THE IMPACT OF TURKEY’S POTENTIAL MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION ON THE ATTEMPTS TO CREATE A EUROPEAN IDENTITY

By
Marina Ilminska

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Supervisor: Professor Uwe Puetter

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ABSTRACT

Turkey is a unique case in the EU enlargement history, because no other state that was granted a candidate status had to wait for so long or stirred up such a heated debate about economic, political, cultural, and religious suitability. It is important to investigate Turkey’s potential role in a European identity, because it would influence not only attempts of a deeper communal integration but also future enlargement(s), foreign policies and governance tactics of the EU. Case-studies focusing on Turkish diasporas’ cultural and social integration in Germany, France and the UK were used in order to be able to project Turkey’s fitting in a European identity if it joins the Union. These states host about 70% of Turks residing in the EU, and some correlate diasporas’ level of integration to the way mainland Turks would integrate into the European community if Turkey joins the EU. Findings of the research led to two possible answers. If Turkey were to join the EU in the near future, it would not have a positive impact on a European identity. If Turkey joins in 2017-2020 (the projected accession date), then the probability of its positive impact on a European identity would be greater.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Turkey is a unique case in the EU enlargement history, because no other state that was granted a candidate status had to wait for forty years (fifty if accepted by the projected date) or stirred up such a heated debate about economic, political, cultural, and religious suitability (Manço 2004; Nas 2002, p.228; Tonge 2005). On one hand, Turkey holds memberships in several elite European organizations, being in the Western bloc after WWII, later joining the Council of Europe, the OECD, and NATO (Nas 2002; Preston 1997; Tonge 2005). It even participates in the events organized for and by the European community like the UEFA Cup and Eurovision. On the other hand, it remains unclear where is the fine line that determines the ‘Europeanness’ of Turkey.

Thus, this thesis will attempt to investigate Turkey’s cultural and social suitability together with the concerns raised by the public, politicians and academics. In particular, social and cultural integration of the three largest Turkish diasporas that reside in Germany, France and the UK will be analyzed. The research question of the thesis is “What is the impact of Turkey’s accession on the attempts to create a European identity, based on the experience of Turkish diasporas’ cultural and social integration in Germany, France and the UK?” Finding the answer is important not only for the reason of learning about the possible impact on a European identity, but, as some claim, it will also determine the future enlargement(s), foreign policies and governance tactics of the European Union (EU). The hypothesis is that Turkey’s accession would not contribute positively to the project of European identity creation.

The next sections describe historical development of the relationship between the EU and Turkey, explain why diasporas, the three member-states and European identity were chosen for the investigation. Chapter 2 describes the methodology. Chapter 3 discusses notions and importance of European identity in general, then in Turkey and the three member-
states specifically. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are dedicated to the analysis of Turkish diasporas’ integration in Germany, France and the UK, respectively, and to what this integration means to the attempts of creating a European identity. Chapter 7 contains the answers to the research question and the hypothesis, as well as some suggestions that may help to improve the integration quality.

1.1. A Brief Summary of the Relationship between Turkey and the EU in Light of the Accession

Turkey’s application for an associate status was approved along with the one from Greece in 1959 (Preston 1997; Nas 2002, p.225). In 1981, Greece joined, but Turkey did not. Immediately Greece started a lobbying campaign against Turkey’s membership (Preston 1997, p.212), but at the end of 1999 it switched to being supportive (BBC 1999). Greece has not been opposing potential membership ever since for the sake of Europe’s peace and security, but Sarkozy’s latest peculiar attempt to establish an alliance with Greece, including Turkey’s membership issue (GreekNews 2008), may change Greece’s position again.

When it comes to the EU membership, Turkey has witnessed six enlargements that welcomed 21 countries to the Union. Even two of its neighbors, Malta and Cyprus, to which Jacques Delors referred as “Mediterranean orphans” succeeded in joining the ‘club’ (Preston 1997, p.210). One of the suggested reasons why other Mediterranean states were accepted is because of the claim that small states, like Cyprus and Malta, have little if no power in the decision-making of the EU; on the other hand, Turkey would represent the opposite case (Preston 1997, p.211). Considering its population size and respective potential representation in the European Parliament and the Council, it would create a strong competition to the current largest states that hold the most voting power (Germany, France and Italy being the top three).
The main obstacle for Turkey on the way to its full membership has been to prove that it is ‘European’, as it is a pre-condition for the membership according to Article 23 of the Rome Treaty (Preston 1997, p.7), and that it fits the concept of ‘identity’ (Preston 1997, p.213). Nas states “Turkey stands on the threshold of difference” due to its different religion, life-style and societal organization (2002, p.222). Preston adds that such countries as Turkey will remain an “uncomfortable question” and serve as a “reminder” to the EU when dealing with further enlargement and European identity issues (1997, p.226). The Turkish side claims that it has always been European, but the EU is more skeptical about this claim. Some claim that Turkey reoriented its political and policy courses towards Westernized prototype only after creating the Republic in 1923, but not earlier (Preston 1997, p.213). Enneli et al (2005) point out a noteworthy fact: taking into account Turkey’s struggles to join the Union and the fact that currently the size of Turkish diaspora living on the EU territory (officially three million, unofficially five) is larger than some of the EU member-states, it is amazing that one of Turks’ biggest problems in the relationship with the Union is cultural and social integration, even though eight out of ten Turkish people currently living in Europe were born and educated there (p.1).

Due to reoccurring problems with Turkey’s EU application, the EU was named “a club with an ever-expanding rule book”, which applied “double standards”, and “[a club] in which one party will apply the rules of the other party’s club” (Preston 1997, p.9), which probably did not contribute positively to the EU’s reputation. Because of such EU behavior, a reaction that was provoked from the Turkish side was communicated through the slogan, “[…] adaptation can only be one-sided. The Turkish nation will gradually lose its identity. It will adopt Christian European culture. In that case the integration may be realized. But Turkey ceases to exist” (Nas 2002, p.227).
Birden, who claims to represent a view of Istanbul, states that France and Germany, along with Austria, were to blame for the delay in the opening of the accession talk: France for rejecting the EU Constitution, Germany for “promoting the idea of a privileged partnership”, and Austria for playing the trade game, meaning it would allow to start the negotiation talk if it is also started with Croatia as another candidate state (2006, p.5). But Turkey was most thankful to the British minister of foreign affairs, who pushed for the ratification of the Framework Document (Birden 2006, p.5), and the UK still strongly supports Turkey’s potential EU membership.

The feedback received from Turkey regarding the official start of the accession talk (October 3, 2005) was mixed too. While the party in power at that time (AKP) considered it a success; the opposition (CHP) was convinced that it would bring Turkey to a privileged partnership only (Birden 2006, p.5). One of the messages sent from the Turkish side was “[…] Turks may become a part of European civilization while at the same time preserving their culture” (Nas 2002, p.224). This is exactly the question of interest of the thesis: whether the preservation of Turkish culture if and once it is a part of the EU culture will complement or damage the attempts to create a unified European identity. In either case it will impact the future image of Europe and the EU (Birden 2006, p.5; Nas 2002).

