WHO VETOES THE EUROPEANIZATION OF THE POLICE?

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ALBANIA AND MACEDONIA

By

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Abstract

The completion of the Fifth Enlargement on 1 January 2007 shifted the attention of scholars and students of EU studies to the countries of the Western Balkans. Two of these countries are the focus of this thesis: Albania and Macedonia. Although very similar, these two countries have not been equally successful in implementing the EU requirements in the police sector between 2001 and 2006. The 2006 Commission’s report evaluates Albania as having made fair progress and Macedonia as having made limited progress. Therefore, the central question that this research answers is: what are the factors that affect successful implementation of the EU countries in the (potential) candidate countries? The methodology used here is that of controlled comparison by the method of difference. Formal and informal conversations were conducted which helped in making the finding of this research more coherent. This thesis concludes that the main factor that has contributed to the difference in success in reforming the police sector is the higher diversity of stands among the Macedonian veto players compared the Albanian ones. In particular, in both countries the Ministry of Interior and the Parliament were the two most important veto players the consensus of which is necessary for the reforms to be undertaken, followed by the government and the international assistance missions. The findings of this thesis are of particular interest given that the security reforms in the region are a priority not only for the EU but also for all the countries in the region.
Acknowledgements

Writing the MA thesis is not an easy for most of the students. However to me, it turned out to be the most enjoyable assignment at CEU because I was surrounded all the time by good listeners and helpful advisors. First and for most, for eased my work, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Annabelle Littoz-Monnet. Not only she listened carefully at my concerns but she also promptly responded to my questions. John Harbord, my academic writing advisor, equally deserves my appreciation for reading carefully my drafts and making valuable comments for improvements. In addition, I would like to express my appreciation to all those hard working experts that allocated some time to answer my questions. It was due to their genuine responses that I managed to incorporate in my thesis information that was unavailable in books or scholarly articles. Above all, I would like to thank Jonian Molla for inspiring me to write on such an interesting yet not explored topic.

I would also like to thank the IRES department coordinators, Julia and Iren for patiently responding to the numerous questions regarding the outlook of the thesis and my IRES colleagues with whom I shared my thoughts and who were constantly advising me what to do. I cannot exclude from thanking two of my best friends, Dragos and Gisela. Although not familiar with the topic they spend hours and hours listening to my thoughts on the thesis and constantly encouraging me to work better. Last but not least, I would like to thank my family who have raised me with love and sacrifice and who are proud of my academic achievements.
To My Parents
# Table of Contents

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................................ II
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................................................ III
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................................... VI

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................ 1

METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................................. 6

CHAPTER I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ..................................................................................................... 8

1.1 DEFINING EUROPEANIZATION AND DISTINGUISHING IT FROM OTHER PROCESSES THAT INDUCE CHANGE .... 9
1.2 TOP-DOWN APPROACH TO EUROPEANIZATION ......................................................................................... 11
1.3 EXPLAINING EUROPEANIZATION THROUGH RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM LENSES ................... 14
1.4 THEORIZING THE VETO PLAYERS ............................................................................................................. 16

CHAPTER II: POLICING: PARALLELS AND CONTRASTS .............................................................................. 21

2.1 POLICE SECTORS IN ALBANIA AND MACEDONIA PRIOR TO 2001 .......................................................... 21
2.2 EXPLAINING REFORMS 2001-2006 ............................................................................................................. 24
2.2.1 EU Pressure ........................................................................................................................................ 24
2.2.2 Governmental Objectives ..................................................................................................................... 26
2.2.3 Degree of Misfit and Administrative Structures ................................................................................... 28

CHAPTER III: THE ALBANIAN VETO PLAYERS .......................................................................................... 32

3.1 FORMAL COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL VETO PLAYERS ................................................................... 33
3.2 INFORMAL COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL VETO PLAYERS ................................................................ 39

CHAPTER IV: THE MACEDONIAN VETO PLAYERS ...................................................................................... 43

4.1 FORMAL COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL VETO PLAYERS ................................................................... 43
4.2 INFORMAL COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL VETO PLAYERS ................................................................ 50

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................... 54

APPENDIX 1: Evaluation of the Police Reforms by the Commission in Albania and Macedonia, 2001-2002 and 2006 ........................................................................................................................................ 58
APPENDIX 2: List of Interviewees/Respondents of the Questionnaire ................................................................ 59
APPENDIX 3: Questionnaire ............................................................................................................................. 60
APPENDIX 4: The Changing Nature of EU Police Cooperation, by Era ................................................................ 62

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................................ 63
**List of Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AHC</td>
<td>Albanian Helsinki Committee</td>
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<td>CARDS</td>
<td>Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization</td>
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<td>CEE</td>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
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<td>CNS</td>
<td>Commission of National Security</td>
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<td>DPMNU</td>
<td>Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUMM</td>
<td>European Union Monitoring Mission</td>
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<td>IAM</td>
<td>International Assistance Missions</td>
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<td>ICITAP</td>
<td>International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program</td>
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<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>IMRO</td>
<td>Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPA</td>
<td>Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoE</td>
<td>Ministry of European Integration</td>
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<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Member State</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pameca</td>
<td>Police Assistance Mission of the European Community to Albania</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>RCI</td>
<td>Rational Choice Intuitionism</td>
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<td>SAA</td>
<td>Stabilization and Association Agreement</td>
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<td>SDUM</td>
<td>Social Democratic Union of Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>State Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>TND</td>
<td>Total National Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>Western Balkan</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The completion of the Fifth Enlargement on 1 January 2007 shifted the attention of politicians, scholars and students of EU studies to the countries of the Western Balkan (WB). Joining the EU for most of these countries comprises the ultimate means to put an end to economic, political and security problems that the region has faced especially since the fall of Communism. Regarding the integration process, the EU has initiated various mechanisms to ensure the approximation of the policies of the aspirant countries such as Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), European Partnerships, and Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS). Although exposed to the same intensity of pressure coming from the EU, some states are implementing EU-led reforms faster than others. This is the case with Albania and Macedonia (official called the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) regarding the reforms in the police sector, which will be the main focus of this thesis.

Albania has contractual relations with the EC since 1992 concerning trade, commerce and economic cooperation. It has signed the SAA in June 2006 but this agreement has not entered into force because it has not yet been ratified by all the EU Member States (MS). In the meantime, an Interim Agreement will allow Albania to benefit from the SAA’s trade-related benefits.1 Currently Albania enjoys official potential candidate status. Macedonia, on the other hand, has contractual relations with the EC since 1996 when it became eligible for Community funds. It signed the SAA in April 2001 and following the application for EU membership submitted in March 2004, the EU leaders agreed to make Macedonia an official candidate country in December 2005. Both countries have emerged from a long period of socialist rule in

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the 1990’s. Since then, they have made progress towards the creation of a democratic system of governance based on the Western European models. Several consecutive waves of reforms, starting from 1991 and continuing until now, have been driven by different motives and actors. Whereas the first waves aimed at democratization and liberalization of the domestic market, the ongoing wave aims at the approximation of the domestic laws with that of the EU in return for a promised EU membership.

The focus of this research project is precisely the ongoing wave of reforms, more specifically the reforms that have occurred between 2001 and 2006. In 2001 the Commission issued the first annual report reviewing the political and economic situation in Albania and assessing its abilities to implement the SAA’s obligations. In this report the Commission states that Albania faces many challenges, given that its early efforts to introduce democracy and build a market economy were slowed down by the collapse of the lawless pyramid schemes in 1997.\(^2\) The 1997 crises also damaged the progress in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) policies. Although progress had been made in the police sector since the 1999 Feasibility Report, this progress was evaluated as unsatisfactory and many areas within the police had to be reformed to meet the EU standards.\(^3\) A similar situation appears in Macedonia as well. The Ohrid Framework Agreement and the First Annual Report of 2002 state that in 2001 Macedonia faced the most serious political and security crisis in its history, the effect of which spilled over to the other countries of the region.\(^4\) Not surprisingly the progress and the reforms in the police sector

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were assessed as unsatisfactory in 2001. The 2006 report states that overall Macedonia has made fair progress in most of the areas that were observed by the EU. However, according to the same report, the progress made in the police sector does not correspond to the overall positive trend.\(^5\)

The 2006 Commission report on Albania highlights a different situation. Whereas overall Albania has made limited progress in adopting and implementing the EU requirements, without excluding here most of the policies falling under the JHA portfolio, the progress made in the field of police is evaluated as fair (see Appendix 1).\(^6\)

Given these puzzling results, the central question that this comparative study will address is: **What are the factors that influence successful implementation of the EU requirements in potential candidate and candidate countries?** In this thesis, “successful implementation”, which is the dependent variable, refers to the completion of a particular task in accordance to the EU requirements aiming at approximation of the domestic standards of the police sector with the EU standards. The increased effectiveness of police service is measured by “…higher rates crime-detection and lower rates of crime; number of complaints on the human right violations perpetrated in the performance of police cooperation.”\(^7\)

A limited number of research projects have adopted the Europeanization literature to explain security-related issues. Bigo, Occhipinti, Bruggeman and Ludford have discussed policing in the European context emphasizing mostly the development of a common police policy at the EU level and the role of EU institutions in this process.\(^8\) However they have not

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\(^{7}\) “CARDS Assistance Programme, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2002-2006,” European Commission, External Relations Directorate General, Directorate Western Balkans.

touched upon police matters either within the MS or in the neighboring countries. Scholars such as Benke, Mawby, Stefanescu, Dimonve and Jenks have discussed policing in CEE countries with a focus on challenges and changes in the police systems in the post-communist societies of this region.  

Weber goes further by carrying a comparative study in these societies. However he identifies the changes that the reforms have brought to the status of police officers and police abuses. None of these authors conducts a thorough analysis of the impact of the EU on reforming the police sector. Instead, they see changes in the police sector as the outcome of democratization and globalization processes.

Hardly any of the articles that focus on the Europeanization of the polities, policies and polities in the WB countries address the Europeanization of the police sector. Demetropoulos, Elbasani, Rajkovits and Peshkopia are mostly concerned with the conditionality principle and how it is applied to the countries of the WB. All but the last adopt a top-down rationalist approach in their analysis, their main focus is on explaining why the EU has set different conditions for the WB than for CEE countries. They point, in their analysis, to the region’s


sensitivity and its importance to the EU but they do not address the EU’s impact particularly on the police sector. Vachudova, Merlingen with Ostrauskaite, Jenne and Flessenkemper discuss the role of the EU in ethnic reintegration in post-conflict Macedonia.\textsuperscript{12} Their analyses however do not touch upon other actors, apart from international assistance missions (IAM), involved in reforming the police in Macedonia. Georgieva and Hroni consider other actors when discussing the reforms in the police sector in Albania and Macedonia respectively.\textsuperscript{13} However, none of them account for all the actors that will be presented in this thesis and they do not analyze the reforms in the police sector in the context of the countries’ Europeanization process. Hence, none of the studies so far focuses on a comparative analysis between Albania and Macedonia regarding the Europeanization of the police sector.

