DEVELOPMENT AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF POST-COMMUNIST PARTY SYSTEM: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ARMENIA AND KYRGYZSTAN

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ABSTRACT

The paper will explore whether high level of institutionalization is conditioned by the existence of informal networks and clientelism, to compare the party system of Armenia with the party system of Kyrgyzstan, specify the level of institutionalization and discover the reasons of different levels, the similarities and differences of the system. How do party politics operate differently in these countries? Why is it that countries with so many similarities (strong informal network, clientelist relations) have different institutional levels of party system? Therefore, it is a puzzle whether institutionalization of party system matters in those countries. If not, what is it that matters in the party and political systems of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan? I will also specify what factors assisted those two countries in the institutionalization of their party system, what criteria should be taken into consideration for measuring the level of party system institutionalization.

There is crucial difference in the functioning and nature of informal networks in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. In Armenia these networks are formed on the basis of clientelist relations and are more like elites, which do not suppose any kinship relations. On the contrary, in Kyrgyzstan, informal networks are based on kinship relations. Moreover, these clans are also nurtured by clientelist relations, which hamper institutionalization of party system in Kyrgyzstan. Despite all these similarities that these two countries have: soviet legacy, informal networks, clientelist relations, equal freedom, they have different levels of party institutionalization that is determined by these phenomena.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

**INTRODUCTION** ........................................................................................................ 1

**CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK** ................................................................. 7
  1.1 Clientelist and Programmatic Relations in Party Systems ........................................ 7
  1.2 Party System Institutionalization ........................................................................... 13

**CHAPTER 2: PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS IN ARMENIA AND KYRGYZSTAN** 21
  2.1 Analysis of the Armenian Party System .................................................................. 21
  2.2 Parties and Party Systems in Kyrgyzstan ................................................................. 26

**CHAPTER 3: SOLUTION OF THE PUZZLE** ............................................................... 35

**CONCLUSION** ........................................................................................................... 43

**APPENDIX 1** ............................................................................................................ 48

**APPENDIX 2** ............................................................................................................ 48

**APPENDIX 3** ............................................................................................................ 49

**APPENDIX 4** ............................................................................................................ 49

**APPENDIX 5** ............................................................................................................ 50

**APPENDIX 6** ............................................................................................................ 50

**APPENDIX 7** ............................................................................................................ 51

**APPENDIX 8** ............................................................................................................ 51

**APPENDIX 9** ............................................................................................................ 51

**APPENDIX 10** ......................................................................................................... 52

**APPENDIX 11** ......................................................................................................... 52

**APPENDIX 12** ......................................................................................................... 52

**APPENDIX 13** ......................................................................................................... 52

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** ....................................................................................................... 53
INTRODUCTION

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Post-Soviet countries encountered many problems concerning their political system and institutionalization, economy, free market development, human rights, etc. There is a continuous debate going on whether these countries managed to overcome the difficulties and can be considered in line with European standards. Scholars and politicians are concerned with the political and party systems of those transition countries. Political system and stability is greatly determined by the functioning of parties. As Pridham notes “…parties and party systems must remain a basic if not the central theme for examining …progress towards and achievement of democratic consolidation¹”.

Under the circumstances of the absence of statehood throughout several centuries the Armenian and Kyrgyz governments adopted mechanisms and institutes of a protective way of living and specific national development. After the declaration of independence, in the beginning of the 1990-s in different parts of the former Soviet Union, mass public movements started and countries made attempts to replace the old political structures with new, democratic and representational ones. First of all, in order to realize new ideas, the devaluation of the communist ideology was carried out. Moreover, governments began to acquire the experiences of Western free markets and democracies with all their social, economic and security aspects.

The countries chosen for my research are Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. These are both post- soviet countries, one from the Caucasus region and the other from Central Asia. The

cases are chosen because they are considered to be more stable than other countries in the region. Moreover there are many similarities between the countries, both of them have relatively small population, have very similar political systems, which should have implied also similar party systems. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate why despite so many similarities the party system is different. Besides the fact that there is no recent research after the parliamentary elections in both countries, one can witness the existence of strong informal networks in these two countries, that have their impact on the formation and functioning of party politics in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. In Kyrgyzstan they bear the form of clans that are based on kinship relations. In Armenia, the informal networks are not based on kinship relations.

Some of the data for this thesis came from semi-structured, intensive interviews with different people from Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, ranking from students to professionals. Interviews are guided conversations in which the researcher poses a series of open-ended questions to the interviewees, followed by probes to obtain detailed explanations and examples. This allowed interviewees to describe their experiences in their own words, rather than forcing them to choose among a restricted set of responses.

In Armenia, after the collapse of the Soviet Union several powers were changed. The first seven - eight years of independence were characterized by instability and volatility of government and party system and its weak performance. Simultaneously with the establishment and formation of democratic institutions, one can already speak about classifying, modelling and analyzing the Armenian party system according to European standards and classical theories. In Kyrgyzstan, the replacement of the old regime with a new

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democratic one was not successful, which resulted in a revolution. However, amendments are being carried out especially in the legislature to improve the representation in parliament and the structure of party system.

While the importance of party system institutionalization is not on the government agenda of the above mentioned countries, different scholars emphasize its crucial impact on democratic consolidation. According to Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, “where the party system is more institutionalized, parties are key actors that structure political process; where it is less institutionalized, parties are not so dominant, they do not structure the political process. Democratic politics is more erratic, establishing legitimacy is more difficult, and governing is more complicated.” Thus, importance of parties and party systems is recognized by Duverger, Huntington, Lijphart, Lipset, Powell, and Sartori.

Much has been written about the post-communist countries party system, especially in Eastern and Central Europe, although less, nearly nothing is written about the level of institutionalization of party systems of post-soviet countries, particularly in the Caucasus and Central Asia. There are numerous articles on democratization processes in the Southern

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3 The tulip revolution refers to the overthrow of the president of Kyrgyzstan after the parliamentary elections in 2005
5 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, tr. Barbara and Robert North (London : Methuen, 1959)
Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968)
Bingham Powell, Contemporary democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Harvard University Press, 1982)
6 Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslav Markowski, Gabor Toka, Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation (Cambridge, 1999)
Algis Krupavicius, Party Systems in Central East Europe: Dimensions of System Stability (Glasgow, 1999)
Herbert Kitschelt, Party Systems in East Central Europe: Consolidation or Fluidity (Glasgow, 1995)
Hubert Twozecki, Learning to Choose: Electoral Politics in East Central Europ (Stanford, 2003)
Caucasus region and in Central Asia\(^7\). However, most of them do not refer to party systems and do not explain the factors that assist countries in the institutionalization processes.

The authors discussed below describe party systems either in general in those regions or specify certain phenomena peculiar to most post-soviet countries. Olson writes that parties developing in the post-communist states may develop distinctive and characteristic traits which do not very much resemble those known in Western democracies\(^8\). However, his emphasis is on Central Europe. Another eminent scholar, Lewis discusses party systems of countries in East-Central Europe, claiming that their characteristics were the absence of mass membership support and stable political constituency\(^9\). In the existing literature parties of post-soviet countries, particularly Armenian and Kyrgyz, are often viewed as not stable, “transient organizations with little continuity from one election to another lacking coherent ideological programmes and reliable social constituencies\(^10\)”. John Anderson\(^11\) and Kathleen Collins have books on Central Asia and its political system and clan politics. Anderson sums up the transformation process of Central Asian countries during Soviet power and after it till 1997.


I will argue that Armenian party system is more developed than the Kyrgyz party system. It has an organizational structure and a higher level of institutionalization. One of the determining phenomena having an impact on party politics are the regionalism and the clan system in Kyrgyzstan. As Collins claims, “Clan–based politics does not inevitably preclude long-term change, growth and democratization, but it does make it unlikely. In the meantime, clan-based politics is all too likely to instigate a negative cycle that can move from clan conflict over political and economic assets, to armed violence between clans in pursuit or defence of their clan interests”\(^{12}\). Here, one more question arises; whether the argument brought by Collins and the idea of clan is so important in analyzing party system structure.