1.2. Recent Developments

The latest development of the relationship between the Union and Turkey is not very positive (Eurobarometer 2008; Transatlantic Trends 2007). The relationship took a “negative turn” after the EU suspended 8 out of 35 chapters which form the accession negotiations (Transatlantic Trends 2007, p.21). In France, the change of presidents also caused a change in the official position towards Turkish membership, from being supportive during Chirac times
(BBC 2004) to strongly opposing since Sarkozy became the president (The New Anatolian 2005).

As for the EU membership, the percentage of the Turkish respondents who are supportive of it has been dropping steadily. In 2004 it was 72%, but in 2005 it dropped to 62%, even though that was the year when the official membership talk started (Birden 2006, p. 5). It dropped even more from 54% in 2006 to 40% in 2007, while European views remained relatively stable during the same time, where 42% of the European respondents viewed Turkish membership as a neutral thing and 31% opposed it, with France and Germany (49% and 43% respectively) leading the opposition camp (Transatlantic Report 2007, p.22). Although when asked whether Turkey will ever join the EU, a surprising result came from Germany (see the chart below). The fact the Germany currently strongly opposes the membership but still thinks that Turkey will join the EU as another member-state in the future is unexpected. Moreover, it ranked in the top three in regards to this belief.

![Chart 19](chart_19.png)

** UK and Germany are 1st and 3rd columns from the left respectively; France is 2nd from the right

The results of the UK and France are logical. The UK as a strong supporter and France as a fierce opponent of Turkey’s membership reflect their positions on Turkey’s potential
membership respectively. The UK found several allies for itself during the last two enlargements (Ross 2008, p.395), and possibly this is the reason why it is a strong lobbyist for Turkey’s membership.

1.3. The Role of Integration

There is a significant correlation between the degree of Turks’ integration in the EU community and the obstacles that Turkey has to overcome on its way to possible membership. The kind of interaction and co-existence that Europeans experience with Turkish diasporas affect public opinion and political statements about Turkey’s potential membership (Manço 2004).

One may argue that other candidate-states, i.e. during the times of southern and eastern European enlargements, had to go through the same resistance which was triggered by the old member-states, therefore the resistance that Turkey is dealing with is nothing new. The reason why the resistance is stronger this time was suggested by Manço (2004): Southern Europeans were seen as “good immigrants”, while the ones from the Muslim world, in this case represented by Turkey, are viewed as “bad immigrants”. Moreover, Turkey’s case is different for several other reasons.

Firstly, Turkish diaspora is the second largest non-European in the EU (Manço 2004) and exceeds total population size of certain EU members. Secondly, significant interaction of Europeans and Turks in the EU started sixty years ago, but it is still “one of the lesser known communities” (Manço 2004), which may explain why hardly any studies were identified in the case of the UK and France. Thirdly, even though Turkey claims that it is discriminated for being Muslim and tries to explain by it integration failures, Manço pointed out that non-Turkish Muslims have a greater degree of integration and more successful experiences with the European communities (2004). Fourthly, current heated debate made political elites
question the whole enlargement policy, and the outcome of it will determine the future of ‘members-want-to-be’ (Aktar 2006).

Therefore, it makes it particularly important to analyze the degree and quality of integration of Turks in various EU states in order to be able to predict how Turkey and its people would contribute to the attempts to create a European identity. An example that would help to support this claim is a contradiction of facts that was found in the literature. While Turkish policymakers’ belief that guest-workers will eventually return to their homeland is constantly decreasing, as the former renamed the latter into “our citizens abroad” (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p.107-108), some poll data brought up by Kazmierkiewicz (2005) shows that most of Turkish respondents (80%) claim that they would like to return to their homeland.

It is also important to look into Turkish youth’ perceptions on the EU and the accession process, because if Turkey is accepted as another member-state, the current youth will be the one to join the Union. The study done by Özdemir, which he claims is “the biggest ever youth research in Turkey”, in which 24,571 students participated (n.d., p.2), is used here to get an idea how Turkish youth views Turkey-EU relationship. Even though 70% of the respondents were supporting potential membership, only 7.5% and 59.5% considered themselves as being either “well-informed” or “alittle informed”, respectively, about the EU; 60% saw it as a “threat” to Turkish culture and values, but 76% and almost 50% believed that the membership would contribute to a greater respect for human rights and ethical values in Turkey (Özdemir n.d.). Another vital finding is that only 7% of the respondents defined the EU as a Union of shared values, which means that the youth does not see it as a cultural union, even though the EU claims to be one (Özdemir n.d., p.4).

Another attention-grabbing finding of the survey concerns Turkey’s accession date. The reason why it is alarming is because 21% of the respondents believed it would happen in 2007, and 32% believed it would happen in 2010, which is obviously not correct in either
case, as the earliest projected accession date ranges from 2014-17 (Hakura 2005; Tonge 2005) to 2023 (Aktar 2006), which may mean that Turkey waited for the highly desirable membership for six decades (see the chart below):

![Bar chart](image)


These answers may be explained by previously mentioned results which concern the lack of knowledge about the EU and obviously about Turkey-EU relations. According to Özdemir these topics are not popular discussions among youth and are not covered well by academic programs; the only access to relevant information is through mass media (n.d., p.5-7), the influence of which will come up again throughout the thesis.

The fact that 70% of the respondents expressed a desire to live in one of the current EU states (Özdemir n.d., p.9) may be viewed positively in light of the social and cultural integration and creation of a European identity. At the same time, this data should lack reliability because almost 60% of the respondents confirmed no prior interaction with an EU citizen (Özdemir n.d., p.9). The reason for wishing to live in the EU is because they associate
it mostly with western states and socio-economic well-being (Özdemir n.d., p.9). This perception is damaging to creating a well-rounded, all-inclusive, in terms of states and cultures, European identity.

These findings are important for the discussion and debate about a possibility to create a European identity in light of Turkey’s potential impact on it. Based on the described results of the survey, Turks’ smooth integration into whatever will be the definition of a European identity seems to be questionable.

1.4. Reasons for Investigating European Identity and Diasporas in the Three Member-States

Analyzing diaspora in Germany, France and the UK in light of its potential fitting into a European identity is legitimate for the following reasons.

A European identity seems to be important for further integration and other developments in the Union. Lutz et al (2006, p.1) claim that it is “a necessary precondition for [political system’s] stability and legitimacy” and that “it could become a force that helps to ‘uphold’ the European integration process also in moments of crisis induced by referenda outcome, decisions taken, national interest, etc.” (p.2).

One of the reasons why it was decided to analyze integration experiences of Turkish communities into EU societies is because there is an identified signaling correlation between their integration experiences and cultural and social integration of Turkey as another member-state in the Union if it is accepted. One of the observations made by Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) adds legitimacy to the claim of the existing correlation. She states that “the link between Turkish-German relations and the relationship between Germans and Turks in Germany is increasingly being made among policymakers in Germany” (2003, p.106).
Today approximately 3.9 million Turks live outside of Turkey (Crul 2007; Manço 2004; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p.108), which makes up 5.4% of its total population (71,892,807 million (CIA 2008)). Germany, France and the UK currently host 2.7 million, 500,000 and 300,000 of Turks respectively (Ersanilli 2007, p.2; International Crisis Group 2007, p.4; Kazmierkiewicz 2005). Therefore, these states take up almost 70% of Turks living abroad and represent examples that are significant for making predictions of potential Turkish integration into European community and becoming a part of a European identity. The sample size seems to be legitimate enough to conduct such analysis and draw predictions.

