MINORITY MOBILIZATION FOR LANGUAGE RIGHTS

A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF THE CARINTHIAN SLOVENE AND BURGENLAND CROAT MINORITIES IN AUSTRIA

By
Gudrun E. Ragossnig

Submitted to
Central European University
Department of International Relations and European Studies

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Supervisor: Professor Erin K. Jenne

Wordcount: 16,993

Budapest, Hungary
2007
ABSTRACT

Linguistic diversity has emerged as a major source of political controversy in the modern world. My thesis seeks to address the following questions related to language conflict: First, why are certain minorities mobilized around language claims whereas others are not? Second, why does the intensity of minority mobilization change over time?

I address these questions through a combination of a longitudinal and comparative analysis of the Carinthian Slovene and the Burgenland Croat minority in the period from 1945 to 2003. Both minorities have mobilized for their language rights, however to very different degrees. In this comparison I use the method of difference, as the dependent variable – mobilization of the ethnic minority for language rights – differs while minority size, cultural and linguistic features and the political context are similar.

Adopting the insights of social movements’ literature, I focus on the external and the internal mobilization powers of the minorities to explain differences between the two cases as well as the differences within each case over time. The analysis shows that minority mobilization for language claims is largely a function of discursive or institutional political opportunity structures and of internal resources – such as elite cohesion or mobilizing structures of minorities. Since these factors are always subject to change, the capacity of a minority to mobilize and the intensity of mobilization changes. Minority mobilization is not a function of assimilationist policies in the first place, but a function of the existing internal and external mobilizational resources, which empower them to defend their interests.
# Table of Contents

Abstract............................................................................................................................................. i

Introduction ......................................................................................................................................1

Chapter 1 - Internal and External Mobilizational Resources. A Theoretical Framework 5

1.1 Literature Review.....................................................................................................................5
1.2 Resource Theory .....................................................................................................................9
1.3 Background............................................................................................................................12
1.4 Case Selection.......................................................................................................................14
1.5 Methodology..........................................................................................................................16
1.6 Conclusion..............................................................................................................................18

Chapter 2 – The Slovenes in the Second Austrian Republic, 1945-2003 .........................19

2.1 History of inter-ethnic relations .........................................................................................20
2.2 1945 – 1955: State Treaty Negotiations ..........................................................................22
2.3 1955 – late 1960s: Period of Integration and Assimilation ..............................................24
2.4 Late 1960s – 1980s: Slovene Minority Rights Movement ...............................................26
2.5 1980s – to mid-1990s: Demobilization ..........................................................................30
2.7 Conclusion............................................................................................................................34

Chapter 3 - The Croats in the Second Austrian Republic, 1945-2003 .............................36

3.1 History of inter-ethnic relations .........................................................................................36
3.2 1945 –1955: State Treaty Negotiations .............................................................................38
3.3 1955 – late 1960s: Strong Assimilation Tendencies and further political division.........40
3.4 Late 1960s –1980s: Intensification of Internal Divisions ..................................................42
3.5 1980s: Ethnic Renaissance ...............................................................................................44
3.6 1990s – to 2007: Demobilisation and institutionalisation of claim-making .......................46
3.7 Conclusion............................................................................................................................48

Chapter 4 – Analysis of Ethnic Mobilization in Carinthia and Burgenland ..................51

4.1 1945 – 1955: State Treaty Negotiations ..........................................................................53
4.2 1955 – late 1960s: Period of Integration and Assimilation ..............................................54
4.3 Late 1960s – 1980: Minority Rights Movement vs. Cleavages within the Minority .........55
4.4 1980s – 1990s: Demobilization vs. Ethnic Renaissance ..................................................56
4.5 Mid-1990s – to 2003 ...........................................................................................................57

Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................58

Glossary...........................................................................................................................................61

List of Acronyms..............................................................................................................................61
List of Interview Partners.................................................................................................................61

Bibliography....................................................................................................................................62

Primary Sources ...............................................................................................................................62
Secondary Sources ............................................................................................................................62
INTRODUCTION

Linguistic diversity has emerged as a major source of political controversy in the modern world. After the fall of communism, ethnic minorities in several countries of Eastern Europe have mobilized for language rights – using everything from peaceful protest to violent secession. However, ethnolinguistic conflict is not confined to Eastern Europe; there are in fact many unresolved linguistic conflicts in the West. Historically, the most intense of these have taken place between the dominant language group of the state and various small, but regionally-concentrated and historically-rooted language groups. Examples of these include the regional language groups of Belgium, Spain, Canada and Italy.

Conflicts between dominant national groups and linguistic minorities have been strongest when the dominant national group attempted to impose its language as the sole official language throughout the country, including those regions that the minority viewed as part of its historic homeland. Assimilationist attempts by dominant groups have typically generated strong resistance on the part of minorities and mobilization for language rights. Examples of such language rights for minorities include the right to use the minority language in schooling, in public service, courts and legislatures, and bilingual topography. States are reluctant to grant these rights because disputes over regional languages are not just debates over language. Larger regional language groups perceive themselves not just as having a distinct language, but also as forming a distinct “nation” within the larger state. Therefore, the debates over the status of a regional language are also debates over the nation.

In the nationalism literature, the understanding of the link between language and nationalism has undergone great change from the 18th century to today. Primordialists such as the 18th century German romantics, Herder, von Humboldt and Fichte advocated an “organic”

or “linguistic” nationalism where culture, and particularly language, was viewed as central to the character (Volksgeist) of the nation. In this perspective, language came to be seen as the most important distinguishing characteristic of nationhood. These essentialist arguments have long since been dismissed in the current nationalism literature. Contemporary constructivist accounts of nationalism argue broadly that language – or any specific cultural aspect of ethnic and national identity – constitutes a “contingent factor of a national identity.” However, the fact that language is a contingent facet of identity does not mean that it is unimportant. This is shown by the heightened salience of language issues in many historical and contemporary political conflicts.

Particular languages are clearly an important and constitutive factor of individual and collective identities. This is true for minority language claims as well as majority language counter-claims. Language is an identity maker, which is associated with particular ethnic and national identities. Majority support for official monolingualism, as much as minority demands for bilingualism, are manifestations of competing nationalist projects. In sum, language conflicts are inextricably related to nationalist conflicts. Because of this, they play a significant role in social and political organization and mobilization.

In the 20th century, linguistic conflict has also occurred in two Austrian provinces between the German speaking majority population and the Carinthian Slovene and the Burgenland Croat minorities. Both minorities have mobilized for their language rights, however to very different degrees. My thesis seeks to address the following three questions related to language conflict: First, why are certain minorities mobilized around language claims whereas others are not? Second, why does the intensity of minority mobilization change over time? Third, why do minorities paradoxically mobilize for language rights even

---

3 Ibid, 141.
4 Patten, Kymlicka, „Introduction,” 5.
at times when they enjoy more rights than ever before? Some scholars argue that the desire to exist as a separate group leads to demands for protection of linguistic rights.\(^5\) Others claim that minorities have economic incentives to obtain education and language rights.\(^6\) These propositions certainly have their validity. However, they can not account for variations of minority mobilization over time.

My thesis will show that minority mobilization for language claims is largely a function of internal resources such as elite cohesion, and mobilizing structures as well as external resources, such as political opportunity structures. I will address these questions through a combination of a longitudinal and comparative analysis of the Carinthian Slovene and the Burgenland Croat minority in the period from 1945 to 2003. An analysis of these cases shows that minorities are not necessarily more active in response to assimilationist policies. To the contrary, even minorities with mild grievances may mobilize, while paradoxically those with deep grievances very often do not. This empirical puzzle challenges the widely-held assumption that minorities mobilize for language rights when they face the greatest threats to their cultural existence. The comparative analysis of the Slovene and Croat cases allow me to control for significant political, cultural and historical variables to determine why the two minorities mobilize or not.

The first chapter shows how the general puzzle of language policies relates to minority language claims. Furthermore, it outlines my argument in more detail and explains what methodology was used to conduct my analysis. Moreover, it provides the background for my cases as it outlines the history of Austrian minorities and minority protection.

---


The second and third chapter present the case studies of the Carinthian Slovene and Burgenland Croat minorities respectively. The fourth chapter provides an analysis of ethnic mobilization of the Carinthian Slovene and Burgenland Croat minority by combining a longitudinal and comparative analysis. This will be followed by concluding remarks on the explanatory value of theories trying to explain minority mobilization.
Chapter 1 - Internal and External Mobilizational Resources. A Theoretical Framework

A state’s choice of official language is an important political issue in a world with thousands of languages. When governments designate the languages of official business, administration, and public education, interests of different language groups come into conflict. Members of linguistic minorities spend years learning the official language and may still communicate with difficulty, undermining their education and employment opportunities. Individuals suffering from minority and peripheral status may therefore rebel against these structural disadvantages.

1.1 Literature Review

According to political economists, linguistic communities enter conflicts over the choice of language policy because this choice has important economic consequences. In their eyes, language policy is a public good that confers education and employment advantages upon one group at the expense of the other. Sniderman et al. (1989) argue that linguistic majorities are unlikely to cede rights to minorities because it is in their best interest not to do so. Laitin (1989) makes a similar economic argument when he argues that India’s language policy is the consequence of the efforts by civil servants to protect their linguistic privileges. Similarly, Fishman states that language conflict is the consequence of the need of the state to have an ethnically and culturally homogeneous society, which explains the choice of a given language as the national language. This language policy often encounters resistance from linguistic

---

minorities because they might suffer disadvantages. De Witte insists that equality under law would require governments to “use as many languages as are spoken by the target public,” and says services may be denied in some languages “on the basis of administrative or judicial efficiency. It is clear, for example, that a single user cannot demand an additional official language, but a group consisting of about half the population can legitimately do so”.

The common assumption of all these arguments is that efficiency and fairness cannot be reconciled. However, Jonathan Pool (1991) shows in his political economy analysis that a state can adopt an efficient and fair language policy at the same time. Thus, the adoption of multiple official languages does not involve any losses in efficiency. Therefore, it is all the more puzzling why linguistic groups engage in costly conflict when a mutually beneficial compromise may be reached. Economic analyses cannot fully account for why states discriminate against linguistic minorities.

