Europeanization of Security and Defence Policy: The Case of Denmark

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Abstract

This paper looks at the process of europeanization in security and defence. The field has been generally omitted from the existing literature, yet its speed-light development quickly changes the international environment. The case of Denmark illustrates that the ESDP has significant impact over the member states of the EU. Even though the Nordic country is not a full participant in CFSP, europeanization processes in the security and defence are clearly discernible. The paper argues that this has happened by means of ideational exchange between the national and supranational level. Prevailing ideas about the EU’s role in security, defence cooperation, anti-terrorism and comprehensive security have been constructed against the strong background of overlapping understandings about the post Cold War security environment. The conceptual agreement between Denmark and the EU about the nature of the new threats and the means to face them has led to europeanization in security perceptions and policy actions after the end of the Cold War.
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Introduction

In the last few years the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has grown with the speed of light. After its inauguration in 2003 there has been proliferation of missions, serious institutional build-up and large political investment therein. There has been a variety of different questions raised by the academic community with regard ESDP that deserve interest. Among them is the issue about the relationship between ESDP and the European Union (EU) member states. In an attempt to describe and explain the dynamics of influence within this new form of security governance in Europe, scholars have employed a variety of theories and methods. Europeanization is one of the research fields, primarily interested in the mutual dynamics between the EU and its member states (MS). Although there have been a growing number of studies in the europeanization framework, issues that touch upon the ESDP have been generally omitted. This paper seeks to enrich the literature that is at the juncture between ESDP and europeanization by focusing on one very peculiar case study - Denmark.

No matter what view we adopt on European integration and the EU, member states always have significant presence in any analysis. In the words of Kenneth Waltz, one has to study the policies and capabilities of major powers in order to understand a given world order\(^1\). Maybe this is true, but it is equally true to assert that in order to understand the effects of the world order, we need to look at the smaller players that do not have the capacity to change things considerably. When we focus our attention at European level, it is easy to find out that there are a large number of relatively small countries who decide at an equal footing with the big ones about the future of Europe. Denmark is one of the states in the EU with a long history of

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membership in EU but at the same time with the most number of exemptions from the founding EU treaties, one of them in the defence aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This makes the country an interesting example to analyze, both in terms of the concrete security and defence dimension and also as part of the broader process of European integration.

One could be deluded that as a small country Denmark does not have a big say in European affairs and especially in ESDP, where it is a limited participant\(^2\). However, a basic assumption of this paper is that there is a significant intensity in the dynamics EU-Denmark in the field of security in defence that create a trend of change both at the EU and at Danish level. So far there have been a lot of studies on the foreign policy of Denmark\(^3\) as well as on its security and defence policies\(^4\). The question of the opt-out decisions has also been a focus of some scholarly work\(^5\). Nevertheless, the development of Danish positions in security and defence and the advancement of ESDP have been examined as separate processes. Very often the relation between the national and the supranational has been overlooked. This creates a gap in the existing literature on ESDP, Danish foreign and security policy and europeanization. The overlap between these three fields represents a sphere that has been under-researched.

This paper seeks to find out about the europeanization effects in Denmark in the field of security and defence. I will examine the developments in four key areas in the EU and

\(^2\) Denmark held two consecutive referenda for ratification of the Treaty for European Union. The negative outcome of the first one forced the government to seek exemptions from the treaty. At the Edinburgh summit of the European Council on 11-12 December 1992 the Danish government negotiated four opt-outs from the Treaty: defence aspects of Common Foreign and Security Policy, participation in the euro-zone, justice and home affairs and European citizenship.

\(^3\) For an overview of europeanization of foreign policy, see Ben Tonra, *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union* (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashagete, 2001)


Denmark based on the prevailing perceptions and political discourse about them. These are: the international security role of the EU, cooperation in defence matters, fight against terrorism and the comprehensive approach to security. An emphasis will be put on Denmark to explaining the discourse and reasons behind its positions and Danish visions in the aspects of ESDP. I will look at the continuity and change of Denmark’s policy towards the EU and the issues concerning security and defence during the period from the end of the Cold War until 2007-2008. This time frame of almost two decades will allow me to trace how Danish and EU positions on key elements of European security and defence have been developing and explain why. Moreover, I will seek to evaluate the reason for their convergence or divergence.

My main argument is that although Denmark is not a full participant in the ESDP, there is significant dynamics between what is being decided at the EU level and Danish security and defence perceptions and policy. This stems from overall overlap between Brussels and Copenhagen in the understandings about the new security environment and the EU’s role in it after the end of the Cold War. The reluctant position of Denmark from 1992 to join the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has undergone significant changes. In some areas where ESDP operates there has been a visible change in Danish stance – this can be traced at both policy and conceptual level. I argue that there is an issue-specific process of convergence with regard to policies and operating concepts between the EU and Denmark in the field of security and defence despite the defence opt-out.

The case study of europeanization of Danish security and defence policy serves another, more theoretical purpose. It tests the explanatory power of the constructivist analytical framework as regards ESDP. Although social constructivism is not an international relations (IR) theory,
it is employed by many scholars and in different nuances. In this particular case it will be used
to outline the operational importance of ideas, perceptions, norms and identities. Moreover,
social constructivism helps us understand how different discourses are formed and to explain
their origin. What is especially interesting in the case of ESDP and European integration in
general, is that perceptions as broad as identity, world views as well as other images as
narrow as perceptions of certain phenomena matter significantly in preference formation and
policy orientation. The ideas of acting decision-makers and their conceptualization of security
and defence issues are embedded in a larger discourse based on structured norms and values.
The method of studying the actions and utterances of key decision makers as an expression of
political will and circulating perceptions, as well as official documents from the state/EU
administration gives us a map of the competing ideas about and meanings attached to reality.
This discourse-analytical approach, as I argue further in the second chapter, is a way of
getting closer to the real meaning of events.

The level of analysis, therefore, is societal perceptions, understood as prevailing ideas,
circulating over time with regard to security and defence, and these perceptions’ role and
place in European integration. By means of extrapolation of meaning from discourse, I argue,
it is more sustainable to trace europeanization processes. The paper will not focus on the exact
direction of these processes – be they national projection of ideas to the EU level or top-down
EU pressure on Denmark. This could be a purpose of a further study. My point here is to
examine the discursive dynamics of Danish security and defence policy and compare them to
the EU perceptual pattern.

This outline clearly positions the current piece at the juncture between constructivist
europeanization research and discourse analysis as a tool for foreign policy analysis. Although
none of these is new, very few works (if any) relate them to each other with a focus on the Danish case. This country’s specific experience in ESDP and European integration provides for fertile ground for drawing conclusions about the dynamics thereof. Thus, the paper aims to contribute both to europeanization research and to the literature on ESDP at the same time.

In the next chapter I will present in short the starting points of my research. This will cover some main aspects of europeanization and ESDP literature that are important for the current case study. Also, I will briefly touch upon the scholarly work on Danish foreign and security policy. Chapter two introduces the theoretical background and the method used. Aimed at mapping some of the existing views in the literature, it outlines the current theoretical and methodological standpoint. In chapter three I will present the empirical case – a study of the discourse of Danish security and defence policy as regards the ESDP. I will go through the period 1989/90 –2007/8 to examine and explain changes in Danish policy towards ESDP related fields and look for overlap/convergence of Danish and EU understandings and actions. I will particularly focus on the perceptions of the security role of the EU, the readiness for cooperation in defence aspects, the anti-terrorism policies and the concepts behind them, and finally on the idea of comprehensive security. Chapter four will briefly present another theoretically-informed viewpoint – that of neo-realism. I will test the hypotheses drawn form the constructivist analysis against what the neo-realist school of IR would make of Danish-ESDP dynamics. In the conclusion I will draw some implications from this particular case and relate them to the field of europeanization.
Chapter 1: Literature Review

1.1. Europeanization

The europeanization literature has grown immensely in the recent years. This field of research has attracted a variety of scholars from different fields that the EU has significant competences in. Some of the major works focus on the EU influence over national policies, i.e. domestic change, and examine how the external pressure from the EU level of governance affect national policies and institutions. This approach, quite naturally, focuses on one particular country and a specific field. Ranging from alcohol policies to election systems, this take on europeanization examines the influence of the EU-level initiatives over the MS. Other scholars acknowledge that the process of change is bi-direction – one of influence from the MS to the EU and vice versa. Undoubtedly the increased interaction between states in the framework of the EU has produced significant changes in European politics. Depending on the specific point of view, the novelties can be analyzed either in the light of domestic change and the downloading effects of the EU or creation of new mechanisms of governance and convergence of interests and policies. Both approaches are present in the europeanization literature and it is fair to say that from a theoretical standpoint

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8 Maria Cowels et al., Transforming Europe....; Beate Kohler-Koch and Rainer Eising The transformation of governance in the European Union (London: Routledge, 1999)
it cuts across the two baseline points of view on European integration— the intergovernmental\textsuperscript{10} and the supranationalist\textsuperscript{11}.

1.2. ESDP

The EU’s role in international relations had been a focus of research long before the inception of ESDP and CFSP. An emphasis has been put on notion of ‘civilian power’\textsuperscript{12}, which stressed the importance of legally binding norms, diplomacy and economic power to solve international problem used by the union\textsuperscript{13}. According to this concept, the EU is seen as a progressive force that has taken the role of traditional military means. Such a notion naturally pushed away power politics from the focus of international relations and of course found its critics amid those centered on the idea that military capabilities are the main independent variable for international relations\textsuperscript{14}.