The third reason for such analysis is a supportive statement made by one of the deputies in the National Assembly that “their [Turkish people] presence is a lobby in and of itself”, especially when it comes to lobbying with the EU (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p.113). Thus, what kind of citizens or residents Turkish people are in host-countries impacts perceptions of host-communities about Turkey and its people in general. It should be noticed that if integration of Turkish diasporas in member-states was smooth and harmonious, there would have been less fear and resistance towards accepting Turkey as a member-state and less speculations about its potential effect on European community as a whole.

The fourth reason is existing strong ties between diasporas and Turkey, fed by messages sent by the Turkish government to its people abroad about how they should represent the country, which creates a relatively clear picture of Turkey’s intentions and vision of itself as an EU member-state, which, in its turn, is helpful in conducting analysis of how it would integrate into existing European community if accepted.

The fifth reason is based on the reoccurring observation that currently Germany, France and the UK are the key players on the EU decision-making and steering arenas (Eurobarometers 2008; Guérot 2008; Kazmierkiewicz 2005; Tiryaki 2006; Tonge 2005). Moreover, some claim that these three states will end up making the final decision regarding
Turkey’s membership (Behr 2008; Kazmierkiewicz 2005; Kazmierkiewicz 2006; Tiryaki 2006). Therefore, it becomes even more important to explore experiences of the host-communities in these states with Turkish diasporas. In light of criticism that currently some states are more powerful than others, Tsebelis (2008) brings up an option of making the Union more centralized in terms of decision-making power over certain political issues which will take away power from certain ruling member-states. If Turkey’s potential membership is a foreign policy decision as some consider it (i.e. Kazmierkiewicz 2005), which [the foreign policy] is in the hands of the member-states, then centralized decision-making should fix two challenges simultaneously: the creation of a common foreign policy for the Union and finalizing decision about Turkey’s potential membership.

The downfall of centralizing the decision making power is the fact that it will take away the power from the people and will reinforce the concern about political decisions not reflecting the will of the people (Tsebelis 2008, p.277-278). As some argue, having power and the will of the people in the formation, which includes deciding on a definition, of a European identity is crucial (Fröhlich 1999). It is important to keep this control in the hands of the current EU community in case of the final decision-making on Turkey’s membership as well, since it would impact not only political and economic types of integration, but also social and cultural (identity-wise) ones.

Once again, based on the described relationship between the EU and Turkey and noted reflections upon it, the hypothesis of the thesis is Turkey would not contribute positively to the project of a European identity creation if it joined the EU, based on the current degree of Turkish diaspora’s integration and concerns of the European public and politicians.

Some noteworthy factors that seem to influence the quality of the relationship between the two were identified already in the chapter. They are problems with accessing reliable information related to the EU activities and mass media influence. At the end policy
recommendations will be proposed focusing on how the relationship between the two actors may be improved, in particular the perception of each other, which should lead to a more welcoming attitude when it comes to Turkey’s potential membership.
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

In order to answer the research question only studies and reports that were specifically focused on the investigation of social and cultural integration of Turkish diasporas in the three member-states were picked for the analysis and comparison to the hypothesis of the thesis.

For the analysis of the integration level of German-Turks, a four-year study conducted by Eva Østergaard-Nielsen was chosen, which was published in *Transnational politics: Turks and Kurds in Germany* (2003). The study was full of information about the political activities of immigrant groups and reactions of institutions and other actors to these activities in Germany and Turkey. In addition, Østergaard-Nielsen personally conducted interviews with the government officials, policymakers, collected mass-media reports and correspondence, and participated in public events. The value of this material is that it contained up-to-date information that came from different sources and is helpful for analyzing Turkish integration situation not only in the past but also in the present and the recent concerns and policy implications that occurred since.

A report composed by the International Crisis Group on Turkish diaspora in Germany (2007) was used as well. The reason for this is that the organization does not represent an academic field, as is the case with the Østergaard-Nielsen’s study, thus it was interesting to track whether the two came to the same or different conclusions regarding Turkish integration. Also, it seemed important to use findings from different sources in order to insure that conclusions drawn in the thesis were not biased or lacked legitimacy. In addition, it was the most recent field-study on Turks that was published. As a complement, findings about German-Turks from the Ersanilli’s study (2007), which was mainly used in the French-Turks’ integration chapter, were added to the German case as well.

For the analysis of French-Turks integration and an attempt to apply their experience to the research question a study conducted by Ersanilli (2007), which focused on the analysis
of cultural integration of Turkish immigrants in France, Germany and the Netherlands, was used. The results concerning the Netherlands were omitted due to irrelevance to the main interest of the thesis. An added-value of Ersanilli’s research, which is particularly helpful for drawing thesis conclusions, is an analysis and comparison of integration degrees of up to three generations of Turks.

For the analysis of Turkish integration into the society of the UK, *Young Turks and Kurds: a set of invisible disadvantaged groups* study (Enneli et al. 2005), was used. There are several reasons why the study was chosen for the analysis and application to the hypothesis. First, a unique added value for the thesis is the authors’ analysis of the integration not only of young Turks who immigrated to the UK with their families, but also those who were born there. This allows to compare whether these two groups that had a different starting point socially had to face the same obstacles when integrating into the British society. Second, it is important to investigate situation of the young Turks and their expectations from the UK and the EU, because if Turkey is accepted as another member in 2017-2020, then they will be the ones who will actually join the Union. Third, the thesis discussion and conclusions in the British context will primarily rely on this study because hardly any other studies have been done on Turkish integration in the UK. The lack of conducted studies concerning Turkish integration in the UK was confirmed by Enneli et al (2005) and Parker (2005).

In order to answer the research question document analysis and multiple case methodologies were used.

*** There are brief references to Parker’s (2005), Manço’s (2004) and Crul’s (2007) publishings during discussions of all case-studies.
CHAPTER 3: VIEWS ON EUROPEAN IDENTITY

In order to estimate how Turkish community would fit into a European identity it is important to investigate what definitions are currently debated in the academic, public and political circles. It is also vital to get an idea about how Turks, French, Germans and Britons see and/or define a European identity and whether they think it plays an important role for further development of the EU. This is what this chapter is dedicated to.

Fröhlich raises the question of defining a European identity and trying to determine its place in the contemporary European society. He points out that the concepts of national identity and unified Europe may seem to be contradictory (2003, p.39). He states that eventually the concept of national identities in cases of some member-states, possibly the ones with high ethnic and migrant minority percentage (Germany, France and the UK seem to suit the profile), may be outdated, and the way he sees the relationship between the two is a European identity outgrowing a national one (Fröhlich 2003, p.39). If a working definition of a national identity is “not being different from others” and a matter of what a nation was in the past (Fröhlich 2003, p.45), then it should not be a problem for candidate-states to realize that by entering the Union their countries start new chapters of their history, including an identity one. It was also mentioned by Bancks that national identities are less flexible when it comes to dealing with changes, because they are based on “common descent lines and homeland” (2007, p.14). Thus, the process of creating a common European identity should be more flexible because these descent lines and territory are much bigger and nations are aware of the size and diversity that they are about to join.

