely political pressures from his own party that made him opt for war. Even though the war was a military success, it was a great political blunder, isolating Britain internationally and threatening with economic collapse. It was at this point of political failure when one of the staunchest hawks, Harold Macmillan turned against the Prime Minister, giving ample weight to the opposition already existing in the Cabinet. By capitulating to Macmillan’s demands, Eden effectively lost the premiership. The fact that the public rallied immediately after the war also gives evidence that it was primarily the political elite that saw it fit that Eden should go. The public reflected the mood of the governing elite only in January 1957 when the economic consequences of the Suez adventure became clear.

If Suez provides evidence for the projected behavior of prime ministers in T2 conflicts, Malaya does the same with respect to T1 conflicts. Clement Attlee’s Labour Cabinet decided
to fight in Malaya to make sure that Communism would not spread at the colony and, thus, Britain could preserve its influence in the region after ending its colonial rule. Even tough Attlee did not have to expect a challenge from the parliamentary party nor a cabinet member, the story of Malaya also shows that even when the prime minister’s position is not in immediate danger, he must tread much more carefully than presidents. Despite the lack of credible rivalry, there was a chance for a challenger to emerge when the war in Malaya was clearly not going well. A challenger did not emerge, yet the danger of it was clearly recognized by Attlee who appeared to grant a speedy audience to Shinwell in order to prevent any divisions in the Cabinet. He was also careful to bind the major cabinet players in the decision.

The war in Kenya represents an anomaly. It was a T2 conflict but the decision was purely motivated by international factors – British desire to preserve its regional influence by leaving Kenya in the hands of pro-British politicians. Nonetheless, it does not mean that domestic political conditions played absolutely no role. Churchill was clearly sensitive to press criticism when the government was lambasted for not acting firmly enough because of not sending Governor Baring immediately to Kenya. The danger presented by accountability to the parliament and the cabinet manifested itself most prominently after the outbreak of the Hola massacres under Macmillan’s premiership. The massacre incited division in the party and, to some extent, in the Cabinet, but by a technical mistake of the opposition and through the Prime Minister’s apt maneuvering, the danger for the government was finally avoided.

The non-emergence of a challenger in the Cabinet during the Kenya and Malaya emergencies was partly due to the loyalty of Bevin, Eden, and Butler. But the lack of challengers was just as much due to the only control variable – conflict intensity – that appeared to have an influence albeit only in British cases. Public attention and the assertion of accountability mechanisms are much weaker for prime ministers in low intensity conflicts.
Thus, low intensity conflicts are dealt with differently, paying them substantially less cabinet and prime ministerial attention. This appears to be the explanation for the fact that in low intensity conflicts neither a challenger nor a very substantial backbench revolt materialized. Regardless of conflict type, such crises cannot bring enough political dividends so that it would be worth risking one’s career and rebel against the premier.

Publicity, that is, the intensity of the crisis was an important intervening variable in prime ministerial sensitivity to domestic factors as well. The more intense the conflict was, the more likely prime ministers were to consider domestic factors in their decisions. As opposed to this, crisis intensity had no influence in American conflicts.

Neither does low intensity mean the same thing for a president than for a prime minister. The low-level coverage of a presidential conflict is still much more substantial than the media attention paid to a low-level conflict in a prime ministerial conflict. Although many would point to the colonial nature of the low intensity British conflicts to explain this, systemic features may as well be responsible: no matter how intense a crisis is, the single focus on presidential action in American foreign policy provides much more heat for a president in low intensity conflicts. Thus, there also appears little difference in dealing with low intensity and high intensity wars for presidents.

In discussing the British mechanism, I suggested that the threat of backbench revolt and a credible challenger may lead to the emergence of a divided cabinet. It seems, however, that the case is that a divided cabinet is the precondition rather than the consequence of the appearance of a credible challenger. The necessity of the threat of backbench revolt for the emergence of a divided cabinet could not be traced through these case studies. As for Suez, Macmillan appeared to have some connections with the Suez group and there was division in the party, but it is unclear whether the doubters of the war effort were also linked to the anti-
Suez party faction. More importantly, it remains without evidence whether the members of the Cabinet took their stand in these crises with regard to their parliamentary support base.