In order to address the gaps in the literature my research question is to explore whether high level of institutionalization is conditioned by the existence of informal network and clientelism in the society and politics, to compare the party system of Armenia with the party system of Kyrgyzstan, specify the level of institutionalization and discover the reasons of different levels and the similarities and differences of the regime. How do party politics operate differently in these countries? Why is it that countries with so many similarities (strong informal network, clientelist relations) have different institutional levels of party system? Therefore, it is a puzzle whether institutionalization of party system matters in those countries. If not, what is it that matters in the party and political systems of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan? I will also specify what factors assisted those two countries in the institutionalization of their party system, what criteria should be taken into consideration for measuring the level of party system institutionalization.

My research will show why two post-soviet countries, having the same legacy and similar systems of governance, characterized by informal networks and clientelist relations have different levels of party system institutionalization. Nevertheless, they are considered to be equally free and democratic. It will answer the question how party politics function in these countries and how they operate differently. There are different articles about the existence of informal networks in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. In both countries politics is organized around informal networks, with elites focusing their attention primarily on issues of self-preservation and succession\(^\text{13}\).

CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter is comprised of two subchapters that will discuss different phenomena characteristic of party systems. The first subchapter will focus on the clientelist and programmatic relations in the party systems and show how they appear in post-communist countries, mostly in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. The second subchapter analyzes the phenomenon of party system institutionalization and how it is linked to clientelist relations and existence of networks in the target countries. It will show and evaluate different criteria and dimensions of party system institutionalization, refuse some of them and offer others, which can illustrate the essence of the phenomena and analyze it in these particular countries in detail.

1.1 Clientelist and Programmatic Relations in Party Systems

According to Sartori “A party is every political group that presents at election and, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office”\(^\text{14}\). Parties can be approached from instrumental view as well, emphasizing the limitation of the candidate. Thus, the definition by John Lord Acton is showing the interrelation between the position and the people holding it, “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.

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Great men are almost always bad men even when they exercise influence and not authority: still more when you add the tendency of certainty of corruption by authority.\textsuperscript{15}

These are definitions that explain parties and party systems from different points of view, illustrating and emphasizing different criteria. The level of institutionalization is an essential dimension in order to understand the structure and functioning of party system. As Jack Bielasiak defines, “The development of electoral systems and political parties is essential for democracies to function well. Therefore, the institutionalization of viable parties within well-established electoral rules is critical to the consolidation of democracy in the former Communist world.\textsuperscript{16}"

In order to analyze, compare and synthesize, I will use the party system institutionalization theory. It shows “The way parties compete in elections and engage in other activities, structures how other political actors interact. The way they shape the political agenda-giving voice to certain interests and conflict while simultaneously muting others-enhances or diminishes prospects for effective government and stable democracy.\textsuperscript{17}’

However, it is very essential and relevant to take into consideration also inter-party competition and the way the parties are formed if we want to learn more about how they function. On the one hand, party formation and inter-party competition will show the peculiarities of the system, and on the other hand it will expose the impact and influence that they can have on the institutionalization of party systems.


Kitschelt and others distinguish the following types of party competition, two of which represent alternatives of post-communist party formation. First, if politicians make investments in neither administrative infrastructure nor consensus building, they run as individual candidates based on the unique personal qualities that are usually called charisma\textsuperscript{18}. The authors claim that in that case charismatic leaders consciously disarticulate policy commitments having the aim to avoid constituency divisions. Moreover, one can assume that the followers are more likely to have psychological dependence on the leader; they follow him with great enthusiasm, hope or/and despair. In addition the administrative staff or people surrounding the charismatic leader are not chosen by their professional experience or social privileges, but rather by personal qualities.

The second form of party formation that the authors distinguish engages investments in procedures of consensus building, rather than in technical and/or administrative organization. In this case the “politicians form coalitions around a variety of policies in the legislative arena. Legislative alliances have little capacity for resource pooling and voter mobilization and therefore become outdated with the advent of universal suffrage and mass politics that raise the stakes with regard to investments in the administrative infrastructure of parties”\textsuperscript{19}.

The third and the fourth are very widespread in modern democracies. The third mode of party formation implies that politicians make “great investments in administrative and technical infrastructure, but shun those in procedure of consensus building around policy


\textsuperscript{19} Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslav Markowski and Gabor Toka, 'Post –Communist Party System: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation’, (Cambridge, 1999) 47-48
packages. In this case politicians offer direct selective material and symbolic advantage to those individuals who demonstratively support the party’s candidates”\(^{20}\). These are usually called clientelistic and/or patronage relations and mostly take the form of monetary transfers, gifts, jobs in the public sector and other benefits. As Philip Keefer notes in clientelist relations “relatively powerful and rich ”patrons” promise to provide relatively powerless and poor ”clients” with jobs, protection, infrastructure, and other benefits in exchange for votes and other forms of loyalty including labor”\(^{21}\). According to a number of eminent scholars, clientelist relations are “…preferential treatment in the allocation of social benefits, regulatory favors, government contracts, and honorary memberships and titles”.\(^{22}\) This kind of relationship can be called trade relationship, because one side is buying agreement compensating political support. That is the reason, that the authors claim that in order to become viable, clientelist relations presuppose a heavy flow of material resources and extensive personal networks. These result from politicians’ investments in the organizational capabilities of a party to extract resources from clients and to redistribute them.

The last mode of party formation is through programmatic parties, which implies a more party cantered organization. These parties also make administrative infrastructural investments, but lesser than clientelist parties. However, clientelist parties have to make substantial investments in procedures of consensus building that craft the policy packages around which politicians attract electoral constituencies. At the same time, “program deliberations are time consuming, but they are essential to make parties’ future conduct

\(^{20}\) ibid


calculable for voters. What differs between the two types [meaning clientelist and programmatic] of parties is the procedural mode of compensating supporters (voters, members, activities) through direct or indirect exchanges”\(^\text{23}\).

However, it is very difficult to claim that these four types of party formation occur separately. Party systems are more likely to have the characteristic features of four of them, with one or two prevailing. Kitschelt and other scholars assume that parties rely on a mix of programmatic, clientelist, and charismatic relations: there are trade-offs between different linkage mechanisms. This is explained by the fact that the more a party moves the personality of the leader into the forefront, the harder it is to show programmatic relations or deliver benefits to clients, because the unpredictability of the leader tends to undercut these commitments. In addition, both clientelist and programmatic linkages rely on long-lasting reciprocal expectations and consequently involve institutionalized relations of accountability and responsiveness that set them apart to exercise purely charismatic and/or extraordinary authority\(^\text{24}\). Thus the development of clientelist or programmatic parties depends also on the existence of informal networks in the political systems. It is more likely that in political systems where informal networks dominate, there are more grounds for the formation and development of clientelist relations. Informal networks, in their turn, assume some relations that are based on certain duties and responsibilities within the network. Thus the ‘regulatory favours, welfare payments, honorary memberships and titles, gifts and monetary transfers’ seem to be preconditions and/or consequences of informal networks: on the one hand, informal networks can develop from clientelist relations. On the other hand, informal


networks can become significant and irreplaceable base for the formation of clientelist relations in the political life of a country.

As Kitschelt states clientelist relations are typically mechanisms of mass control. One can explain this by the rationale of duty and services process, because it gives the ruling a great tool, possibility to imply decisions that are beneficiary for the other side, thus also giving them a part, a share from the ‘cake’. Moreover, according to Kitschelt and some other authors, “in societies with greater state and market incorporation and industrialization, patron and client networks develop greater complexity and reach up into regional and national bureaucracies”\(^\text{25}\), at the same time becoming more short-term, specific and interest based. Another argument that is worthy of mentioning here is that “Applied to post-communist democracies, clientelism should become distinctly more common in the economically more backward regions of Eurasia or certain poor Balkan countries (Macedonia, Bosnia, Serbia, Albania) and Moldova”\(^\text{26}\).

To conclude, the emergence of informal networks and clientelist relations is closely connected and related to the level of institutionalization of party system of the countries. According to Mainwaring, “Where a party system is not institutionalized, a multitude of actors competes for influence and power, often employing nondemocratic means”\(^\text{27}\). So the next subchapter will refer to the theories of institutionalization, explain and analyze the linkages between levels of institutionalization of party systems and clientelist relations. This will assist in evaluating the theories and further investigating the political parties and party systems in the two post-soviet countries, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.