Fröhlich suggests that normative theory defines what and who belong to Europe, but it does not imply a final answer (2003, p.44). Thus, it is possible to construct an identity. The only two ingredients that are required are the will of the people, mainly because it is not possible to force a new definition of identity onto people, and necessary political changes, as
it would be helpful if the people had a common view and understanding of their past, present and future (Fröhlich 2003, p.40). Then, the definition of a European identity would be “the inherent dynamics between diversity and unity, the process of character, the cultural plurality, regional variety, and openness of Europe” (Fröhlich 2003, p.44). The way to achieve this is by combining consistency and change (Camilleri 1995, p.84).

If “identity is a key concept for understanding politics” (Fröhlich 2003, p.40), and EU is an “organization […] [with] symbols of hope and status for belonging to the west” (2003, p.40), then it means that a European identity will not consist of the diversity represented through western, central, eastern European, most likely Balkans and possibly middle eastern, represented by Turkey if accepted to the Union, states. Instead, it will be a ruling western identity that would spill over onto all the other ones. Such European identity vision was associated with the ‘project of elites’ through which a “bounded community of exclusion and opposition” would be created (Bancks 2007, p.12), which contradicts the EU communication about having “unity through diversity” (CoE 2002).

If a European identity assumed only its political aspect, “terms such as stability, trust, constitution, citizenship, sovereignty as well as loyalty and legitimacy” (Fröhlich 2003, p.42), then there would not be so much debate about whether the EU needs an identity and what it is going to be. A counterargument to Fröhlich’s claims that a lesson to be learnt by Central and East European countries is that sovereignty and integration are not contradictory is the example of France, the Netherlands and the UK rejecting the Constitution, one of the reasons for which was the unwillingness to give up their sovereignty (Europa 2008).

It should not be a surprising assumption that the EU is interested in maintaining and promoting peace within and outside of it, therefore ideas of having stability and trust should not stir additional debates. But the reality of the EU is more complicated than just a political common identity. Current debates in political, academic, media and public circles also bring
up the issues of common cultural and communal identities in addition to the political one. For instance, Fröhlich lists four types of identities\(^1\) (2003, p.47). The Union’s common interests should be obvious— they are of political and economic natures, and this is where earlier discussed political identity is tied into the definition creation. But it seems unclear who will determine the common norms for the Union and how, considering its current diversity or an option of freezing further enlargement.

*The Declaration on European Identity* (Copenhagen European Summit -1973) provided the first foundation for defining a European identity. But it is not clear whether nine states that formulated it envisioned the border-states, i.e. Turkey, as a part of it. The declaration pointed to the importance of common heritage and preservation of national cultures, “the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice and of respect for human rights” (ENA n.d.). If these are the actual components of a European identity, then once Turkey reforms these areas to satisfy the EU standards, it will fit into the definition. But in this case scenario, current public and political opinions about Turkey specifically are disregarded.

Europe needs a single voice, expressed through a united identity to be able to compete with world powers such as China, US and Asia (BBC 2002). But an important historical fact must be considered: “once identities become politicized” (which is the case with Turkey’s potential addition), loyalty and sovereignty must shift, but such shifts never happened in a peaceful conflict-free manner (Shore 2000, p.225).

### 3.1. Views on a European identity in Turkey

Fröhlich makes the following statement (2003) “in today’s Europe it is not possible to construct one’s national identity by pointing at a direct enemy either in the form of minorities

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1. ‘through a common enemy’; 2. ‘a common problem’; 3. ‘common interests’; 4. ‘common norms and values’, with a remark that the last one is the least stable one.
or at an enemy from the outside. Such behavior would be ‘non-European’” (p.44). If this guidance were used to end the debate about Turkey’s place in Europe, ignoring the claims from Turkey that it is European, the answer would not be in its favor, because of a long-existing discrimination of minorities (Kurds and Christians) in Turkey, which is also a problem within Turkish diasporas in the EU. Nas insists that immigrants especially in Western Europe are viewed as a “threat to a common culture”, as “invaders”, therefore they provoke “xenophobic and racist” reactions from host-societies, which may result in a “fragmentation and compartmentalization of societies” (2002, p.223). But the results of the studies used in the thesis show that Kurds experience more discrimination from Turks than from other diasporas or host-societies, which is the case in Germany and the UK (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Enneli et al 2005).

The reason why the issue and definition of a European identity are debated in all circles may be explained by the following rationalization: questions about identity definition arise when formed communities crack and individuals become exposed to the external world; such exposition makes people compare something unknown to something they are used to, and such comparison may stir up a confusion and a debate (Tamir 1999, p.9). Identity confusion and debate are typical during “social and political transition” (Tamir 1999, p.9) or when minorities (here Muslim/Turkish) try to participate fully in the public life of the host-community (Guglielmo 2004, p.52), which is the case with the ongoing rapid EU enlargement, which requires communal adaptations and institutional reforms in order to keep the Union working.

Tamir raised an interesting point (which also was highlighted by Özdemir) about how is it possible for a nation to choose a membership in another nation when it is only “superficially acquainted” with it (1999, p.15). Tamir is convinced that making such choice based on partial information about an identity of the other is unthinkable, but if nations had an
opportunity to make such decisions based on full information, such changes of identities would hardly occur (1999, p.15).

There are two possible outcomes for such ‘reflection’: people may choose to keep their old identity or decide to adapt a new one (Tamir 1999, p.10). If applied to the case discussed in this thesis, Turks who still live in Turkey seem to have chosen the second option of adapting a ‘core European’ culture, which is seen through their actions taken in economic, political and cultural reforms in their community. In contrast, when analyzing experiences of Turkish diasporas in Europe, and in particular in Germany, France and the UK, Turks and Europeans seem to have chosen the definition of the identity that their forefathers held. Possibly it is because some cultures are more difficult to leave or enter than others because of different skin colors or values (Tamir 1999, p.18). This may explain why Turkey out of all candidates in the last forty years was put through so much debate: to ‘core Europeans’ it represents not something that is slightly different, as it might have been the case in the accession process of countries from Eastern Europe or even during the current accession talk with Balkans, but something that is extremely different or even ‘unknown and unpredictable’ when it comes to mutual collaboration on political and cultural arenas.

Turkish view on cultural and identity adaptation represented by Tamir is resembled by the French understanding of the same- “the different aspects of a cultural system seem to be negotiable to different degrees during acculturation processes” (Schnapper (n.d., quoted in Caminelli 1995, p.72)). It is important to have the EU and Turkey understand that not all societies and cultures go through the same process of integration and achieve the same degree of assimilation.