In a seminal work from 2002, Ian Manners identifies important similarities between these different visions of the EU’s international role and opposes them to a new concept – “normative power Europe”\textsuperscript{15}. As he rightly points out, the ideas of ‘civilian power’ and ‘military power’ share common concern in material capabilities (be they economic or military) and also originate from a Euro-centric vision of the IR, in which European interests

\textsuperscript{13} Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A contradiction in terms?” \textit{JCMS} 40:2 (2002)
\textsuperscript{15} Manners, “Normative Power …”
are paramount\textsuperscript{16}. The notion of ‘normative power Europe’ emphasizes the importance of ideas and beliefs as determining the international role of the EU, rather than the material civilian and military capabilities. Central to the concept are the power to shape opinions and views, i.e. the ‘ideational impact of the EU’s international identity/role’\textsuperscript{17}.

Another point that relates to the importance of norms and perceptions in the integration processes is made by Merand\textsuperscript{18}. His argument is that the specific identity character of the EU in the field of Security and Defence is formed through interaction between different social representations. These notions of certain type of social being, he argues, are deeply rooted and institutionalized at national level and naturally project themselves in the institution-building and decision-making processes in the EU\textsuperscript{19}.

The debate about the emerging European Strategic Culture also involves thorough examination of ideas and norms with regard the ESDP. It is argued that what determines action in the IR is circumscribed by threat perception and ideas about how to face them. This includes the important question of use of force, its application, the need of domestic authorization and the preferred mode of international cooperation.

In the light of the recent ESDP developments, strategic culture is mentioned as an objective in the European Security Strategy\textsuperscript{20}. The call of this fundamental ESDP document for strategic culture at a European level has not been left unnoticed by academia. Upgrading this specific national feature to the EU level inevitably invokes europeanization research interest. In

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid. pp.238
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid pp.238
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} European Council “A Secure Europe In A Better World - The European Security Strategy” pp. 13
attempt to establish if there is normative convergence in the use of force and international activism, Meyer skillfully identifies dynamic processes that exercise pressure over MS strategic cultures. Another study of Meyer’s involves a comparison between the strategic culture dynamics in the biggest EU member states. However, Denmark is not mentioned in his research.

1.3. Denmark’s security and defence policy

Danish strategic culture in particular has been the focus of Rasmussen’s work. By mapping the foreign policy discourse dating back to the 19th century, he explains the strategic behaviour of Denmark after the end of the Cold War. He points out that armed forces were seen as a means of international cooperation which (with Denmark being a traditional neutral and multilaterally-oriented state) was high on Danish FP agenda. Rasmussen’s arguments provide for an important link between the history of perception of military force and international role with the current developments in ESDP. Another study that uses discourse analysis with regard to Danish strategic orientation and Danish EU Affairs is carried out by Larsen. He distinguishes between two competing discourses about the EU’s role in international security. He traces their development over time but does not relate the policy decisions that originate from them to europeanization processes.

The works mentioned above touch upon the important question of Danish foreign policy orientation and strategic objectives, issues that have central place in this paper. The existing

literature gives various accounts for Denmark’s foreign policy decisions and international activism throughout the 1990s without any particular reference to europeanization. For instance, Holm argues that the end of the Cold War was a window of opportunity for Denmark to pursue its FP objectives that were hindered before the 1990s, i.e. ensuring democracy and human rights, pushing for sustainable global economic and social development. However, Holm continues, this active international policy is on the decline since the negative vote in 2001 in the referendum for the Euro and because the government has become increasingly restricted by domestic factors. Olsen and Pilegaard do not go that far in their skepticism regarding the future of Danish foreign policy activism. Basing their argument on empirical studies from three ESDP military missions, they assert that the coalition power of Denmark has not decreased. However, they warn that if the gap between Danish strategic objectives (spreading democracy, multilateralism, international involvement in peacekeeping, peace-enforcing and humanitarian aid) and the restricted ability to act (ESDP opt-out) continues to exist, it will lead to an increasing political burden for Denmark in the international arena. In a later work, Olsen identifies that this moment came by 2005 when ESDP had already gained momentum and Denmark had articulated FP objectives in line with those of the EU, but could not afford to pursue them due to the defence exemption. In these circumstances, the Danish credibility in the international arena becomes increasingly threatened. He concludes that this leaves only one possible option for Denmark- to seek active NATO engagement and cooperation with the US.

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24 Hans-Henrik Holm, “Danish foreign policy activism: The rise and decline”
Following this argument, in the light of Danish involvement in the Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, Mouritzen argues that Danish FP in the field of security is characterized by “super atlanticism”\(^2^7\). This argument is in line with Mouritzen\(^2^8\) and Holm’s\(^2^9\) previous works which emphasized that Danish policy towards the EU is an exception of the overall FP activism after the end of the Cold War. The opposite point of view, as outlined above, is put forward by Olsen, Pilegaard and Larsen\(^3^0\). However none of the two camps has particular interest in the dynamics of this process with regard to getting closer to the positions and objectives of the EU. Although there is a lot of literature on Danish FP, it is certainly state-centered and does not refer to processes of convergence/divergence between Danish and EU security policies.

These are some of the opinions about the Danish security and defence orientation that sketch the main dilemmas for the Foreign Policy of Denmark. These studies, although important contributions, do not research the interrelation between the strategic objectives of Denmark and those of the EU, neither do they focus explicitly on similarities/differences in the ways of achieving them. Europeanization is definitely omitted with regard to these issues.

To sum up this chapter, although there is growing interest in the areas of ESDP and Europeanization, there is almost no research that covers both fields. The Danish specific experience in ESDP is not left unnoticed, but the literature so far focuses almost exclusively on the political and strategic consequences of the opt-out. In this paper I try to overcome this shortcoming and examine the overlap and convergence between Danish and EU ideas about

\(^2^7\) Hans Mouritzen, “Denmark’s New …”
\(^2^9\) Hans-Henrik Holm, ”Denmark’s Active Internationalism: Advocating International Norms with Domestic Constrains” in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook1997, eds. Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Affairs), pp. 62
\(^3^0\) Henrik Larsen, „Danish CFSP Policy in the Post Cold War Period: Continuity or Change?”, Cooperation and Conflict 35:1 (2000)
providing security as well as the readiness to create EU mechanisms of governance. For this purpose I will draw on the existing literature of the foreign policy orientation of the EU and Denmark in its normative version. In the following chapter I will outline the theoretical and conceptual basis of my research.
Chapter 2: Theory and Concept

2.1. Conceptualizing Europeanization

As outlined above, there are a number of different understandings of Europeanization. This research field has been dominated by diverging operational concepts. The paper aligns with the research that takes Europeanization as bi-directional vertical process. In other words, here it is acknowledged that national projection in the formation of EU-level preferences (uploading) exists, but at the same time it is also emphasized that there is substantial influence of community norms, rules, agencies and leadership towards national policies. These two directions of Europeanization make an especially good case when considering norms and perceptions. However, it is important to note that establishing the cause for Europeanization (national projection or EU influence) is not the purpose of the paper.

My operational concept of Europeanization in the Security and Defence policy of Denmark seeks to examine two main sets of elements. The first one is security perceptions and the second – readiness for creation of EU-level mechanisms of governance. I will take as a starting point of EU and Danish articulation of positions about these two from the end of the Cold War and around the preparation of the Treaty of European Union (TEU). I assume that even as early as the inception of CFSP there is some overlap between Danish and EU positions as regard the two sets elements I look at. I will follow the process and indicate further convergence/divergence.

In analyzing the perceptions of security and readiness for EU governance mechanisms, I will go beyond immediate decisions and look for long-term trends in foreign and security policy.
In doing so one can easily limit the research to what Taylor calls brute facts\textsuperscript{31}. Another approach, employed here, is to focus interest on the meaning attached to the material reality and analyze the ‘social facts’. Therefore, the social construction of reality is central to the policy decisions and the interpretations of international environment. It is not the material reality, but endogenous cognitive processes and social interaction that shape our understanding of the world. In other words, the facts we study ‘are facts only by human agreement’\textsuperscript{32}. Such a point of view is in line with the constructivist school of international relations.

### 2.2. Constructivist Lens

Ideas are central for constructivists. In opposition to the rational approaches in IR, the constructivist school emphasizes the constitutive nature of ideas with regard to interests. The latter are seen as pre-determined by the existing ideas and concepts. Therefore, any systemic explanation of interest-formation is irrelevant in the constructivist framework. Instead it asserts that ‘identities, interests and behaviour of political agents are socially constructed by collective meanings, interpretations and assumptions about the world’\textsuperscript{33}. A central definition, which is a point of divergence for different versions of constructivism, is the exact relation between reality and ideas, i.e. what happens as opposed to what we think happens. In this work the existence of material reality is not denied. However, it is seen as socially emergent and can be understood only in terms of studying our ideas and perceptions about it. Adopting such understanding of international relations inevitably raises the question of how ideas, meanings and interpretations are established and where they come from. Two approaches can

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\textsuperscript{31} Charles Taylor, “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man” in *Interpretive Social Science*, eds., Paul Rabinow and William Sullivan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979)


\textsuperscript{33} Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” *European Journal of International Relations* 3:3 (1997), pp.324
be discerned – the first one emphasizes that social understandings and identities ‘arise from
the result of the action and interaction of individuals’. The second one argues that
individuals are structural idiots and meaning ascribed to phenomena lies in ideational social
structures beyond individual cognition.