Primordialist and constructivist explanations of language conflict focus on the symbolic elements of these struggles. They assert that the choice of official language is inherently divisive because language signifies national identity – a fact that cannot be compromised. Thus, a gain for one community constitutes a loss for the other. This is consistent with Rustow’s explanation which emphasizes the primordial, symbolic, divisive, uncompromisable character of language conflict (1970) and Deutsch’s and Laponce’s one that there are inherent incompatibilities between linguistic communities. These scholars are generally pessimistic concerning the possibility of resolving such conflicts. It is important to note however, that linguistic conflicts are not inherent to multi-ethnic polities. Examples of

12 Schöpflin, Nations, 72.
peaceful coexistence include Quebec before and after the Francophone movement of the 1960s, Finland and Switzerland.

The stakes of language conflicts seem to be rather trivial such as in the case of the Carinthian dispute over bilingual street signs. Peter Jordan argues that bilingual street signs are a symbolic recognition of a linguistic or ethnic minority. They symbolise the fact that the cultural landscape of the region where the minority lives was also created by them. Thus, place names in the minority language, which are part of their cultural heritage, are an important instrument of identity creation for minorities.¹⁵

Schöpflin takes a similar constructivist approach in order to account for why minorities mobilize over apparently trivial things. Official languages designate one linguistic group as the state-making nation and provide this group with nominal control over the state apparatus as well as the advantages that accrue from this control. Schöpflin argues, therefore, that linguistic disputes over seemingly trivial things transcend the immediate consequences of such conflicts, representing struggles over the very existence of the minority and its right to cultural reproduction. Assimilationist threats are therefore perceived as tantamount to cultural genocide.¹⁶

Constructivist arguments hold that language rights have a highly symbolic character and this is why they might be important to minorities in general. They fail to explain, however, why some minorities mobilize for these rights whereas others do so to a lesser extent or not at all. Constructivists cannot account for the fluctuation of intensity of such conflicts over time. As Erin Jenne points out, empirical observation shows that there is no

---


¹⁶ Schöpflin, Nations, 75.
one-to-one correlation between the degree of assimilation pressures minorities face and their mobilization over language rights.  

In sum, the two widely held explanations about the roots of language conflict are the economic and the symbolic arguments. An application of these theories to the Carinthian Slovene and the Burgenland Croat cases shows that neither explanation can account for the pattern of language disputes in these two cases. The theory that language conflicts emerge due to its material consequences do not have great explanatory value because in the present cases practically all Slovenes and Croats in Austria are bilingual. Moreover, economic explanations can account for language claims in the area of education, but these explanations cannot elucidate claims for bilingual street signs.

The argument that groups fight over language policy because it signifies the extent to which each group has the right to culturally reproduce sheds important light on the sociology of language conflict. However, it has no predictive value for the emergence of such conflict. As mentioned above, this theory argues that language disputes are most likely to occur when assimilation pressures are greatest. Examples include the Roma populations throughout Europe, which have faced brutal cultural and linguistic assimilation but which have remained politically inactive. By contrast, the Slovene minority in Carinthia, which enjoys state-funded minority language education, has been the most active of all minorities in Austria in their demands for language rights. Moreover, even though the Carinthian Slovene minority has achieved significant extension of their minority protection in the course of the last fifty years, the language conflict in Carinthia has intensified again in the end of the 1990s up to the present day.

---

1.2 Resource Theory

In my thesis, I will combine a comparative and longitudinal analysis of the Carinthian Slovene and Burgenland Croat minorities in Austria, in order to explain minority mobilization for language rights. I will develop a framework that challenges the widely held assumptions for minority mobilization. The central insight of the social movements’ literature that grievances alone cannot generate collective mobilization forms the basis of my framework. Rather than looking at the grievances of minorities, I will focus on those factors that empower minorities to mobilize, including internal and external resources.

With regard to internal resources, I examine the role of the intelligentsia in the emergence of movements. Eric Hobsbawm asserts that the driver of nationalist movements is “the educated classes – the educational progress of large numbers of ‘new men’ into areas hitherto occupied by a small elite. The progress of schools and universities measures that of nationalism, just as schools and especially universities become its most conspicuous champions.”18 In these cases, I will focus on the behaviour of regional elites in the selected case studies and at the changes of socio-economic conditions over the period from 1945 to the present day. In order to determine whether these variables influence the extent to which the minorities mobilize over language claims, I will examine the cases closely to determine whether elites played an important role in these movements.

In their theories on social movements McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly argue that the challenging group – a minority in this case – has to have mobilising structures at its disposal. However, they emphasize that rather than creating new organizations, minorities appropriate existing ones and turn them into vehicles of mobilization. Thus, it is the minority’s capacity to appropriate sufficient organization and numbers to provide a social/organisational base – and

not that organization itself – that makes mobilization possible.\textsuperscript{19} Since the minority elite usually leads these organizations, elite cohesion is an important condition for a unified organisational base. To test for the impact of these mobilizing structures, I will look at political and cultural minority organisations in the region to analyse to what extent the minority appropriated these organisations to turn them into vehicles of contention.

According to the social movements’ literature, there must also be a political opportunity structure to transmit grievances into action. Political opportunity structure may be defined as

“elements in the environment [that] impose certain constraints on political activity or open avenues for it. The manner, in which individuals and groups in the political system behave, then, is not simply a function of the resources they command, but of the openings, weak spots, barriers, and resources of the political system itself. There is, in this sense, interaction, or linkage, between the environment, understood in terms of the notion of a structure of political opportunities, and political behaviour.”\textsuperscript{20}

The concept of political opportunity emphasizes resources \textit{external} to the group – unlike money, mobilising structures, elite cohesion or power – that can be taken advantage of even by weak or disorganized challengers. Social movements form when ordinary citizens, sometimes encouraged by their leaders, respond to changes in opportunities that lower the costs of collective action, reveal potential allies and show where elites and authorities in the governing structures are vulnerable.\textsuperscript{21} Political opportunity structures might promise minority claims when a government liberalizes or when its rulers become preoccupied with foreign engagements.

\textsuperscript{19} Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly, \textit{Dynamics of Contention} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 47.
Fiona Adamson makes a distinction between discursive, institutional and geopolitical opportunity structures. Here, I will focus on the first two of these. Institutional opportunity structure is defined as the political environment that emerges to alter the relationship between the minority and the centre. Discursive opportunity structure maps the symbolic, cultural, and ideational resources in a given environment that are available for political entrepreneurs to draw upon in the process of strategic framing. The discursive opportunity structure functions as a “normative toolbox and ideational resource pool that [can] be deployed in pursuit of political objectives.” An example of this is liberalism, as it provides the language of rights, equality, rationality, and progress that minority representatives can draw upon when framing their claims against the political centre.

McAdam et al. assert that it is not enough that there is a political opportunity structure. “No opportunity however objectively open, will invite mobilization unless it is a) visible to potential challengers and b) perceived as an opportunity. Attribution of opportunity or threat is an activating mechanism responsible in part for the mobilization of previously inert populations.” Following this argument, I will compare the attribution of institutional and discursive opportunity and threat in the field of language policy in the Carinthian and the Burgenland case as a possible activating mechanism and resource for minority mobilization.

Importantly, Tarrow emphasizes that movements are only created when political opportunities open up for social actors who usually lack them. Thus, according to Tarrow the “when” of social movements’ mobilization – when political opportunities are opening up – goes a long way towards explaining its “why”. This approach seems to be a very valuable one for explaining the differences in minority mobilization over time. Furthermore, Tarrow’s theory explains why the minority is not necessarily active in response to assimilationist

---

25 McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, 43.
26 Tarrow, Power in movement, 1.
pressure. If it is political opportunities that translate the potential for movement into mobilization, then even minorities with mild grievances and few internal resources may appear in movement, while those with deep grievances and dense resources – but lacking opportunities – may not.\textsuperscript{27} Thus, by testing the presented theories, I intend to create a framework to explain mobilization around language claims and thereby contribute to the study of minority mobilization in general.

In my thesis, I combine a comparative and longitudinal analysis of the Carinthian Slovene and Burgenland Croat minorities in Austria to identify shifts in the degree of mobilization around language claims. This is particularly well exemplified by a comparison of the Carinthian Slovene minority and the Burgenland Croat minority, which differ greatly in the degree of mobilization over language claims. My research will identify the causes for the differences between the two cases as well as the differences within each case over time. From the framework outlined above I deduce the following hypotheses:

\begin{itemize}
\item H\textsubscript{1}: The existence of a unified broad intellectual basis is a precondition of minority mobilization over language claims.
\item H\textsubscript{2}: The “when” of minority mobilization for language claims is determined by the appropriation of existing discursive and institutional opportunity structures.
\item H\textsubscript{3}: Minorities mobilize when they have an institutional opportunity structure, such as a liberal government, which might be favourable to minority language claims.
\end{itemize}

\section*{1.3 Background}

From a historical point of view, Austria’s ethnic minorities appear to enjoy more rights today than ever before. Minority rights were primarily introduced by the Austrian government in

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 18.
\end{footnotesize}
response to international pressure, such as in the case of the Treaty of St Germain of 1919 and
the Treaty of Vienna of 1955.

Austria’s minority protection system is based on the State Basic Law (from the
Habsburg Monarchy), the Treaty of St Germain, and the Treaty of Vienna. The latter is the
most relevant for our purposes as it guarantees special rights to the Slovene minority in
Carinthia and the Croatian minority in Burgenland. Art 7.1 states the principle of equality,
Article 7.2 guarantees the right of persons belonging to ethnic groups to instruction in
Slovene and Croatian; Article 7.3 guarantees language rights and the employment of bilingual
street signs; Article 7.4 guarantees participation in cultural, administrative and judicial bodies
on the basis of equality with other Austrian citizens; and Article 7.5 forbids the activity of any
organizations whose aim is to restrict the rights of the Croat and Slovene minorities. It has to
be clarified, that the provisions of the treaty are vague, as they are only intended to be general
guidelines for framing more specific laws.  

Thus, various laws have been passed that elaborate the provisions set out in the Treaty
of Vienna. The most important enabling provision is the Ethnic Groups Act which was passed
in 1976. It stipulates the establishment of an Advisory Council for Ethnic Groups for each
minority group, which is recognized by the Austrian federal government as an autochthonous
minority such as the Carinthian Slovenes and the Burgenland Croats. Furthermore, it provides
for the establishment of bilingual street signs in minority areas as well as the use of the
minority language as an official language and regulates the financing of the minorities.