Tamir’s social integration model may be used to predict how cultures may integrate into each other: when liberal and illiberal cultures collide, the liberal one becomes the dominant one and pressures the latter one either to die or change to the point where it
becomes fully absorbed by the former one (1999, p.17). This was not the case with the Turkish culture when it collided with any of the European (assumed to be liberal) cultures. In every collision Turkish culture managed to preserve itself without having to leave the host-country. Taking such interaction into consideration, it is likely for the same to happen if Turkey joins the EU. Its culture is strong enough to preserve itself against ‘EU-27 cultures’ or one ‘core European’ culture. It seems that the European side would have to make a bigger compromise and adjust to a culture that is different from the one of the majority.

Nas (2002) suggested an interesting analysis of a European identity concept and its relation to the process of integration. It is appealing for two reasons: proposed definition of a ‘European identity’ and a Turkish view on a European identity project. He claims that integration and identity are directly related, therefore once integrated Europe simply had to create a ‘European identity’ based on a common heritage that goes beyond national identities, but does not rely on ‘European people’ or ‘European culture’ because there are no such things; moreover, ongoing integration constantly reshapes identity too (Nas 2002, p.218).

Considering the fact that the EU leadership keeps introducing harmonized policies for the Union (a common currency, citizenship and European elections) in order to create a more integrated community, Nas says that this strategy changes the perception of a European identity in people’s minds as well (2004, p.218). Thus, there is no stable precise definition of what it is and who fits into it. Having common policies leads to a greater interdependence among member-states, which in its turn leads to “a greater awareness of differentiation and the need to work out patterns of recognition that are conditional, partial, and managed as the only rules in town” (Nicolaïdis 2007, p.696). The same should be taken into consideration when trying to form a common identity because it is in the power of the EU to create a new Europe, by defining what state is European or questioning some states’ ‘Europeanness’. These decisions on definitions are driven by the EU’s priorities and enlargement strategies, therefore
the EU is reforming itself into a “postmodern empire” based on consent rather than a macro nation-state (Nas 2002, p.219). Nas’ conclusion is European identity cannot be based on a culture and a religion (2002). It is by no means a “homogenous” culture as some may think (Nas 2002). It cannot aim to replace a national identity, but instead should give a feeling of belonging to a larger community, should be defined by “a particular set of values, socio-economic development, and societal organization” and based on “a mutual sense of trust […] and ability to communicate effectively” (Nas 2002, p.221). Just like Tamir (1999), he fails to specify who will set these values, although he is sure that “Turkey’s inclusion will enrich the EU in many ways. The EU […] will have the opportunity to reconsider its Euro-centric worldview. […] Pluralism, cultural and ethnic diversity will create a synergy that is going to shape the future of Europe. […] Turkish identity is also a part of this emerging conglomeration” (2002, p. 232). The above discussion makes it clear that the Turkish side is convinced that Turkey would enrich the European identity and uses it as a reason why it should join the Union.

### 3.2. Notions of a European identity in France, Germany and the UK

Taking into account that the thesis focuses on Germany, France and the UK, it is interesting to see how these communities see European identity and Turks as a part of it. Despite suggested notion about European identity being “rooted in national diversity” and respect for human rights and democracy (CoE 2002), Europe is facing “an identity crisis” (Anholt 2008). When it comes to fear of losing national identities and cultures with further EU cultural and social integration, the UK ranked first (61%), France 10th (47%) and Germany 13th (34%) among EU-15 (Eurobarometer 57.1, 2002, p.30).
The French seem to be very skeptical about full integration of immigrants and think that having a common culture and identity is just a myth (Schnapper (n.d., quoted in Caminelli 1995, p.69)). They expect for the minority groups to accept French cultural rules and identity definition (De Certeau (n.d., quoted in Caminelli 1995, p.73)) - a one-way assimilation, which is a concern that was brought up by Nas (2002) and Tamir (1999). In the French understanding the ‘others’ (foreigners, minority groups, etc.) are associated with something “dangerous” or “unstable” (De Certeau (n.d., quoted in Caminelli1995, p.73)). If this is used as a working definition for representing a different culture or identity, it may also explain skepticism towards Turkey’s potential membership.

Especially in the case of Turkey’s potential membership, France has been strongly opposing at least since 2005 (Turkish Weekly 2005). 69% of the French opposed (Eurobarometer 2006) regardless Chirac’s support of the membership (BBC 2004). President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing claimed that Turkey “would be the end of Europe” as it is “not a European country”, and those who push for its accession are the ‘enemies’ of the EU (Parker 2005, p.21). President Sarkozy has nothing against Turks but does not want an ‘Asian state’ in the EU and for Kurdish, Palestine, Iraq and Iran problems to become European problems, claiming that if Turkey were European, it would have joined years ago (The New Anatolian 2005).

Germany seems to have changed its definition for Turkey. While former Chancellor Schroeder stated it belongs to Europe (Die Budesregierung 2005; TURKS 2003), but never called it a European state, Chancellor Merkel strongly opposes it, “Turkey is a friend, but no place for that friend in EU” (TDN 2005), because it is “too culturally different” (Reuters 2005), and the most she is willing to compromise on is a privileged (economic) partnership.

The former UK minister to the EU made a similar but bolder statement if compared to the position of the other two states, “Europe is doing its best to tell Turkey it is no longer
wanted as part of the European Union. It is a high-risk game with little to gain and everything to lose” (Hooper 2007). The new ‘cost conscious’ prime minister Brown seems to support a ‘wide, but not deep’ Europe based on economic reasons (Kearns 2007). This and the fact that Britons are afraid of losing their national identity in the European one, may explain why there are no statements how Turkey fits into it.

A study (Cinnirella and Hamilton 2007) confirmed Eurobarometer’s conclusions about British fears also. As seen on the chart below, Britons, white and of ethnic minority origins, strongly identify themselves as British, while European identification is weak. Although, minorities are slightly more likely to choose the European identification as well.

**Chart 1- General Perception of Oneself:**

![Chart Image]

*Source: Cinnirella and Hamilton 2007, p.489.*

** ▲ = British; ■ = European;

The public feedback that was gathered from mass media also confirms that Britons tend to be the most skeptical, “There can never be a 'European' identity. Europe is a continent, not a nation”; while people from the mainland Europe or those who lived in different countries tend to be much more open-minded and convinced that a European identity already
exists, and the debate that is taking place nowadays is more about an EU identity and is a purely political project (BBC 2002).

The current debate discussed throughout the chapter confirms the hypothesis of the thesis. Considering that the majority tends to define a European identity as something based on common values, including respect for democracy and human rights, today’s Turkey’s stereotype and profile do not fit in well within this particular definition. However, considering Turkey’s progressive reforms in these particular areas that are driven by the wish to join the EU, it is logical to expect that the situation in terms of fitting into a European identity may improve in the future.
CHAPTER 4: THE TURKEY THAT EXISTS IN GERMANY

The first case-study analyzes the level of integration of Turkish diaspora in Germany and provides pieces of evidence that support the hypothesis of the thesis.

Massive migration of Turkish people to Germany started almost fifty years ago (Preston 1997, p.216), but by today no considerable integration has taken place. Tamir (1999) states that changes are possible because they occur gradually, thus, people have the time to compare their own and new cultures and make some kind of modifications to their values, beliefs and lifestyles (p.14). The case with the German society and Turkish integration into it contradicts his statement. Today, there is a German society within which there is a large Turkish ‘clan’. Despite the significant size of the Turkish diaspora in Germany and a long history of the two communities living together, one of the consequences of the lack of mutual cultural and social integration is Germany being one of the weakest supporters of Turkey’s potential EU membership (Eurobarometer 69-Germany 2008).