Alexander Wendt gives a rather parsimonious definition of the basic tenets of constructivism.
He asserts that first ‘the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared
ideas rather than material forces, and [second] that the identities and interests of purposive
actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature’. This particular
constructivist understanding about ideas is also found in Adler. According to him ideas
constitute ‘collective knowledge, institutionalized in practice’ and it is this structural nature of
the social reality that circumscribes agents’ actions and determine their limits. Therefore, he
continues, there are ideas and identities which are intersubjective in the meaning that they
exist independently of the individual agents. To this we should add that ideational structures
are dynamic and can be subject to change. In fact they are constantly evolving because the
meaning embedded in ideas ‘arises out of social interaction, which creates intersubjective
knowledge which in turn constitutes identities’. This structuration approach posits that ideas
and identities are the dynamic outcomes of the constitutive process between agents and
structure. Based on such notions about the international environment, one can look at ESDP
not simply as an instrument for foreign policy action, but also as a structure of shared
meanings, that are shaped and reproduced by the actors operating in the ESDP context.

37 Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle…” , pp.325
38 Ibid p. 327
The agency-structure debate within constructivism is supplemented by another no less important problem – how to study ideas. If we assume that they are central to our understanding of reality, then this methodological issue becomes central to any study that rests on constructivist ontological grounds. The interpretation of attached social meaning to material reality cannot be assigned to an ‘objective observer’ in the meaning given by Goltstein and Keohane⁴¹. Studying the behaviour of individuals raises the question about the account given to this behaviour by an individual (and therefore subjective) observer. Since every individual is situated in a shared structure of meanings and ideas, it is a conceptual contradiction to assume that such an analysis will reveal the actual meaning of ideas and actions. Instead, ‘actions must always be understood from within’⁴². Despite the intersubjectivity of ideas, it is only their emergence on the surface of the social structure through social interaction that we can study. This certainly puts limits to any understanding of the world but this is a lesser evil than adopting ontologically inconsistent starting point of research.

Therefore, in studying social interaction, constructivism focuses on the means of interaction, i.e. language. In short, if we want to study reality, we first need to unravel the ideas that shape our understanding of it, but the only way to do so is to examine them on the surface of human interaction. Although ideas are intersubjective, the agent’s use of them is also meaningful⁴³. Moreover, it is only through this use that ideas interact and create social structure of understandings and meanings. The means of human interaction is always language and ideas are interpreted and implemented through it. Consequently, in order to understand ideas one

⁴² Martin Holis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) pp.72
⁴³ Ibid. 396
needs to study language, and given that the ideas are central to social reality, ‘we cannot know
the world independently of the language we use’\textsuperscript{44}. This way of entering the structure of
shared understandings uses discourse analysis as a method to study what is behind human
actions and what determines them.

\textbf{2.3. Discourse Analysis}

Discourse analysis is a way of studying reality, understood through language. It was already
pointed out that regardless of the constitutive relationship between reality and ideas, the latter
reveal themselves only through social interaction. As language is the primary means to carry
out such interaction, studying it gets us closer to the nature of the world. A traditional view of
language in the IR literature on beliefs and ideas sees ‘language as transparent’\textsuperscript{45}. This means
that language is a mere conveyor of meaning and does not have its own dynamic; it is only a
vocal/written representation of something that exists outside and independent of it. This
positivist notion is not shared by Saussure, who believes that there is no deterministic relation
between meaning and language. In his terms, the relation between signifier (language) and the
signified (meaning) is an arbitrary one. The existence of variety of sound forms of the same
meaning (different languages) is indicative to this arbitrariness\textsuperscript{46}. Therefore, language is seen
as a structure of signifiers that derives its meaning from the difference between its own
elements (words). This structural view differs from the positivist one in assuming that
language is dynamic but agrees that the meaning of ideas is outside language.

\textsuperscript{44} Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle…,” pp. 326
\textsuperscript{45} Henrik Larsen, \textit{Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France Britain and Europe}, New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 1997) p.9-10
This problematization of the relationship between language and meaning is not shared by the post-structuralists. For this train of thought, meaning is not independent of language, and nothing will be lost if we focus entirely on language in order to understand social reality. Unlike the structural view, post-structuralists assume that no meaning can be fixed on language and it is constantly being constructed. In the words of Der Derian and Shapiro, the opaqueness of language makes it impossible to penetrate and establish if there is something beyond it. Thus meaning and ideas are language itself and they are constantly on the move with it. In my interpretation of language I will not go that far and will assume that although the ‘signifiers’ can be shaped by individual creativity and change meaning, ideas and meaning exist behind language. The concept of something is not emergent through language but represented and shaped by it. I do not follow the positivist approach to language but also do not share the post-structuralists’ view of its sameness with meaning. In the words of Henrik Larsen:

There has to be some substance or content before we can speak of meaning: pure general language has no meaning in itself. And as soon as we enter into the substance, we do not find a general system of meaning but special systems whereby meanings of words differ from system to system, from discourse to discourse.

The discourse analytical standpoint here is focusing on the centrality of the social values ascribed to language in a given substance. In our case, the substance is Danish and European Foreign Policy and Security and Defence Policy. In this particular context I will study the discourse of meanings assigned to different phenomena of relevance to these policies. For this reason I will adopt a macro view of discourse, as shaping social processes. At the same time

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47 Michel Foucault, *Archeology of Knowledge*, (Sheridan Smith New York : Pantheon, 1972)
49 Henrik Larsen, *Foreign Policy and Discourse*..., pp. 14
the construction of ideas will be followed mainly on a structural level. Although I do not deny
the existence of critical situations in which individual agents can change discourse, such an
idea will not be the guiding light in this paper. After all, although there are meanings that are
immediate result of certain decisions, they are produced the setting of the circulating
ideational system of a society.
Chapter 3: Denmark and the Europanization of security and defence policy

This chapter provides the empirical focus of the study. Based on the limitations of the existing literature outlined in Chapter 1 and the theoretical approach described in Chapter 2, I will examine some aspects of the Europeanization of the security and defence policy in Denmark. The chapter proceeds with a historical outline of some crucial events in Danish history. Then I map the main political discourses in Danish foreign and security policy. In section 2 I examine the different ideas about EU’s security role in Copenhagen and Brussels and compare them to one another throughout the period 1990-2008. Section three deals with the Danish attitudes towards defence cooperation and their relation to the advancement of EU-driven ideas about common defence policy. In the fourth section I look at the anti-terrorism policy in the EU and Denmark and seek ideational overlap embodied in political language and policy actions. Finally, I examine the ideational influence of the EU with regard the comprehensive security concept. Every section concludes with a short discussion of the main findings and europeanization effects in the respective area.

3.1. Danish Foreign Policy and Security Discourse

As was already pointed out, discursive practices shape perceptions of social phenomena in the field of foreign and security policy. The structural nature of ideational construction suggests that this process takes place over long periods of time. A discourse can hardly emerge within several months, or even a few years. For this reason it is important to provide a brief historical overview of how the foreign policy discourse in Denmark was shaped.
3.1.1 A Historical Outline

Denmark has a long history of neutrality. The neutral trend started during the first part of the 18th century and was significantly reinforced during the 19th century. The traumatic experience during the Napoleonic wars and the subsequent loss of Norway to Sweden created a powerful debate in Denmark about the meaning of aligning with any of the major powers in Europe. International relations were increasingly seen as a trap for Denmark because at any moment the country could be used for the interests of the powerful Russia, France, Britain and later Germany. This created a more introvert approach to international politics and a desire to abandon the international arena at the expense of creating a harmonious society. Since the former rivals in the European North (mainly Sweden, but also Finland and later Norway) had similar experience during the wars between the major powers, a continuous and broad understanding among the Nordic countries emerged with regard to foreign policy and neutrality. Moreover, the Nordic neighbours of Denmark were seen as fellow-men in terms of sharing the same societal values about cooperation, welfare and peaceful resolution of conflicts with legal means and consent from all the parties. As a result, a powerful drive for Nordic cooperation emerged, which later in the 20th century was termed one of the four cornerstones in Danish International relations. This discourse was shaped primarily by the idea about the uniqueness and importance of Nordic values for Danish society. Moreover, the Nordic (and Danish in particular) value system was seen as different from that of the rest of Europe and the world. It was considered central for the peace, prosperity and beneficial

51 Ibid.
52 Mikkel Rasmussen, What’s the use ..., pp.73
53 Per Haekkerup, “Danmarks udenrigspolitik”, (Copenhagen: Fremad, 1965) quoted in “Danish foreign policy activism: The rise and decline” Hans-Henrik Holm in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2003, eds. Per Carlsen and Hans Mouritzen (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Affairs, 2003), pp.7; the other three are the UN, NATO and EC/EU
international cooperation of the Nordic countries. Thus Danish ideas of neutrality, cooperation and welfare were understood as the way others can also improve their own well-being and prosperity.\textsuperscript{54}