Therefore, this thesis fills an important gap in the existing literature in two ways. First, Europeanization of the WB countries is a new field of research, which attracted the attention of scholars in the field of EU studies mostly after the accession of ten new countries in 2004. The theoretical approaches on Europeanization have been built in the context of the CEE Enlargement, thus leaving the potential of the ‘WB case’ widely unused in terms of feeding into the existing concepts and models on Europeanization dynamics. Second, few International Relation (IR) scholars have touched upon the Europeanization of police sector. Therefore, analysis of Albania and Macedonia will not only add to the existing literature but will also lay


the foundations for further comparative research on the region not only in the police but also in other sectors. For these reasons, comparing Albania and Macedonia on matters of policing will contribute to the current literature to a great extent.

**Methodology**

Given that the purpose of this research project is to test existing hypotheses proposed in the Europeanization literature, the examination of case studies is the most appropriate methodology. In particular, the methodology used here is that of controlled comparison by the method of difference.\(^{14}\) Albania and Macedonia are two cases with similar general characteristics and yet they have produced a different value on the study variable that is the Europeanization of the police sector. Several hypotheses will be drawn from the literature regarding the possible factors that might have contributed to the (un)successful implementation of EU requirements. One disadvantage ascribed to this method is that the characteristics of paired cases are never nearly identical. However, this shortcoming will not invalidate the results, given that Albania and Macedonia have very similar general characteristics as will be illustrated in the second chapter.

Interviews and personal formal and informal conversations with experts in charge of the Europeanization of the police sector in Albania and Macedonia add more data to the analysis. At the same time, this data is used to test the hypotheses in order to get realistic assessment of the domestic situation in both countries on their way to the EU integration.

The thesis will be divided into four chapters. Chapter I will discuss the current debate on Europeanization and will lay the foundations for the theoretical framework. Chapter II will present the parallels and the contrasts between the two cases, their background conditions and will test the general hypotheses set forth in the first chapter. The Europeanization of the Albanian

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and Macedonian police sector will be discussed in Chapter III and Chapter IV respectively, where the hypotheses drawn from the veto players’ theory will be tested. Finally, the thesis concludes by summarizing the outcome of the case studies’ analysis as well as the lessons drawn from the Albanian and Macedonian experience.
CHAPTER I: Theoretical Framework

Within the Europeanization literature, there exist various debates on the right approach to studying the EU’s impact on the domestic level of MS and candidate countries. The aim of this chapter is to select out of this vastness of literature those approaches that could account in a more comprehensive way for all the factors that have contributed to the different level of implementation of the police reforms in Albania and Macedonia. Given that the candidate and potential candidate countries obey the existing EU law, in which they did not have a chance to upload their preferences, this thesis will adopt a top-down approach. This implies that the EU requirements in the forms of recommendations are presented to both countries. It is then up to the respective governments to choose whether to consider these recommendations or not.

This thesis supports the rational choice institutionalisms’ (RCI) arguments which state that the effectiveness of rule transfer and rule adoption depends on the cost-benefit analysis of all the actors having a stake in the Europeanization process. In this cost-benefit analysis the main actors known as the veto players play a central role by avoiding constrains and exploring opportunities resulting from the change in the status quo. According to this approach, the Europeanization of the domestic policies follows this line of logic: the aspiring countries have the desire to join the EU; however there is a degree of misfit between their domestic policies and those at the EU level. The higher the degree of misfit, the higher the EU pressure to change the status quo. Each of the sections below will serve as an additional step in explaining the reasons why Albania and Macedonia have made different progress in the police reforms between 2001 and 2006.
1.1 Defining Europeanization and Distinguishing It from Other Processes that Induce Change

Even though the origins of the term “Europeanization” date back to Napoleonic times, the modern understanding of Europeanization is associated strictly the EC/EU.\textsuperscript{15} Prior to the Eastern Enlargement, Europeanization referred only to the EC/EU impact on the domestic politics and social processes of the integrated countries. For instance, Goetz, Hix and Dimitrova define Europeanization in terms of the EU’s impact on domestic polities, politics and policies of the MS.\textsuperscript{16} This definition can not be adopted in this research project, given that neither Albania nor Macedonia is a member of the EU. Scholars like Colwes, Caporaso and Risse and. Radaelli define Europeanization in boarder terms including the impact of the EU on social institutions, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms.\textsuperscript{17} However, this definition is fairly broad and encompasses many areas which will not be discussed in this research. Given that the focus of this paper is on the EU’s impact on domestic policies of candidate and potential candidate countries only, the definition given by Sedelmeier will be used as the working definition. He defines Europeanization “...as the EU’s impact on the domestic level in the candidates.”\textsuperscript{18} Although he defines Europeanization in the context of the CEE countries; his definition could be stretched to the WB countries given that their official status now is comparable to that of the CEE countries prior to their accession.

\textsuperscript{17} Maria G. Cowless, James Caporaso and Thomas Risse, \textit{Europeanization and Domestic Change, Transforming Europe}, London: Cornell University Press, 2001.
\textsuperscript{18} Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Europeanization in New Members and Candidate States,” \textit{Living Reviews In European Governance} 1 (2006): 8.
Similarly to the CEE countries, the countries of the WB, including Albania and Macedonia, have undergone consecutive reforms after the fall of Communism aiming at liberalization, democratization and modernization of the economy, politics and the social life. In addition, the two countries, like all the other countries in the world, are embraced by the wave of globalization which is followed by technological advancement. The police sector could have not been separate from all the other areas that were affected by these processes that induce change in a continuous and irreversible way. Distinguishing these processes from Europeanization remains one of the biggest challenges in the literature and, of course, one of the biggest challenges in this research project as well. To adequately measure the EU’s impact on the policies of the aspiring countries and to correctly account for all those factors that determine the success of this impact; it is very important that the process of Europeanization is carefully distinguished from that of globalization, liberalization and democratization. In doing so, the present research addresses a particular question aiming at finding out the opinion of the experts on which of the processes have played a greater role in the police reforms in Albania and Macedonia respectively. The majority of the respondents answered that the reforms in the police sector are happening only because of Europeanization and both Europeanization and democratization, a few added globalization, while none included liberalization in their answers (see Appendix 2). To distinguish between the impacts of Europeanization and democratization, this research will discuss only those reforms in the field of police which explicitly state that the objective of the reform is to meet the EU requirements.

1.2 Top-down Approach to Europeanization

Apart from the debates on defining Europeanization, another heated debate in the literature is that on the approach to studying Europeanization. Scholars of EU studies are divided into two camps on this matter: the defendants of the top-down versus those of the bottom-up approach.

The top-down approach to Europeanization, which is also the typical work of the 1970’s and 1980’s, is found in the theories of Borzel and Risse (2000), Buller and Gamble (2002), Hix and Goetz (2000) and George (2001). Caporaso goes further by identifying the term Europeanization with a set of top-down processes solely. The top-down approach tends to rely on the following chain according to Radaelli: “…pressure from EuropeÆintervening variablesÆreactions and change at the domestic level.” In contrast, if one adopts a bottom-up approach, then one considers the way states affect the policies of the EU in a given area. Given that the aspirant countries do not have a voice in the making of the rules that they have to adopt, thus having no scope for ‘uploading’ their own preferences to the EU level, this research will adopt the top-down approach. This decision follows also the opinion of the majority of the experts interviewed. When asked which of the process can best describe the Europeanization of the police sector in both countries, seventy five percent of the respondents replied that the Europeanization of the police sector is a top-down approach. Only two respondents, Ilda Zhulali and Ditmir Bushati, answered that it is a bottom-up approach. They argued that the EU sets the agenda according to the problems that it notices at the domestic level. So, if the reforms in the police sector were difficult to undertake at the domestic level, the EU would recommend precisely the reforms in the police

sector as the main objective. However, both Xhulali and Bushati agreed that it is the EU that sends the recommendations after all and the domestic institutions decide whether to consider those recommendations or not.

Referring back to the top-down chain proposed by Radaelli, three main links in the chain have to be discussed (see Figure 1).
The first factor is the pressure that comes from the EU towards the aspiring countries. Pressure can indeed vary, from one sector to the other or from one candidate state to the other. This leads to the first hypothesis drawn from Radaelli’s work:\textsuperscript{24}

\textit{Hypothesis 1: The higher the pressure coming from the EU, the more likely it is that change in the domestic status quo will occur.}

One would assume that the police reforms in Albania have been more successful because there has been a higher pressure to reform coming from the EU toward Albania as compared to Macedonia, \textit{ceteris paribus}. Second, several intervening variables have to be identified and accounted for in the success or failure of the implementation of EU-led reforms. Possible intervening variables will be discussed in section 1.3 of this chapter. Third, one has to assess the changes that have occurred at the domestic level. The result of Europeanization of the police sector in Albania and Macedonia are quite clear referring to Commission’s 2006 reports. It is precisely this difference in the result that constitutes the main puzzle that this research project is trying to solve. Given that the reaction at the domestic level is already known due to the Commission’ annual reports of 2006, the main focus will be on the pressure coming from the EU as well as on the intervening variables. However prior to talking about these two elements, the next section will emphasize the rational approach to studying Europeanization.

\textsuperscript{24} Radaelli, 2000.
1.3 Explaining Europeanization through Rational Choice Institutionalism Lenses

Regardless of whether one studies the changes in politics, policies and polities, there are three conditions for expecting domestic changes in response to Europeanization. Given that the main focus of this paper is the Europeanization of domestic policies, the three conditions will be applied accordingly. According to Borzel and Risse these three conditions are the followings: First, there must be some degree of misfit between the European-level and the domestic level policies. Second, this degree of fit or misfit leads to adaptation pressure which constitutes a necessary but not sufficient condition for expecting domestic change. The first two conditions lead to the second hypothesis.²⁵

**Hypothesis 2:** The higher the degree of fit/misfit, the lower/higher the adaptation pressure at the domestic level.

Haverland goes furthering in arguing that the adaptation performance is conditioned by the policy objectives of the governments.²⁷ This leads to the third hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 3:** The more the policy objectives of the government of the (potential) candidate countries match with that of the EU, the more likely it is that the implementation of the EU requirements is successful.