Heavy migration of Turks to Germany started in the 1960s. By 1984 German authorities noticed correlations between activities of migrant organizations and happenings in their homecountries, and between Germany’s foreign policy choices and a degree of activity of these organizations (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p.85). Considering significant presence of Turkish migrants in the country, German government became better aware of Turkey’s domestic issues and more involved in German-Turkish relations (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p.85). This knowledge almost created a fear that in case some radical changes happen in Turkey, it will activate Turkish diaspora in Germany as well (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p.85-86). Therefore, as one of the Østergaard-Nielsen’s interviewees stated, the government had to phrase statements about relations between the two countries very cautiously because of a possible reaction from the Turkish diaspora, “When we say something critical about China or India we have no idea if they get upset. But with Turkey we do”(2003, p.86).
Another Østergaard-Nielsen’s interviewee’s stated, ”It is very hurtful for Turks to see how their country is discussed in Germany [...] we have a difficult situation in which the foreign policy relation with Turkey has become a domestic political conflict” (2003, p.86). For a while Turks were expected to adapt identification of the host-society, including culture, religion and the language (International Crisis Group [ICG from now on] 2007, p.1), but these expectations without any actions led to no significant results. Instead, another problem that German society came to face was poorly integrated second generation of Turks who still struggled with the host language and culture and practiced a different than most of the population religion (ICG 2007, p.1).

Due to language problems, Turkish students show below average performance at schools, have higher drop out rates (25% versus 1% among Germans), thus only about 10% of Turkish origin students are enrolled in higher education (ICG 2007, p.23-24). Some claim that Germany is ‘particularly bad’ integrating students who are not fluent in German (ICG 2007, p.23; Crul, 2007), but the same problem will be identified in the UK case-study. Lack of education limits their opportunities in the labor market (ICG 2007, p.24), but opportunities are still better due to influential Turkish labor unions than in France or the UK (Crul 2007; Ersanilli 2007).

This situation triggered a political campaign “Integration is not a one-way street”, which meant to remind Turks that they need to give up some of their traditional values and accept and respect some of those held by the host-community (ICG 2007, p.1-2). This kind of expectation, carried by some political parties (CDU/CSU), is tracked to 2000s when the 'leitkultur’ [guiding culture] was introduced in the form of German language, culture and history tests in order to solve the integration problem (ICG 2007, p.5). Of course not all politicians share the same conservative understanding of integration. Some seem to be less demanding, “We must find a common basis with them, we must find an “us”. In return, the
original German inhabitants must accept that their environment has changed and must accept that mosques will be built, etc. [...] They are going to change as much as the host-country will change” (ICG 2007, p.21). Thus, the difference between two positions is an understanding and acceptance of the proper way of integration, which is a multidimensional process that requires cooperation from all parties involved, not just one of many.

Another example of the lack of integration into German society is an observation that even nowadays diaspora is more interested in observing Turkish politics than German (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). The situation may improve in the future because policymakers of Turkish origin try to give German politics a bigger priority and leave Turkish one somewhat behind (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p. 90-92). Turkish government sends supportive messages as well by trying to encourage Turks to become more influential in political and economic sectors and destroy current stereotype of ‘a second class’ and ‘guest workers’, which should lead to a more effective lobbying when it comes to Turkey’s EU membership (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p.114-115; Manço 2004).

When speaking about Germany-Turkey relations, it is hard to prove whether Germany’s choice of foreign relations with Turkey has anything to do with diaspora’s reactions, because it is easier to track a correlation when minorities represent either a significant electorate share or an economic power (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). In the case of Turks neither is true, especially since most of them are not citizens and therefore cannot vote (by 2007 only 600,000 out of 2.6 million became citizens (ICG 2007, p.5)). The only way for Turks to have a voice, at least in the 1960s-70s was through labor unions’ membership, which [the unions] helped to manage daily lives, future perspectives and served as reflections of political events in the homeland (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p. 88).

The connection is more visible in the conflict between Turks and Kurds. German government stresses its concern about human rights issues when communicating its national
interests at home and abroad (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). During the last three decades 'German-Kurds' (500,000-700,000) have been trying to help to solve the Kurdish issue in Turkey through vocal activities of political associations (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p.98). Germany was put in the epicenter of a lobbying campaign because these associations demanded from the government to take their side and solve the issue of Kurds in Turkey (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003, p.98). At the same time Turkey demanded from Germany to calm Kurds’ political activity on its territory (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p. 103). It is yet another example of how a foreign issue over time turned into domestic one.

On the other hand, Alevis (another Turkish minority in Germany) represent a successful integration example. They integrated well, consider themselves a “bridge” between Turks and Kurds, tend to identify with the host-society more and promote human rights and gender equality (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p.104; Ersanilli 2007, p.19). Despite their successful experience of integration and modern views on a societal structure, unfortunately, this example is not significant enough for the EU scale, as there is no available data from any other member-states to be able to compare Alives’ integration.

Based on the described examples, it is clear that Turkish diaspora feels the importance of being actively involved in German policymaking because of a link between their activity level and “development of multicultural democracy in their country of settlement” (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p.131). German government was blamed for avoiding these “multicultural strategies” (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p.117), which was based on the fact that it did not admit until 2000s that Germany is “a country of immigration”(Ersanilli 2007, p.8) despite the significant size of Turkish and other diasporas that it hosted for many decades. German-Turks draw a direct link between Turkey’s integration in Europe and their well-being in Germany. They believe that if Turkey is accepted, it will help them to be “accepted in the consciousness of the German population“ (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p.106), which is reverse
to the hypothesis of the thesis but still proves that Turkish diaspora in the EU and Turkey’s potential integration into the Union are linked.

In conclusion, it is important to remember that for Germany a domestic policy overlaps with an immigration policy, which in its turn is connected to the EU immigration and integration policies. Despite the fact that for Germany Turkish integration is a multidimensional policy issue, another noteworthy point is that regardless the long history between Germans and German-Turks of living side by side and the government’s attempts to integrate Turks better into the host society, Germany still strongly opposes Turkey’s potential EU membership. In the latest Eurobarometer-Germany (#69 2008) 63% of Germans expressed a strong opposition even if Turkey fulfills all membership requirements (p.6).

Another vital issue to remember is the following. Taking into account that Kurds have been lobbying German government for such a long period of time relatively unsuccessfully and that Kurds and Turks in Germany do not live in peace either, it should be a logical conclusion that if Turkey is accepted into the Union before the issue between Turks and Kurds is solved completely in Turkey, it may become yet another problem for the EU states and communities to deal with. In Germany it is already considered a “domestic security threat” issue (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p.99).