### 3.1.2 Cosmopolitanism and Defencism

In this historical background scholars distinguish two different discourses about Danish engagement in international relations with regard to the use of force. According to Rasmussen, the first is a ‘cosmopolitan’ discourse which is Scandinavian in nature and regards the use of military force as unnecessary. It accepts defence forces with protective functions only as much as they are not involved in power politics.\textsuperscript{55} The long historical neutrality-seeking trend naturally stems from this approach. With regard to foreign policy it emphasizes the use of non-military means and spreading Scandinavian values through international assistance, development aid, and inter-state cooperation. The second powerful discourse, termed by Rasmussen ‘defencist’ is not based on the uniqueness of Danish values. This posits that threats should be deterred through military means and stresses the importance of military alliances and military action.\textsuperscript{56} According to this view, Denmark should be an active part of the European security architecture.\textsuperscript{57}

The cosmopolitan and defencist discourses represent two opposing structural perceptions of Danish foreign policy role and use of military means. Justifications of Danish international activity can be sought in each of the two. For instance, one can easily refer to Scandinavian cosmopolitanism when looking for the reasons behind the neutrality-trend of Denmark. On

\textsuperscript{54} Mikkel Rasmussen, \textit{What’s the use} ... pp.73
\textsuperscript{55} Mikkel Rasmussen, \textit{What’s the use}..., pp.73
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Elemann-Jensen quoted in Mikkel Rasmussen, \textit{What’s the use} ..., pp.73-74
the other hand, joining NATO after the Second World War was clearly grounded in defencist idea about Danish foreign relations.

3.1.3 Non-privileged and Essential Cooperation discourses

In his scholarly work on Danish policy towards the EU, Larsen delineates two competing ideas with regard to the security role of the EU. The first he calls ‘non-privileged cooperation discourse’, which emphasizes that the EU should not play any essential role in IR and security. The EU is seen as constraining the member states’ foreign policies in an attempt to create a super-ministry of foreign affairs around the CFSP. This relates to the traditional Danish fear of being used for the purposes of major European powers, which opposes any federal ideas about the EU future. The role of the EU according to this discourse is therefore limited to the internal market and should not have any security implications. The defence opt-out is paid a lot of attention in its role to prevent the danger of building a European super-state and to put a strong limitation to Danish participation in European integration.

The second discourse is the so called ‘essential cooperation’. According to this the EU is considered an ‘anchor for European security’ and should enhance its role in this field. Within this view CFSP and ESDP are looked at positively. In this discourse the activities of the other important international fora meet in the EU and upgrade its role in the international relations. This, however, holds true only within certain limits. For example, the essential

59 Henrik Larsen, “Denmark and the ESDP…” pp.82
60 Pernille Reiker, Europeization of… pp.130
61 Henrik Larsen, “Denmark and the ESDP…” pp.82
cooperation does not imply further integration in the field of defence or creation of European
army. The task of common defence is ascribed to NATO and the alliance is seen as the
safeguard of Danish territorial integrity\textsuperscript{63}.

It is important to note that both discourses have a primary functional view to the EU, i.e.
Danish actions do not stem from a reference to the mythological role of the Union, but from
the utility that it brings for Denmark\textsuperscript{64}. These two different sets of ideas are the grounds for
particular foreign policy decisions. It is important to note that Danish political culture requires
a broad political consensus and a referendum before any transfer of national competences to
the EU level, which is embodied in the art.20 of the Danish Constitution. Therefore the
political discourse about EU’s role in security is certainly not limited to the political elite but
circulates among the Danish public and shapes the attitudes towards the EU.

3.2. EU’s security role in the international affairs

Both CFSP and ESDP are driven mostly by the role that the EU assigns to itself in
international security. The way this is understood in Denmark is fundamental for the
perceptions of all EU activities in the field. In a way this broader security concept is later on
reflected in all policy areas. This is why examining the perceptions about the EU’s security
image gives us stable grounds for analysis of other related phenomena.

3.2.1 The EU

\textsuperscript{63} Henrik Larsen, “Denmark and the ESDP…”, pp. 83
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid pp.82
Before the beginning of the 1990s there was very little done in the EU in terms of cooperation in the political aspects of foreign affairs. The Union had competences in international trade and development, but not in the spheres of high politics. There was the loose process of European Political Cooperation (EPC) which was kept outside the formal frameworks and did not have any official instruments. However with TEU changed things radically and the EU took up the post-Cold War challenge to step on the international arena. The creation of CFSP was the answer to the old problem of speaking with one voice.

After the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty the EU received an opportunity to use the West European Union’s capabilities. This meant that the CFSP already ‘include[d] humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’\(^{65}\). Nevertheless this gained significance only after the St. Malo summit, when Great Britain and France agreed on establishment of ESDP. This new policy was first implemented in 2003 and served an important part of the EU’s security role ever since. This is still the main crisis management tool of the EU both with civilian as well as military capabilities. Its speed-light development created a new role of the EU as a security provider and internationally engaged political union.

3.2.2 Denmark

In the 1980s Denmark was not among the strongest supporters of the EPC\(^ {66}\). The center-right political parties in the government (Conservative Peoples’ Party and the Liberal Party - Venstre) continue to see NATO as the appropriate international security forum. At the same time the Danish government was forced by the opposition to make big concessions on its

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\(^{65}\) Official Journal C 340 of 10 November 1997

\(^{66}\) Henrik Larsen, "Danish CFSP Policy…", pp.52
NATO positions, which became known as the so called ‘NATO footnote policy’. The more cosmopolitan parties from the left were firmly grounded in the discourse tradition of non-provocation and non-use of force. They were supportive of universalist and all-European organizations, such as the UN and OSCE. The new international circumstances brought about with the end of the Cold War triggered further cosmopolitan activism. With the demise of the Soviet threat, a new window of opportunity was opened. Denmark could increase cooperation with the countries from Eastern Europe and the Baltic region and export its vision of democracy, international partnership and global justice without the fear of confrontation with the USSR. Simultaneously, the EU was the only political model left in Europe and increased its international standing. Both Denmark and the EU had the same objectives at the beginning of the 90s: exporting democratic values, peaceful transition, conflict prevention and encouraging economic development with market economy rules.

The cosmopolitan discourse attached important meaning to the CFSP as an essential European undertaking which can put forward Danish perceptions about democracy and norms of cooperation and partnership in the international scene. The official Danish foreign policy documents at the time expressed this idea that the EU needed ‘unity and consistency in the performance of the Union internationally’. The concept of unity was broadened from the national level to include the security role of the EU. A crucial element was that the end of the Cold War and the new security environment were interpreted in Brussels and Copenhagen in the same way. Both the EU and Denmark made the same of the new situation and naturally engaged in a similar way of pursuing the new FP objectives. In this process the EU was seen as essential partner that used its international influence to promote important ideas about integration, peace, prosperity and justice. The marriage between the cosmopolitan and

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68 Danish Government ,“Memorandum…”
essential cooperation discourses was embodied in the broad political agreement and the adoption of the TEU by the Folketing with 130 votes in favour and just 25 against\textsuperscript{69}.

The negative result of the referendum for ratification of TEU in 1992 was not detrimental to the perception of the EU as important security actor. The trend for strong commitment to the CFSP was already rooted in traditional Danish perceptions about IR. Yet, it showed that there was a gap between the political elite and the population as regards the EU’s international role. This, however, seem to be true only about the defence common defence aspects of this role. The turnout in the vote was more than 82% which indicated the importance assigned to the Danish EU affairs by the public. However the slight majority of 50,7% of the votes against the ratification meant that the essential cooperation with the EU still not unconditional for the society. The otherwise marginal political actors managed to trigger the traditional fear of creating an EU-supper state and EU army which eventually produced the ‘No’-result of the referendum\textsuperscript{70}. Besides, there were the issues of common currency and justice and home affairs policy that furthered the fear of the EU going in an unacceptable federal direction.

Therefore at the end of the 80s and right after the end of the Cold War there was a major change towards upgrading the international role of the EU. This view of essential cooperation saw the EU as ‘anchor to European security’. The political elite was particularly supportive of such idea, yet the population did not share the this view due to the uncertainty about the direction in which CFSP would be going. Danish politicians also had their reservations towards CFSP and the cooperation in defence matters, but this was not seen as an impediment for continuing the integration. After all, Denmark only opted out of some aspects of the integration and just defence cooperation, not political and foreign policy cooperation.

\textsuperscript{69} Gorm Olsen and Jess Pilegaard, “The Costs of…”, pp. 346

\textsuperscript{70} Interview
Most important in this period was that the end of the Cold war was perceived in both Denmark and the EU in the same way. Moreover, they both expressed willingness to enhance their international role and work for achieving the same objectives: multilateralism, legal order in the IR and promotion of democracy. Although Denmark did not fully join the CFSP, the foreign policy orientation already rested on strong cosmopolitan grounds that also gave priority to international role connected to the EU.

The EU’s and Denmark’s positions about defence cooperation were the only point of divergence. However, since the foreign policy objectives of both were rooted in the same perceptions of the international environment and the role in it, it was natural to expect that this will not bring major problems in foreign policy. In reality the opt-out was activated on several occasions, which otherwise represented a good opportunity for Denmark to achieve its FP objectives. This had only symbolic implications at the time and Denmark stayed supportive of the EU’s foreign policy and security role. This is clearly discernible in the commitment to the CFSP expressed at the 1996 Intergovernmental conference by the Danish delegation.