The second hypothesis suggests that there has been a higher degree of misfit in Albania as compared to Macedonia; therefore there has been a higher adaptation pressure in Albania as


²⁶ Ibid.

compared to Macedonia, *ceteris paribus*. The third hypothesis suggests that the policy objectives of the Albanian government match with that of the EU to a greater extent as compared to Macedonia; therefore the adaptation pressure in Albania has been higher than that in Macedonia, *ceteris paribus*. The validity of these two statements will be discussed in Chapter 2. Third, there must be various facilitating factors that induce change.\(^{28}\) This implies that in the absence of these facilitating factors or when the facilitating factors are better off in preserving the status quo, change will not occur. Borzel’s and Risse’s argument raises a very important question: How can one conceptualize the adaptation pressure in response to Europeanization?

There are two models presented in the literature regarding the effectiveness of rule transfer and rule adoption: sociological/constructivist institutionalism perspective and RCI perspective. According to the sociological/constructivist perspective a non-EU state adopts the EU rules only if it is persuaded of the appropriateness of these rules.\(^{29}\) This model assumes a ‘logic of appropriateness’, first introduced by March and Olsen.\(^{30}\) According to this logic the actors are motivated by internalized identities, values and norms and among various alternatives presented, the actors chose the most appropriate or legitimate action.\(^{31}\) This model suggests that Europeanization leads to domestic change through a socialization and collective learning process resulting in norm internalization and the development of new identities. The rationalist perspective, on the other hand, assumes “logic of consequentialism”. According to this logic the misfit between the European and domestic policies, provides the domestic actors with opportunities and constrains to pursue their interests. The RCI suggests that Europeanization leads to domestic change through a

\(^{28}\) Ibid.


\(^{31}\) Shimmelfenning and Sedeleier, 2004: 675.
differential empowerment of actors resulting from a redistribution of resources at the domestic level.

EU studies scholars have made extensive research to identify the model that best explains the Europeanization of domestic policies. Grabbe, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier all agree that the rationalist perspective conceptualizes the best the Europeanization of domestic policies equally for all (potential) candidate countries. According to RCI, the changes in the opportunity structures at the domestic level depend on the capacity of veto players to exploit the opportunities and avoid constraints. For instance, an opportunity that the government could exploit when introducing reforms in the police sector is the support of the electorate. A constraint, however, is the unwillingness of the opposition to cooperate with the government. The following part of the paper will identify the veto actors in the police sector and present two hypotheses drawn from the literature.

1.4 Theorizing the Veto Players

So far this research project has discussed the Europeanization of the domestic policies in the candidate and potential candidate countries as a top-down process and from the RCI perspective. These two approaches combined produce a comprehensive theoretical framework for conceptualizing the impact of the EU on the policies of aspiring countries. The remaining part of this chapter will discuss the literature on the intervening variables and domestic actors aiming at drawing several hypotheses from this literature.

There is no clear distinction between the mediating factors and domestic actors in the literature. However, to have a better understanding of all the actors involved and their role in the Europeanization process, this paper at first distinguishes these two elements of the chain and then groups them under the umbrella term of the veto players. According to Caporaso, “…every domestic structural condition that affects the impact of European integration could

32 Borzel and Risse, 2007.
be conceptualized as mediating factor.” Domestic actors, on the other hand, are those that might not be directly connected with the EU level but that have a stake in the Europeanization process. Both mediating factors and domestic actors can play the role of the veto players in the Europeanization process. A veto is the ability to turn down a piece of legislation or to implement an executive order. Veto players are those actors who possess veto right and whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo. This follows that a change in the status quo requires the unanimous decision of all the veto players.

Haverland and Tsebelis propose two different classifications of veto players. Haverland classifies the veto players into formal and informal while Tsebelis into individual and collective. Haverland lists the political parties, the government institutions and the regional actors as formal veto players while interests groups as informal ones. Tsebelis, on the other hand lists, parliament and the government as collective veto players, while regional actors as individual ones. This research project combines the two classifications as presented in Table 1:

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<th>Individual</th>
<th>Collective</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Formal</strong></td>
<td>Regional actors</td>
<td>Parliament, Government, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informal</strong></td>
<td>Individuals that are directly affected by the policy</td>
<td>interest groups, international assistance</td>
</tr>
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Table 1 Classification of Veto Players

For the purpose of this research, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Ministry of European Integration (MoE) are classified as separate veto players from the government. The decision to make such a classification was affected by the results of the interviews.

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34 Ibid.
According to the interviewees from respective ministries, although they are part of the government, they have performed different functions when it comes to the Europeanization of the police sector. For instance, the MoE has served as interlocutor between the EU, the MoI and the government, its involvement in reforming the police in both countries has been insignificant. The MoI, on the other hand, has been the implementer of the reforms initiated by the government. The evidence presented in the following chapters show that the MoI has been very little involved in drawing the legislation. The latter has arrived in the form of recommendation from the EU or EU-dependent agencies that operate in both countries. For this reason there will be a differentiation between the MoE, the MoI and the government.

Individuals, as veto players, were added in this research project by the author. Given that both Albania and Macedonia have been constantly attacked by the EU representatives as the main sources of crime, the purpose of adding this veto player was to discover whether the establishment of law and order was opposed by any of these individuals who would be better off if both countries preserve their status quo. However, as the majority of the respondents in both countries agree that there is no evidence that individuals have either furthered or hindered the reforms in the police sector, this particular veto players will not be discussed in the following chapters. Instead, the IAM in both countries will be added as important veto players. The majority of the respondents added this category of actors as important veto players when asked whether there was any other veto player that was not listed in the questionnaire (see Appendix 3).

Table 1 is inclusive to all possible veto players that could veto any part of the Europeanization process. However not all the above veto players might act as such when it comes to the Europeanization of the police sector. The number of the veto players and their objectives is very important in determining the success of the Europeanization of the police in
both Albania and Macedonia for Thomas and Risse, Caporaso and Haverland. Following their arguments, the fourth hypothesis is presented below:

**Hypothesis 4:** The larger the number of veto players the more difficult is for the Europeanization to produce change at the domestic level.

This hypothesis suggests that there are more veto players in Macedonia than in Albania, therefore the Europeanization of the Macedonian police has not happened to the same extent as it did in Albania, *ceteris paribus*. Tsebelis, on the other hand stresses the diversity among the stands of the veto players. Drawing from this line of logic the fifth hypothesis in this thesis follows:

**Hypothesis 5:** The higher the diversity of the stands among the veto players, the less likely it is that there is a change in the status quo.

This hypothesis suggests that the tendency to preserve the status quo in Macedonia is attributed to the greater variety of stands among the Macedonian veto players as compared to the Albanian ones, *ceteris paribus*.

Haverland considers another factor when discussing national adaptation to European pressure. He argues that decentralization is another important phenomenon that should be accounted for when talking about Europeanization of any policy in the (potential) candidate countries. Following his arguments the following is the last hypothesis that will be tested in this thesis:

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37 Haverland, 1999.
Hypothesis 6: The higher the degree of decentralization, the smaller the success of the implementation of the EU requirements at the domestic level.

Hypotheses six assumes a higher degree of decentralization in Macedonia than in Albania, ceteris paribus. The validity of this hypothesis in explaining the different results regarding the Europeanization of the police sector in Albania and Macedonia will be discussed in the following chapter.

To conclude, the theoretical framework presented here will be the foundations for explaining the different result regarding the reforms in the police sector in Albania and Macedonia. Six hypotheses were drawn from the literature to explain the different degree of success of the police reforms in both countries. These hypotheses will test the EU pressure, the degree of misfit, the number of veto players and their objectives as well as the degree of decentralization in both countries. It is very important to emphasize once again, that this research adopted a top-down RCI approach. Following the rationalists’ argument, this thesis will discuss four links of the Europeanization chain: the degree of (mis)fit between the Albanian and Macedonian policies and those at the EU level, the pressure coming from the EU toward both countries regarding the reforms in the police sector, intervening variables and domestic factors (the latter two also referred to as veto players).
CHAPTER II: Policing: Parallels and Contrasts

The previous chapter laid the theoretical framework for studying the different levels of success of the police reforms in Albania and Macedonia. This chapter will discuss the parallels and the contrasts between the two case studies and, at the same time, test the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter. The first section will discuss policing prior to 2001 while the second policing between 2001 and 2006, evaluating the impact of the following factors on Europeanization dynamics: the nature of EU pressure, governmental objectives, the degree of misfit between EU requirements and existing domestic policies, and the administrative structure of the police sector in both countries. At the end, this section will present once again the hypotheses and test them against the conclusions drawn from each subsection.

2.1 Police Sectors in Albania and Macedonia Prior to 2001

WB countries share a similar story regarding the organization and the role of the police during Communism. In Albania, after World War II (WWII) when Germany withdrew its forces due to the Communist resistance, the Communist regime was established with Enver Hoxha as the leader. The regime lasted until the early 1990’s when the political upheavals to depose Communist governments in the Eastern Block spilled over to Albania. Most current administrative structures were created and consolidated, during Communist times, including that of the police. The function of the police under Communism was similar to that of xhandarmeri during the reign of King Zogu I. The police were responsible for ensuring the safety of the king and to a lesser extent that of the people. Similarly, during Communism the main function of the police was to safeguard the party, detect any suspicious activities that would undermine the party’s control over the people and ensure public security and safety. Whereas during the reign of King Zogu I, the police was composed of a few local
people who were feared by the community, during Communism the police officers were selected amongst families that had devoted themselves to the party. From locally administered under the reign of King Zogu I, the police became highly centralized, with the party deciding on who was to be performing each individual function. In this way, the party had total control over the activities of the police.\textsuperscript{38}

A similar situation was in Macedonia under Tito’s rule. After WW II, the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia became a Communist Republic.\textsuperscript{39} It was composed of six republics, including Macedonia. Until 1991, when Macedonia proclaimed independence, the Macedonian police was constantly restructured and expanded to prevent the inevitable breakdown of Yugoslavia. By contrast with the Albanian police, the structure of the Macedonian police was meant to serve the needs of the Federation and of the Republic at the same time. Regarding the former, Tito developed the concept of Total National Defense (TND), later known as General People’s Defense, which would require coordination of the army, territorial defense forces and the population.\textsuperscript{40} In addition to the troops controlled by the Ministry of Defense, the Federal MoI controlled intelligence and state police forces throughout the country. The police were part of the territorial defense forces which operated within a given municipality but were nominally under the control of the MoI. The respective Ministries of Interior of each Republic also had national and regional police units which usually operated outside the boundaries of the municipalities. The relationship between federal, national and regional units was clear in all the Republics of Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{41}