Finally, considering that Turkish residents in Western Europe, including Germany, are treated as second class (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, p.109), it is safe to predict that if a European identity is created and if Turkey is a part of it, it will not be an equal one. The Western identities would most likely dictate the appropriate rules for setting unified norms and values for the European community as a whole. Therefore, predictions about one party ruling over another mentioned earlier in the thesis with reference to Preston (1997) and Nas (2002) would be correct.
On the other hand, considering that the earliest possible membership date for Turkey (2017-2020) (Hakura 2005; Tonge 2005) the identity and uniqueness of Turks, at least those who will be living on the territory of the Union by then, may not be as sharp. The assumption is based on the observations that already third generation of diaspora-Turks struggle to find their purely Turkish identity, as they tend to float between the host-culture and the Turkish one (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003, p.109; p.126). Hence, such loss of a firm identity frame may favor the attempts to create a European identity which is relatively homogeneous, but at the same time is equally inclusive in terms of the cultures represented in the Union.
CHAPTER 5: TURKISH DIASPORA IN FRANCE- “FAUX FRANÇAIS”?

The second case-study analyzes the level of integration of the Turkish diaspora in France. In addition, it is also compared to the previously discussed German case-study in order to identify differences and similarities in the integration of the two Turkish diasporas.

According to the statistics, France hosts between 350,000-500,000 of Turks, which ranks it second after Germany (Ersanilli 2007, p.2; Manço 2004). In contrast to Germany, France seems to be more flexible and welcoming towards immigrants, including Turks. This conclusion is based on the study of cultural integration of Turks done by Ersanilli (2007), who analyzed degrees of integration in states that have different immigrant policies by labeling Germany “assimilationist” and France “universalist” (2007, p.4).

From the very beginning, France was more supportive than Germany about immigrants' adaptation at least in terms of citizenship policy. The third generation receives it automatically; the second one has a choice of refusing one when turning 18 years of age; and the first one qualifies for it after living in the country for five years and successfully passing language and culture assimilation exams (Ersanilli 2007, p.10). In Germany receiving citizenship was hardly possible until 2000 and is still extremely hard to obtain even if a person spent the last sixty years in the country (Ersanilli 2007; ICG 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). But such flexibility on the government’s side does not necessarily mean that Turks adapt better in France than in Germany, even though the feedback collected from French-Turks was more positive than from German-Turks when it concerned the comfort of living in a host-society and daily interaction with it (Ersanilli, 2007).

On one hand, France is a good example for rejecting the concern raised by Nas (2002) that successful integration of Turks into a European identity means giving up root-culture. On the other hand, assimilating as much as possible into a host-culture does not imply equal social treatment, a concern that was raised by Ersanilli (2007), Nas (2002) and Østergaard-
Nielsen (2003). Thus, it is a challenge for Turks to assimilate well into the host-culture to such degree when it becomes publically admitted by all. There is still a traditional understanding that French society and culture assume white Christian members (Manço 2004), into which Turks obviously do not fit in.

The absence of a precise identity definition, a government’s choice of policy and public concerns regarding Turkish cultural and religious differences gave skeptics an opportunity to criticize French policies, praise German ones instead and earmark Turks and other immigrants as “faux français” (Ersanilli 2007, p.10). Despite of the lack of clarity and earmarking, French-Turks identify with the host-country more than German-Turks. They felt more accepted in the French society than in German, even though in both states Turks felt that they were forced to make a choice between identities (Ersanilli 2007, p.19-20).

When it comes to social adaptation, French-Turks tend to use French language more often even when communicating with family and friends and have more social contacts represented by host-community than Turks in Germany (Ersanilli 2007, p.21-24). It is worth mentioning that the second and third generations of Turks have a harder time understanding Turkish than French (Ersanilli 2007, p.22; Manço, 2004), which signals about their higher degree of integration than in the German case.

When comparing level of vocational education, only one fourth of the second generation of French-Turks is enrolled versus three fourth of German-Turks, and drop-out rates in France are significantly higher than in Germany (Crul 2007). But more Turks enter higher education in France than in Germany, thus having a better chance to succeed in the future, especially since in France employment “is solely based on school qualifications” (Crul 2007, n.p.). German-Turks face a better situation in the labor market than French-Turks. This was written off to the power of Turkish labor unions in Germany (Ersanilli 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003).
As for religious differences, French-Turks are more likely to admit being Muslim, because it was institutionalized (Ersanilli 2007, p.26). German-Turks reported less identification with Islam because the only two government supported religions in Germany are Christianity and Judaism (Ersanilli 2007, p.9).

In conclusion, it is important to note that despite the positive feedback that came from French-Turks regarding their social and cultural integration into community, French still strongly oppose Turkey’s EU membership. France’s support for further enlargement has been dropping steadily at least since 2002 (40%) to 31% in 2008 (Eurobarometer 69, p.43). Turkish membership specifically is the least supported among the French (71% in opposition) out of all possible future members, as can be seen in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Favorable</th>
<th>Défavorable</th>
<th>NSP</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Norvège</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Suisse</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’Islande</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Croatie</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’Ukraine</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Bosnie-Herzégovine</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’ARYM</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Le Monténégro</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Serbie</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’Albanie</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Kosovo</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Turquie</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: Eurobarometer 69- France, p.44
** translation: blue= in favor; red=opposed; grey= do not know

A claim that France rejected the European Constitution precisely because it assumed Turkey’s potential membership is floating in the public space as well (Europa 2008; Parker 2005, p.23).
Moreover, if it comes to voting about Turkey’s membership, France will most likely hold a national referendum on the issue (EurAktiv 2004), and considering that the French do not consider Turks ‘European’, they would most likely reject Turkey’s membership also if the referendum were administered in the near future.
CHAPTER 6: LITTLE TURKEY OF GREAT BRITAIN

The third case-study analyzes the level of Turkish diaspora’s integration in the UK. Moreover, during the analysis comparisons are made to the integration situation in Germany and France in order to identify similarities and differences among Turkish diasporas, which is helpful for drawing conclusions at the end of this thesis.

According to the 2001 UK census, almost half of the ethnical minorities in Britain lives in London, which makes up 29% of its residents (Enneli et al 2005, p.vii). 65% of the UK’s Turkish diaspora settled there as well (Manço 2004). Despite the fact that these numbers represent a significant share of the community, little is known about the situation of Turks, which is why Enneli et al named Turkish community “largely invisible” (2005). Even government agencies do not have precise data on Turks because many of them are not registered with any kind of social services or employment agencies. Those who do register usually choose a broad category of “not in employment, education or training”, which contributes to the vagueness of the situation (Enneli et al 2005, p. viii).

The situation with Turkish integration into the British society seems to resemble the German one. One of the interviewees (Enneli et al 2005, p.2) said that North London (where majority of Turkish diaspora lives) is not really London, because it looks just like Turkey. He said that it is most likely the most “self-sufficient” minority community because there Turks have their own mass media and community services that are managed by the Turks for the Turks (Enneli et al 2005, p.2). But in the UK Turkish diaspora is more fragmented than in Germany. Turks are divided not only into Turks and Kurds, but also into Turkish Cypriots, mainland Turks and the ones of mixed origin. The latter are considered the most vulnerable group because they do not belong fully to either of the other groups, thus they prefer to hide their real identity by not admitting to it. Just like in Germany, Turkish minority groups do not get along among themselves also (Enneli et al 2005).
Study results (Enneli et al 2005) show that Turkish youth clearly does not integrate well into the British society, because they are discriminated in the society and receive very little support from schools or social services staff (p.15). One of the interviewees (Enneli et al 2005) stated that the best experience for him in school “was the leaving day, because he didn’t need to go back there ever again” (p.15). One may assume that staff of schools and social services should be supportive or helpful in the integration process of Turks. Instead, reality revealed by the study proves the opposite. The authors called it an “institutional racism”, “In the council, the officer told one of the interviewed Turkish girls that they were “taking resources from the people in this country”; therefore they should go back to their own country” (p.31-32) and that Turks who recently immigrated and have English language problems “find it problematic that teachers do not allow them to use dictionaries, especially during exams” which keeps them from performing well academically (p.15).