\(^{26}\) Ibid 50-51

1.2 Party System Institutionalization

Most scholars agree that the development of stable, coherent representative parties which can shape and channel popular preferences is crucial to successful democratization in the wake of political transition\textsuperscript{28}. The level of institutionalization is an essential criterion for understanding the system and functioning of party system. As authors emphasize the institutionalization of party systems is critical to the consolidation of democracy in post-communist countries\textsuperscript{29}. Thus analyzing party systems through this theory will show the weaknesses of the theory, emphasizing why the level of party system institutionalization is different in similar countries. In this part of the paper different dimensions and criteria of party system institutionalization will be presented. Some of the criteria will be rejected and other criteria will be presented, which will make the analysis more appropriate and precise and the evaluation- easier. Then, the link and relation between party system institutionalization and clientelist relations will be shown, depicting different variations of the relations.

The study of the interaction of political parties and party systems is crucial, because if the party system is stable, parties can fulfil many of their democratic functions, likewise recruitment of leaders, aggregation of accountability and interest. Thus stabilization and institutionalization of party system is very essential for the formation and functioning of

Relatively highly institutionalized party system is characterized by stability and continuity. In Armenian party politics this stability is also described by the continuity in the preferences of voters. As in Armenia more attention is attached to the programmatic aspects of party politics, it is easier for voters to identify some differences in the programmatic and ideological factors of the parties. At the same time in Kyrgyzstan clan politics and revolution stimulated existence of a less institutionalized and weak party system that is characterized by instability, volatility and discontinuity.

According to Mainwaring measuring institutionalization can be conducted based on four criteria: 1.regularity in the patterns of party competition, 2. the parties having stable roots in society, 3. parties and elections being the means of determining who governs and that the electoral process and parties are accorded legitimacy, and 4. relatively solid party organization. For gathering and analyzing such kind of information I will also use statistical data and surveys. In order to measure the volatility of party system, the results of parliamentary elections will be ranked and compared. Though all these four dimensions seem to be entwined, they should be analyzed separately in order to provide a comprehensive framework. The first criterion, regularity of party competition is measured and compared by Pederson’s index of electoral volatility by which “the net change within the electoral party system resulting from individual vote transfers” will be calculated. This is to evaluate whether there is some consistency in the party system, whether certain parties have already

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formed preferences and roots in the society, which is also one of the other criteria of measuring institutionalization.

The second criterion addresses linkages between parties, citizens and organized interests\(^{32}\). This is very difficult to measure. However, in our cases we can see that both in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan there are strong informal networks. This can be viewed as strong linkages in the society. On the one hand, these networks can somehow hinder the process of democratization by informal relations in the party politics. On the other hand, the parties have strong networks in society and elicit loyalty from broad sectors. According to Mainwaring and Torcal strong party roots in the society presuppose that programmatic or ideological linkages are at the root of the stable linkages between voters and parties\(^{33}\). In many cases voters choose a party or candidate on the basis of their ideological or programmatic preferences. “Weaker programmatic or ideological linkages between voters and parties are a key part of weaker party system”.\(^{34}\) In addition strong roots in the society limit electoral volatility. Moreover, where parties have weak roots in the society, more voters are likely to shift ‘loyalty’ from one election to the other. The third criterion indicates whether people perceive elections and/or as determinants who governs. Hans Stockton is suggesting that indicators for this are presented as the presence of coups, regular and meaningful elections, and low degrees of personalism\(^{35}\). By the fourth criteria usually is

\(^{32}\) ibid


\(^{35}\) Hans Stockton, ‘Political Parties, Party Systems, and Democracy in East Asia: Lessons from Latin America’, *Comparative Political Studies*, (2001) 104
meant the organization of parties and the party discipline. This criterion can also have some weak points. To illustrate, parties can have presence at the local and national levels, but at the same time they can be very personalized and individualistic.

Some authors claim that other aspect of party politics should be examined and investigated, because inter, intra linkages of parties are also important. Vicky Randell and Lars Svasand offer that there should be internal and external dimensions of party institutionalization. The internal dimension refers to how well the party is organized and to how strongly the adherents are emotionally linked to the party. Moreover, according to the authors, if a party has a fairly detailed organizational network and in which decisions in the party follow the procedures set down in its statutes, it is considered highly institutionalized.\(^{36}\) The other dimension determining the level of institutionalization is the external one: it assumes that the party members and supporters identify with the party. In other words, the higher the degree of voter loyalty, the more institutionalized it is.\(^ {37}\) To be more precise, the external dimension refers to the party’s relationship and response to the environment. A party that totally depends on external factors is less institutionalized than one in the preservation of the organization is not at the mercy of such factors. In addition, a party system can not be regarded institutionalized if it is not able to survive over time, for a certain period of time. The authors also mention that “the more parties, collectively, are supported by the public measures, including subsidies, access to media and legal protection, the party system is more institutionalized”.\(^ {38}\)

\(^{36}\) Vicky Randall and Lars Svasand, 'Party Institutionalization and the New Democracies', (Paper for the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Mannheim, 1999)5-10
\(^{37}\) Ibid 5 -10
\(^{38}\) Ibid 7
Thus, it is very difficult to analyze party systems based only on some criteria. At the same time it is very essential to admit that to measure electoral volatility is may be difficult, because in transitional countries the electoral and the party systems are on the process of formulation. The overall or aggregate volatility between election one and election two is the result of a combination of three factors: (1) changes in party support on the part of individual voters who vote at both election one and election two; (2) change in the electorate as a result of exits, entries, and differences in ‘abstentionism’; (3) changes in the variety of parties as a result of party entries, exits, alterations in the coalitions, and non-contestation\textsuperscript{39}.

The results of the calculations show that in the recent elections in Armenia the electoral volatility is low as compared with the electoral volatility of Kyrgyzstan. This emphasizes relatively low level of institutionalization that may also be explained by the changes in the electoral system. In Kyrgyzstan there was a change from the majoritarian into the proportional representation during the last elections. In Armenia there has not been such a change in the electoral system, but there was a change in the governmental system. So, one can argue that changes in the political system in general may not effect the party system institutionalization, but change in the electoral system has direct impact on the party system institutionalization. Thus, electoral systems can also explain differences in the party system institutionalization. In Armenia there are several parties, like the Republican Party that is entering Parliament for several terms and there is some consistency in its gained seats and percentage of votes. In Kyrgyzstan, the party that got majority of votes was formed just several months before the elections, so the volatility is very high and there is no consistency and continuity in the system.

Those party systems that are characterized by a low degree of institutionalization are called fluid or weakly institutionalized. Thus Mainwaring and Torcal assume that the level of institutionalization is a continuous that goes from institutionalized party systems to fluid party systems. As compared with more institutionalized party systems the fluid systems are characterized by less regularity in patterns of party competition; weaker party roots in society\textsuperscript{40}; less legitimacy accorded to parties, weaker party organizations that are usually dominated by personalism and individualism\textsuperscript{41}. If parties have stable roots in the society (in other words parties are formed on class, region, ethnic group, or religious affiliation), volatility is more likely to be lower. This is explained by the fact that few voters will shift parties from election to election, thus providing some stability to the party system. This is exactly the case with the Republic of Armenia.

The attached Annexes (2-4) show consistency of certain parties during the elections. It shows that certain parties, like the Republican Party or the Armenian Revolutionary Federation enter the parliament for several terms, some other parties, such as Orinats Yerkir already for the second time entered the parliament; once as a pro governmental party and next time as an opposition. This shows that patterns of party competition have already gained certain stability in the country. The next phenomenon to be discussed here is the difference of the countries. Thus, Annex 1 presented below shows the difference of two countries in terms of human development index. To be more precise, Armenia is wealthier as compared with Kyrgyzstan. And as Mainwaring and Torcal define wealthier countries have lower electoral


\textsuperscript{41} Ibid 7
volatility\textsuperscript{42}. This is also one more fact assuming that electoral volatility is lower in Armenia than in Kyrgyzstan. The Appendixes showing electoral volatility in these two countries expose that electoral volatility reduced in Armenia twice in the last two terms. However, in Kyrgyzstan, the tables show that especially in the last two elections none of the previous parties entered the parliament.

There are some scholars who assume that party systems would become more stable over time when voters become to identify themselves with certain parties.\textsuperscript{43} At the same time, others, Mainwaring and Torcal, emphasize that weak institutionalization (and high volatility) could go on for an extended period\textsuperscript{44}. At the same time the weaker is the party system institutionalization, it is more likely that other factors such as personality, government performance may affect the continuity and electoral behaviour.