The Minority School Law for Carinthia as amended in 2001, and the Minority School
Law for Burgenland from 1994 are enabling provisions of Art. 7 in the Treaty of Vienna
pertaining to schooling. Both laws establish a constitutional right to instruction in the mother
tongue.

28 Mirjam Polzer Srien, “Austria an Overview.” In The ethnopolitical encyclopaedia of Europe, ed. Karl Cordell
Since Austria’s accession to the EU in 1995, the government has signed several international agreements for the protection of minorities, including the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional Minority Languages.\textsuperscript{30}

\subsection*{1.4 Case Selection}

My thesis aims at answering the question what factors determine why a minority in a multiethnic society might or might not mobilize for language rights. To answer this question I conduct a comparative-longitudinal analysis of the Carinthian Slovene and the Burgenland Croat minorities. The analysis will cover the period between 1945 and 2003 because this period has a uniform institutional framework of minority rights. Nearly all minority mobilization around language claims since 1945 has referred to the provisions of Art. 7 Austrian State Treaty of Vienna.

The Carinthian Slovene minority is a so-called autochthonous ethnic group, which settled in the area of today’s Austrian province Carinthia in the second half of the 6\textsuperscript{th} century. The Alpine Slavs founded the principality of Karantania around 600 AD in an area ranging from contemporary Carinthia, over large parts of Styria to Lower Austria and existed until the 8\textsuperscript{th} century. The political centre of the predecessors of the Republic of Slovenia is based on the southern parts of Carinthia. In the 8\textsuperscript{th} century, Karantania was under Bavarian and later Frank rule and was christianized by Bavarian missionaries. The ethnic composition of the region changed as a result of Bavarian colonisation. Since the 15\textsuperscript{th} century the language border remained unchanged until the 19\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{31}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 30.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Mirjam Polzer Sriend, “The Slovene Community in Austria.” In The ethnopolitical encyclopaedia of Europe, ed. Karl Cordell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 35.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Linguists claim that at the turn of the 20th century, two thirds of residents of Carinthia spoke German and one third Slovene. The census of 2001 showed that the number of Slovene speakers in Carinthia only amounts to around 13,000. The Carinthian Slovenes’ region is essentially spread over three valleys in the south of Carinthia: Gailtal, Rosental and Jauntal. The Slovene-speaking population is scattered over this area, and makes up the majority in some parts. Thus, the Carinthian Slovene community refers to those people speaking Slovene in this particular territory.\textsuperscript{32}

The Burgenland Croat minority is also a so-called autochthonous minority. The Croats settled in Burgenland as a consequence of the conquest of large parts of Bosnia, Croatia and Dalmatia by the Ottomans in the 16th century. Some fled to western Hungary, southern Slovakia and Austria, others were resettled by the authorities in this region. In the 16th century, the population of around 30,000 Croats constituted 30 per cent of the population of Burgenland. In contrast to the Slovenes, Burgenland Croats had never enjoyed sovereignty over this territory.\textsuperscript{33}

In Burgenland, several ethnic groups – Croats, Hungarians, Germans and Roma – had lived together for centuries. According to the census of 2001, there are 17,241 Croats living in Burgenland. They are dispersed throughout the province with the exception of the district of Jennersdorf, in which several densely-populated Croatian villages are situated.\textsuperscript{34}

I have chosen to compare the Burgenland Croat and the Carinthian Slovene minorities because mobilization around language rights differs greatly between the two cases. In fact, the Carinthian Slovene minority was more mobilized than any other ethnic minority in Austria. In undertaking this comparison, I use the method of difference, as the dependent variable – mobilization of the ethnic minority for language rights – differs, while minority size, cultural

\textsuperscript{32} This statement is equally true for the Burgenland Croat minority in Burgenland.


\textsuperscript{34} Mirjam Polzer Srienz, “The Croat Community in Austria,” in The ethnopolitical encyclopaedia of Europe, ed. Karl Cordell. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 41.
and linguistic features and the political context is similar; they also have had the same external homeland.

These cases are excellent candidates for controlled comparison. As they are both regions in Austria, I control for most state-level factors that might influence the level of mobilization. The two cases share the same political context: they are both subjected to the same constitutional court, the same federal government and national political setting, international obligations and legal provisions in force. Additionally, until the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991, the Carinthian Slovene and Burgenland Croat minorities had the same external homeland. Moreover, the Slovene and Croat minorities are very similar culturally and linguistically. A further reason for this choice is that the minorities have approximately the same size, they both constitute a relatively small proportion of the population. In view of the Austrian population size of 8,032,926 the numbers of autochthonous minorities are relatively small. With regard to territorial concentration, they differ in the sense that the Burgenland Croats are more dispersed over the territory of Burgenland, whereas the Carinthian Slovenes are more concentrated in the southern part of Carinthia. However, in both cases, these regions are also populated by German-speaking people.

Having controlled for most relevant state and group-level variables, I can effectively separate the effects of these variables from those of external and internal mobilization resources on the level of group mobilization.

1.5 Methodology

My research draws on secondary literature to discern shifts in the overall level of minority mobilization over time in the cases under consideration. Additionally, I consulted the archives of minority organizations in order to determine the level of mobilization of the group at any
given time. This approach constituted the best way to pursue this analysis, because the analysis of secondary literature, survey data, media reports and communications between minority organisations and the government served as a means of reconstructing minority mobilization in the period of analysis.

To fill the potential gaps in the record and to check the reliability of these sources, I have conducted interviews with the representatives of minority parties and associations. In the case of Carinthia, I conducted these interviews with the representatives of the Carinthian Unity List, the Zveza Slovenskih Organizacij (ZSO) [Central Association of Slovene Organizations] and the Narodni Svet Koroških Slovencev (NSKS) [Council of the Carinthian Slovenes]. In the case of Burgenland, the representatives of the Hravtsko kulturno društvo (HKD) [Croatian Cultural Association] and the Hrvatski Kulturni i Dokumentarni Centar (HKDC) [Croatian Cultural and Documentation Centre] have been interviewed.

I used the semi-structured format with each set of respondents in order to detect what factors determine why minorities mobilize for their rights. The questions I focused on were: When did the minority mobilize? Did the organisations representing the minority make similar claims? What was the relationship between the minority and the external homeland like? What were the means at their disposal to fulfil their demands? How well was the minority represented in the political decision-making on the municipal, provincial and national levels? The answers to these questions were particularly helpful to understand the mobilization around language claims in the recent years, because they are not covered by any secondary literature yet.
1.6 Conclusion

Having identified that economic and symbolic theories can not account for fluctuations of minority mobilization, I have outlined an alternative approach for minority mobilization in this chapter. Resource theory focuses on the external and the internal mobilization powers of minorities. The next chapter will apply this theory to the selected cases.
Chapter 2 – The Slovenes in the Second Austrian Republic, 1945-2003

The sixty-year period of investigation of the Carinthian Slovene\textsuperscript{35} minority will be broken down into five segments, which represent different levels of minority mobilisation. Minority behaviour will be analysed in each time period in connection with the relative amount of existing internal and external resources for mobilisation. With regard to internal mobilising resources of the Slovenes, I concentrate on two factors. First, I focus on the presence of an intellectual elite and whether this elite had a common strategy toward the majority government. Second, I will analyse whether the minority utilized its political, cultural and youth organizations as an organizational basis to claim language rights. With regard to external mobilising resources, I look at the capacity of the Slovenes to appropriate existing discursive and institutional opportunity structures. The time segments will also be examined in terms of intervening variables, such as economic conditions and assimilationist pressures, in order to evaluate the resource hypothesis of minority mobilisation against alternative explanations, which focus on economic factors or assimilation pressures.

This chapter consists of three parts: first, it aims at outlining the history of ethnic relations in Carinthia in the interwar period as a background for understanding the minority-majority relations in the post-war period. Second, I conduct an analysis of the mobilization for language rights in the period from 1945 to 2003. Finally, I summarize the results of this analysis.

\textsuperscript{35} For practical reasons I refer to Carinthian Slovenes as Slovenes.
2.1 History of inter-ethnic relations

After the fall of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in 1918, the Republic Deutsch-Österreich and the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes put forward competing claims for the territory of southern Carinthia, which was inhabited predominantly by Slovenes. The unresolved border question led to fighting between the Carinthian Defence Federation (Kärntner Abwehrkämpfer) and Southern Slavic troops. Under the auspices of the League of Nations, the border dispute was finally resolved by plebiscite on October, 10 1920. The official results showed that a total of 59.04 per cent of the population voted to join Austria. In fact, many ethnic Slovenes had voted for the Austrian option.

In the interwar period, Carinthian politics were influenced by the “Kärntner Heimatdienst”, a German-nationalist organisation which promoted assimilationist policies, such as a ban on Slovene newspapers, the removal of bilingual street signs and the employment of German speaking teachers in bilingual schools. Host state repression against the minority resulted in significant losses of the Slovene intelligentsia in Carinthia. The centre of Slovene national ideology, the publishing house “Družba Sv. Mohorja” which had been established in 1852 in Klagenfurt and aimed at distributing Slovene literature was moved to Slovenia.