A number of European countries wish to improve ways of effectively taking on humanitarian tasks, crisis-management and peace-keeping efforts in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter. The Danish Government believes that EU Member States should have the opportunity of participating in the performance of such tasks if they so desire. This would increase the EU’s ability to help in resolving foreign and security problems.

71 Henrik Larsen, ”Danish CFSP Policy…”, pp.51-53
73 Henrik Larsen, ”Danish CFSP Policy…”, pp. 49
The essential cooperation discourse became the mainstream vision of the EU’s role in security and was expressed on numerous occasions. In the political debates about this issue, it is clearly discernible that besides the importance ascribed to the Union, the EU was also seen in strong normative nuances. As then Foreign Minister Helveg Petersen put it:

Today we need the Union for three main reasons… First, we need the Union for reasons of security…Secondly, we need the Union to produce common solutions to common problems… Thirdly, we need the Union to promote our values and defend our interests at the global level…

After the change of government in 2001 the perception of a strong international role for the EU was preserved. The new Prime Minister, Andres Fogh Rasmussen, saw the EU as an important security provider. He considered that through the EU ‘…we must achieve a secure Europe. The EU must guarantee its citizens’ safety and security’.

We must strengthen the common foreign and security policy through better coordination of EU policies on the international stage. We must enhance the ability of the EU to act in crises and to render assistance to EU citizens internationally.
Therefore, support from the early 90s continued and grew throughout the whole period. With a special emphasis to norms and values. There was a very positive perception of the EU’s security role and the essential cooperation discourse rooted deeply in the debate about this issue. The political language showed advancement from the acknowledgment of EU’s importance (‘anchor of security’) to the pro-active stance directed in enhancing abilities and strengthening the CFSP. In this background political actions showed determination and commitment to work towards unity in the international political affairs of the Union. It is important to point out that the discourse about EU’s role was constructed entirely around perceptions that favored the Union as project for peace, security provider and signifier of values inherent in the Danish society like freedom and democracy.

3.2.3. Europeanization

To summarize my main findings, the role of the EU in the post-Cold War was perceived in the same way in Copenhagen and in Brussels. This was crucial to the formation of deep stable political perception of the EU as an ‘anchor of security’ and to the continuous Danish commitment to CFSP. The end of the Cold War in itself created room for different ideas about the new security situation in Europe and EU’s role in it. However, the commitment to the same values in IR predetermined the sameness of the outcome. Both the EU and Denmark were strong supporters of promotion of peace, democracy, development, integration and cooperation and naturally chose the same way of achieving these objectives – through active international engagement. Denmark saw in EU an opportunity to implement its ideas about the post Cold War world and this forum quickly become a strong focus of Danish FP. Therefore, there was almost full overlap in the ideas about EU’s security role, a trend which is still present in Danish political discourse. This Europeanized vision was persistent in time and
proved that the EU and Denmark have very close perceptions of the EU’s role in IR thus becoming a fertile ground for converging positions in the future.

3.3. Cooperation in Defence

Defence is usually perceived as inherent to the state and relates intimately to national identity and independence. This field of high politics was a novelty in European integration in 1992 and triggered sensitive questions about the extent to which the EU should assume MS competences. The new mechanisms of governance in this field are meaningful to the overall process of European integration and identity construction.

3.3.1 The EU

According to article J.4. of the original version of TEU, the EU committed itself to ‘eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence’\(^{77}\). Later on, after the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam the word ‘eventual’ was changed to ‘progressive’\(^{78}\), and this indicated the desire of the MS to take further steps in common defence. A major step in the defence cooperation was taken in 1998 when at the St. Malo summit Great Britain and France agreed on an EU’s security and defence policy. Later on the European Council decided on the establishment of military force under direct EU command, Defence College, European Defence Agency, own headquarters and financing mechanism and independent intelligence. To add to that there was a reform in the Council of the EU which received a plethora of new bodies to support the ESDP defence matters.


\(^{78}\) Consolidated version of the Treaty of European Union Eur-lex *Official Journal C 340* of 10 November 1997
These developments were in the core of the institutional build up of ESDP and the over twenty deployments since 2003. These brute facts however were ascribed a different meaning in the EU. Two competing understandings of the ESDP can be distinguished. First of all, the originally French idea was to establish a military arm of the EU that is independent of the US and NATO. Therefore, France did not save energy to emphasize how the EU approach to security was different and how important its autonomous nature is. The other discourse argued that ESDP is a useful tool for crisis management but should be developed with close cooperation with NATO without duplicating and discriminating the Alliance. Also, although this view was supportive of defence cooperation, it was totally disapproving of common defence. Over the last 10 years all the developments in ESDP were centered around these two competing views and all the decisions by the EU and MS were interpreted in the light of this discursive antagonism.

3.3.2 Denmark

The Danish perception about EU cooperation in defence matters was constructed against the background of three different discourses. The first one was about the use of military force, the second – about the role of NATO and the third - about the EU’s international role.

As was already outlined, the cosmopolitan discourse emerged as a dominant one in the IR of Denmark at the end of the 80s and beginning of the 90s. It was supplemented by the traditional perception of the IR system as compartmentalized between different organizations with specific roles. Although the role of the EU was enhanced, NATO also kept its important position in the field of defence. Moreover, with the commitment to cooperation, political

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dialogue and promotion of comprehensive approach to security that involved social, economic and environmental dimensions, NATO gained even more recognition\textsuperscript{80}. Besides its traditional role in defence, after 1990 it received also a value-based profile and was not seen in Denmark as the only option to choose from as it was right after the Cold War, but rather as an international organization, attached to defence and cooperation in line with the Danish understanding. Through the political dialogue and the Partnership for Peace, the perception of military force turned from a coercive means into a way of furthering international cooperation. This approach was embraced by Denmark in its support to the Baltic States’ young militaries.

Thus the cosmopolitan value-based discourse and the defencist positive view on military force were merged and upgraded the role of NATO in the post Cold War world. NATO’s role was recognized as Danish and the country became an active member and close ally to the US. This was sustained throughout the 90s which can be seen by the Danish military deployments in the Gulf War, Kosovo and later in Afghanistan and Iraq.

With this background the defence dimension of CFSP was considered as interference in tasks assigned to another pillar of the Danish foreign policy (FP). Moreover, there were fears both among the elite and the public that this might be the first step to a European army and European super-state. Such traditional negativism was attached to the debate on EU defence dimension and naturally produced an opt-out of the integration.

However, third background already in place was that the EU had a significant role in international security. The essential cooperation was the dominant political discourse among

\textsuperscript{80} NATO, “The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council”, 8 November 1991 \url{http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm}
almost the whole spectrum of the political elite\textsuperscript{81}. The EU was viewed as an important factor in security and the sub-debate of defence cooperation had to be constructed in the framework of this perception. The EU and Denmark’s views on the post-Cold War security in Europe stemmed from the same understandings of IR. Therefore, with the unfolding of the events, naturally the two positions were very much overlapping. The defence opt-out represented a single-vote result that was provoked by otherwise marginal popular movements. The fears of an EU army proved to be wrong over time and naturally Danish governments returned to the guiding idea about EU’s important security role. This triggered the political elite to seek a way to participate in defence cooperation too.

Although the use of the opt-out was very limited and definitely symbolic\textsuperscript{82}, already by 1996 it was clear that Denmark was not happy with the status quo. In the preparation for the negotiations of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Danish clearly showed that they supported the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks\textsuperscript{83}. The support to soft military missions was in line with Danish perception of dealing with international threats, be they direct, indirect or outside the borders of Europe\textsuperscript{84}. Support was articulated on a variety of occasions by the political elite. It could not be otherwise since the fundamental ideas about the EU and post Cold War security were overlapping since the early 90s.