At the same time, there can be other phenomena that link institutionalization and clientelist relations. According to Kitschelt\textsuperscript{45} besides programmatic and ideological relations there exist also one more criterion, that is the voters may choose and elect on the basis of clientelist goods. Thus a person may choose a party or a representative of a party according to his or he own interests and clientelist benefits, thus at the same time assisting in the maintenance of continuity of the electoral system.

The other phenomena that may assist to the maintenance of the stability of the party system is that the voters may value government performance\textsuperscript{46}, thus casting their vote to the

\textsuperscript{43}Phill Converse, ‘Of Time and Stability’, \textit{Comparative Political Studies}, (1969, 2), 139-171
\textsuperscript{44}Scott Mainwaring and Mariano Torcal, (April, 2005), 11 available at http://www.ics.ul.pt/agenda/seminarioinskiapoli/pdfs/Party_Systems.pdf
\textsuperscript{45}Herbert Kitschelt, ‘Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Politics’, \textit{Comparative Political Studies} (2000), 33, 845-879
\textsuperscript{46}John Ferejohn, 'Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control', \textit{Public Choice} (1986), 5-20
party that already was in power and is predictable, people are aware of their political program and their performance. The fact that some parties come to power for several terms can be explained both by some clientelist relations that are relevant in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, and also by the government performance.

One of the other criteria showing the level of institutionalization of party system can be the role of leaders of the parties. The more institutionalized the party and the party system is the less dependent it should be on the leader. In the case of Armenia, both the Republican and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation had different leaders during different elections. However, it was not an obstacle for the parties during the elections. While in Kyrgyzstan, parties are more personality centred. People associate parties with personalities rather than programs, the clans rather than ideologies.

Thus, clientelism and party system institutionalization are linked to each other and have different implications in similar cases. Clientelism is fostering the development of certain networks in the society that has impact on the level of institutionalization of party system. Measurement of party system institutionalization that was conducted slightly differently than suggested by Mainwaring is likely to assure that party system is weakly institutionalized in Kyrgyzstan than in Armenia. In the next chapter the description and analysis of Armenian and Kyrgyz party systems will show these differences more clearly.
CHAPTER 2: PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS IN ARMENIA AND KYRGYZSTAN

This chapter will discuss and analyze parties and party systems in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. It will show how party politics operate there and show what the impact of informal networks is in the maintenance of party politics. The relationship between informal networks and clientelist relation will be discussed. I will explore the reasons for the difficulties of a building stable party system and address the consequences of weak institutionalization in Kyrgyzstan.

2.1 Analysis of the Armenian Party System

To analyze the party system of one country it is very important to give a non-biased and full description of parties and the party system. First of all there is a short but detailed description of parties and party system in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. As a source to gather statistical data for this research served mainly the Constitution of Armenia, the ‘Vote’s Guidebook’ published with the support of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) office in Yerevan and also the websites of the discussed parties.

According to the Constitution ‘The Republic of Armenia is a sovereign, democratic state, based on social justice and the rule of law. In the Republic of Armenia power lies with the people. The people exercise their power through free elections and referenda, as well as
through state and local self-governing bodies and public officials as provided by the Constitution.\textsuperscript{47}

In the Republic of Armenia there is a division of powers: executive--president (head of state), prime minister (head of cabinet), legislative--unicameral National Assembly (parliament), judicial--Constitutional Court.\textsuperscript{48} In the 1990 first elections after the collapse of Soviet Union Levon ter-Petrosyan became the first president, when the Armenian National Movement defeated the Communist party. The Constitution of Armenia was adopted in 1995. In 1998 Levon Ter-Petrosyan was obliged to resign due to public’s dissatisfaction with his policies. In March of the same year the prime minister Robert Kocharyan, who had no party affiliation, was elected as the president of the Republic. In 1999 country suffered a crisis, when the Speaker of the parliament, Karen Demirchyan, and the Prime Minister, Vazgen Sargsyan, were assassinated in the National Assembly. The strong alliance ‘Unity’ that was formed by those two people and their parties lost its power and collapsed. However, the political situation was stabilized and Robert Kocharyan was re-elected in March 2003. In 2005 Constitutional amendments were introduced as a result of referendum held in November 27. That was an essential shift from presidential-parliamentary to parliamentary-presidential system which gives much more importance to parliament and parties, thus determining their crucial and key role in political processes of Armenia. Before the constitutional referendum one could argue that superpresidentialism was dominating in politics, which reduced the role and influence of parties. Fish describes superpresidentialism like this: “An apparatus of executive power that dwarfs all other agencies in terms of size and


the resources it consumes; a president who enjoys decree powers, a president who de jure and de facto controls most of the powers of the purse; a relatively toothless legislature that cannot repeal presidential decrees and that enjoys scant authority and/or resources to monitor the chief executive; provisions that render impeachment of the president virtually impossible…

Fish claims that superpresidentialism makes political life personalized. However, the amendments to the constitution assisted in overcoming that ‘weakness’. John Ishiyama and Ryan Kennedy conducted statistical surveys and said that already in 2001 parties were developed in Armenia.

As a result of the May 2007 parliamentary elections, 103 seats of the 131 in the National Assembly (90 elected on a proportional basis and 41 on a district-by-district majoritarian basis) are members of pro-governmental parties. The Republican Party and Prosperous Armenia formed a coalition; the ARF Dashnaksutyun Party signed a cooperation agreement with this coalition. The Heritage Party and Rule of Law (Orinats Yerkir) are opposition parties.

I shall start with the Republican Party ideology. As a ruling party it is more centralized. The party was founded in 1990 by Ashot Navasardyan. The party is being led by the ideologies of Garegin Njdeh, who was a hero of Armenian nation. Njdeh’s ideologies can be found in the Republican Party program:

Comprehending its God-given existence, Armenian people have a supreme goal of sustaining in its homeland, confirming its vitality, genius and free will. The

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http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0966-8136(200112)53%3A8%3C1177%3ASAPPDI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P
pledge of this is the Armenian national ideology in which Garegin Njdeh’s philosophy plays an essential role. The Armenian national ideology is based on the system of values and historical and cultural experience of the nation, combining generally accepted human and national values. It is aimed at strengthening the belief of Armenian people in its power and future, and as an ideological system, has to evolve continuously.

We can assume that Republican Party is a mass party, because there are no restrictions for enrollment and it has more than 55 000 members. It has party representation offices in all the regions of Armenia and carries out a very active policy at recruiting members. The party has a conservative viewpoint on its foreign and inner policy; sometimes it is even tough concerning such crucial issues, as the recognition of Armenian genocide or Karabakh conflict resolution. It will be relevant to distinguish between western and eastern (or status quo) oriented parties. In this context the Republican Party is western oriented, because one of its priorities is full integration and promotion of good relations with NATO and USA.

The other party to be discussed is Prosperous Armenia, which was formed quite a short time before the elections. The party is a “center–driven political force, the activity of which is based on reality and rationality. Denying extremes, political adventurism and dogmatism, we would wish to resolve fundamentally the problems facing society”. This party is also a mass party and aims at recruiting as many members as possible (370 000 members). After the elections May 12, 2007 Prosperous Armenia gained second (after the Republican Party) place in the National Assembly. However, this party is not so tough in international and foreign policy affairs as the Republican Party. Even if we assume that the

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54 Samvel Mkhitaryan, et al., (Yerevan, 2007) 19
number of party members presented in the official website is not accurate and only one tenth of it is true, we still see big numbers. This shows how organized are parties in Armenia.

The next party to be discussed is the Armenian Revolutionary Party (Dashnaks) that is the third party in parliament. It was founded in 1890 by Christaphor Mikayelyan, Rostom Zorian and Simon Zavarian. The group had a socialist ideology from its very origin. That is why the group participated in various social movements active in Transcaucasia. Armenian Revolutionary Party was a ruling party during Armenia’s first republic. Internally the party is decentralized, with elective legislative assemblies and executive bodies. It has a Supreme body of 21 members, a committee of 5 or 7 members. The party is led with this slogan “The party finds that foreign relations should be led exceptionally by national interests without taking into account intentions of any party, social group, politician or statement.”

Rule of Law (Orinats Yerkir) started its activities in 1996 and has more than 100 000 members. In 1999 the party participated in parliamentary elections. This party claims its priority to be engagement and membership in the European Union, consistent development of friendly relations with Russia and USA. This party is not prioritizing the issue of Armenian genocide or Karabakh conflict in foreign policy as compared with the other mentioned parties.