---

38 For the reasons why Carinthian Slovenes voted for Austria see: Suppan, „Geschichte Südkärntens,” 133.
39 The German-nationalist movement (Deutschnationalen Bewegung) was a political movement, which emerged in the period of the Habsburg-Monarchy and remained influential in Austria until 1945. It stood for a unification of all German-speaking territories.
40 Gerhard Baumgartner, 6xÖsterreich, 32.
Despite these assimilation pressures, Slovenes developed a very diversified network of cultural and religious organizations and associations. The “Slovene School Association” appealed to the League of Nations on behalf of the minority, especially over the unresolved dispute over the private Slovene schools.\textsuperscript{43} The minority organised itself into a political party, the “Koroska Slovenska Stranka” (Carinthian Slovene party) which scored successes in the municipal elections in the Slovene speaking regions of Carinthia but did not have the votes to enter the provincial or federal parliament.\textsuperscript{44}

At the time of the Anschluss, the Slovene minority proclaimed loyalty to the Nazi state.\textsuperscript{45} Nevertheless, Slovenes were confronted with policies aimed at the total assimilation and dissolution of the ethnic minority during the period of the Third Reich. Slovene intelligence was persecuted by the NS-authorities, 300 families were forced to resettle, Slovene organizations were prohibited and Slovene education was abolished in schools.\textsuperscript{46}

The repressive policy of the Nazi regime, in particular the resettlement in 1942, was the trigger of the military mobilization against the Nazi regime by the Slovenes. However, the condition that mobilization could take place at all was the emergence of a Slovene resistance movement after the occupation of Yugoslavia by the German army.\textsuperscript{47} The Slovene Communist Party called for the common battle of the Slovene people against Nazi Germany and many Carinthian Slovenes followed this proclamation.\textsuperscript{48} Soon, a network of Slovene underground organisations established the so-called Liberation Front (OF). The OF represented the only military resistance movement against the Nazi regime in the entire Third Reich.\textsuperscript{49}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{43} Suppan, Volksgruppen, 147.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 168.
\textsuperscript{45} Hans Haas, Karl Stuhlpfarrer, Österreicch und seine Slowenen. (Wien: Löcker&Wögenstein, 1977), 77.
\textsuperscript{46} Suppan, Volksgruppen, 172.
\textsuperscript{48} Suppan, Volksgruppen, 174.
\textsuperscript{49} Valentin Inzko, Geschichte der Kärntner Slowenen von 1918 bis zur Gegenwart unter Berücksichtigung der gesamtslowenischen Geschichte. (Wien, Klagenfurt: Hermagoras Verlag, 1988), 112.
\end{flushright}
2.2 1945 – 1955: State Treaty Negotiations

After the capitulation of the Third Reich on May, 8 1945, the south-eastern parts of Carinthia including the capital Klagenfurt were occupied by Yugoslav troops. Only after pressure from the British occupation force, these troops left Carinthia.\textsuperscript{50} British pressure to find a solution to the minority issue in Carinthia and irredentist claims by the Slovene Communist party forced the Carinthian provisional government to accommodate the Slovene minority by promising reparations for the resettlement, re-establishment of all cultural and economic associations of the Slovenes, removal of the German settlers in southern Carinthia, reestablishment of Slovene schooling, and freedom of speech in the administration.\textsuperscript{51} The Slovene minority, led by Dr. Petek and Dr. Vinko Zwitter, referred to their fight against National Socialism and demanded more political participation.\textsuperscript{52} To meet their demands, the Slovene teacher Dr. Joschko Tischler was included in the provincial government in July 1945, and bilingual education in the bilingual region of Carinthia was re-established in October the same year.

In the beginning of the occupation period the Communist-oriented Slovenes were the most active group of the Slovene minority. Already in May 1945, they held demonstrations in Klagenfurt for the unification with Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{53} Furthermore, they established a Slovene provincial government next to the already existing Austrian one. They established their party, the “Osvobodilna Fronta za Slovensko Koroško” (Liberation Front for Slovene Carinthia) (OF) and intended to run in the first elections for the provincial parliament in November 1945. Support for the OF came from the regions where the partisan battle had been most active, amounting to fifteen percent of the Slovene votes. The majority of the small Slovene

\textsuperscript{51} Haas, Stuhlpfarrer, Kärntner Slowenen, 88.
\textsuperscript{52} Memorandum of the Carinthian Slovenes to the British military government, 27.6.1945 – Documents on the Carinthian Question, ed. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the FPRY (Beograd 1948) 81 ff.; Haas, Stuhlpfarrer, Kärntner Slowenen, 90.
\textsuperscript{53} Suppan, \textit{Volksgruppen}, 179.
intelligentsia and the functionaries of the re-established Slovene cultural organisations still supported the OF in 1945.\textsuperscript{54} However, already in July 1945 the British government asserted that it would not accept any demands for unification with Yugoslavia from the representatives of the Slovene minority, possible border changes would only be discussed during the international peace negotiations.\textsuperscript{55}

During the State Treaty negotiations, the Yugoslav government officially demanded from the Allies 247 km\textsuperscript{2} of Carinthian territory, encompassing 180,000 inhabitants including the capital Klagenfurt and the second major city in the region, Villach.\textsuperscript{56} Consequently, various representatives of Slovene political, religious or cultural organisations petitioned to the foreign minister conference in Moscow and London demanding everything from unification with Yugoslavia to extensive language rights. The most radical group, the OF, started a propaganda offensive for unification with Yugoslavia. Moreover, a group of fifty-one priests petitioned to the foreign minister conference in 1947: “Austria gives the Slovenes neither the possibility for a cultural and economic development, nor for the existence of a national life”.\textsuperscript{57}

In the State Treaty negotiations, neither the Allies – in particular Great Britain – nor Austria wanted to divide Carinthia. In face of this opposition, Yugoslavia modified its territorial demands and stopped supporting Slovene irredentism. In return for abandoning the idea of unification with Yugoslavia or of territorial autonomy, the Allies decided in 1949 to include the protection of the Slovene and Croat minorities in the Austrian State Treaty.\textsuperscript{58}

The loss of Yugoslav support for unification constituted a turning point for the OF as it gradually lost the support of the Slovene population and parts of its intelligentsia. The most

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 181.
\item \textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 179.
\item \textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 181.
\item \textsuperscript{57} Memorandum of 51 Slovene priests of Carinthia to the Council of Foreign Ministers, Celovec (Klagenfurt), 3.2.1947 – Documents on the Carinthian Question, 128-131.
\item \textsuperscript{58} Suppan, \textit{Volksgruppen}, 183.
\end{itemize}
decisive blow against the OF constituted the establishment of another Slovene political organization, the so-called Narodni svet Koroških Slovencev [Council of the Carinthian Slovenes] (NSKS), by Dr. Joschko Tischler, the leader of the conservative group of the Slovenes.\textsuperscript{59} The political division of the Slovene organisations into a Communist-oriented and a conservative association hindered their political participation.\textsuperscript{60} Neither the successor of the OF the “Demokratična fronta delavnega ljudstva” [Democratic front of the working people] nor the “Ljudska Krščanka stranaka” [Christian People’s Party] won a seat in the provincial parliament in the elections of 1949. By contrast, in the elections to the Chamber of Agriculture, the two groups cooperated and obtained representation in this body.\textsuperscript{61}

Finally, in 1955, the negotiations for the Austrian State Treaty of Vienna came to an end and the provisions for the protection of the Slovene and Burgenland Croat minority were laid down in Art. 7 State Treaty of Vienna.\textsuperscript{62}

\textbf{2.3 1955 – late 1960s: Period of Integration and Assimilation}

Despite these ideological cleavages, the two Slovene organizations joined in the demand for the protection of minority rights. The two political organization of the Slovenes, the conservative NSKS and the “Zveza slovenskih organizacij na Koroškem” [Central association of Slovene organizations in Carinthia] (ZSO) issued a common Memorandum to the federal government in October 1955. Their claims were mainly aimed at achieving proportional representation of Slovenes in administration and government of Carinthia and limited territorial autonomy. First, they asked for proportional representation in the federal, provincial and municipal administration. Second, they demanded that civil servants in bilingual regions

\textsuperscript{59} Suppan, \textit{Volksgruppen}, 185.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 186.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 186.
would have to know both, German and Slovene, or learn them within three years. Third, they
demanded the establishment of a Slovene secondary school and a Slovene institution for
teacher education as well as an independent administrative body in the provincial government
for Slovene schools.\(^{63}\)

The Slovene organisations expected that the provisions of Art. 7 would be gradually
implemented. In the period from 1955 to the late 1960s, the Slovene organizations tried to
integrate themselves into the existing political structures in order to achieve their political
goals from “within the system”. The political division was reflected by their political
strategies: The ZSO supported the Social Democratic Party whereas the NSKS cooperated
with the conservative Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP).\(^{64}\) Thus, in this period the
representatives of the Slovene organizations issued only three common memoranda, one for
bilingual schools, a critique of the “Minority School Law”, and the “Law on the Language of
Jurisdiction”\(^{65}\). Cooperation with the existing parties had only limited success, the only
demand which was heard was the establishment of the “Zvezna gimnazija za Slovence v
Celovcu” [Secondary school for Slovenes in Klagenfurt] in 1957.\(^{66}\)

The great socioeconomic difference between the majority and minority of the interwar
period gradually disappeared. Due to modernization in the 1960s and 70s there was a general
development towards societal emancipation of the Slovene minority.\(^{67}\) This is particularly
well exemplified by a growth of its intelligentsia.\(^{68}\) According to statistical analyses from
1971, the Slovene community shows a very dynamic development in the educational sector
since the establishment of the Secondary school for Slovenes in Klagenfurt which graduated

\(^{63}\) Memorandum der Kärntner Slowenen an die Bundesregierung der Republik Österreich, 11.10. 1955.
\(^{64}\) Marian Sturm, „Kärntner Slowenen zwischen Emanzipation und Folklore,“ in ...und raus bist du! Ethnische
Minderheiten in der Politik. ed. Bauböck, Rainer; Gerhard Baumgartner; Bernhard Perching; Karin Pinter, 344-
\(^{65}\) Suppan, Volksgruppen, 208.
\(^{66}\) Rudolf Vouk, „Der Anlassfall,“ in Ortstafelkonflikt in Kärnten – Krise oder Chance?, ed. Martin Pandel,
Mirjam Polzer-Srienz, Miroslav Polzer, Reginald Vospernik (Wien: Braunmüller, 2004), 82.
\(^{67}\) Suppan, Volksgruppen, 194.
\(^{68}\) Ibid., 207.
its first class in 1963. In 1971 the proportion of students in secondary school and university was significantly higher than either the Carinthian German-speaking population or the overall Austrian population.\(^6^9\)

The re-emergences of German-nationalist forces after the end of the Austrian occupation barely affected the degree of mobilization of the minority. However, shortly after the Austrian State Treaty was signed, the German-nationalist organization “Kärntner Heimatdienst” was re-established and due to its influence on politics compulsory bilingual education in southern Carinthia was abolished. A new “Minority School Law” was passed in 1959, which significantly worsened the situation of bilingual schooling, because parents had to apply for Slovene schooling, necessitating stronger ethnic declaration than before.\(^7^0\)

### 2.4 Late 1960s – 1980s: Slovene Minority Rights Movement

Socioeconomic progress within the Slovene community was a necessary condition for the intense ethnic mobilization of the late 1960s and 1970s. The increase in the size of the Slovene intelligentsia paralleled the diversification of its structure. In contrast to the interwar period, when priests and teachers were the most important representatives of Slovene intelligentsia, doctors, lawyers, artists, journalists and university professors became their representatives in the 1960s and 1970s.