\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
After the fall of Communism, the new governments in Albania and Macedonia
initiated processes to establish democratic institutions, which affected the police sector as
well. From the early 1990’s until 2001, both countries underwent intensive reforms aiming at
democratizing the police sector. Yusufi divides the reforms into two waves: 1990-1991 and
1992-2001. According to him, the first encompassed the following fields: transforming the
police from being part of the police system of the Yugoslav Federation into an independent
police structure of the new Republic (in Macedonia) and organizing and structuring the police
at national and local level and setting up the necessary legal framework for the police. The
second included reforms related to issues of police structure, organization and
professionalism. The main goals of this wave were to strengthen the ability of the police to
respond to new criminal issues, to establish cooperative structures with international
counterparts and to reach Western standards of professionalism and ethics. During this
wave both countries joined several international conventions on police matters. For instance,
Albania signed OSCE’s Code of Conduct Politico-Military Aspects of Security, Europol
Convention, Interpol Seoul Declaration and European Convention on Human Rights. In
addition to these, Macedonia signed also the International Criminal Police Organization,
International Convention for the Supervision of the Financing Terrorism and Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption. Therefore, in this section one can conclude that the pre-2001
situation concerning policing in both countries is similar. The developments during the first
wave of the reforms were very important in that they paved the way to the third wave of
reforms which is the focus of this research project. The following subsections will discuss the

42 Islam Yusufi, “Macedonia’s Police Reforms,” in Transforming Police in Central and Eastern Europes, edited
43 Ibid.
44 Hroni, 2006.
45 Justice and Home Affairs, Chapter 24, document received from the Macedonian Ministry for European
Integration on 2 May 2007.
EU’s pressure, the administrative changes in the police sectors and the government objectives during the third wave.

2.2 Explaining Reforms 2001-2006

2.2.1 EU Pressure

Partly because police reform is among the most important criteria established in the Copenhagen Summit in 1993 and partly because Albania and Macedonia are immediate EU neighbors, the EU has followed closely the domestic reforms in the police sector. JHA policies, including police matters, fall under the Third Pillar established for the first time in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. Thus, at the EU level policing falls under the competencies of the MS, which have the power to decide under the unanimity rule (see Appendix 4). The Commission shares the right of initiative with the MS while the European Parliament has only a consultative role. All the issues under the third pillar are excluded from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisdiction, thus permitting only national courts to decide on matters related to third pillar policies.\(^{46}\) Yet, despite the lack of harmonization inside the EU in the field of JHA, the EU has been very specific regarding the reforms that candidate countries should introduce in order to progress towards EU membership. The EU has been especially concerned with the policing in Albania and Macedonia since bad policing in neighboring countries threatens EU security and stability.\(^{47}\) All EU MS unanimously agreed to send peacekeeping troops to Macedonia during the ethnic conflicts in 2001. They also unanimously agreed to allocate a relatively high budget to both countries to cope with the reforms, particularly in the JHA area. The following table illustrates the amount of money allocated to each country through CARDS divided by sector\(^{48}\):

\(^{46}\)Ludford, 2004: 29.
## Table 2 EU assistance to Albania and Macedonia through the CARDS program 2001-2006 (in million eur)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Albania</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Assistance</td>
<td>282.1</td>
<td>285.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHA Total</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Border Management</td>
<td>13.90</td>
<td>27(^{49})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police and Organized Crime</td>
<td>15.35</td>
<td>Over 14(^{50})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relatively high budget allocated to each country illustrates that the EU is highly concerned with a successful completion of the domestic reforms. In addition the relatively equal amount of money allocated to the reforms in the police sectors clearly indicate that the EU is equally interested in the successful completion of the reforms in both Albania and Macedonia. Therefore, on the basis of financial aid given to both countries, one can conclude that the pressure coming from the EU to reform the police sector in Albania and Macedonia is similar.

Another indicator showing similar intensity of the pressure exercised by the EU on both countries regarding the reforms in general and those in the police sector in particular is related to the use of the “conditionality principle”. This principle is used by the EU in the context of a promised future EU membership; on the ‘condition’ that aspirant countries fulfill certain pre-set criteria. Conditionality is at the heart of the EU-Balkan relations.\(^{51}\) Similarly to CEE countries, the Balkan countries, including Albania and Macedonia, must set in place stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law and respect for and protection of human rights. They must also have a functioning market economy and be able to cope with

\(^{49}\) This is the amount from the period 2000-2006. Merlingen with Ostrauskaite, 2006: 101.

\(^{50}\) Ibid.

the competitive pressures and market forces within the Union. However, the saga for membership for the Balkan countries does not finish here. Unlike the CEE enlargement, the WB countries must fulfill some additional criteria due to the region’s sensitivity. Without differentiating among them, the EU requires that all the Balkan countries fulfill the following additional criteria established in the European Council in 1997: credible commitment to democratic and economic reforms, willingness to develop regional economic and political relations, and compliance with the obligations of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Evidence gathered from the interviewees show that regarding the reforms in the police sector; the EU has not applied different conditions to Albania and Macedonia. The uniformity in the application of the conditionality principle for all the WB countries, including Albania and Macedonia, indicates that the EU pressure towards both countries is the same.

2.2.2 Governmental Objectives

In the country’s aspiration for EU membership, the government plays a very important role by acting as an interlocutor between the EU and domestic actors. The government sets the objectives for the period it is in power and formulates the strategic plan to achieve them. Such objectives could be related to improving economic, social or political life. Between 2001 and 2006 there have been two parliamentary elections in Albania and Macedonia. In the 2001 elections in Albania the socialists won the majority of the votes and in the 2005 elections the democrats won. Although representing two different wings, the governments formed from these two party groups shared a common objective: EU membership. The means to achieve this objective though was different in both cases. Whereas the socialists stressed reforms in the economic sector, the democrats are

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emphasizing the fight against corruption and organized crime. The 2002 elections in Macedonia brought into power the coalition “For Macedonia Together” led by the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDUM). The 2006 elections, on the other hand, brought into power another coalition led by the right-wing Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (IMRO-DPMNU). Although the two coalitions have different discourses they share the same goal: Macedonia’s full integration in the EU alongside with NATO membership.

The reforms in the police sector in both countries are conducted bearing in mind the overall objective of the government. What the Albanian government wants to accomplish with reforming the police are: fight against organized crime and terrorism, reduction in the ordinary crimes, increase public and road safety and strengthen the institutional capacities for the implementation of law. For the Macedonian government it is important to accomplish the following strategic objectives: efficiency of the police operation, organization, expertise and cost-effectiveness in the work, improved technological equipment, appropriate and equitable representation of citizens belonging to all communities, fight against organized crime and improvement of regional and international cooperation. All these objectives are set to achieve the main goal set by the governments of the respective countries: EU membership.

The governments’ goal is confirmed also by the experts interviewed for the purpose of this research project. Unanimously the respondents asserted that the reform process in the police sector is closely linked to the Europeanization process and the countries’ aspiration to become part of the EU one day. Not surprisingly none of the respondents disagreed with this

statement. As shown in this section, the governmental objectives—the EU membership—in both countries has been identical and stable regardless of the party on power. Therefore, the governmental objective is not a factor that could be account for the difference in the level of success in the police reforms in Albania and Macedonia.

2.2.3 Degree of Misfit and Administrative Structures

After the 1997 crisis which emerged as the result of the failure of the financial pyramid schemes, the socio-political situation in Albania was in chaos. The country was on the verge of the outbreak of a civil war. However the international involvement minimized such a risk. The complete failure of the state apparatus, including the police sector, prolonged the recovery period. In 2001 the situation had improved but not the situation concerning the police sector. In 2001 Commission report emphasized that progress of police sector reforms was unsatisfactory. It urged the government to undertake immediate measures for improvement, making it clear that otherwise the security of the region would be threatened. During the 1997 crisis many military reserves were opened by civilians resulting in thousands of light and heavy weapons falling in the hands of the Albanian population. Eager to make money, many of these civilians sold those arms to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The latter used the arms to revolt initially against the Serbian repression and later to organize ethnic conflict in Macedonia aiming at creating a greater Albanian with the Kosovo and the Macedonian Albanians in. It was precisely in 2001 when the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia assisted by the former KLA soldiers demanded ethnic separation from the Macedonian state.

This period was also marked by a very difficult socio-political situation in Macedonia and also the police sector was faced with big challenges in term of ensuring public safety and security. The Commission evaluates the situation in this sector in 2001 and 2002 as unsatisfactory (see Appendix 1). The international involvement in Macedonia became
necessity for the ethnic reintegration. According to Vachudova and Jenne it was precisely due to international involvement that the crisis in Macedonia did not evolve to the extent it did in Bosnia or in Croatia. Jenne, as well as Merlingen and Rasa all agree that soon after the 2001 crisis Macedonia became relatively stable due to the international presence in the country aiming at peacebuilding, (EU involvement) and monitoring the high risk zones (EU, US and individual European countries involved). Although for different reasons, the situation in the police sector in both countries was far from that required by the EU. This is signaled also by the Commission’s report in 2001 and 2002 on both countries regarding the police reforms. According to these report both countries lacked long-term strategic planning, training programs for the police, advanced technological equipment and coordination between the law enforcement bodies and the judiciary. Therefore, the overall evaluation was unsatisfactory and in both cases the Commission laid down urgent recommendations to the domestic governments to intensify the reforms in this sector.