Why is the Armenian party system considered to be more institutionalized as compared with the Kyrgyz case? First from the attached appendixes one can see that in Armenia one and the same parties, such as the Republican, Armenian Revolutionary Federation and Orinats Yerkir have already formulated certain preferences in the society. To

56 Samvel Mkhitaryan, et al, (Yerevan, 2007) 50
put it in other words, they have already certain roots in the society. Moreover, electoral accountability is sensible and high, that contributes to the maintenance of trust and certain attitudes toward the parties. In addition, the proportional representation of the electoral system strengthens the parties, party system and the party leadership in the Armenian party system.

2.2 Parties and Party Systems in Kyrgyzstan

This subchapter will discuss and analyze parties and party system institutionalization in Kyrgyzstan. It will show how party politics operates there and show what the impact of informal networks is in the maintenance of party politics. I will explore the reasons for the difficulties of building a stable party system and address the consequences of weak institutionalization.

According to the Constitution of Kyrgyzstan, “The Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyzstan) is a sovereign, unitary, democratic Republic, founded as a rule-of-law and secular state”\textsuperscript{58}. In October 1991, Akayev, receiving majority of votes, was elected the president of Kyrgyz Republic. Now the head of state is Kurmanbek Bakiev. Kyrgyzstan has a unicameral Supreme Council (Jorgorku Kenesh) with 90 seats. The President of the country is elected every 5 years. In December 2007 Parliamentary elections were held. However, before that Constitutional amendments and a new election code were adopted by referendum in October.

According to the OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission the political structure in Kyrgyzstan is fragmented with over one hundred registered political parties. In the past two years the political landscape has changed and new parties have emerged in the forefront of political life. One of the biggest parties was Ata-Meken that is led by former Speaker of Parliament Omurbek Tekebaev. However, in October 2007, a new pro-presidential party, Ak Zhol, was formed. President Bakiev was elected as its chairman but suspended his activities as chairman during his presidency.  

According to results based on 81% of the polling stations, turnout was over 60%, but no party apart from Ak-Zhol had managed to pass both thresholds. Ak-Zhol reportedly received 47.8% of the vote. Ata-Menken received 9.3% of the vote nationwide, but failed the regional thresholds in three regions. Ak-Zhol therefore appeared to be the only party to enter parliament. International monitors from the OSCE heavily criticized the election. Monitors from the CIS, however, claimed the election met democratic standards. Results showed that two other parties, the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party, narrowly managed to pass the national threshold. “It is unclear whether the CEC is ignoring or reinterpreting the Supreme Court ruling which would entitle the Ata-Menken party to seats despite failing to win at least 0.5% of the vote in all seven regions and two cities. However, out of 88 places in Parliament eight seats got the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan and nine places got the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan.”  


For the first time in the history of the young republic deputies were elected on the basis of lists. The electoral Code of Kyrgyz Republic imposes that a political party needs 5% of the total number of voters nationwide and 0.5% of all voting residents of each of the seven regions of Kyrgyzstan and central cities of Bishkek and Osh to make the parliament. Four political parties scaled the 5% barrier in the snap parliamentary election in Kyrgyzstan - Ak Zhol with 46.99%, Socialist Party Ata-Meken with 8.29%, Communist Party (5.12%), and Social-Democratic Party (5.05%). At the beginning the number of participating parties was much, twenty two. However, twelve of them were accepted and registered. The ruling Ak-Zhol party which Bakiev personally created on October was among those parties. The number of its new members, who come from a wide variety of backgrounds, has grown very rapidly since its establishment.61

As for the opposition, there has been a similar concentration of forces. The radical opposition was united under the leadership of Omurbek Tekebaev, the president of Ata-Meken and former parliamentary speaker. Former Prime Minister Felix Kulov ran in the elections with his party Ar-Namys. The moderate forces have gathered around Prime Minister Atambaev and his social democratic party. Even some people assured that the President's party, Ak-Zhol, resembled an assembly of opportunistic politicians62.

The interesting phenomenon is that this election was the first that was held by the proportional system. Before that parties existed but single candidates ran for elections. However, the role of parties was also significant in the previous parliamentary elections.

In the previous elections there were about forty seven political parties. Many of these had a very small membership, restricted to a specific geographical area. Alga, Kyrgyzstan was government’s main tool to win in the parliamentary elections in 2005. The president’s daughter, who did not have any formal role in the party, acted as a consultant to the party and was widely involved in its activities. Another pro-governmental party, Adilet was officially led by the head of the presidential administration, Toichubek Kasymov. However, in practice it was led by the deputy Kubanychbek Jumaliev, a close friend of the president. The other party, Moya Strana was created as a pro governmental party, but became gradually more independent, intentionally trying to represent modernist, progressive politics with a strong emphasis on economic reforms. Forty four opposition parties composed 4-5 blocs. The Civic Union for Fair Elections included parties like Ar-Namys, led by Felix Kulov, who challenged the president in 2000. Other opposition parties had more regional focus, such as Ata-Meken, which in generally was associated with parliamentary deputy Omurbek Tekebaev’s territory of Jalal abad.63

This division in Kyrgyzstan is also associated with clan politics and clientelism. Collins emphasizes the role of clans in Central Asian politics and shows how they penetrate into and weaken regimes. She contrasts the decline of clans in Western Europe with their persistence in parts of Africa, Central Asia, and the Caucasus, highlighting certain conditions that may break down the clan politics.64 However, as the paper is not aimed at analyzing clan systems in the world, the definition chosen for analysis is this: clans are informal

64 Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
organizations comprising a network of individuals linked by kinship relations⁶⁵. In other words, informal networks within which people are attached by a strong sense of identity. All of this literature seems to be mostly general, without much attention to the party system and its recent development.

However, this election in Kyrgyzstan as compared with the parliamentary elections in Armenia was not in line with democratic standards. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which monitored the polls, also said they lacked transparency and were a step backward compared to the previous elections in 2005. "Having led the past two OSCE election observation missions here in Kyrgyzstan, I am personally disappointed that there is now a backsliding in the elections process. Political pluralism which I have seen develop is undermined by this missed opportunity", said Kimmo Kiljunen, Special Co-Ordinator of the OSCE short-term observers and Head of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly delegation⁶⁶.

"We witnessed only how one clan was changed for another one. When we were discussing [in parliament] whether we should celebrate this day or not, I said that the revolution is still ongoing. Those people who wanted to arrest us [in 2005], who became very rich under Akaev’s regime, they are still here [around Bakiev now]. But those who made this revolution are left on the streets. That's why they are all disappointed," claims Otunbaeva, who is one of many political figures in Kyrgyzstan. It is still early to make any

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predictions concerning the next elections. However, till the present day party system in Kyrgyzstan is more likely to be characterized with instability and discontinuity. Despite the existence of networks within the government, that are usually called clans, parties do not have any roots in the society; they are not main means of providing legitimacy. This phenomenon, namely phenomenon of clans, has direct impact on the legitimacy of part competition that is undermined by negative relations among clans which bring hostility within the society. This, in its turn, influences the party system institutionalization.

In 1999 the new electoral code of Kyrgyzstan introduced new electoral system with proportional representation. “The natural effect of this act was to form a six deputy association including three main political orientations: ‘the left wing’ (Kyrgyzstan’, ‘Communists of Kyrgyzstan’), ‘the right wing’, (the right Coalition) , ‘the centralists’ (‘Eluchun’, ‘Unanimity’, ‘Regions of Kyrgyzstan’). This is testimony that Kyrgyzstan is moving towards forming a sustainable three-party political system and passed into a higher level of democracy – from democracy of persons to party democracy”. The author adds, “At the same time there exists a problem as well: in Kyrgyzstan the political system is flabby and amorphous. The parties are weak and don’t have at the local level an extensive network and representation. They don’t have necessary branches to involve all the masses and to be able to influence them at a local level. Therefore, it is of great importance to establish not only an efficient legislature, meeting the specific needs of the country and national interests, but also to create the necessary prerequisites for development of political parties that form the government. Unfortunately, all these efforts thus far have proved ineffective”\textsuperscript{68}. Though the

author claimed that Kyrgyzstan was moving towards forming a sustainable party system, it had a backward move. Instead of stability, there is much volatility and discontinuity.