The new elite articulated claims which cast the existing power structures and organisational structures of the minority organisations into question. Today’s president of the ZSO Marjan Sturm states: “We [Slovene university students] were influenced by the ideas of the social movement in 1968, and returned to Carinthia with a more radical approach to

---


\(^7^0\) Suppan, *Volksgruppen*, 187 ff.
politics than the existing political elite".\textsuperscript{71} Similarly, students from the Secondary school for Slovenes in Klagenfurt were highly politicised. Organised in the “Koroška dijaška zveza” [Carinthian Student Association] these groups launched a campaign for the implementation of Art. 7, and completed the street signs in southern Carinthia with Slovene names in 1970.\textsuperscript{72}

Due to the influence of the Slovene youth movement, the internal structures of the Slovene organizations and their political strategy changed. The traditional organizations, the NSKS and the ZSO, distanced themselves from the big majority parties. The NSKS supported the candidacy of the Slovene Party “Koroška enotna lista” [Carinthian Unity List] (KEL) in the municipal and provincial elections.\textsuperscript{73} In 1975, the KEL attained two percent of all the votes in Carinthia and almost obtained a seat in the provincial parliament. Due to a change in the election rules in 1979 by the governing parties, the Slovene territory was divided into four electoral districts, and it became practically impossible for the KEL to get a seat in the provincial parliament.\textsuperscript{74} By contrast, as an expression of the new political consciousness the Slovene party achieved some success on the municipal level.\textsuperscript{75} Similarly, the ZSO stopped recommending that the Slovenes vote for the Socialists.\textsuperscript{76} As an expression of their rapprochement, the two organizations published the common memorandum to the Vienna Conference of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 1977.\textsuperscript{77}

International pressure by Yugoslavia on Austria increased again in the 1970s. The Yugoslav representative in the UN-Committee for Racial Discrimination accused Austria of discriminating against the Slovene and Croat minorities. Furthermore, the Yugoslav

\textsuperscript{71} Interview with Dr. Marjan Sturm.
\textsuperscript{72} Interview with Dr. Marjan Sturm and Dr. Rudolf Vouk.
\textsuperscript{73} Interview with Vladimir Smrtnik.
\textsuperscript{74} Karel Smolle, „Die Kärntner Slowenen und die österreichischen politischen Parteien,” in Kärntner Slovenen. 1900-2000, ed. Andreas Moritsch. (Klagenfurt: Hermagoras/Mohorjeva, 2000), 233.
\textsuperscript{75} Suppan, Volksgruppen, 208.
\textsuperscript{77} Gerhard Baumgartner, „Minderheiten als politische Kraft,” in...und raus bist du! Ethnische Minderheiten in der Politik, ed. Bauböck, Rainer; Gerhard Baumgartner; Bernhard Perchinig; Karin Pinter (Wien: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, 1988), 320.
government threatened the Austrian authorities to lodge a complaint to the responsible international organisations if Austria did not find a solution to the minority problem.\textsuperscript{78}

The international pressure combined with a more liberal political climate among the governing Austrian elites proved to be an opportunity structure for the Slovenes. The Austrian Socialist Party (SPÖ), which strove for liberalisation, governed the federal government and the Carinthian provincial parliament with an absolute majority since 1970.\textsuperscript{79} Due to these favourable circumstances, the campaigns by the Slovene youth fell on fertile ground, and bilingual topography in specific villages in Carinthia was finally enacted in 1972.\textsuperscript{80}

The enactment resulted in violent protests and the “Kärntner Heimatdienst”, a German-nationalist organization removed the newly set-up bilingual signs by force, an incident which is called the “Ortstafelsturm”.\textsuperscript{81} In the subsequent negotiations between the Slovene, German-nationalist organisations and political parties, the Socialist government gave in to demands of the German-nationalist associations, which questioned the extension of the Slovene area. The federal government organized a secret census on colloquial language use in 1976 for all Austrian provinces in order to determine the size of the bilingual area. The Slovene elite condemned this measure, fearing that many Slovenes would not indicate Slovene but German as their mother because of negative experiences with ethnic declarations in the past. In protest, the Slovene organisations called for a boycott of the secret census. Consequently, the census results could not be used for the determination of the area where bilingual topography was implemented.

Shortly after, the federal government passed the Ethnic Groups Act of 1976, which interpreted the Art. 7 State Treaty of Vienna in a restricted manner. The use of Slovene as

\textsuperscript{78} Fritz Robak, \emph{Kroaten im Burgenland. Eine Dokumentation.} (Wien, München, Zürich: Europaverlag, 1985), 68.
\textsuperscript{79} Steininger, Rolf; Michael Gehler. \emph{Österreich im 20. Jahrhundert. Vom Zweiten Weltkrieg bis zur Gegenwart.} (Wien: Böhlau, 1997), 310.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 83.
official language and bilingual topography was implemented only in villages with more than twenty-five percent Slovenes. The act established the Advisory Councils on Ethnic Groups for each ethnic group in Austria. In order to safeguard the interests of the Slovenes, laws pertaining to minorities should be negotiated between the governmental and minority representatives in the council. As an expression of discontent with the restrictive interpretation of Art. 7 by the Ethnic Groups Act, the Slovenes did not join the Advisory Council.

Instead, after the Ethnic Groups Act was passed, the Slovene student organizations organized several demonstrations in Carinthia and Vienna. In these demonstrations, they were supported by a politicised intellectual public, which was interested in minority issues.

In 1979, the Slovene organisations issued the so called “Operation calendar” in their negotiations with the Socialist government. This document encompassed all the demands whose implementation were a condition for cooperation in the Advisory Council. First, they demanded the integration of Slovene representatives in an economic development project for the Carinthian border region. Second, they asked for bilingualism in administration and industries in Southern Carinthia. They also demanded the employment of Slovene university professors at the newly established University of Klagenfurt and the creation of posts for Slovene speakers in the provincial archives, museum and library. Furthermore, they asked for Slovene pre-school education and a business-oriented secondary school in Slovene, as well as more publicly-funded Slovene radio and television.

In addition to these largely justified claims, the organisations presented some demands that exceeded the promised rights laid down in Art. 7. They demanded financial support for Slovene political organizations, bilingual education in all kindergartens, primary and

---

83 Karner, „Kärntner Minderheitenproblem,” 87.
84 Interview with Dr. Marjan Sturm and Dr. Rudolf Vouk.
secondary schools and bilingualism in the administration of state-owned industries in bilingual areas.\textsuperscript{86}

\section*{2.5 1980s – to mid-1990s: Demobilization}

After the Ortstafelsturm, the major Austrian political parties (the Austrian People’s Party, Social Democrats and Freedom Party) decided to pursue a common minority policy. In particular the formerly pro-minority Social Democrats no longer had any interest to act alone in regard to this issue after the initial political backlash. Moreover, the extra-parliamentary movement lost its force in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{87} Consequently, the bargaining power of Slovenes in the political arena diminished and a general trend towards demobilization of the minority became apparent.\textsuperscript{88} This is particularly well exemplified by the fact that they joined the Advisory Council in 1989 without having obtained any of the rights they had put forward as a condition for joining in 1979.

In the 1980s, the NSKS and the ZSO did not agree on a common political strategy how to gain more language rights. The NSKS supported the KEL and demanded a minority presentation in the provincial parliament. By contrast, the ZSO supported the existing opposition parties, in particular the minority friendly Green Alternative. In 1986, the Green Alternative was elected to the federal parliament. An alliance with the Green Alternative party was successful in the sense that a Slovene – Karel Smolle – obtained a seat in the federal

\textsuperscript{86} Letter of the two organizations of the Carinthian Slovenes to Chancellor Dr. Bruno Kreisky, Celovec/ Klagenfurt, 15.5.1979.
\textsuperscript{88} Marian Sturm, „Kärntner Slowenen zwischen Emanzipation und Folklore,“ in \textit{...und raus bist du! Ethnische Minderheiten in der Politik.} ed. Bauböck, Rainer; Gerhard Baumgartner; Bernhard Perchinig; Karin Pinter, 344-353. (Wien: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, 1988), 350.
parliament in 1986. However, the school conflict showed that he was obliged to represent the opinion of the Green Alternative and not of the Slovenes.  

In this decade, the school question dominated the political discussion between the Carinthian government and the Slovene organisations. In 1984, the Carinthian Freedom Party (FPÖ), together with the nationalist organisation “Kärntner Heimatdienst”, collected signatures for a petition for a referendum against bilingual education in primary schools. Despite unclear results of the referendum, the minority school system was then reformed in 1988. The NSKS and the ZSO had been against the reform and claimed that it would result in segregation. However, the school question could not mobilize masses of people as the issue of bilingual street signs had done in the 1970s, when several demonstrations had taken place in Klagenfurt and Vienna.

After the solution of the minority school question, the ethnic mobilization around language claims lost its momentum. In the course of the 1990s, the relationship between the Carinthian government and the Slovenes improved and an era of dialogue set in. Due to an initiative by provincial governor Christof Zernatto in 1995, a Slovene could hold a speech in Slovenian for the first time on the occasion of the official celebrations for the plebiscite of 1920.

---

89 Smolle, „Die Kärntner Slowenen,” 233.
90 Baumgartner, 6xÖsterreich, 28.
92 As a matter of fact, the reform proved to be extremely positive for the bilingual education in Austrian and more and more parents send their children to bilingual schooling. Gerold Glantschnig, „Das Minderheitenschulrecht,” in Geschichte der österreichischen Bundesländer seit 1945. Kärnten, ed. Helmut Rumpler and Ulfried Burz (Wien, Köln, Weimar: Böhlau, 1998), 536.
93 Karner, „Minderheitenproblem,” 88.
2.6 Mid-1990s – 2003: New Wave of Mobilization for Language Rights?

The period from the late 1990s to today is characterized by a new wave of mobilization by the Slovenes. In this the period the decisions of the federal constitutional court had been favourable towards the protection of minorities. Several decisions in the last decade had extended Slovene language rights. First, due to a decision of the constitutional court in 1989, bilingual education was extended to the entire territory of Carinthia. Second, the constitutional court extended the right to linguistic instruction in the mother tongue from the first to fourth grade. Third, it decided that municipalities with as little as 10.4 percent minority population should have a bilingual administration and jurisdiction.