The opt-out represented a very unpleasant legal matter\textsuperscript{85} rather than a genuine policy tool for the Danish governments. Naturally, with every further step in defence matters in the EU, Denmark expressed discontent and frustration about its self-imposed limitations and tried to

\textsuperscript{81} An exception to this are the Socialist Peoples’ Party (Socialistik Folkeparti – SF) and the Danish Peoples’ Party (Dansk Folkeparti - DF); While DF favoured closer ties with NATO, SF did not approve of defence engagement in neither of the fora; See Henrik Larsen, "Danish CFSP Policy…", pp.45
\textsuperscript{82} Gorm Olsen and Jess Pilegaard, “The Costs of…”
\textsuperscript{83} Henrik Larsen, "Danish CFSP Policy…", pp. 49
\textsuperscript{85} Author’s interview, 10.04.2008
find a way to get closer to the inner circle. Thus after the St. Malo declaration the then prime minister, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, widened Danish maneuvering space within CFSP and stated that Denmark could participate in the discussion about the future of military cooperation and this would be fully in line with the defence opt-out\(^6\). Indicative of the dilemma that the Danish government was facing are the words of the foreign minister, Petersen:

> The defence exemption is a political reality. It has impact on Denmark’s participation in European crisis management. It put limits to our role in European security. This was not what we had in mind when we negotiated the national compromise.\(^7\)

After the inception of the ESDP Denmark made all necessary administrative adjustments and participated in all ESDP working groups (except the one for the European Defence Agency)\(^8\). Also, the military reform in Denmark was fully in line with the crisis management concept and the Battle Group concept of the EU\(^9\). However, institutional adjustments and participation in civilian missions were the limit of Danish activity in ESDP. The gap between the ideas incorporated in Danish FP and the available maneuvering space deepened after the start of the first military deployments of ESDP. By 2005-6 the problem spread to another favored forum for security cooperation – the UN and thus endangered another cornerstone of Danish FP. The words of the current Foreign Minister Per Moller are self-explanatory in this case:

\(^{6}\) Poul Rasmussen quoted in Henrik Larsen, "Danish CFSP Policy…", pp.50
\(^{7}\) Pernille Rieker The Europeanization of … pp. 137
\(^{8}\) Gorm Olsen, "Denmark and ESDP" pp.26-27
\(^{9}\) Ibid pp.27-28
As a matter of fact, we can end in the paradoxical situation where Denmark will one day sit in New York and ask the EU to carry out crisis management tasks for the UN. But when the next day we sit in the Council of Ministers in Brussels, we may have to abstain from heeding the call of the UN, which we have actively participated in getting through the Security Council . . . The opt-out prevents us from participating in a number of areas where the EU takes on the responsibility for meeting the new challenges which are also ours: To make peace and security in our neighbouring areas.\(^90\)

The opt-out problem stemmed not from different perceptions of IR, but from a very unpleasant and out-dated restriction. It created consequences for both the international image of Denmark, because, as minister of defence Trojborg warned in his annual declaration, the country could be marginalized because it was not legally allowed to do what it had committed to\(^91\).

### 3.3.3 Europeanization

The europeanization effect in Danish policy towards cooperation in defence matters is clearly discernible. From the beginning of the 90s when the Danish delegation opposed to the inclusion of such a clause in TEU, the progress to ‘the paradoxical situation’ was very logical. Stemming from the same perception of use of force and the same idea about the EU’s role in IR, the ideational overlap between Danish and EU positions makes the opt-out look increasingly obsolete. Defence cooperation is a desired element of European integration for Denmark and this can be seen in the discourse about it in the country. The main prevailing ideas about the use of force as tool for cooperation and crisis management to tackle indirect

\(^{90}\) Ibid. pp.355
\(^{91}\) Pernille Reiker, *Europeanization of..., pp.138*
threats clearly show that. Not only is the political elite supportive of abolishing the exemption, but a similar trend can be also observed among the public. The population was getting more and more supportive of the EU foreign policy role and common defence aspects. In 2001 about 78% of the Danes were in favour of joint EU decisions on defence. Another survey from 2005 indicates that a significant majority of 69% was in favour of common European defence policy, which is an increase from previous years\textsuperscript{92}. In terms of policy and public perception this represents a true evidence of europeanization based on ideational factors.

As regards the direction of ESDP and the opposing discourses about the degree of autonomy of ESDP and its relation to NATO – europeanization process cannot be identified as long as there are competing views in the EU itself. Denmark still preserves the dominant role of the Alliance in the security discourse. Moreover, it sees ESDP as a NATO ally which will support the alliance in its international tasks and at the same time bring the Americans closer to Europe\textsuperscript{93}. The importance of NATO interoperability and experience is strongly emphasized by the political elite too. In the words of one military expert from the Danish delegation to the EU, if NATO did not exist, there would not be ESDP\textsuperscript{94}.

\subsection*{3.4. Fight against Terrorism}

The measures taken to prevent terrorism after 2001 represent an interesting example of EU influence in the spheres of both internal and external security. Although anti-terrorism is not

\textsuperscript{92} Gorm Olsen, "Denmark and ESDP" pp. 28
\textsuperscript{93} Author’s interview, 10.04.2008
\textsuperscript{94} Author’s interview, 10.04.2008
in the core of ESDP itself, it represents an important part of the EU security policy understood in broader terms.

3.4.1. The EU

Terrorism was not a major issue in the EU before 9/11. Although it had been discussed, no reference was made to joint EU activities. After 2001 the Union severely condemned terrorism and opposed it to the liberal democratic values. However, the threat was not constructed as the significant other and therefore, did not attract the same intensity of measures like in the US. Terrorism has not been used to promote military build up or interventionism – things that the EU traditionally has been very reserved to. Therefore, the terrorist shock did not change the EU’s perception of its own international role, and the Union FP continued to be based on multilateralism, strengthening the international legal order, and peaceful long-term preventive measures like integration, fighting poverty, etc.\footnote{Henrik Larsen, *Analyzing the Foreign Policy…* pp. 98-101}. This approach has been stipulated and reconfirmed at all the major fora of the European Council after 9/11\footnote{See European Council, “Conclusions And Plan Of Action Of The Extraordinary European Council Meeting On 21 September 2001” pp.2-3 \url{http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/140.en.pdf}; European Council, “Declaration on combating terrorism 25 March 2004” \url{http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/DECL-25.3.pdf}}. Although the European Security strategy opens for eventual use of military means for anti-terrorism, the EU has never resorted to this, and there has been no reference to future activities of this kind\footnote{European Council, “A Secure Europe in a Better World – The European Security Strategy” \url{http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf} pp.7}. Instead, the Union has used its international networks of cooperation with regional organizations and states to promote its preventive and multilateral approach\footnote{Council of the European Union, “Summary of remarks by Gijs de Vries, EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, at the joint conference of the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council on Combating Terrorist Financing”, pp. 2-3 \url{http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/83998.pdf}}.
The EU has adopted a comprehensive approach to terrorism and the external and internal aspects of it have been looked at as two sides of the same coin. International multilateralism has been closely linked to justice and home affairs aspects (JHA) and the EU has significantly strengthened the cooperation in police and judicial matters. The European Arrest Warrant and border control, among others, have been significantly strengthened and used as one of the main tools to implement the anti-terrorism policy of the EU.

3.4.2 Denmark

Just like in the EU, before 2001 terrorism was not a primary concern in Denmark. Although it was mentioned among other threats in official government reports, it has stayed on the margins of political attention. However after 9/11 the issue quickly gained salience and found its permanent place among the top priorities of Danish FP. It has been said by the current Prime Minister A.F. Rasmussen to be among the biggest concerns for Denmark. Besides, the political attention, terrorism has been given ontological status and has been referred to as ‘significant other’ in Danish FP. This is clearly discernible in the language used by all the prime ministers since 2001. Right after 9/11 the then Prime Minister P.N. Rasmussen referred to international terrorism as follows

99 Henrik Larsen, Analyzing the Foreign Policy of a small state in the EU: The Case of Denmark (Houndmills, Hampshire: Palgrave: Macmillan, 2005), pp. 84
100 Ibid. pp. 78-84
101 Friis Petersen, “The International Situation and Danish Foreign Policy” in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2002, eds. Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Affairs, 2002), pp.4
102 Danish Prime Minister’s Office, “Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s speech at the EU Conference of the Confederation of Danish Industries and CO-Industri on Thursday 31 January 2008” http://www.stm.dk/Index/dokumenter.asp?o=6&n=0&h=6&t=14&d=2975&s=2
The attack in New York and Washington is not simply another terrorist attack. It is not simply an attack on two cities in the US. It is a ruthless attack on everything we represent: … everything that sustains the concept of democracy.\textsuperscript{103}

This articulation is not an isolate one and has been constantly repeated by the political elite. The reference of the current Prime Minister to the war on terror as a ‘struggle between good and evil’\textsuperscript{104} in 2008 is a strong indication about the deeply rooted ideas in Denmark about the imminence of the threat. Terrorism was constructed in the political discourse as a negation of what is cherished and seen as sacred by the Danish state and society. This opposition of values (democracy and freedom on one hand, and ruthless terror on the other) originated from the cosmopolitan discourse in Denmark. The new threat was seen from a value-based point of view and threatens the very basis of Danish society. Naturally, this provoked a robust response involving variety of anti-terrorist measures.

The well-established essential cooperation idea about the EU triggered Danish reaction to terrorism that was in line with the perception of the post-Cold War world and EU’s role in it. Denmark followed the EU approach seeking active multilateralism and cooperation in all security fora\textsuperscript{105}. In the words of the Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs in 2001: ‘Both bilaterally and through our membership of international organizations such as the UN , EU, NATO and OSCE, Denmark contributes with all available means to the ongoing efforts…’\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{103} Quoted and translated in Sten Rynning, “Crusading for Democracy? Denmark as a Strategic Actor? Danish Security Policy after 11 September 2001” in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook, eds., Per Carlsen and Hans Moritzen (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Affairs, 2002), pp. 28

\textsuperscript{104} Danish Prime Minister’s Office, “Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s speech at the US Chamber of Commerce, Washington D.C., 28 February 2008” http://www.stm.dk/Index/dokumenter.asp?o=6&n=0&d=2991&s=2

\textsuperscript{105} Henrik Larsen, Analysing the Foreign Policy … pp. 90-93

\textsuperscript{106} Also see Danish Prime Minister’s Office, “Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s Speech at the UN Security Council Summit Meeting on 14 September 2005” http://www.stm.dk/Index/dokumenter.asp?o=6&n=0&h=6&t=14&d=2389&s=2
Also Denmark has emphasized the importance of development aid and dialogue with the Third World in the fight against terrorism.