The strange phenomena that occurred in Kyrgyzstan during the last parliamentary elections created much suspicion and doubts concerning the stability, continuity and even institutionalization of party system. The ultimate victory of one party that was formed only about two months before the elections shows that parties in Kyrgyzstan not only do not have strong roots in the society, but also can not be analyzed or even described by most of the criteria of institutionalization. In contrast to Armenia, where parties have already certain roots in the society, that is not the case with Kyrgyzstan. In Kyrgyzstan government and the parliament were the target of suspicion, distrust and hatred, which resulted in the colour „revolution”. Causes of revolution were also the existence of certain networks within the government and parliament, that some scholars and politicians call clans. Clans are usually perceived as informal organizations comprising a network of individuals linked by kin relations.69

Thus, the analysis provided above shows that party system institutionalization is very low in Kyrgyzstan, and the main reason for it is that clans influence legitimacy of party competition having impact on party system. The consequences of low institutionalization are non predictability of elections, non stable political system, and dissatisfaction of the public and threat of another revolution. This shows how important it is to have institutionalized and stable party system that will result in the stable political system.

Thus taking into account the continuity and stability of party politics in Armenia, one can say that there the party politics is comparatively more stable than in Kyrgyzstan. For

69 See Kathleen Collins, (Cambridge, 2006), Andrew Shryock (Berkley 1997)
example in Armenia after the collapse of Soviet Union in the last several parliamentary elections the Republican Party and Armenian Revolutionary Federation gained considerable seats. This does not only mean that there is some consistency in the voter behaviour, but also that the parties have stable roots in the society and some voter loyalty. The institutionalization of the system can also be explained by the fact that newly emerged parties can not gain majority of seats as it was in the case of Kyrgyzstan. In the latter case only the fact that a party being formed just two months before the elections was able to get the majority of seats in Parliament can only be explained by the low level of institutionalization of party system in the country. This can have two explanations: one is that influence of the clan politics and the other is the existence of strong clientelist relations. Different scholars define clans differently. However, as the paper is not aimed at analyzing clan systems in the world, I would concentrate on a more general but precise definition to describe the phenomenon: clans are informal organizations comprising a network of individuals linked by kin and fictive relations. In other words, informal networks within which people are attached by a strong sense of identity.

Thus the existence of different networks might have different impact on the functioning of party politics and the level of institutionalization. Informal networks are based on achieving a mutual exchange of information and favours. Actually, there are no formal rules, but people within networks share advice freely, achieve personal goals, and help each other to obtain business and career advantages. People, members of informal

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networks all rely on the support and cooperation of others to achieve certain goals. For instance, informal networks help people to obtain jobs, to advance up the corporate ladder, to gain skills, and to acquire legitimacy\textsuperscript{71}. However, who makes up the network? What are their needs and interests? How come that existence of networks, clientelist relations is having different impact on the party system institutionalizations? These questions are discussed in the third chapter, where the puzzle of the difference of these outcomes is explained by the sequence of occurrence and influence of these phenomena.

\textsuperscript{71} James Montgomery, ‘Job Search and Network Composition: Implications of the Strength-Of-Weak-Ties Hypothesis’, \textit{American Sociological Review}, (Vol. 57) 586- 596
CHAPTER 3: SOLUTION OF THE PUZZLE

The previous chapters showed that Armenia and Kyrgyzstan have many similarities. There are phenomena characteristic of these two countries in their regions: first, informal networks, which are based on kinship relations in Kyrgyzstan, while in Armenia these relations are not based on kinship. Second common feature are clientelist relations that determine different levels of party system institutionalization in these countries. So, why do these phenomena change the outcome of party system functioning, what is rationale for treating the countries’ party systems differently? I argue that the simultaneous existence of clans and clientelist relations hampers the development party system institutionalization, because they create separation in the society and people identify themselves with certain clans or parties very strongly. This, in its turn, has negative and regressive effect on the party system.

An institutionalized party system is one that is distinguished by stability, strong roots in the society and recognition of parties as legitimate ways of governing. Such characteristics show the regularized pattern of interactions between political parties and which parties enter or exit political competition\(^{72}\). The more institutionalized a party system is, the greater is the likelihood that it will have programmatic political parties\(^{73}\). However, why do we always have clientelist relations within parties and the society in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan? Both in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan we witness very strong informal networks that function differently.

\(^{72}\) Hans Stockton, ‘Political Parties, Party Systems, and Democracy in East Asia: Lessons from Latin America’, *Comparative Political Studies*, (2001) 5

These informal networks differ in their nature and functioning. In Armenia the informal networks are not based on kinship relations. On the contrary, in Kyrgyzstan the bases of informal networks are kinship relations. The puzzle is in both cases we have clientelist relations and informal networks, but the level of institutionalization of party systems is different. So, with so many similarities, what makes the party systems function differently?

Armenian informal networks are not characterized by strong identities as in Kyrgyzstan. These informal networks comprise parties in the political life of Armenia. People usually become members of the parties due to their merits and/or share the same views, values or ideology as the party does. Though there is not much ideological difference among the parties in Armenia, they slightly differ in their programs. Moreover, voters are also attracted on the basis how government performed and how they will benefit from this or that party. Even in one of the articles describing the informal networks in Armenia, ‘Karabakh elite’ is mentioned, that is, somehow, considered to be an informal network.\(^{74}\) Some other journalists argue that in Armenia these informal networks are formed by some oligarchs through semi-monopolies.\(^ {75}\) Thus, these informal networks in Armenia are not based on kinship, but rather on economic, social benefits and ideological values. This combination fosters development of programmatic relations and relatively high level of party system institutionalization. An anthropologist Nora Dudwick claims in regard to Armenia that there exist “clusters of relationships based on networks of relatives, friends, colleagues, acquaintances and neighbours, hierarchically bound together through the on-going exchange

\(^{74}\) Mark Jones, Rice University, (Workshop on State Reform, Public Policies, and Policymaking Processes, 2005)

\(^{75}\) Richard Giragosian, Armenia on the Move: A Comparative Assessment ,2007

of favours and obligations” 76. On the one hand it is true; people may become a member of the party based on their relations to another person. However, if they do not have any benefits or they do not share any mutual goals or views, this affiliation may not last long, because relative ties and kinship are not the base for the formation of networks. This short term relations are based on mutually beneficial ‘trading’ relations.

Moreover, in the case of Armenia we can see some continuity in the system and preferences of the voters: we see that one and the same party has appeared in parliament for already several terms. This suggests that not only clientelist but also programmatic relations are fostering the development of party system institutionalization in Armenia. While in Kyrgyzstan, programmatic relations can not develop because of the weak institutionalized party system. That is the reason why short term populist parties and personalities have great opportunity to be elected. During the history of political life of Kyrgyzstan we witness how different personalities were able to be elected in the Parliament without having any party affiliation, without any program or ideology. Rather they were members of the clans that were elected by the other members of the same clan. However, there is continuous competition between clans, and those people who are usually not satisfied with the government and the clan in power, elect the representatives of the other clan. At the same time, the number of such people is very high, because clan affiliation has traditional and historical background and it passes from generation to generation.

Individuals within a clan organization share common goals and are imbued with a collective identity. This high goal congruence arises from established trust, high socialization, and the social economic dependence upon the clan. Likewise the clan’s internal

76 Soren Theisen, ‘Mountaineers, racketeers and the ideals of modernity: statebuilding and elite-competition in Caucasia’, *Contrasts and Solutions in the Caucasus*, ed. Ole Hojris and Sefa Martin Yürikel (Aarhus 1999) 140-158
social mechanisms can reduce differences between individual and organizational goals\textsuperscript{77}. Consequently clan ties are more enduring than those of purely political or economic interactions\textsuperscript{78}. Collins claims that clientelism and clan relations should not be equated. In Kyrgyzstan clan networks were nurtured by the clientelistic relations. Direct exchange of favours fostered the maintenance of clans in the society and political life.