The fourth decision was the consequence of an initiative by Dr. Rudolf Vouk, a representative of the NSKS, whom I conducted an interview with. He exceeded the speed limit when entering a village called St. Kanzian in Carinthia in 1994 and refused to pay the fine to the police, claiming that the monolingual German street sign was unconstitutional as it violated Art.7 Treaty of Vienna. In 1999, the incident culminated in an appeal to the constitutional court. The court supported Vouk and abrogated the Decree on Topography (1977), as well as the provisions of the Ethnic Groups Act (1976) pertaining to bilingual topography. According to their decision, a village with a population of 10.4 percent Slovene should have bilingual street signs. Due to the decision by the constitutional court on this issue in 2001 a group of Slovenes continued challenging the German street signs as Vouk did. So far, the constitutional court has already decided favourably in more than twenty cases, and seven decisions are still to come. The court proclaimed that the rationale of the decision was

---

94 Baumgartner, 6xÖsterreich, 33.
95 Polzer Srienz, “Austria an Overview,” 34.
97 Polzer Srienz, “Slovene Community,” 34.
98 Interview with Dr. Rudolf Vouk.
to “make the general public aware that in this area relatively many members of the minority live”.

Opposition to the decision by the constitutional court on bilingual topography was fierce. In 1999, the right wing populist Jörg Haider became the provincial governor when his party, the Austrian Freedom Party obtained 41.1 percent of the votes in the elections to the provincial parliament. Particularly his party and the German-nationalist organisations “Kärntner Heimatbund” and “Carinthian Defence Federation” opposed the court decision. Negotiations over the implementation of the decision by the constitutional court have dragged on until the present day. The bilingual street signs have yet to be implemented. In the negotiations, German-nationalist organisations, the governing political parties and the representatives of the Slovene organisations could not reach a compromise.

The open opposition to the implementation functioned as a mobilizing factor for the Slovene community. Several campaigns were initiated together with the support of the majority in the form of petitions, signature collections and cultural events. Supported by German-speaking intellectuals, well known Carinthian Slovene intellectuals, writers, artists, politicians and journalist have taken on the responsibility for bilingual street signs on private plots, an initiative called “pro Kärnten – za Koroške” or “Vidna Domovina – Sichtbare Heimat”.

Despite this new wave of mobilization, the developments since 2003 indicate that divisions within the minority emerge again. A third political organization, the “Community of Carinthian Slovenes” [Skupnost koroskih Slovencev in Slovenk] (SKS), emerged as a consequence to internal disagreement. Furthermore, as mentioned above the NSKS and the ZSO gave the campaign for bilingual street signs two different names. Moreover, the

100 Vouk, „Der Anlassfall,“ 98.
102 Interview with Dr. Marjan Sturm and with Dr. Rudolf Vouk.
103 Internet site for the initiative pro kärnten –za koroško [http://www.prokaernten.at/] 27.05.2007.
negotiations with the government about bilingual topography proved to be very difficult, because the NSKS has a more radical stance whereas the ZSO and the SKS take a more moderate stance.  

2.7 Conclusion

A dynamic model such as resource theory which focuses on the external and internal resources of the minority can account for fluctuations in minority mobilization for language rights in this case. In the period in question, the minority was able to utilize the existing institutional and discursive opportunity structures to mobilize around language claims. Changes in these opportunity structures, their openings and closures, can account for the fluctuations in minority mobilization. The three phases of mobilization correspond to three political opportunity structures that the minority used to achieve its goals. The first incentive for mobilization was the support by the Yugoslav government for the integration of minority rights into the State Treaty of Vienna. Second, the civil and human rights movement in the 1960s played an important role in the political emancipation of the Slovenes as it provided them with the necessary discursive opportunity structure to frame their demands. At the same time, the Socialist federal and provincial governments, constituted the institutional opportunity structure that made mobilization more likely to succeed. Third, the pro-minority position of the constitutional court in the 1990s was a new opportunity structure that was recognized by the minority. However, new internal divisions constitute an obstacle to fully use this opportunity.

In the sixty years under observation, the Slovene minority has undergone a tremendous modernization process and the size of its intelligentsia has significantly increased.

---

104 Interview with Dr. Marjan Sturm and Dr. Rudolf Vouk.
In the 1970s, the minority already had a broader intellectual basis than the majority population in Carinthia. Relative to its size, the minority had dense internal resources at its disposal since the 1970s. Despite ideological differences between the two minority organisations, the NSKS and the ZSO were able to cooperate in minority rights matters. Therefore the minority could fully use the opportunity structures of the 1950s, 1970s as well as of the 1990s for its purposes. However, in 2003 new internal divisions emerged which weakened their position significantly.
Chapter 3 - THE CROATS IN THE SECOND AUSTRIAN REPUBLIC, 1945-2003

This chapter follows the same logic as the previous one and consists of three parts: first, it outlines the history of ethnic relations in Burgenland in the interwar period which is crucial for understanding the minority-majority relations in the following years. Second, I analyse the mobilization for language rights in the period from 1945 to the present day. Finally, I summarize the results.

3.1 History of inter-ethnic relations

At the time of the break-up of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy, Burgenland formed part of the Hungarian realm. The Treaty of Trianon obliged Hungary to cede western Hungary to Austria, whereas the region around Sopron remained part of Hungary. In the interwar period, a deep division in the Croat minority emerged between the Social Democratic and conservative Christian Socialist camp. These two groups were particularly divided over the school question. The conservative Croats wanted to maintain the influence of the church on schools in order to maintain Croatian as the language of instruction and therefore the Christian Socialist Party prevented the introduction of the Austrian school law in Burgenland. By contrast, the Croats in the Social Democratic Party, who represented the workers, preferred German as the language of instruction in order for workers to obtain the level of German required in the German-speaking industry.

In the following years, the usage of Croatian was strictly associated with the conservative Christian Socialist party. Croatian organisations were successively integrated in the Christian Socialist party structures and later into the structures of the authoritarian

---

Austrian Corporate State. The Hrvatsko kulturno društvo [Croatian Cultural Association] (HKD), which had already been founded in the 19th century, was re-established in 1929. Even if it aimed at representing the entire Croat community, it could not bridge the political differences within the minority and was closely linked to the conservative Christian Socialist Party.

In order to dissociate itself from the conservative Croat nationalist organisation, the Croats in the Social Democratic party developed an extreme pro-German stance. They denied everything that was Croat because it was a symbol of the conservative order. Thus, in Social Democratic dominated villages, German-only schools were introduced, and the Croatian Social Democratic Newspaper “Naš Glas” was abolished. As a consequence to the political divisions within the Croat community they did not succeed in establishing an ethnic party. The Hrvatska Stranka [Croatian Party], which was founded in 1923 by Dr. Lovro Karall, failed.

In the interwar period, modernisation, migration, the influence of the German administration and the German-nationalist propaganda by the “Deutscher Schulverein Südmark” increased assimilation pressures in this region. After the Anschluss in 1938, the policies of the Third Reich towards the Croats excluded them from posts in the administration, only German street signs were allowed, only Germans could be elected for political positions and the Croat newspaper was banned.

Despite these repressive policies, membership in the Nazi Party (NSDAP) was high among Croats, who were particularly badly affected by the economic recession and unemployment in the 1930s since most of them were small farmers or industrial and seasonal

107 Bauböck, Baumgartner, Perchinig, Pinter. ..., und raus bist du!, 315.
108 Baumgartner, 6xÖsterreich, 60.
109 Suppan, Volksgruppen, 114.
110 Suppan, Volksgruppen, 104.
111 Suppan, Volksgruppen, 116.
workers.\textsuperscript{112} Therefore, a paradoxical situation emerged: when Berlin planned a forced resettlement of Croats in 1941, the Croat minority was protected by the Burgenland authorities. As a consequence to the strong support for the NSDAP among Croats, no resistance movement emerged within the minority.\textsuperscript{113}

\section*{3.2 1945 –1955: State Treaty Negotiations}

Soon after the war, Croatian organisations were re-established as they had existed before the period of the Third Reich. The period from 1945 to 1955 is characterised by an integration of the minority organisations into the existing party structures. The Croats did not challenge existing power structures, ethnic political claims remained a side issue.\textsuperscript{114} A symbol of the positive political integration of the Croat minority in Burgenland was that the first governor elected in 1946 was the Croat Dr. Lovro Karali.

During this period, the Croat community could not overcome its political divisions as reflected in their organisational structure. On one side, Croat majors or vice-majors in the Social Democratic party formed a group called “the Representatives of the Social Democratic Party in the Croatian and Hungarian-speaking Municipalities,”\textsuperscript{115} which claimed to represent the Croat minority. Their spokesman was Fritz Robak, who was a Socialist major, member of the Burgenland provincial parliament and Member of federal parliament. On the other side, the Hrvatsko kulturno društvo [Croatian Cultural Association] (HKD) was re-established in 1947 and aligned with the conservative “Austrian People’s Party” (ÖVP).\textsuperscript{116} In 1947, the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{112} Polzer Srienz, “Croat Community,” 41.
\bibitem{113} Baumgartner, 6xÖsterreich, 60.
\bibitem{114} Bauböck, Baumgartner, Perchinig, Pinter, ...und raus bist du!, 318.
\bibitem{115} In my work I will refer to the “Representatives of the Social Democratic Party in the Croatian and Hungarian-speaking Municipalities” as the “Robak Group” because of their spokesman Robak.
\end{thebibliography}
“Hrvatski Akademski Klub” [Croatian Academic Club] (HAK) was established in Vienna and supported the HKD in their more ethno-political stance.