The cosmopolitanism in the understanding of terrorism was also supplemented by defencist elements. Denmark considered the use of military force as a way to deter terrorism and diverged from the EU standpoint. With its active support to the US and participation in Afghanistan and Iraq military campaigns, Denmark has shown very strong determination to fight off terror, including with office. This is particularly visible in the way political language shaped the idea of terrorism as totally intolerable. In a speech given to the UN Security Council on 14 September 2005, Prime Minister A.F. Rasmussen clearly showed that no exceptions in the field of anti-terrorism policy can be made: ‘Terrorism can never be justified. Terrorism is never a legitimate weapon. The targeting and deliberate killing of civilians is unacceptable. Full stop’.  

In the official documents of the Defence ministry as well as in the last Defence Agreement it can be clearly seen that Denmark sees important role of the military in fighting terrorism: ‘The goals of Danish Defence are the following: to counter direct and indirect threats to the security of Denmark and allied countries…’ Furthermore, Danish defence considers terrorism an enemy no matter where it emerges and is expected to act accordingly: ‘the priority of security policy should be aimed at possessing the capability to counter the threats

107 Danish Prime Minister’s Office, “Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s Speech at the UN Security Council Summit Meeting on 14 September 2005”
http://www.stm.dk/Index/dokumenter.asp?q=6&n=0&h=6&t=14&d=2389&s=2
http://forsvaret.dk/NR/rdonlyres/73BAB725-750E-46C8-8786-7C59D9DAD18C/0/ENG_Forligstekst.pdf
where they emerge, regardless of whether this is within or beyond Denmark’s borders. The role assigned to NATO in the anti-terrorism also bears the mark of defencist discourse.

The defencism however applies meaning only to the one part way terrorism should be tackled. More importantly, this discourse builds upon the already prevalent cosmopolitanism and EU essential cooperation idea. In other words, although defencism manages to get through and justify use of force against terrorists, this is only valid as long as there is a normative meaning assigned to terrorism. This in turn comes from the cosmopolitan view of IR. Moreover, Defencism brings differences in the approach only as much as force is concerned. The other part of the anti-terrorist policy is still constructed by the strong essential cooperation discourse, and naturally EU multilateralism and long-term preventive measures are internatlized.

Therefore defencism brought some elements of divergence from the EU, especially in the external aspect of anti-terrorism. The internal measures were largely drawn from the EU, especially in the field of legislation, where references in Danish laws were made to EU legal texts. As a result internal and external aspects of anti-terrorism are seen as separate, with the internal clearly relating to essential cooperation and EU mechanisms and the external-originating both from defencism and links with NATO and EU ideas and practices at the same time.

### 3.4.3. Europeanization

109 Ministry of Defence Denmark, “Security and Defence Policy”
http://forsvaret.dk/FMN/eng/Security+and+Defence+Policy/
110 Ministry of Defence Denmark, “Danish Policy in NATO”
http://forsvaret.dk/FMN/eng/Security+and+Defence+Policy/Danish+Policy+in+NATO/
111 Henrik Larsen Analysing the Foreign Policy..., p. 96
The time frame 2001-2008 is rather short and this may create limitation for drawing stable conclusions. Nevertheless, it is clearly discernible that there is a significant overlap between EU and Danish approach to anti-terrorism. Both emphasize the role of international organization, multilateralism, long-term preventive measures, etc. There is fundamental agreement about the nature of threats in the post-Cold War environment and the way how they should be dealt with. Moreover, the stable grounds of the deeply rooted essential cooperation discourse provide for an important link between the EU and Danish approach. At the background of cosmopolitan-essential cooperation merge, the defencist discourse brings about only a slight difference in the external activities and the use of force to deter terrorism abroad. This also rests on the traditionally strong links with NATO.

Merging the main ideas of Danish FP in a single policy suggests long-term stability in the approach of Denmark. Also it creates slight divergence from the EU perception of use of force. However this is constructed against essential cooperation understandings which trigger the biggest part of Danish anti-terror policy. It is indicative how close Denmark has moved to EU measures in JHA, although the state has opt-out in this field. Although the country is not a formal part in JHA and defence aspects of ESDP, significant influence from the EU is present. The key reason for this is the overlap of strategic objectives and perceptions about the post-Cold War security environment.

3.5. Comprehensive Security Approach

The idea of comprehensive security has increased its popularity significantly after the end of the Cold War. Due to change in perceptions about the nature of the threats it has become increasingly common to view security beyond the traditional divides external-internal and
civilian-military. Studying the discourse about the nature of security threats gives clearer idea about the influence between Denmark and the EU in the field of security.

3.5.1. The EU

The EU is a leading actor in the field of comprehensive security. Although this relates more to policy implementation, behind it there are stable perceptions of the contemporary threats and sustained understandings about the way to tackle them. The political language used Delors indicated that as early as 1991 security was perceived in a new way beyond the preoccupation with territorial defence and prevention of crime\textsuperscript{112}. The union has continuously advanced its efforts to address also issues like border external border control, food safety, social security and environmental protection. A clear emphasis on the need of proper instruments has been put from the highest political level. In the words of Solana:

\begin{quote}
I am convinced that security in Europe in the twenty-first century is increasingly multi-layered. It will require a wide range of instruments\ldots\textsuperscript{113}
\end{quote}

The EU has developed a variety of mechanisms throughout the 90s to address internal security issues in a comprehensive manner. With the creation of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice, the Union targeted a wide range of problems – from fundamental rights to judicial and police cooperation, to visa policy and border control. Simultaneously the institutional build up has followed the political discourse and EUROJUST and EURPOL were created. The strong political discourse in the EU about comprehensive security is consistently followed by policy implementation. The first steps taken with the Treaty of Amsterdam were

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{112}] Jacques Delors “European Integration and Security”, speech given at IISS in London on 7 March, 1991, Europe Documents 1699
\item[\textsuperscript{113}] Xavier Solana “Europe: Security in the Twenty-First Century”, speech given at SIPRI, Stockholm on 20 June, 2001 http://about.sipri.se/activities/lect.html
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
accelerated after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the EU put the comprehensive approach on top of its agenda\textsuperscript{114}.

In the field of external security the EU has pursued to enhance cooperation and establish political dialogue with the regions of potential instability - Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. The prevailing perception was that insecurity is created through non-traditional dangers like human and drug-trafficking, trans-border organized crime, poverty and regional instability. This concept was embodied in the development of a broad network of regional partnerships such as the Barcelona Process, the Stability and Association Pact, the enlargement process and later on the European Neighbouring Policy. With the creation of ESDP the EU acquired valuable crisis management tools that included both civilian and legal components capable of covering all the spectrum of crisis management operations. In this framework an increasing attention is paid to civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC) and the cooperation between the Community policies and CFSP in the field of security.

3.5.2. Denmark

In contrast with the EU, Denmark did not focus on a comprehensive approach to security. The issues concerning the internal sphere were viewed traditionally until the late 1990s\textsuperscript{115}. However, the EU comprehensive security discourse triggered developments that forced Denmark to act. With the Treaty of Amsterdam the Schengen \textit{acquis} were moved from the JHA to the first pillar of the EU thus allowing qualified majority voting. Denmark could not participate in the new institutional structure because it disagreed with the new voting procedure and insisted on keeping all JHA issues intergovernmental. This gap between the EU and Danish view of tackling security issues did not impede the integration process, but

\textsuperscript{114} Pernille Rieker \textit{Europeanization of…}, pp.38-44
\textsuperscript{115} Pernille Rieker \textit{Europeanization of…}, 140-144
rather increased fears of marginalization in Denmark. This lead to the increasing realization in Copenhagen that steps should be made to avoid marginalization in an important sphere of the integration. Thus in the years 2000-2001 both defence minister Haekkerup and foreign minister Lykketoft referred to the EU as example in the security approach.\textsuperscript{116}

It is important to stress that until this point in Denmark threats perceptions were still operating in the traditional framework\textsuperscript{117}. After that some adaptations were maid in order to avoid marginalization. In the internal security aspect the defence minister Gade showed increased concern in the civilian preparedness capacity\textsuperscript{118}. Also the Defence Ministry developed a concept of the so called ‘concerted planning and action’ (CPA), aimed to increase the civilian-military cooperation. This change was certainly triggered by the long-standing EU discourse of comprehensive security. At the same time the EU was more and more seen as a main security actor (see section 3.2.). The dominant essential cooperation discourse therefore triggered adjustments by Denmark, yet they were not based on any stable ideational grounds.

In the field of external security, although Denmark was one of the first European countries to carry out military reforms in the 90s and create specialized internationally deployable military force (Danish International Brigade – DIB), it did not consider incorporation of civilian component in its crisis management capabilities. Only as late as 2004-5 did the Defence Ministry introduced this novelty:

\begin{quote}
we have introduced a new concept in our defence agreement: Concerted planning and action of civil and military activities – for short CPA….. CPA is
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[116] Ibid. pp.145-6
\item[117] Ibid.
\item[118] Ibid. pp.143
\end{footnotes}
about coordination of all civilian, including political, economic and legal elements, and military efforts during all phases of an operation….119

In the framework of ESDP Denmark could not participate in the military aspects. Yet, it showed great interest in the civilian dimension. The fact that at 2001-2002 the government’s official documents and the political language did not incorporate any significant reference to CIMIC and comprehensive security however show that this activism might have been instrumental. Yet it was encouraged by the EU and in 2002 a Danish police officer was appointed the first head of EU civilian mission120.