The authors attempt to find out how Turks identify themselves in the UK. This is helpful for the thesis conclusions when trying to make predictions how Turkish people would integrate into existing European community if the country is accepted as another member-state. Regardless the gender or the place of birth, respondents were not likely to identify as British: the percentage was higher for males (75%) and non-UK born (84%) (Enneli et al 2005, p. 38-39). 60% chose multiple identities, but it did not necessarily imply a Turkish one as one of, especially Kurds who tend to reject the Turkish identification (Enneli et al 2005, p. 39-40). Due to vagueness of ‘a British’ definition, Turkish youth does not tend to identify with it also even if ticking the multiple-identity option (Enneli et al 2005, p.42). In addition, there is an observed “increasing polarization” between British and ethnic minority youth, including possibilities available for them in the job market or during social integration. An example is the fact that government sponsored youth programs for ethnic minority youth are known as programs for the youth ‘at risk’ (Enneli et al 2005, p.vii). This should be alarming.
In conclusion, the situation of British-Turks is more similar to the German one than the French. In the UK Turkey is considered a “third world” country, which is similar to Germany’s ‘second class’ people. But British society considers Turks non-white, thus Turks also face racial discrimination, which makes them different from German-Turks, however, not all Turks consider themselves non-white according to the 1991 UK census (Enneli et al 2005, p.ix). Therefore, considering their current degree of integration, the hypothesis is confirmed once again: Turks would not integrate well into the European community, thus, they would not impact positively a European identity. It is noteworthy that despite of the disadvantaged position, British-Turks, just like French- and German-Turks, have positive expectations from the future, “they want to have a comfortable life”, do not want to be employed by their parents, want to work in other EU countries, and “set benchmarks that are different from those of their parents” (Enneli et al 2005, p.45-47). This clearly indicates a stronger will to integrate deeper into the host-society, including the EU-community, which may lead to a better fitting into a European identity in the future.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

The research question of the thesis was “What is the impact of Turkey’s EU accession on the attempts to create a European identity, based on the experience of Turkish diasporas’ cultural and social integration in Germany, France and the UK?” The hypothesis was that Turkey’s accession would not contribute positively to the project of European identity creation. There are two possible answers to the research question. If Turkey were accepted in the near future, the hypothesis would be confirmed. If Turkey is accepted during the currently projected date, 2017-2020, then there is a greater probability that Turkey’s membership would contribute positively to the European identity project, and, therefore, the hypothesis may be rejected.

So far the EU public, at least in the three analyzed member-states, has not had a successful interaction and integration experience with the first generation of Turks. A positive change is that the second and third generations of Turks tend to assimilate with and integrate into host-communities, and the EU, better than their parents. Younger Europeans tend to be more open-minded than previous generations about multiculturalism in their societies and to the idea of being ‘Europeans’ in general. A trend towards more plural policies and societies was identified in Germany and France. This may help Turkey to fit better into a European identity. The remaining concern is the messages sent by the Turkish government, which seems to support the economic and political but not the cultural integration of Turks in the EU.

Based on the case studies of Turkish diasporas’ integration in the three member-states and the fact that all three concluded that Turks did not integrate well (with France being the most successful example out of the three) into host-societies in the last 40-60 years, it leads to a conclusion that Turkish minority groups have rejected the identities of the host-societies. Therefore, it is unlikely that Turkey, if accepted in the near future, would accept a European
identity, which would be shaped and defined for all newcomers by the current ruling member-states.

Thus far, there is no clear European identity definition. This may be because there is no agreement on the course of further EU development, but there is a consensus that the EU is “entering a new era” (Ross 2008), which may also help Turkey to fit into the Union. The statement that “when foreigners living among the citizens of a dominant society claim the right to be themselves and to make their way in the midst of diversity they reject not only an identity imposed from outside, but the idea of identity itself” (Camilleri1995, p.73) seems to explain integration experience of Turks in the EU. During identity discussions in the thesis it became clear that the most important ingredients that must be included in the European identity definition are respect for human rights, democracy and cultural diversity. If Turkey manages to resolve its minority issues and reform its political system that would meet the EU expectations and if a European identity definition will equally include all cultures involved, then Turkey should fit into a European identity well.

The thesis research has also identified a lack of knowledge and understanding of social and cultural differences among the parties involved, current negative influence of mass media on the perception of the EU and Turkey, and a variety of integration policies that were implemented in the three member-states in order to improve the situation with the Turkish diasporas. Based on these findings, the following suggestions can be made.

A supranational integration policy should not be created, as it would not lead to the same results across the Union. The studies discussed in the thesis make it obvious that quite different approaches work in different member-states, and that the EU integration policy is particularly sensitive not only towards cultures but also towards population compositions and host communities’ openness to the idea of changing their profiles.
The influence of mass media on forming public opinions about Turks’ capability to integrate, contribution to the conflict between Kurds and Turks in Turkey, and not informing properly European and Turkish societies about each other (Lutz et al 2006; Manço 2004; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Özdemir n.d.) were tracked. Therefore, there is a clear need for an official EU channel which would become a source of legitimate and unbiased information available for the EU and Turkish communities and should focus on working on the issues listed above. Since most likely Turkey will join the Union, because it seems to be a strategic political project of the elites, which is backed up by the motivation to maintain EU’s peace and security (Eurobarometer-December 2006; Hooper, 2007; Manchin 2002; Tassinari 2007, p.1), it is important to educate and prepare both communities to ensure better understanding and integration into the same European identity. CNN’s *Inside the Middle East* program which allows to learn about every aspect of cultures and daily lives of the region from within (CNN 2008) is a good example of what an EU channel should center on. Similar projects must be created and implemented in the very near future with a special focus on Turkey to prepare involved communities.

Since a more successful integration experience from both Turkish and European sides was betted on the future generations (Anholt 2008; Manço 2004; Schmidt 2007), it becomes another reason why educating and informing communities, which should be initiated by the EU elites through the means of mass media, is needed urgently in order for today’s younger generation to meet the expectations of the future.

A European Identity creation is important because it will not only help to unite Union’s diverse community, but will also set “the rules for the game of policy making”, form a common foreign policy for the Union, enhance governance, and, finally, help to predict future moves to be made by the Union’s leadership in these areas (Bancks 2007, p.7-18).
Thus, Turkey’s positive contribution to it is crucial for maintaining a relatively harmonious existence of the Union in the future.
Bibliography


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