However, the intensity of reforms depends also on the degree of decentralization according to Haverland. Both Albania and Macedonia have been highly centralized systems with the party standing at the tip of the pyramid. The fall of Communism left both countries vulnerable to many challenges in the field of security. The typology and frequency of criminal activity changed. The police lacked both the necessary speed and efficiency to face these new challenges. In 2001 the police sector was still characterized by the centralized structure inherited from the Communist times. In order to increase speed and efficiency the EU urged Albania and Macedonia to decentralize the system. Following the EU recommendations the governments of both countries started the decentralization process in all the areas including the police sector. Differently from Albania, Macedonia was less

60 Jenne, 2007; Merlingen with Ostrauskaite, 2006: 86.
61 Haverland, 1999.
successful in the decentralization process. It was only in 2006 when the reforms aiming at
decentralization were implemented, though some laws were introduced prior to that. The
2006 report readdresses the question of decentralization of the police sector and emphasizes
that the system is not completely decentralized. Complete decentralization in both countries
would mean that the high rank police officers are elected by the local municipalities and are
accountable to these municipalities, not to the MoI. Asked whether the respective government
systems were decentralized or not all the respondents answered negatively (see Appendix 2).
A similar trend appears also when the respondents were asked whether they thought that the
police sector in particular was decentralized. All the respondents both in Albania and in
Macedonia agreed that the police sector is in the process of decentralization.

The conclusions of this chapter are significant because they are applicable to the
hypotheses that were drawn from the literature and presented in the first chapter. Concerning
hypothesis 1, one would assume that there is a change in the status quo in Albania because
there has been a higher EU pressure to reform in this country as compared with Macedonia.
However, in this section it was shown that the EU pressure toward both countries was
similar. The second hypothesis assumes that the higher the degree of misfit, the higher the
adaptation pressure at the domestic level. Considering this hypothesis one would assume that
the reforms in Macedonia were less successful than those in Albania since there was a lower
degree of misfit in Macedonia than in Albania in the police sector. However this chapter
showed that according to the Commission’s report the degree of misfit in both countries was
equally high. Therefore, the degree of misfit cannot account for the difference in the success
of the police reforms in Albania and in Macedonia. Hypothesis 3 states that the more the
police objective of the aspirants matches with those of the EU, the more likely it is that the
implementation of the EU requirement is successful at the domestic level. Given that in both

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62 Ulrich Dugas, Werner Geck and Otto Pfannenschmidt, “The Reform of the Macedonian Police,” February,
countries the government goal was EU integration and all the reforms were conducted bearing this main goal in mind, the Hypothesis 3 cannot account for the difference in success levels in Albania and Macedonia regarding the reforms in the police sector. Hypothesis 6 states that the higher the degree of decentralization, the smaller the success of the EU requirements at the domestic level. This hypothesis suggests that Macedonia had a higher degree of decentralization, thus explaining why the police reforms were not successful. However this chapter has shown that both countries were highly centralized prior to 2001 and from 2001-2006 both countries are undergoing reforms aiming at decentralization of the system, including the police sector. Even though Macedonia lagged behind Albania in this process, it still did not succeed in implementing the EU requirements faster then Albania. Given the findings of this chapter one concludes that the EU pressure, degree of misfit, government objective and level of decentralization do not count for the difference in the success of the Europeanization of policing in Albania and Macedonia.
CHAPTER III: The Albanian Veto Players

This chapter will present the veto players in Albania and discuss in detail their objectives as well as their degree of involvement in reforming the police. So far, this thesis has tested whether the success of the police reforms in Albania was due to a higher degree of pressure coming from the EU, a higher degree of misfit between the Albanian policies and the EU ones or a lower degree of decentralization in Albania as compared to Macedonia. Given that none of these factors account for the fair progress in reforming the police in Albania, the aim of this chapter is to test whether the veto players can account for the difference in success in Albania and Macedonia.

After consulting the literature and conducting several formal and informal conversations with the parties directly or indirectly involved in the police reform process in Albania, a list of veto players was drawn. Referring back to the theoretical chapter and the classification of the veto players (Table 1), the list will be presented in this section divided into formal collective and individual veto players, on the one hand, and informal collective and individual veto players on the other hand.

The formal collective and individual veto players are those individuals or institutions formally regulated by the Albanian law and the consent of which is necessary for the reforms to be undertaken. This category includes the government, the MoE and the MoI, regional actors and the parliament, which are traditional veto players that act as such permanently.

The informal collective and individual veto players are those individuals or institutions which are not created or regulated by the Albanian law but the consent of which is still necessary for the reforms in the police sector to be undertaken. These veto players act as such in an ad hoc manner and are not traditional permanent individual or institutions. They appear on the scene only when they are appointed by other formal institutions or when their interests are at stake. This category includes the foreign assistance missions and pressure...
groups. The following sections will examine the objective of each of these veto players and will discuss their role regarding the reforms in the police sector in Albania.

3.1 Formal Collective and Individual Veto Players

The Albanian Government

The president of the Republic, who is elected by two-thirds of the votes in the Assembly every five years, does not have any competences on issues related to decision-making on police matters. However the Head of the State may use his moral authority to bring the attention of the government on particular issues related to police structure and performance. According to Hroni, most often the Head of the State would address police on election-related operations to enforce the law and to ensure transparency of the process. The new Draft Law on State Police would enhance the competences of the President by giving him the right to appoint the General Police Director on proposal from the Prime Minister (PM). Currently it is the PM who appoints the General Police Director and who signs government decisions and other normative acts that affect the police forces. The PM, as the head of the government, is the one who decides on the objectives and approves the national strategic plan to achieve these objectives. Each individual ministry then designs its ministerial action plan in accordance with the guidelines set by the government.

The objective of the current and previous governments was EU integration alongside with NATO integration, emphasizing more the former. The previous government was less involved however with the reforms in the police sector. Rather it was concentrated on the reforms in the economic sector given that it had to govern the country after the economic crisis that resulted from the collapse of the pyramid schemes. In contrast, the current government has emphasized the reforms in the police sector as its main means to achieve its objectives.

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objective: EU integration. In the electoral campaigns of 2005, the Democratic Party stressed the necessity to fight against organized crime and corruption by consolidating the role of the police forces. The slogan that the party used was “With clean hands”. The current PM, Sali Berisha, known also as the most omnipresent political figure of the democratic times, is personally involved in the police operations by exercising his influence over police through the MoI or the General Police Director. The PM initiates proposals on police matters which pass then to the Council of Ministers. The latter formulates and endorses policy decisions that affect the police activity. Evidence gathered from interviewees suggests that the Council of Ministers is highly supportive to the Prime Minister proposals and has had an active role in formulating police-related policy proposals. Example of active involvement of both the Prime Ministers’ office and the Council of Ministers include the New Draft Law on State Police (SP) and a Ten-Year Strategy Plan for the Development of Albanian Police which is being ready for approval by the Parliament. Therefore one can conclude that regardless of whether the government is composed of right-wing or left-wing parties, it has always supported the EU reforms particularly those in the security sector. Hence, the government can be considered as a veto player that has furthered the reform process in the police sector.

*The Ministry of European Integration*

The Albanian MoE was created in December 2003 and its creation serves as clear evidence of the rapid Europeanization process that is happening in Albania since then. Its mission is to manage and coordinate the integration process of Albania in the EU, through the approximation of the national legislation to that of the European Union; to draw up policies of integration and to coordinate the financial assistance and the public information on this
process. This ministry has a limited role in the police reforms, given that it acts not as an implementer of the EU requirements but rather as an interlocutor between the EU and the Albanian Ministries. The police matters are handled by the JHA Directorate within this ministry. The Appointed Director, Jonian Molla, states that the Directorate’s role in the police reforms is to negotiate on the behalf of the government and the MoI on regional conferences. It receives recommendations presented in these conferences regarding improvements that need to be made in the police sector and then passes them on to the MoI or other state organs such as the SP. It is then these institutions that decide on whether and how to implement the recommendations that were sent by the Directorate. Edvin Dule, expert in the office of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) Unit in the MoE also agrees that the ministry’s role is that of a mediator.

Overall, however, the MoE supports the reforms in the police sector, not only because it is part of the government and as such follows the government’s main objectives but because the very existence of this ministry in Albania is linked with the approximation of the Albanian legislation with that of the EU and the improvements of the domestic standards to those of the EU. The reforms in the police sector would mean for this ministry a step forward in the integration process and thus larger competences. Given that institutions often want to expand their powers as argued by the bureaucratic politics scholars, a successful Europeanization process in Albania would mean a greater role of the MoE in the decision-making process.¶


The Ministry of Interior

The Albanian MoI was created in October 1944 when the Communist regime was established in Albania. Since then this ministry has been highly involved in formulating and endorsing policies on police matters. In cooperation with the PM’s office, this ministry has been active in initiating law which has then passed through the Council of Ministers to the parliament for approval. It is the only authority that signs international contracts and enters in international agreements on police matters. The PM exercises his influence through the Minister of Interior to authorize, oversees or end international contracts.\(^\text{67}\) The current wave of reforms in the police sector has slightly changed the role of the MoI which is less and less involved in the decision-making process. Therefore, the role of the Ministry in influencing the activity of the SP is limited, allowing more room for the PM to exercise his influence. Although \textit{de jure} this ministry has the right of initiation, \textit{de facto} it has turned into an implementing body. The chain of the activities is the followings: the negotiating team composed of representatives from the MoE and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs receives recommendations from EU officials and distributes them to the respective ministries. Based on these recommendations, the Head of the Government initiates proposals which pass by the Council of Ministers and end up in the parliament for approval. Once the proposal is passed, the MoI becomes an implementing body. At this stage it sends out goals and objectives to make sure that all the Territorial Police Services abide to the new approved law.

Irena Taga, coordinator in the Anti-Trafficking Unit in the MoI argues that sometimes this ministry receives contradictory signals; one of them is also the EU v. NATO integration. According to her, these two objectives require adoption and implementation of various acts which might contradict one another. Whereas Albania is good at adopting law, the problem, according to her, remains in implementing the law. Vasilika Hysi, Executive Director of the

\(^{67}\) Hroni, 2006: 12.
Albanian Helsinki Committee (AHC), shares the same opinion when asked what could be the reasons behind the non implementation of EU requirements in the police sector in Albania. Hysi argues that Albania does not have difficulties in adopting laws that demand higher standards in the police sector, but it has difficulties in implementing these laws. She also agrees that different signals are sent to the MoI by the Government, therefore the ministry sometimes does not know which track to follow regarding the implementation of the EU requirements. Overall, according to Hysi, although the MoI has not been directly involved in initiating laws on police matters it has been very successful in implementing the law that has been adopted by the Parliament. This success is also attributed to the close cooperation that this ministry maintains with international independent agencies which will be discussed later in this chapter. The majority of the respondents list the MoI as the most important institution regarding the success of reforms in the police sector. Although the MoI is faced sometimes with contradicting objectives which might lead to a hesitation period, overall this ministry has played a positive role in the reforms. Therefore it can be seen as one of the veto players that foster rather than hinder the reforms in the police sector.