3.5.3. Europeanization

The overall acceptance of the comprehensive security approach in Denmark was partial. Perhaps it ends with the promotion of EU/NATO enlargements and development aid to third world countries. These policies, although very limited, could have been important parts of the comprehensive security agenda. However, this concept simply did not exist in the Danish politics in the 90s. It was not part of a broad political and societal understanding of how to deal with the new security challenges. The opposite, it was triggered by the EU developments and somehow came as a late response to them.

It is important to note however that the fear of marginalization in the EU security policies itself was seen in Denmark as a threat. By the mid-90s the essential cooperation discourse were generating perception of the EU as a leading actor in IR and security. Therefore, the

120 Pernille Rieker Europeanization of…, pp.114-116
lagging behind in the comprehensive security was compensated with a strong desire for cooperation with the EU. This produced change in the way security policy was perceived in Denmark. The recent Danish initiatives of both the Foreign and the Defence Ministries in CIMIC, CPA and the introduction of the homeland security concept clearly indicate that. However, these changes are not likely to have been a result of deeply internalized perception of security at this point, but rather an instrumental change.

Therefore as regards the concept of comprehensive security we can see some convergence in the two approaches triggered by the dominant Danish perception of the importance of the EU in security issues. Although Denmark and the EU recognize the same problems as the new security challenges, the Danish approach to facing those rests on different ideas. The importance of the EU’s security role and the recent activism of Danish agencies suggest that ideational transfer is taking place from supranational to national level. This europeanization process is now in its embryonic stage as regards comprehensive security, but it is likely to quickly advance due to the prevailing idea of the leading security role of the EU.
Chapter 4: Testing the Theory: A Neo-Realist View on Denmark and ESDP

In this chapter I will present an alternative view of the Danish policy towards CFSP/ESDP. In order to test the constructivist approach, I will briefly present a neo-realist explanation of the same issues discussed in the previous chapter. In the last section I will compare the two alternative approaches and draw conclusions about the advantages of using constructivist point of view.

4.1. Basic Tenets of Neo-Realism

Neo-realism is a variation of the oldest and very rich tradition of IR realism. The latter has been artfully and extensively theorized by Hans Morgenthau who is said to be its founding father. He formulates its main principles that guide the theoretical analysis of this school. In short Morgenthau sees the world politics as rooted in the human nature, i.e. man’s desire for power. There is no central authority and therefore international relations represent an anarchical system without a sovereign. States are the main actors in the IR and they are autonomous, rational and unitary. They operate in self-help circumstances, in which ensuring your own survival at all costs (including destruction of others) is the primary objective. State interests are formulated as a means of maximizing power, where power is understood explicitly by military capabilities. The underlying ontological assumption of neo-realism is, therefore, the reproductive nature of the IR system. In other words, it does not account for the transformation in the way of making politics, but rather in the variable circumscribing structure of the world distribution of power.

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According to this school of thought, state security can be improved through internal military buildup or externally, through military alliances. Looked through realist lenses, relative power gains matter most, i.e. increasing one’s security decreases the security of others. Therefore, for neorealists the structure of distribution of power is of utmost for state behaviour. The world structure gives the constraints within which states act. In the words one of Kenneth Waltz: ‘A system is composed of a structure and of interacting units. The structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible to think of the system as a whole.’

Traditionally the world structure is seen by the neo-realists as unipolar, bipolar or multipolar depending on the distribution of military capabilities.

4.2. Propositions for Denmark-ESDP relation

Analyzing the dynamics in Danish-EU relations with regards security, neo-realists are likely to emphasize the following factors. First of all, the end of the Cold War improved significantly Danish and European security removing the Soviet threat. Second, in the subsystem of the Baltic region there was a security vacuum after the dissolution of the USSR which also increased the security of Denmark. Third, German reunification represented a potential threat, because of the stronger role that Germany could play in European security. In a neo-realist view, however, this was mitigated by the fact that both countries were part of the same military alliance. Therefore, Denmark had the opportunity to constrain its powerful neighbour through binding it stronger to NATO and strengthening the organization from within. This also explains the proactive role that Denmark adopted in the alliance after the end of the Cold War.

122 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 79
Danish refusal to join CFSP would be considered by the neo-realists as a clear sign of bandwagoning with the global hegemon – the US. On the other hand, CFSP and later ESDP in this view would represent the balancing ambitions of the EU. Denmark chose to side with the hegemon and did not participate in the countering attempts of the EU. The traditional preoccupation with territorial defence also would be considered important in this case – since Denmark is the only EU state with possessions in the western hemisphere (Greenland), it was important to maintain good relations with the US.

Another argument in support of the neo-realist explanation is that Denmark has always been against creation of EU army. Increase of EU military capabilities have been very small and insignificant as opposed to the US might. However, Denmark would be not supportive of further steps in this direction and would try to prevent them. In neo-realist view this can include abolishing the opt-out and entering the voting mechanisms in order to keep EU away from the balancing game. At the same time Denmark will be expected to participate actively in US-led missions and interventions, like it did in the Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.

### 4.3. Constructivism vs. Neo-Realism

The systemic approach of neo-realism makes viable propositions for this concrete empirical case. However, having the system as a unit of analysis and adopting a state-centric approach greatly limits the discussion. Thus the neo-realist approach does not explain why Denmark

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decided to check German power only though NATO and not also though the EU. Also it is not clear how exactly entering the CFSP in 1992 would deteriorate Denmark-NATO relations. At this point and in the next years there was zero activity in the field of defence cooperation in the EU. Neo-realists also omit the important question about Danish support to EU military missions and the approval of incorporation of the Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty of Amsterdam.

A further limitation of this approach is related to Danish support to a strong EU role in IR and adoption of EU approach with regard to long-term conflict prevention, fight against terrorism, multilateralism, etc. Neo-realism also would not account for Danish activity in all the international fora after the Cold War and the increased cooperation in defence aspects with the former enemies from the post-Soviet space. Borrowing legal norms and concepts from international organizations in the sphere of home affairs and justice is also hard to explain behind neo-realist glasses.

Instead, a constructivist approach that focuses on the perceptions of the global change in 1989/1990 would give a clear account of all these issues. By emphasizing what states make of the post-Cold War world and how they perceive their roles in the new security environment, one can better understand the reasons behind their actions. Therefore, analyzing the political discourse in Denmark and the ideas rooted in Danish politics provide us with much clearer view and show the explanatory power of constructivism in IR. Furthermore, the focus on the structural nature of perceptions and gradual change in meaning indicate that there is continuity in understanding about the reality, which is mirrored in further political statements and actions. Therefore, the constructivist can make viable predictions about the ideational
dynamics and the future actions that will stem from the attitudes and perceptions attached to reality.
Conclusion

The findings of this paper indicate that there is a significant overlap and convergence of ideas about security between the EU and Denmark. The ESDP as a main concentration of activity in this field is a bridge between the national and supranational level. Thus europeanization spreads in the areas of security and defence. This happens by means of ideational impact from the EU and convergence of fundamental beliefs and understandings about the post Cold War reality.

In interpreting the international security role of the EU it is clear that Danish and European ideas overlap almost fully. This created a powerful discourse about the role of the Union in IR which further triggered convergence of other concepts in the field. A striking example is the increasing readiness of Denmark to participate in the EU mechanisms of governance in the defence area. The common understanding about the use of force and the roles of NATO and EU makes it increasingly illogical for Denmark to stay outside this cooperation. This conclusion is reinforced by the growing frustration of the government about the current ‘paradoxical situation’ and the increasing popular approval for full participation in CFSP. The most recent political debates in Denmark clearly show that the removal of the opt-out is not a matter of ‘how’ but ‘when’.

Europeanization effects are very strong in the field of anti-terrorism policy too. Although Denmark has had some differences in its approach in the past, they are becoming less and less with the time and adoption of EU ideas about internal and external measures. This view is enhanced by the finding that as regards the comprehensive security concept, Denmark shows significant progress and move closer to the EU understanding of it. At this point the
Europeanization operates mainly through adaptation and adjustments. Furthermore, the political will for introducing major reforms expressed over the last few years indicates that conceptual transformation is also starting to take place.

With the increasing importance of JHA in fields where Denmark adopts purely EU ideas and approaches, this opt-out also faces the country with increasing political burden. Just like it happened in the mid-90s with the defence opt-out, the fundamental importance of the essential cooperation discourse is making this exemption increasingly obsolete.

The opt-outs in defence and JHA contradict basic ideas about IR and security that are deeply rooted in Danish political discourse. However, this did not impede the process of Europeanisation. The opt-outs are now understood in Denmark as policy tools pre-determined by political reality that is conceptually outdated. Therefore, it is very likely that we soon witness renewed political efforts to abolish the exemptions. This will certainly increase the standing of Denmark in European security affairs and open up new horizons for further deepening of Europeanization in security and defence.
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