The challenge from Macmillan in the Suez crisis appeared at a predicted point. He rose to oppose Eden when Eden’s policy was apparently a failure. Attlee’s sensitivity to the suggestion of policy failure from Secretary of State for War Shinwell also points toward the conclusion that failure is a point where a credible challenger is likely to rise. Prime Minister Macmillan’s worries after the eruption of the scandal over the Hola massacres allows for the same conclusion.

It is less clear whether an opponent may openly stand up against the prime minister earlier either to try to divert him/her from the chosen tough stand or to remind him of his early commitment if the prime minister wished to back down. Nothing can be said to support or refute the former scenario on the basis of the present cases. Macmillan’s threat to resign if action was not taken against Nasser on October 25, 1956 lends some evidence to the latter, that is, a challenger could emerge to remind the prime minister of his earlier stand. Had Eden capitulated then, he most certainly would have lost the premiership.

What the present framework did not allow to ponder about is whether there may be a difference in behavior among parliamentary democracies on the basis of the number of governing parties, that is, between the behavior of single-party and coalition governments. I would argue that even though both are coalitions of different political forces, an inter-party coalition magnifies problems and, thus, coalition governments are even more predisposed toward risk-taking. Coalition partners may have less in common than intra-party coalitions. Factions in a single governing party, at the least, share loyalty and attachment to the party. In inter-party governments, the loyalty of coalition partners is less obvious. This creates a closer link between cabinet and parliamentary accountability: a coalition partner may be able to play the same card at both places. Moreover, a challenge in the Cabinet may have two sources: it
may come from the prime minister’s own party as well as from ministers of any of the coalition partners. To test the validity of these claims remains a task for the future.

The present explanatory framework can also explain the difference in behavior of democracies and autocracies. I have suggested that it is electoral accountability that has a peaceful effect, and indirect – elite – accountability that may mean too much constraint and modify the positive effect of electoral accountability and may propel risk-taking under conditions of domestic unpopularity. Since the former is not but the latter may be present in autocracies, I explain the extreme bellicosity of autocracies by the fact that lacking electoral accountability they are not restricted from international risk-taking at all. Worse, the only kind of accountability that may exist in autocracies also prejudices them toward risky behavior internationally.

Second, the hypothesized relationship points toward the reasons for mixed support for the diversionary use of force. The key is the US centeredness of the literature: diversion has been most often investigated where it is least likely to appear.

All in all, I do not wish to suggest that either of the democratic peace or the diversionary use of force propositions were entirely in the wrong. Rather, I suggest that diversion models democratic peace under conditions of separation of purpose in parliamentary democracies. In all other cases the conventional democratic peace proposition adequately explains the behavior of democracies. Thus, curvilinearity is nothing else than the unification of the linearity claims of a positive relationship (diversionary use of force) and a negative relationship (democratic peace) between accountability and risk-taking or wars by defining the scope conditions of the two assumptions.

Some caution is in order. Ideally sufficient conditions should be subjected to analysis and non-war cases should be studies as well. It is also unclear at present how safe it is to generalize on the basis of an explanation drawn from two country cases. It may also be
necessary to supplement these case studies with a quantitative analysis in the future, provided that adequate data can be collected.

Finally, it is difficult to avoid reflecting on the normative issue of which institutional structure may be better. If “better” is defined on the basis of pointing at the immorality of war or to the undesirability of international risk-taking based on domestic imperatives, presidential democracies perform better. All else being equal, presidential democracies are more likely to make decisions on the basis of merit and not on domestic political grounds. Presidential judgment may, of course, be clouded by several factors such as improper intelligence or misperception. However, these factors also affect chief executives in parliamentary regimes as well.

From a normative point of view, what have been derogatively described as the emergence of an imperial presidency and the presidentialization of parliamentary democracies may not be such negative developments. After all, a move toward the ideal type presidential regime appears to indicate positive developments in the war involvement of democracies. All in all, Forrestal’s fears appear to have been unfounded: his proposal to move toward British-type of cabinet government would not have ensured less risk-taking by American presidents but could have led to more risky behavior internationally.

---

\(^{786}\) Presidential – as well as prime ministerial – ability to judge issues on their merits may, of course, be hindered by improper intelligence or cognitive limitations of the human mind.
Bibliography

Primary Sources


All documents starting with the following acronyms can be found in the quoted folders in the British National Archives (Public Records Office) in Kew Gardens in London, England:

- PRO CAB
- PRO CO
- PRO DO
- PRO FO
- PRO PREM
- PRO WO

Secondary Sources