**Regional Actors**

The regional actors are the heads of Territorial Police Services Units, known also as Sector for Internal Affairs. Such services include police stations and substations, department for criminal units and criminal police sections. All these different services are under the supervision of the MoI. The minister appoints the heads of the sections who are in charge of hiring and firing new police forces in accordance to the provisions of Law no. 8553 dated 25. 11. 1999 “On State Police”. Overall the role of the regional actors in Albania in hindering the reform process has been very limited. The chief officers in territorial units comply with the guidelines established by the MoI and abide to the Law adopted by the Parliament. There is
no evidence that these actors have in any way hindered the reform process. On the contrary, they are seen as facilitators in the process because of their quick response to changes that Albanian policing is undergoing to meet the high EU standards.

The Parliament

The People’s Assembly of the Republic of Albania was created in 1944 and functioned until 1991. In the first democratic elections in 1991, the parliament changed from a uni-party Assembly to a multi-party one. Currently the majority of the seats in the Albanian Parliament are held by the Democrats and the Socialists, 56 and 42 of the seats respectively. Both of them share the same view about the future of Albania. The other small parties or independent deputies also have joined the respective governments in their aspirations in joining the EU. None of the party groups or individual independent deputies has expressed any concern about EU integration. Therefore, overall the Parliament has been supportive of the Albanian reforms aiming at approximating the law with that of the EU. A similar trend is observed also regarding the reforms in the police sector.

The main institution that formulates, implements and oversees the police policies in the Parliament is the Commission of National Security (CNS). The SP is accountable through the Minister of Interior to the CNS. This Committee has also the right to investigate institutions subject to the Ministers, which include the various law enforcement agencies.68 This means that the leaders of law enforcement institutions may appear in front of the CNS if their respective Minister asks them to do so. Apart from the New Draft Law on SP the Parliament has passed all the other laws on police reforms with a limited debate.69 The New Draft Law on the SP has constituted a heated debate in the Parliament. This law was

68 Hroni, 2003: 5.
supposed to be approved at the end of 2006, but is still under scrutiny. The CNS is one of the
groups that have constantly postponed the new draft law. The reason has been the
constructive opposition of other parties directly or indirectly involved in the police reforms.
These parties include the Ombudsman office and the AHC, which will be discussed later in
this chapter. However, one can conclude that overall the Albanian Parliament has been very
supportive towards EU reforms in general and those in the police sector in particular. The
majority of the Interviewees listed parliament as the second most important institution after
the MoI regarding the success of the reforms in the police sector.

3.2 Informal Collective and Individual Veto Players

International Assistance Missions

Prior to conducting the research, IAM in Albania were not considered as important
veto players, but after extensive conversations with the experts working on reforming the
police sector, they appeared to be very important players. Such missions include the Police
Assistance Mission of the European Community to Albania (Pameca), the International
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), the United Nation
Development Program (UNDP), the OSCE and the AHC. In addition to these international
missions, individual countries such as Norway and Denmark have bilateral agreements with
the MoI to establish training centers for the Albanian police Most of these organizations have
been involved directly in the police reforms since the collapse of the pyramid schemes and
they continue to be present in Albania through various programs that they design to improve
professionalism in policing.

Among them Pameca, AHC and ICITAP are the three biggest contributors to the
reforms in the police sector. Pameca was established in June 2003, when the Memorandum of
Understanding was signed between Albania and the European Commission.\textsuperscript{70} The main objectives of this mission are to enhance the institutional and operational capacities of Albanian SP in the fight against crime, strengthen cooperation between SP and judiciary and assist the police in their efforts to raise public confidence.\textsuperscript{71} In order to achieve its objectives Pameca has been focusing on developing projects that aim at improving the management capacities of the SP, capacity building and training, law enforcement cooperating, criminal investigating and increase confidence of the public on police officers. So far Pameca’s work has been considered very successful. For that reason its mandate was extended for one more year. Similarly ICITAP has focused on strategic planning and management training to assist the ASP in developing a modern democratic police organization.\textsuperscript{72} Differently from Pameca though, ICITIAP is a US assistance program therefore it introduces slightly different methods of policing then Pameca.

Faced with two different methods of policing, the SP sometimes finds itself in a difficult situation when choosing between the methods that best suits its interests. This might result in a hesitation period associated with confusion which slows down the process of reforms. AHC, on the other hand, plays the role of a constructive opposition to the activities undertaken by the other assistance missions in Albania or by the government offices. Its main objective is to provide advice in the area of human rights protection. To achieve its objective this office cooperates closely with the SP and the MoI. Other missions in Albania have primarily been involved in training the police forces on various topics. Regardless of their great contribution, Taga sees these missions as hindering the police reforms because of the different methods of policing they introduce in Albania. According to her, the high presence

of international assistance in Albanian involved in the police matters might be a cause for the limited progress Albanian police has made in some areas such as decentralizing the police sector. Overall however, the presence of these missions in Albania is seen as positive by the majority of the respondents who believe that the progress Albania has made in the police sector is certainly also attributed to these missions. Therefore, one can conclude that the police missions in Albania do not hinder the process; on the contrary they have highly contributed to furthering this process particularly regarding the training of new and existing police officers.

**Pressure Groups**

There are two broad categories that can exercise pressure on police reforms in Albania: media and civil society. In Albania, media is very sensitive towards police services and devotes considerable space to the activities of the ASP. According to Hroni, in general the media is not hostile to the police, although police leaders consider the media rather problematic because often they blame the media for reporting false news on activities of the police. Nonetheless, the media has never commented on the expenditures of the budget of the ASP or the MoI. Therefore, overall the media can be considered as an ally for the police.

Similarly the Albanian civil society has supported the reforms in the police sector. Youth organizations such as “Mjaft” and independent research institutes such as and Agenda Institute support the reforms in the police sector. The respective executive directors, Veliaj and Bushati said that they believe that Albania has made progress in the police and that their organizations have been supportive to all these changes.

To conclude, there are seven categories of veto players in Albanian classified into two broader groups: formal individual and collective. Some of these veto players have been more involved in the reforms process than the others and consequently their position for or against
the reforms in the police sector is very important. As noted above such veto players in Albania are the MoI, the Parliament, the government and the foreign police missions. The MoE, the regional actors, the pressure groups and the media are less concerned with the police reforms. When reviewing the position of the former, one can certainly conclude that all these veto players have been supportive to the police reforms because they all share a common goal: EU integration. However, several practices can be distinguished within these veto players that hinders the reforms to some extent. For instance, the government sends contradicting signals to the MoI which overloaded with objectives can not prioritize among them. Contradicting advice is sent also from the foreign missions in Albania to the high rank police officers. Although these contradicting signals could be blamed negatively affecting the police reforms to some degree, they have not been problematic enough as to hinder the process to the degree one can see in Macedonia. This might also be because the Albanian Parliament has played a significant role in approving laws concerning the police matters. In conclusion, there is no opposition to the reforms in the police sector as all the Albanian veto players not only support the reform process, but the majority of them is also actively involved in fostering this process.
CHAPTER IV: The Macedonian Veto Players

Whereas the previous chapter discussed the Albanian veto players, this one will focus on the Macedonia ones. The same structure will be applied here in order to highlight the parallels and the differences between the veto players in both countries. Initially the Macedonian formal collective and individual players will be discussed followed by discussion of informal collective and individual veto players. The focus of each of the sections below will be on the role of the Macedonian veto players on reforms of the police sector. To what degree they support or not these reforms will be the main question that will be addressed in this chapter.

4.1 Formal Collective and Individual Veto Players

The Macedonian Government

The President of Macedonia, who is directly elected by the majority of votes, does not have direct competence on police matters. However, similarly to the Albanian President, he can draw attention to particular issues which concern the public. His only noticeable presence is when he appoints or dismisses officials whose election is within the sphere of competence of the Assembly, including the Minister of Interior. The PM, on the other hand, is directly involved in the police reforms as it is his duty to appoint and dismiss high rank police officers. His role in the police matters has increased especially since 2001, when it became his duty and responsibility to drive the country toward EU membership. In doing so, the Prime Minister has been highly involved in the country’s reform process, including in the security sector. This sector is of high importance to the government in general and to the PM especially after the Albanian ethnic aspirations led to an ethnic conflict in the country.

When talking about the Macedonian government, one has to address the political instability in the early 2000s, which has shifted the balance of participation in politics from ethnic Macedonians only to proportionally ethnic Macedonians and Albanians; this has led to several changes in the government as well as in the administration. However, the political instability has not hindered the reforms in the process per se. EU integration has been unanimously supported by all political parties in Macedonia. It has been the main goal of consecutive governments since the early 1990’s when the reforms in the security sector have been considered very important given the country aspiration to join EU and NATO. Government’s role in the decision-making process is similar to that of the Albanian government: the PM initiates a proposal which then passes to the Cabinet of Ministers and then to the Parliament for approval. Differently from the current Albanian PM Sali Berisha, neither Valdo Buckovski nor Nikola Gruevski has been known for being omnipresent. Therefore, neither of the two is informally involved in the affairs of the MoI.

Overall one can certainly conclude that despite political unrest in the early 2000s, the Macedonian government not only is supporting the reforms in the police sector but it also takes an active role ensuring that these reforms lead to meeting the Western standards as set by the EU.

*Ministry of European Integration*

Similarly to the case of Albania, the creation of the Macedonian MoE serves as vivid evidence of the country’s aspiration and determination to join the EU. This ministry has a marginal role regarding the police reforms as its main function is to provide recommendations to the government and respective ministries on matters on legislation that contradict the EU legislation, to detect areas that need improvements in order to reach the EU standards and to negotiate on behalf of the Republic of Macedonia with EU on the future
relations between the two. Differently from the Albanian MoE, it seems like the Macedonian one is less concerned with informing the public given that this is the only ministry that does not have an official website. Gorica Atanasova, Assistant of the MoE confirms that the ministry’s role in the police sector is that of the interlocutor between the EU, the government and the other ministries. It receives recommendations for improvement from the EU and then distributes these recommendations to the government or other interested parties, including the MoI. It is the government, which decides whether to consider the EU recommendations or not. When asked about the importance of the MoE in the reforming the police sector, the Macedonian respondents all agreed that its role is marginal as compared to the government or the MoI.