The low level of Kyrgyz party system institutionalization is conditioned by different factors, such as the existence of clan politics and regionalism in Kyrgyzstan. And as Collins emphasizes that though there is still the post-communist regime, institutions turn out to be less significant than the informal clan relationships that organize society and politics\textsuperscript{79}. I suppose that this is also determined by the continuity and stability of party system in Armenia as compared with the party system of Kyrgyzstan. Clans also “engage in ‘crowding out’, a process by which they participate politically through their networks, clans effectively crowd out non-clan forms of association or participation. Clans use this mechanism (inclusion of members and exclusion of non-members) as a means of mobilization and political participation and competition. Clan elites use the clan to mobilize social support for their agendas, thereby avoiding the costs of creating new organizations, which would have broader and less reliable constituencies”\textsuperscript{80}. Collins claims that clan engenders the rise of certain norms\textsuperscript{81}. These norms are nothing but clientelistic relations\textsuperscript{82}, which are likely to bear a form of mutually beneficial informal agreement.

Thus, viewing clans as informal organizations comprising a network of individuals linked by kinship relations, Collins argues that patronage is a key element that binds clan

\textsuperscript{77} Kathleen Collins, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 30
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid 28
\textsuperscript{79} Kathleen Collins, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 5
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid 53
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid 31
\textsuperscript{82} Kitschelt, et al, (Cambridge, 1999) 44-48
members to each other. Informal network suggests that relations based on certain interests can last longer and bear the form of already other kinds of relations, consequently have ‘unwritten rules’ and norms that possess affiliation and identification with a certain network. Thus, clans can be regarded as groups that can be characterised by clientelist relations.

Collins assumes that there are several conditions that helped clans to exist. These are: 1. late state formation, due in large part to colonialism, 2. late formation of a national identity, 3. the absence of a market economy. To illustrate, I shall bring the example of Kyrgyzstan. Here clans became increasingly important when the regime was losing power both in the case of soviet power, and when Akaev lost his power.

This strong identical separation in the country and political life of Kyrgyzstan creates obstacles for party system institutionalization. Even if a clan has power to make party system more stable, practically it can not do so, because the division of the country is represented by the separation of party affiliation that is very strong and deep, but at the same time a huge number of people are always unsatisfied with the government performance. In Akaev’s period party system institutionalization was also very weak. That was the result of another clan’s wish to gain dominant role in the political life. Moreover, as the president and his clan favoured and supported the northern clans, the southern clans expressed their dissatisfaction. Thus this division impedes party system institutionalization. With a weak institutionalized party system it is very difficult to hold the government accountable. Instead of strengthening and stabilizing party system, clans make it weaker and more fragile.

Thus, the analysis provided above shows that party system institutionalization is very low in Kyrgyzstan, and the main reason for it is the combination of clans in the society and

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83 Kathleen Collins, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 30-45
84 Kathleen Collins, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 44-45
clientelist relations that nurture clans. The consequences of low institutionalization are the non-predictability of elections, a non-stable political system, and public dissatisfaction and the threat of another revolution. This shows how important it is to have an institutionalized and stable party system that will result in a stable political system.

Hence one can assume that the differences in the levels of party system institutionalization in these two countries depend on the sequence of phenomena: to illustrate, in Armenia clientelist relations foster the development of informal networks in the society and political life that are not clan relations because they do not suppose any kinship relations. This, in its turn, fosters the development of programmatic relations. The reason is that, besides some personal interest, people attach much value to the programmatic aspects of the parties and economic benefits.

On the other hand, in Kyrgyzstan informal networks, clans, that have a long history and are traditionally embedded in the society, foster the development of clientelist relations, negatively effecting legitimacy of party competition, thus reducing the level of party system institutionalization. This combination hampers stability in the political life of the country that has its negative impact in the formation of party system.

Therefore, the phenomena are the same both in Armenia and in Kyrgyzstan, but the difference is what influences what. As clans presuppose kinship relations where the members of the clan are attached to each other with strong connections, one can assume that a clan is more likely to provide stability. However, this is not the case with the Kyrgyz party system. Why? There can be several explanations for this: first, the existence of several clans assumes that one clan is usually competing with other clans represented by their parties, and in the case of one’s victory the other clan is trying to destabilize the system and hold victory over the other. Thus the combination of these phenomena seems to create problems for stability
for party systems. High volatility of the elections and the colour revolution were the result of
the government’s failures in Kyrgyzstan. The third reason for such low level of
institutionalization can be the electoral system. As in Kyrgyzstan the electoral system is more
disproportional than in Armenia. There is another puzzle here: proportional systems are
usually more stabilizing for party systems, which is not the case for Kyrgyzstan.
Accordingly, the electoral system is also determined by the informal networks and clientelist
relations, thus having impact on the party system institutionalization. Moreover, if parties
were proportionally represented, people would vote for their own clan/party. However, due
to disproportional representation, ‘chaotic’ situation emerges, where clans and affiliation
create difficulties for the institutionalization of party systems.

The case is different in Armenia, where clientelist relations create informal networks;
the party system has become more stable. As mentioned above, these informal networks are
not clans, they can be called ‘elites’ or groups of people that have great influence not only in
political, but in economic, cultural and business spheres as well. These relations within the
group are not based on kinship, but on interests and benefits. Besides, clientelist relations we
witness also programmatic relations in Armenia. Parties have specific rules and ideologies,
which help people to identify them and choose also according to their values. Moreover, in

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85 More on Kyrgyz revolutions the links: Martha Brill Olcott, 'Kyrgyzstan’s “Tulip Revolution”', Carnegie
2008),
Jeremy Bransten, 'Kyrgyzstan: Was “Revolution” A Worthy Successor To Rose And Orange?', Radio Free
2008),
'Kyrgyzstan Revolution: Morning After', Peace Corps Kyrgyzstan, March 24, 2005
Armenia the government carries out certain activities, such as voter education\textsuperscript{86} to put emphasis on ideological and programmatic aspects of parties. In Armenia and Kyrgyzstan government performance will be viewed from two points of view: the government’s activities and the programmatic relations between parties. The reason why there is stability and continuity in the party system of Armenia is that, firstly, people agree and are satisfied with the activities and policies of the government represented by some parties. Second, they attach great importance to the programmatic aspect of party politics, consequently electing them from one election to another election.

To sum up, there is crucial difference in the functioning and nature of informal networks in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. In Armenia these networks are formed on the basis of clientelist relations and are more like elites, which do not suppose any kinship relations. On the contrary, in Kyrgyzstan, informal networks are based on kinship relations. However, these clans are also nurtured by clientelist relations, which hamper institutionalization of party system in Kyrgyzstan.

\textsuperscript{86} ‘Armenia after the election’, (written material submitted by the Government of the Republic of Armenia for inclusion in the record of the hearing of the US commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington DC, 2007)
CONCLUSION

Armenia and Kyrgyzstan are countries that have much in common: the same legacy, informal networks, clientelist relations and are considered to be equally free. However, despite all these similarities the level of institutionalization of party systems is different that is conditioned by these phenomena. Though these countries have informal networks and clientelist relations, they have different levels of party system institutionalization. The latter is determined by the combination and interrelation of informal networks and clientelist relations.

In both countries politics is organized around informal networks, and elites focus their attention mostly on issues of self-preservation and succession⁸⁷. We had clientelist relations in both countries that is defined “as relations in which relatively powerful and rich "patrons" promise to provide relatively powerless and poor "clients" with jobs, protection, infrastructure, and other benefits in exchange for votes and other forms of loyalty including labor⁸⁸.".

Informal networks, in their turn, assume some relations that are based on certain duties and responsibilities within the ‘family’ network. Thus the regulatory favours, welfare payments, titles, gifts and monetary transfers seem to be preconditions and/or consequences of informal networks. On the one hand, informal networks can develop from clientelist

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relations and on the other hand informal networks can become significant and irreplaceable base for the formation clientelist relations.

As the paper showed in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan this sequence is different: in Armenia clientelist relations form informal networks. In Kyrgyzstan, just the contrary, informal networks are nurtured by the clientelist relations. This was the puzzle: why with so many similarities such differences? The difference of party system institutionalization is conditioned by the interrelation of clientelist relations and informal networks. If clientelism forms and influences informal networks, the level of party system institutionalization is higher than when informal networks are a base for the formation of clientelist relations.

Relatively highly institutionalized party system is characterized by stability and continuity. In Armenian party politics this stability is also described by the continuity in the preferences of voters. As in Armenia more attention is attached to the programmatic aspects of party politics, it is easier for voters to identify some differences in the programmatic and ideological factors of the parties. At the same time in Kyrgyzstan clan politics and revolution stimulated existence of a less institutionalized and weak party system that is characterized by instability, volatility and discontinuity.