On two occasions the conflict between the two elite groups became particularly apparent. The first dispute was caused by the request of the HKD to the Tito government to release Burgenland Croat war prisoners. The Robak group condemned this move by the HKD because it invited foreign intervention in domestic affairs.\textsuperscript{117} The Yugoslav demand of an exchange of population between the Croats in Burgenland and the Germans living in Southern Carinthia which followed shortly after, shed a very negative light on the HKD and its contacts to the Yugoslav government.\textsuperscript{118} On this occasion, both camps of the minority protested openly against the demands of Yugoslavia, because a forced resettlement was not in their interests.\textsuperscript{119} After 1949, Russia did not support Yugoslavia in these claims any longer, and Yugoslavia lowered its demands to the concession of extensive minority rights for the Croats and Slovenes in Austria.\textsuperscript{120} On the occasion of the visit of Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koča Popović to the Austrian government in 1953, the newspaper “Naš Tajednik” backed by the HKD asked for the support from the Yugoslav government for bilingual schooling and other language claims. The group around Robak held a parallel conference where it proclaimed that the majority of Croats were against any minority rights. Furthermore, they disputed that the HKD and the HAK represented the majority of the Croat population and presented them as a “group of extremists”.\textsuperscript{121}

As these two episodes showed, the HKD accepted Yugoslavia as their kin state, whereas the Robak group distanced itself from their former home-country and refused to see Burgenland Croats as the Croatian diaspora. However, the Croat minority benefited from the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{117} Fritz Robak, \textit{Kroaten im Burgenland. Eine Dokumentation.} (Wien, München, Zürich: Europaverlag, 1985), 35.
\textsuperscript{118} Suppan, \textit{Volksguppen}, 122.
\textsuperscript{119} Robak, \textit{Kroaten}, 36.
\textsuperscript{120} Baumgartner, \textit{6xÖsterreich}, 61.
\textsuperscript{121} Robak, \textit{Kroaten}, 44.
\end{flushright}
support by the Yugoslav government, which insisted on special minority rights for the Slovenes and Croats in the state treaty negotiations. Thus, the Croat and the Slovene minority were the most privileged Austrian minority, as extensive rights were laid down in Art. 7 State Treaty of Vienna.\(^\text{122}\)

### 3.3 1955 – late 1960s: Strong Assimilation Tendencies and further political division

Even in the period after 1955, the Croatian political elite could not bridge its political divisions. The trend to integrate themselves in the existing political structures that started after the war continued. The political participation of Croats was proportional to their size, in each legislative period Croats were represented in the provincial and the federal parliament on the lists of the major political parties.\(^\text{123}\) Members of the HKD were more and more tightly integrated into the party structure of the Austrian People’s Party and claimed to represent the Croat minority. This was opposed by members of the Socialist Robak Group, who claimed to be the real representatives of this constituency.

The most important division between these groups in this context were their differing opinions about the implementation of minority rights laid down in Art. 7 State Treaty of Vienna. Already in 1955, the HKD issued a memorandum to the Austrian government, the provincial government in Eisenstadt, and the signatory powers of the Vienna State Treaty. The Memorandum asked the government to implement the provisions of Art. 7 and proposed concrete measures.\(^\text{124}\)

\(^{122}\) Stourzh, *Staatsverträge*, 22ff.
\(^{123}\) Suppan, *Volksgruppen*, 130.
\(^{124}\) Bela Schreiner, *Das Schicksal der Burgenländischen Kroaten durch 450 Jahre. Sudbina Gradiščanskih Hrvatov kroz 450 ljet* (Mattersburg, Austria: Buch und Offsetdruck Bernd Wograndl, 1983), 143.
By contrast, the Robak group proclaimed on several occasions in the provincial and federal parliaments that Croats wanted to assimilate and did not ask for minority rights.\textsuperscript{125} Their spokesman Robak proclaimed that the Croats considered themselves to “belong to the Austrian-German cultural area”. Despite the non-fulfilment of the obligations for minority protection laid down in Art. 7 State Treaty of Vienna, the Croat remained – in Robak’s words – “the silent minority” in the 1960s and 1970s.\textsuperscript{126} Due to the fact that the Robak group had great influence in provincial politics, none of the provisions pertaining to minority rights were implemented in the period from 1955 until the end of the 1970s.

In the 1960s, the relations between the Croats and the Yugoslav government intensified. On the occasion of the first official visit by the Minister President Dr. Dragutin Haramija to Burgenland in October 1970, a delegation of Croats (representatives of the Robak group and the HKD) was invited. The representatives of the HKD asked Yugoslav politicians for help in their efforts to implement the provisions of Art. 7 State Treaty of Vienna. Two years later in 1972, the President of the Yugoslav Republic Džemal Bijedić visited Austria again to conclude an cooperation agreement in economic, cultural and scientific matters. In this moment, Yugoslavia was keen to maintain friendly relations with Austria, and Bijedić proclaimed that the Croat can not expect any help, because “there are no minority problems in Burgenland.”\textsuperscript{127}

Despite the fact that Croatian primary education had been reintroduced in 1945, the conditions for bilingual schools deteriorated due to the introduction of the new School Law of 1962. As a consequence of this law, bilingual schooling was severely restricted.\textsuperscript{128} Even if a comparison between the Croat and German communities shows that there were very few differences in the socio-economic structure of these two groups, Croats lacked a broad

\textsuperscript{125} Resolution des Präsidiums der Bürgermeister- und Vizebürgermeisterkonferenz der kroatischen und gemischtsprachigen Gemeinden (26.11.1955).
\textsuperscript{126} Baumgartner, \textit{6xÖsterreich}, 61.
\textsuperscript{127} Robak, \textit{Kroaten}, 59.
\textsuperscript{128} Schreiner, \textit{Schicksal der Burgenländischen Kroaten}, 137.
academic basis. As a consequence of the dissatisfying schooling situation, Croats showed a lower level of education than the rest of the Burgenland population. Their proportion of university graduates was 0.36 percent, as opposed to 1.76 percent for Hungarians in the region and 0.56 percent for Germans in Burgenland. Furthermore, Croats had a lower proportion of secondary school graduates.

3.4 Late 1960s –1980s: Intensification of Internal Divisions

As a consequence of the “Ortstafelsturm” in Carinthia in 1972, the Socialist federal chancellor Bruno Kreisky installed a contact committee for minorities in 1974. This was the first move by the government to negotiate with minority representatives over the implementation of Art. 7 of the State Treaty of Vienna since 1955. The HKD saw the establishment of the committee as an opportunity to demand full implementation of Art. 7. It emphasized the importance of reforms in the educational sector, and demanded regular subsidies for the minority associations. However, as a consequence of the developments in Carinthia, where German-nationalist did not accept the decisions of the Socialist provincial and federal governments, Kreisky decided to conduct a secret census in order to determine the size of each minority group.

The census exemplified the division within the Croat elite: The Socialist representatives of the Croats, the Robak Group, appealed in its leaflets to Croats to indicate that they were German. The organisation argued that this would indicate that Croats are satisfied with the situation as is and would not demand any additional rights such as bilingual

---

129 Suppan, Volksgruppen, 129.
130 Suppan, Volksgruppen, 132.
131 Kreisky, Bruno (1911-1990), Austrian politician for the Austrian Socialist Party (SPÖ) and Austrian Federal Chancellor from 1970 to1983.
street signs, bilingual inscriptions on public building or bilingual education.\textsuperscript{133} The representative of the Social Democratic organisation, Fritz Robak, who was also Member of Parliament proclaimed: “We want to be at the centre of our lives, we want to assimilate, as all assimilate, who enter a new nation”.\textsuperscript{134} As a representative of Croat workers, he was convinced that the proficiency of German was the most important condition for socio-economic progress of the Croats working in German-speaking industries. By contrast, fearing the influence of the Robak group on considerable parts of the Croat population and that the census might lead to a restriction of their rights, the HKD condemned it and recommended to boycott the census.\textsuperscript{135} The HKD immediately proclaimed that organisations such as the “Robak Group”, which openly proclaimed an assimilationist policy, should not be allowed to enter the Advisory Council.\textsuperscript{136} The conflicts between the Croat organisations continued until the end of the 1970s, when Robak retired. As a consequence of internal divisions, the Croat minority did not set up an Advisory Council in 1976.

An analysis conducted by the Austrian research institute IFES in 1975 indicated that only twenty-four percent of the Croats felt represented by the “Robak group” whereas forty-seven percent indicated that the HKD was their representation. Interestingly, most of the Croat university graduates in this survey indicated that the HKD was the representation of the Croat minority.\textsuperscript{137} The results of the survey show the growing support in the Croat community – in particular their intelligentsia – for the HKD.

\textsuperscript{133} Leaflet issued by the Representatives of the Social Democratic Party in the Croatian and Multilingual municipalities in: Schreiner, \textit{Schicksal der Burgenländischen Kroaten}, 143.
\textsuperscript{134} Speech by the member of parliament, Fritz Robak, In: Ibid., 211.
\textsuperscript{135} Statement by the HKD to the census. In \textit{Hrvatske Novine} (6.2.1976)
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 168.
3.5 1980s: Ethnic Renaissance

In the 1980s, a generational change took place and the “old elites” were replaced by a “new elite”. The newcomers took a much more radical stance and mobilized for the implementation of constitutionally guaranteed rights. In contrast to the “old elite”, the new one was predominantly urban and recruited its supporters from politicised intellectuals. They had been inculcated in the ideas of the civil and human rights movement and articulated claims that cast the existing power structures and organizational structures of the minority into question. They challenged the political strategies of the traditional organisations and changed them. After the retirement of Robak, the Social Democratic representatives of the Croats distanced themselves from the former pro-German stance. In 1983, they created the association “Croatian Cultural and Documentation Centre“ (HKDC).

In the late 1970s and 1980s, the HAK had an important influence on the political direction of the Croats. The students were the first to challenge the accommodationist policy of awaiting minority rights and started to claim them. In 1973 and 1983, the HAK organised the “Symposion Croaticon” at the University of Vienna. The aim of the event was to encourage academic interest in the situation of the Croats. In order to reach the youth, the HAK has organised each year the “Dan mladine” [Youth Day] since 1978. On this occasion bilingual street signs were set up by the HAK, which was fined by the police.