Despite its indirect role, one cannot ignore the positive attitude that the MoE has regarding the reforms in the police sector. This attitude is connected to that of being the interlocutor between the EU, the government and the MoI and as such it has played the role of facilitator of the EU-led reforms. Furthermore, given that institutions want to expand their competences according to the bureaucratic politics scholars, a successful completion of the Europeanization process in Macedonia would mean greater role in the decision making-process for MoE.74

Ministry of Interior

The Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Republic of Macedonia was created in 1944 and it was under the supervision of the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Yugoslav Federation until Macedonia proclaimed independence in 1991. Since then, this ministry has undergone major structural and functional changes to demilitarize and to increase professionalism of the police forces. It is highly involved in reforming the police as it acts as

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the main implementing body. Differently from the Albanian case, this ministry is also
involved in the decision-making process by initiating law concerning state security together
with other state organs such as the Ministry of Defense. Their main focus has been on
professionalism, education and training of the police force and, at the same time, ensuring
proportional participation of the ethnic Albanians (and other minorities) in various segments
of the sector. Given that after the ethnic crisis public confidence in this ministry was close to
zero, it is worth noting that the role of this ministry in reforming the police has been
sometimes marginalized by lack of cooperation between the public and the police forces. In
order to overcome this problem, MoI has initiated a campaign aiming at communicating to
the public the activities of the police sector either through the website, or various media
channels. The new Law on Police that was just approved by the parliament, the long-term
strategic plans and the Code of Ethics serve as clear evidence of the high involvement of this
ministry not only as an implementing but also as an initiative body.

All the Macedonian respondents list the MoI as the most important institution when
asked which of the veto players they believe have contributed the most in the successful
implementation of the EU requirements in the police sector. They all also listed the MoI as
the most important institution when asked to rank the actors according to their overall
importance in the successful implementation of the EU requirements regarding the police
sector. None of the respondents blamed the MoI for any of the cases when the reforms were
not successful in meeting the EU standards. Therefore, this ministry is considered as one of
those veto players that has contributed to the success of the reforms in Macedonia.

75Georgieva, 2003: 197.
Regional Actors

The regional actors, who are the heads of territorial units and police sections in Macedonia, are appointed and supervised by the MoI. Differently from Albania though, these regional actors have been criticized for hindering the reforms in that they do not follow the instructions coming from the MoI. The most problematic area is the hiring of the ethnic minorities in police sectors. The proportionality of representation in all the Macedonian administration is an EU requirement and the MoI ordered the regional actors to implement the requirement. However, the latter are skeptical about hiring ethnic Albanians. According to Dugas, Geck and Pfannenschmidt, although the proportion of the ethnic Albanians has increased the number is still far from meeting the fixed quota set by the Framework Agreement. They argue that the chief officers believe that the Albanians are not competent in performing police duties. Therefore, hiring one more Albanian as opposed to one more Macedonian means, for them, hindering the reforms in Macedonia, not fostering them. Furthermore, the chief officers argue that even the training that the new generation of officers receives is inadequate to address the deficiencies that the Albanian recruits have. According to interviews conducted by Dugas, Geck and Pfannenschmidt “…this procedure will have a major impact on the quality of policing and inadvertently result in ‘second-class police forces’ due to the different levels of qualification and performance.” Given that one of the areas where the EU has evaluated negatively the progress in Macedonia is also the proportionality representation, one can easily conclude that the fact that the regional actors are not following the MoI instructions and are not complying with this requirement classifies them automatically as veto players whose objectives do not match with the rest of the veto players.

77 Ibid.
However when asked who are those veto players that might hinder the reforms process, the Macedonian respondents put their emphasis on other actors. This suggests that the regional actors are not the only veto players that hinder the reforms in Macedonia.

**The Parliament**

The Macedonian Parliament (*Sobranie*) has 120 members, elected by proportional representation. After the 2006 elections the majority of the seats are held by the IMRO-DPMNU and SDUM a coalition led by Ali Ahmeti, 38 and 23 seats respectively. Similarly to Albania, the Parliament is the main legislative body in the Republic of Macedonia. Consequently it is highly involved in the approximation of legislation and the approval of new law that aims at meeting the EU requirements for membership. Differently from Albania, there are two committees that are in charge of security issues within the Parliament: Committee on Defense and Security and Committee for Supervising the Work of the Security and Counterintelligence Directorate and the Security Services. The latter is criticized for its inefficiency mostly because the Committee’s Chairman was indicted by the Hague Tribunal on war crimes charges. Therefore, the Committee has not held any meeting since then.\(^78\) The former, however, meets regularly and invites representatives from the press and NGO’s. Its main task is to review documents and legal acts proposed by the executive. However this committee is also high criticized for its inadequate monitoring function or influence on the procedure.\(^79\) Differently from the Commission that deals with security matters in Albania, the members of this committee are not necessarily ex-military or police experts. Therefore, one can argue that the inefficiency of the Committee’s work might also result to the lack of expertise on police matters.

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\(^79\) Georgieva, 2003: 182.
One major difference between the behavior of the Albanian and the Macedonian MPs is that whereas the former agree on the majority of the legal acts on police issues, the latter do not. The Macedonian Parliament lacks the ability to find consensus among the party groups. The behavior of the Macedonian MPs regarding the adoption of certain legal acts concerning the police sector has not escaped the general trend. Numerous examples where one notices a clear division of the parliamentarians according to their ethnicity can be found when one observes carefully the daily work of the parliament. One of the key reform bills which raised a heated debate among the party representatives, the New Law on Police, was adopted by the parliament in November 2006, but it failed to win the backing of the main ethnic Albanian party. The adoption of this bill was congratulated by many international offices and in particular by the EU mission in Macedonia. The latter however, expressed concern regarding the time delay and the continuing disagreements over some key aspects of the law. According to Stojanvska, immediately after the law was adopted the leader of the coalition, Ali Ahmeti warned that mayors belonging to the parties of the coalition would not cooperate with the police. The Macedonian respondents also emphasize the lack of political dialogue between the two biggest coalitions in the Parliament. Ramadani stresses that it is precisely due to the lack of political dialogue that Macedonia has not been successful in reforming the police. The lack of political dialogue turns out to be a very important factor for Macedonia given that, overall, the Parliament is listed as the second most important veto player. At the same time the Parliament is the most important legislative body in parliamentary systems such as Macedonia. Therefore, one can conclude that the parliament has certainly been one of those veto payers which has negatively affected the degree of success in reforming the police sector in Macedonia.

81 Ibid.; The coalition has 15 mayors out of 16 municipalities with majority ethnic Albanian population.
4.2 Informal Collective and Individual Veto Players

International Assistance Missions

In contrast to Albania, where the IAM were established after the collapse of the pyramid schemes, in Macedonia they were established during and after the breakout of the ethnic conflict. Many scholars attribute the success of ethnic reintegration precisely to the presence of these international missions, which were mostly settled in the most heated zones of conflicts. As political and social life returned to normality a few of them left the country while many are still operating in full capacity. OSCE and the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) were present during 2001 to monitor the hot spots of the Northeast part of Macedonia, while NATO was in charge of demobilizing and disarming the rebels. As the situation calmed down, the Macedonian government called the EU to take control instead of NATO. It was then that the first European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) military mission named Concordia was established in Macedonia. 82 Concordia was soon replaced by Proxima, whose task was to monitor and advice the local police during the process of reforms to increase public confidence on the police forces. Proxima ceased to exist in December 2005 signaling that the country no longer needed EU assistance in the police sector.

Between 2001 and 2006, the EU consecutive missions and OSCE were not alone in the country. Rather, many other well known international organizations and individual European states offered their assistance to reforming the police sector. These organizations were the Macedonian Helsinki Committee, the Swedish Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, ICITAP and the UNDP. Bilateral donors such as UK and France had also established offices which were constantly advising the MoI on police matters. Differently from Albania, where the IAM were mostly involved in training (except from Pameca and AHC), the Macedonian international missions were highly involved in all the police matters, making the

82 Flessenkemper, forthcoming in October 2007.
police sector one of the most crowded sectors of the Macedonian administration. According to Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, the high number of actors involved in policing after 2003 led the Macedonian government to be often inconsistent in its foreign interventions. The experts that were financed by the donors mentored and advised their Macedonian colleagues on a variety of issues without bearing in mind the overall reform strategy set by the government. This resulted in confusion among police officers when faced with choosing which strategy and what methods to use when implementing reforms.

As explained in the previous chapter, the Albanian high rank police officers were faced with a similar phenomenon, but the degree to which it was happening in Macedonia was not comparable to that in Albania for two reasons. First, the international missions in Macedonia were not only involved in training the police forces, as it was the case in Albania with the majority of the missions, but also in influencing the decision-making process as well in providing legal advice. Second, the ethnic unrest was very recent in Macedonia and the fear of repetition of the same experience led these international missions to become highly involved in all aspects of policing. Hence, on the one hand, the IAM indeed have played a central role in preventing the crisis from exacerbating as they did in Croatia and Bosnia, but, on the other, they have indirectly hindered the reforms in the police sector by overcrowding the officers with advice.

Pressure Groups

Similarly to the case of Albania, the media plays a very important role in Macedonia as well. There are several daily newspapers and all of them cover security issues. There is no evidence showing that the media has hindered the police reforms. On the contrary, it has contributed to raising the public awareness on European matters. In contrast to Albania, the

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83 Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006: 85.
84 Ibid.
Macedonian civil society is highly fragmented according to the international donor organizations. Whereas this fragmentation could have an impact on the political and social situation in the country, it does not affect the reforms in the police sector. None of the international donors disagree with establishing the rule of law and strengthening the security, consequently none of the civil society groups disagrees or campaigns against any particular reform in this sector. Therefore, currently one can conclude that neither media nor civil society has attempted to hinder the process of reforms in the security sector.

Given that there is the same number of actors (seven) involved in the police reforms in Albania as well, the difference in degree of success in reforming the police sector in both countries is not due to the different number of veto players involved in the process. Differently from the case of Albania though, the Macedonian parliament has difficulties in finding consensus given that the majority of the parliamentarians belong to two different ethnicity groups: ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. This division within the Assembly has negatively affected the law adoption process in general in Macedonia and that regarding the police sector in particular. Although not aimed at impeding the reforms, the involvement of the IAM is considered as another reason for slow progress of the reforms. The international experts’ contradicting advice to the Macedonian counterparts has a negative effect on the overall process given that the Macedonian officers do not know which international policing method to implement.