Thus, clientelism and party system institutionalization are linked to each other and have different impacts in similar countries. Measurement of party system institutionalization that was conducted slightly differently than suggested by Mainwaring shows that party system is weakly institutionalized in Kyrgyzstan than in Armenia.

Armenian informal networks are not characterized by strong identities. These informal networks comprise parties in the political life of Armenia. People usually become members of the parties due to their merits and/or share the same views, values or ideology as
the party does. Though there is not much ideological difference in among the parties in 
Armenia, they slightly differ in their programs. Moreover, voters are also attracted on the 
basis how government performed and how they will benefit from this or that party. Even in 
one of the articles describing the informal networks in Armenia, ‘Karabakh elite’ is 
mentioned, that is, somehow, considered to be an informal network.89 Some other journalists 
argue that in Armenia these informal networks are formed by some oligarchs through semi-
monopolies.90

Thus, these informal networks in Armenia are not based on kinship, but rather on 
economic, social benefits and ideological values. This combination fosters development of 
programmatic relations and relatively high level of party system institutionalization. An 
anthropologist Nora Dudwick claims in regard to Armenia that there exist “clusters of 
relationships based on networks of relatives, friends, colleagues, acquaintances and 
neighbours, hierarchically bound together through the on-going exchange of favours and 
obligations”91. On the one hand it is true; people may become a member of the party based 
on their relations to another person. On the other hand, if they do not have any benefits or 
they do not share any mutual goals or views, this affiliation may not last long, because 
relative ties and kinship relations are not the base for the formation of networks.

In the case of Armenia we can see some continuity in the system and preferences of 
the voters: we see that one and the same party has appeared in parliament for already several 
terms. This suggests that not only clientelist but also programmatic relations are fostering the

89 Mark Jones, ‘The Role of Parties and Part Systems in the Policymaking Process’, (Rice University, 
Workshop on State Reform, Public Policies, and Policymaking Processes, 2005)
90 Richard Giragosian, Armenia on the Move: A Comparative Assessment ,2007

91 Soren Theisen, ‘Mountaineers, racketeers and the ideals of modernity: statebuilding and elite-competition in 
Caucasia’, Contrasts and Solutions in the Caucasus, ed. Ole Hojris and Sefa Martin Yürükel (Aarhus 1999) 
140-158
development of party system institutionalization in Armenia. While in Kyrgyzstan, the weak institutionalized party system leaves no place for the development of programmatic relations.

The low level of Kyrgyz party system institutionalization is conditioned by different factors, such as the existence of clan politics and regionalism in Kyrgyzstan. This strong identical separation in the country and political life of Kyrgyzstan creates obstacles for party system institutionalization. Even if a clan has power to make party system more stable, practically it can not do so, because the division of the country is represented by the division of party affiliation and it is a very strongly and deeply rooted in the society.

Thus, the analysis provided above shows that party system institutionalization is very low in Kyrgyzstan, and the main reason for it is the combination of clans, that creates illegitimacy in party competition, and clientelist relations that nurture these clans. The consequences of low institutionalization are the non-predictability of elections, a non-stable political system, and public dissatisfaction and the threat of another revolution. This shows how important it is to have an institutionalized and stable party system that will result in a stable political system.

The case is different in Armenia, where due to ‘trading relations’ in informal networks, the party system has become more stable. As mentioned above, these informal networks are not clans, they can be called ‘elites’, groups that have great influence not only in political, but in economic, cultural and business spheres as well. These relations are not based on kinship, but on interests and benefits. Besides, clientelist relations we witness also programmatic relations in Armenia. Parties have specific rules and ideologies, which help people to identify them and choose also according to their values. In Armenia the
government carries out certain activities, such as voter education\(^9\) to put emphasis on ideological and programmatic aspects of parties.

To sum up, there is a crucial difference in the functioning and nature of informal networks in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. In Armenia these networks are formed on the basis of clientelist relations and are more like elites, which do not suppose any kinship relations. In Kyrgyzstan informal networks are based on kinship relations. Moreover, these clans are also nurtured by clientelist relations. They influence legitimacy in the party competition that is undermined by negative relations among clans and brings hostility within society hampering institutionalization of party system in Kyrgyzstan.

APPENDIX 1

Human Development Index of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index Rank</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank (according to Human Development Reports 2007-2008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, annual estimates</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Literacy rate (% aged 15 and older)</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>98.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined gross enrolment ration for primary, secondary and tertiary education (%)</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>77.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (PPP US$)</td>
<td>4.945</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, annual growth rate</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX 2

Parliamentary Elections in Armenia, 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union Republic</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shamiram</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Communist Party</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Union</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of National Self-determination</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


APPENDIX 3\textsuperscript{95}

Parliamentary Elections in Armenia in 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>41.69</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia Communist Party</td>
<td>12.09</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Unity</td>
<td>7.96</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia Revolutionary Federation</td>
<td>12.09</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orinats Yerkir</td>
<td>5.28</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Union</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX 4\textsuperscript{96}

Parliamentary Elections in Armenia in 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party of Armenia</td>
<td>23.66</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orinats Yerkir</td>
<td>12.60</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Revolutionary Federation</td>
<td>11.45</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>13.71</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Unity</td>
<td>8.91</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified Labor Party</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### APPENDIX 5[^97]

**Parliamentary Elections in Armenia in 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party of Armenia</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Prosperous Armenia&quot;</td>
<td>12.60</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Revolutionary Federation</td>
<td>11.45</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orinats Yerkir</td>
<td>13.71</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage</td>
<td>8.91</td>
<td>7</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


### APPENDIX 6[^98]

**Elections in Kyrgyzstan 1995**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
<th>Seats</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social democrats</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist party</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarians</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ata Meken</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Republican Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity Party of Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMK (Democratic Movement)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erkin Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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</table>

[^98]: Kathleen Collins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 234
APPENDIX 799

Parliamentary Elections in Kyrgyzstan in 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union of Democratic Forces</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My Country Party of Action</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
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</table>

APPENDIX 8100

Parliamentary Elections in Kyrgyzstan in 2005

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alga Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ata-Jurt</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asaba</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
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APPENDIX 9101

Parliamentary Elections in Kyrgyzstan in 2007

<table>
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<th>Parties</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ak Zhol</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>1.25%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists’ party</td>
<td>2.86%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX 10


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Parties</th>
<th>UP</th>
<th>SH</th>
<th>ACP</th>
<th>NDU</th>
<th>UNS</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>LU</th>
<th>ARF</th>
<th>OY</th>
<th>NDU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>7.96%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>5.28%</td>
<td>5.17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>results</td>
<td>-50</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-7.5</td>
<td>-7.5</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>7.96%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>5.28%</td>
<td>5.17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Volatility 73.01%

APPENDIX 11


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Parties</th>
<th>RPA</th>
<th>OY</th>
<th>ARF</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>NU</th>
<th>ULP</th>
<th>PA</th>
<th>H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>23.66%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>11.45%</td>
<td>13.71%</td>
<td>8.91%</td>
<td>5.67%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
<td>13.71%</td>
<td>11.45%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>8.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>results</td>
<td>10.24%</td>
<td>1.11%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-13.71%</td>
<td>-8.91%</td>
<td>-5.67%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>8.91%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Volatility 32.86%

As we can see from these results the percentage of electoral volatility decreased twice the amount, which shows that party system institutionalization is relatively high in Armenia.

APPENDIX 12


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Parties</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>CP</th>
<th>AG</th>
<th>AM</th>
<th>PRP</th>
<th>UPK</th>
<th>DMK</th>
<th>AW</th>
<th>EK</th>
<th>UDF</th>
<th>MCPA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>results</td>
<td>-9.5%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
<td>-1.9%</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
<td>-1.9%</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
<td>-1.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX 13


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Parties</th>
<th>ALG</th>
<th>AJ</th>
<th>AS</th>
<th>AZ</th>
<th>SDP</th>
<th>CP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td>1.25%</td>
<td>2.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>results</td>
<td>-40.1%</td>
<td>-2.7%</td>
<td>-2.7%</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td>1.25%</td>
<td>2.86%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even if we did not calculate the electoral volatility, the graph shows that all those parties that were in parliament in 2005, were not elected in 2007, so the party representation in the parliament changed for 100%, and the volatility was 100%.
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