The third and the least influential veto players which are hindering the implementation of the new adopted laws are the regional actors. These actors are not following the instructions given by the MoI in recruiting and training the new police forces. The rest of the veto players, the government, the MoE, the MoI, the civil society and the media support the reforms in policing. Hypothesis 5 presented in Chapter I states that the higher the stands among the veto players the less likely it is that there will be a change in the
status quo. Referring to this hypothesis, one can conclude that because there is a higher degree of stands among the Macedonian veto players as compared to the Albanian ones, the degree of success in reforming the police sector in Albania is higher than in Macedonia.
CONCLUSION

This research has explored the reasons that lie behind the different degree of success in implementing the EU requirements in Albania and Macedonia in the police sector. The two countries have very similar general characteristics and yet reforming the police sector in Albania has proven more successful than in Macedonia according to the last Commission’s report in 2006. To account for this difference in success six hypotheses drawn from the literature on Europeanization were tested.

After testing the hypotheses, this thesis concludes that the EU pressure (Hypothesis 1), the degree of misfit (Hypothesis 2), the governmental objectives (Hypothesis 3) and the level of decentralization (Hypothesis 6) are similar in both cases, therefore all these factors cannot account for the difference of success in Europeanizing the police sector in Albania and Macedonai. The number of the veto players (Hypothesis 4) also does not account for the difference in result, given that in both countries there is the same number of actors (seven), although not all these veto players are equally involved in the reforming process. Rather, the diversity of stands (Hypothesis 5) is what counts the most for explaining the different level of success in Europeanizing the police sector in both countries. This implies that there is a lower degree of success of the police reforms in Macedonia due to a higher diversity of stands among the Macedonian veto players as compared to the Albanian ones.

This thesis has shown that the MoE, the civil society and the media are only indirectly involved in reforming the police in both countries. Overall their attitude towards reforming the security sector has been very positive. The government, the foreign assistance missions and the regional actors are the next category of veto players ranked by their importance in reforming the police sector. Given that the main goal of each of the governments regardless of their discourse has been EU integration, they have formulated the objective of the reforms in the police sector having in mind the EU standards of policing. Differently from the
Macedonian government, the Albanian government, in particular the current one, sends contradicting signals to the MoI which sometimes slow the process down, given that the Ministry needs some time to decide which objective should be followed. However, overall these contradicting signals have not hindered the reforms process to the degree that one notices in Macedonia. Foreign assistance missions which are involved in the security sector reforms are seen as problematic. In Macedonia their presence overcrowds the policing sector by giving all sort of legal and non legal advice that confuse the Macedonian police officers when they have to decide about the most appropriate policing methods. The same phenomenon can be noticed in Albania as well. Differently from Macedonia though, the IAM in Albania are more concerned with developing training programs thus interfering less in the other issues of policing. Regional actors who appeared so obedient in Albania, are not so in Macedonia. In Macedonia these actors, although under the supervision of the MoI, especially the ethnic Macedonians, do not follow the ministry’s orders on hiring and training other ethnicities in the police.

The MoI and the Parliament are the two most important veto players in both countries regarding the reforms in the police sector. Therefore the consent of these two veto players is very important in progressing with the reforms. This thesis has shown that the Ministries of Interior in both countries not only support but are also actively involved in the reforms process. The Albanian ministry, differently from the Macedonian one, finds itself sometimes in a difficult situation as it receives contradicting signals from the government; however, overall it has been appreciated for its active role in contributing to the success of the reforms in Albania. Similarly, the Macedonian MoI has been appraised for its contribution in the security sector reforms. The role of the Parliament however differs in both countries. Whereas in Albania the Parliamentarians have agreed on adopting laws aiming at reforming the police sector, this consensus seems to be lacking in Macedonia. The ethnic Albanians
oppose many bills that are waiting to be approved given that the security has been a very sensitive area since the ethnic crisis. All in all, the successful implementation of EU requirements in the police sector in Albania has been due to the common stands among the veto players. This common stand is missing in Macedonia therefore Macedonians lag behind in reforming the police sector. The actors that constantly veto the progress in reforming the police sector in Macedonia are the parliament, the IAM and the regional actors.

This research is novel for the existing literature on Europeanization in that it uses this literature to explain security related phenomena. Most of the existing literature on Europeanization of the WB countries focuses on explaining why the EU has set different conditions to this region compared to the CEE region. The literature on the police mostly identifies the changes and challenges of the police sector at the EU level and post-communist societies of the CEE. Few scholars have discussed reforms in the police sector in the context of the WB countries and even fewer are particularly interested in the police reforms in Albania and Macedonia. Two important lessons can be drawn from this comparative analysis. First, the approval of all the actors is necessary to achieve a successful Europeanization of domestic policies. In the absence of such approval, it becomes very hard for the EU to drive any change in the aspiring countries. Second, not all the actors are equally involved in the process. Therefore, it is very important for the EU to identify the most and important veto actors and demand their consent for a successful implementation of the EU-led reforms to occur. These findings are in line with the top-down rationalist approach and emphasize that this is the best approach to identify and examine the role of each of the veto players involved in the Europeanization process.

This research is conducted in a critical moment for the security sector of the WB. The death of Yugoslavia, the collapse of the pyramid schemes in Albania and the ethnic conflicts in Macedonia are vivid proofs of the importance of having well organized and functional law
enforcement institutions to avoid similar experiences in the future. The lessons drawn from the Albanian and Macedonian experience in their rocky road to reforming the police between 2001 and 2006 should be certainly kept in mind when discussing the reforms in the other countries of the region.

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Albania</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restructuring of police forces</td>
<td>in progress</td>
<td>satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting minorities&lt;sup&gt;85&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>satisfactory</td>
<td>unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of police networks</td>
<td>unsatisfactory</td>
<td>satisfactory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall training of the police</td>
<td>unsatisfactory</td>
<td>satisfactory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clear division of police and army</td>
<td>in progress</td>
<td>satisfactory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional police cooperation</td>
<td>unsatisfactory</td>
<td>satisfactory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police decentralization</td>
<td>unsatisfactory</td>
<td>in progress</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long-term strategic planning&lt;sup&gt;86&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>unsatisfactory</td>
<td>unsatisfactory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>unsatisfactory</td>
<td>in progress</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arms collection and destructions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improve coordination between police and judiciary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interagency cooperation</td>
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<td>satisfactory</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Overall progress</strong></td>
<td>FAIR</td>
<td>LIMITED</td>
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<sup>85</sup> The initial deadline set by the Ohrid Framework Agreement was by 2004. However in the Annual Report of the 2002, the Commission set an urgent deadline by the end of 2002.
APPENDIX 2: List of Interviewees/ Respondents of the Questionnaire

Atanasova, Gorica, Assistant for the Macedonian Minister for European Integration. Responded on 2 May 2007.

Bushati, Ditmir, Research Director of the Agenda Institute, Albania. Interviewed on 23 April 2007.


Hysi, Vasilika, Executive Director of the Albanian Helsinki Committee. Interviewed on 30 April 2007.


Veliaj, Erion, Executive Director of “Mjaft Movement”, Albania, Interviewed on 23 April 2007.

Xhulali, Ilda, Director of the Department for European Integration, Albanian Ministry of Foreing Affairs Interviewed on 20 April 2007.
APPENDIX 3: Questionnaire

**Objective:** To assess the role of the veto players in the implementation of the EU requirements in Albania/Macedonia in the Police sector.

1. Have you noticed changes in Macedonia during 2001 to 2006 period?
   a. Yes  
   b. No

2. If yes, which of the following processes have played an important role in inducing these changes?
   a. Globalization  
   b. Liberalization  
   c. Democratization  
   d. Europeanization  
   e. More than one of the following processes. Which ones?________________  
   f. All of the above processes. Difficult to distinguish

3. Do you think that the Macedonian Police is decentralized?
   a. Yes  
   b. No  
   c. In the process of decentralization

4. Do you think that there have been significant reforms in the field of Police, 2001-2006?
   a. Yes  
   b. No

5. If yes, do you thing that these reforms have been implemented to meet the EU requirements?
   a. Yes  
   b. No. If not for what other purpose?________________

6. If yes, which of the following factors have impacted the successful implementation of the EU requirements in the field of Police? (you can mark more than one answer)?
   a. Ministry of Integration and Ministry of Interior  
   b. Parliament  
   c. Lobby groups/civil society  
   d. Individuals who directly benefit from the application of the EU requirements  
   e. Regional actors

7. Have you noticed areas in Police when the EU requirements have not been implemented yet?
   a. Yes  
   b. No

8. If yes, which of the following factors have impacted unsuccessful implementation of these requirements?
   a. Ministry of Integration and Ministry of Interior  
   b. Parliament  
   c. Lobby groups/civil society
d. Individuals who are directly affected from the application of the EU requirements

9. Please rank the following factors according to their overall importance in the successful implementation of the EU requirements in Albania in the field of Police, where 1 indicates the least important and 5 the most important.

   a. Ministry of Integration and Ministry of Interior
   b. Parliament
   c. Lobby groups/'civil society
   d. Individuals who are directly affected from the application of the EU requirements
   e. Regional actors

10. In your opinion, is there any other factor which is important but is not considered in this questionnaire?

    a. Yes, which one?______
    b. No

11. Why do you think this factor is important?

    Thank you 😊
APPENDIX 4 The Changing Nature of EU Police Cooperation, by Era\(^{87}\)

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<td>- JHA Council</td>
<td>- K. 4 Committee</td>
<td>- Article 36 Committee</td>
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<td>- JHA Task Force</td>
<td>- Commission</td>
<td>- Europol Management Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Europol Drugs Unit (EDU)</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Directorate General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Eurojust, CEPOL, Task Force of Police Chiefs, Crime Prevention Networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgotten, central authorities</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>- Build and maintain TACS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Share information with third parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powers of Central Authorities</td>
<td>- Communication links</td>
<td>- Analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Limited sharing of tactics and information</td>
<td>- Limited pooling of information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Analysis</td>
<td>- Coordination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Coordination</td>
<td>- Immunity for staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual and potential crime fighting remit</td>
<td>- Very limited</td>
<td>- Potential to request information and participate in joint teams</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Ministers</td>
<td>Ministerial group acting by consensus</td>
<td>- Initially limited to drugs but expanded somewhat by joint actions after 2995</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>No role</td>
<td>- Initially as limited by Europol but expanded in 2002 to include all crimes in its annex</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>Must be kept informed</td>
<td>JHA Council acting by Unanimity but implementing measures possible by QMV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>No role</td>
<td>Shares right of initiative in all JHA areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
<td>No role</td>
<td>Possible role</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{87}\) Occhipinti, 2003: 228. 
Bruggeman, 2004: 153
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