Out of the HAK, several new organizations emerged. Amongst these was the “Komitet za prava Gradišćanskih Hravtov” [Committee for the Rights of Burgenland Croats], which focused mainly on legal questions. The numerous legal confrontations between Croat...
individuals with the German-speaking administration showed that the 1980s were not marked by assimilation but by a new ethnic self-understanding. Backed by the “Committee for the Rights of Burgenland Croats”, Marijana Grandits, a Member of Parliament, launched a lawsuit that had far-reaching consequences for the status of the Croatian language in Burgenland. Grandits had been denied an official wedding ceremony in Croatian. She initiated a case and a decision by the federal constitutional court in 1987 repealed parts of the restrictive Austrian Ethnic Groups Act which had been passed in 1976. In six out of seven districts in Burgenland, Croatian got the status of an official language in public administration.\footnote{Baumgartner, 6xÖsterreich, 55.}

Another new initiative was KUGA – Kulturna Zadruga, which was established in 1982 and became within a few years the centre of a new ethnic consciousness among the younger generations. This initiative gave the impetus for the foundation of several Croatian pop- and rockbands, a publishing house and several exhibitions. An “action committee” pressed for the introduction of Croatian radio and organised a media campaign for Croatian radio in 1978. In a letter to the Austrian Public Broadcasting Company (ORF), several Croat organisations asked for Croatian radio, following the model that had already been introduced in Carinthia.\footnote{Schreiner, Schicksal der Burgenländischen Kroaten, 180.} Finally, in 1979, Croatian radio was introduced, limited to 42 minutes a day. In 1989, a weekly television for 20 minutes was granted on a state-funded regional TV station.\footnote{Baumgartner, 6xÖsterreich, 55.}

These new organisations also gave a new impetus to traditional Croat organisations.\footnote{Schreiner, Schicksal der Burgenländischen Kroaten, 194.} Already since the 1970s, the HKD demanded a reform of the bilingual school system in Burgenland.\footnote{Suppan, Volksgruppen, 132.} In 1983, the HKD and the Burgenland Hungarian Cultural Association demanded in a letter to the Minister of Education and Culture of the time, Fred Sinowatz, to
establish a secondary school for both ethnic groups. In their efforts, they were supported by the provincial governor, Theodor Kery. Finally in 1992, the so-called “ethnic groups secondary school” in Oberwart was opened for Croatian and Hungarian speakers. In other areas of the school system, such as kindergarten and teacher training academies, the conditions for bilingual education improved due to a new law on kindergarten (1989) and the Minority School Law (1994).

## 3.6 1990s – to 2007: Demobilisation and institutionalisation of claim-making

In 1993, the rapprochement of the socialist HKDC and the conservative HKD after the retirement of Robak was also reflected by the fact that the Croat associations joined the Advisory Council. However, as the chairman of the Advisory Council, Martin Ivancsics, explains negotiations in the Council showed that the divisions within the Croat elite persisted, even though they had become less accentuated. The most important organisations included in the Advisory Council were the HKD, the HKDC, the HAK and the initiative KUGA.

The first issue to be discussed in the Advisory Council was bilingual topography in the autochthonous area of the Croat minority. The federal chancellery reacted reluctantly, indicating that it feared political backlash similar to the one in Carinthia in 1972. Federal Chancellor Viktor Klima signed the decree for implementation only in 2000. On the level

---

149 Schreiner, Schicksal der Burgenländischen Kroaten, 200.
150 Baumgartner, 6xÖsterreich, 55.
152 Polzer Srienz, “Croat Community,” 42.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 The politician in the Austrian Social Democratic Party, Dr. Viktor Klima was Federal Chancellor of Austria from 1997 to 2000.
of the provincial government, all political parties agreed to bilingual street signs. In 2001, the setting up of bilingual street signs in 47 villages was celebrated as a public festival.\footnote{Zlatka Gieler, “Zweisprachige Topographie im Burgenland,” in Ortstafelkonflikt in Kärnten – Krise oder Chance?, ed. Martin Pandel, Mirjam Polzer-Srienz, Miroslav Polzer, Reginald Vospernik. (Wien: Braumüller, 2004), 79.}

It is important to note, however, that the reason it took almost ten years to set up the bilingual street signs was not only the stance of the majority, but also divergent opinions of the minority organisations within the Advisory Council. Due to the fact that bilingual street signs have a strong symbolic value, it was particularly difficult to forge a common stance on this issue.\footnote{Baumgartner, 6xÖsterreich, 76.} Even though political polarisation between the minority groups had been overcome, they still stood for different strategies with regards to minority rights.

As opposed to the era of Fritz Robak, the successors of the Robak Group, the HKDC, does not follow an assimilation-position, but an integrationist one. The aims of the HKDC is fostering and preserving the Croat language and culture. However, in contrast to other Croat organisations that have a clear Croatian focus, the goal of the HKDC is a multicultural Burgenland.\footnote{Interview with Martin Ivancsics.} The HKDC does not support the demands of some minority organisations for minority representation in the provincial and national parliament. According to them, an ethnocentric political engagement is neither necessary nor welcome, because the Croat minority is totally integrated in all levels of government and in all levels of the administration.\footnote{Baumgartner, 6xÖsterreich, 76.}

By contrast, the HKD wanted to strengthen the national self-esteem. According to their long-term president, Mag. Zlatka Gieler, the implementation of the minority rights laid down in the Austrian constitution is a prerequisite for safeguarding the survival of the Croats
in Burgenland. The Croatian Academic Club/HAK and KUGA were also pronounced opponents of assimilation tendencies, both from outside and inside the minority.

The demands of HKD, HAK and KUGA were that the provisions of the State Treaty of Vienna on the status of Croatian as an official language of administration in Burgenland should be implemented by the provisions of documents in Croatian and bilingual civil servants. Moreover, the fact that large parts of the minority have moved to Vienna in the last fifty years should be taken into account and bilingual state administration should also be provided in Vienna. In contrast to the HDKC, HAK, KUGA and HKD argue that all Croatian representatives in the government are not dependent on the votes of minority members and do not represent the minority but the respective social group. Therefore, these organizations support the idea to establish a minority representative in the provincial parliament.

3.7 Conclusion

In comparison to the Carinthian Slovene minority the Croat minority can be called the “silent minority”. Mobilization in their case never acquired the same level of attention, because it was not as intense as in the Carinthian Slovene case. As in the Carinthian case, mobilization and demobilization for language rights have alternated repeatedly. Therefore, any theory which tries to explain the dynamic process of minority mobilization by using static models fails to explain the Croat case.

By contrast, resource theory, which focuses on the external and internal resources of the minority, can account for fluctuations in minority mobilization. In order to determine the internal mobilization resources of a minority, it is necessary to focus on status and nature of their leadership and ask whether its elite had a common strategy towards the majority.

---

160 Interview with Mag. Zlatka Gieler.
161 Stabel, Burgenländischen Kroaten, 70.
government or whether it was divided in their political strategies. The results of the analysis show that Croat elites pursued opposing strategies with regard to minority rights. As long as Robak remained influential in the Social Democratic Party and claimed to represent the Croats, part of the Croat elite pursued an assimilationist strategy. Consequently, for a relatively long period of time, the Croat community was paralysed by an internal elite conflict and a lack of elite cohesion. Only after the retirement of Robak in the beginning of the 1980s, did the Croat elite unify its internal resources and demand concessions from the government.

Even though the HKD and other Croat organisations recognized the existing political opportunity structures, the minority could not utilize them. The reason for this lay primarily in the lack of elite cohesion and in the influence of the Socialist representatives of the Croats, the “Robak group”. Despite the low intensity of mobilization this analysis showed that changes in the political opportunity structures were recognized and reflected by the activities of the HKD. As in the Carinthian Slovene case, the HKD sought the support of the Yugoslav government during the time of the state treaty negotiations. Furthermore, confronted with a relatively liberal government, the HKD increased their activities during the 1970s and pressed more forcefully for minority rights. This period was especially marked by confrontations between the HKD and the Robak group.

After Robak’s retirement, the Croats experienced an ethnic renaissance and mobilized for the first time for language rights. This period of mobilization has to be seen in the context of the earlier mobilization of the Slovene minority. Due to the Slovene mobilization, the government had passed several laws to implement language rights. The Croats used this institutional opportunity structure to demand at least the same concessions as the Slovenes.

In the 1990s, their internal divisions still dominated the agenda and therefore they could not make full use of the institutional opportunity structure presented by the Advisory Council of Ethnic Groups. As opposed to the period of intense mobilization in the 1980s,
claim making took place in an institutionalised manner. Minority organisations did not force concessions from the government by decisions of the constitutional court or by provocative actions in public.
Chapter 4 – Analysis of Ethnic Mobilization in Carinthia and Burgenland

In the comparative analysis of the Burgenland Croat and Carinthian Slovene cases I adopt a model that utilizes a 2X2 matrix of joint comparative and longitudinal analysis. I use this methodology in a subsequent section to test the resource hypothesis in the selected cases against alternative theories of minority mobilization for their relative explanatory power.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Over Time</th>
<th>Between Groups</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Different</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>1 Static Similarities</td>
<td>Cultural Features</td>
<td>2 Static Differences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different</td>
<td>3 Changing Similarities</td>
<td>External Mobilizational Resources</td>
<td>4 Changing Differences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The vertical axis represents the comparison over time, indicating whether the intensity of minority mobilization for language claims has changed over time. On the horizontal axis the cross-case comparison is represented, indicating whether the minorities behave similarly.

---

162 Jenne, Ethnic Bargaining, 52.
or differently at any point in time. By representing this complex comparison in a schematic way, it is possible to discern different driving forces for minority mobilization.

In field “1”, the two groups behave the same, their behaviour does not change over time, even if their economic and political environment does change over time. If this is the case, the minority mobilization is neither a reaction to changing institutional and discursive opportunity structures, nor is it the outcome of changes in internal mobilization resources over time. In fact, this field represents the primordialist theory that minority mobilization is a function of static variables such as linguistic and cultural differences between the majority and the minority.

In field “2”, the two minorities behave differently and these differences are fixed. Again, this outcome would prove the resource hypothesis wrong. Equally, the primordialist explanation that cultural or linguistic differences – speaking a Slavic language in a predominantly German speaking state – are the reason for language conflicts would be disconfirmed. In fact this field represents the hypothesis that the history of majority-minority relations in Carinthia and Burgenland determines whether or not the minority will mobilize.

In field “3”, the two minorities mobilize simultaneously. This outcome would disconfirm any theories based on static differences between the minority and majority. Thus, cultural differences and the history of majority-minority relations cannot explain shifts in mobilization for language claims, nor why these minorities would act simultaneously. However, it would be possible to explain this outcome by a theory which argues that changes in common political opportunity structures cause identical shifts of minority mobilization in the two cases.

In field “4”, the two minorities mobilize independently of each other, in contrast to field “3”; the fluctuations of minority mobilization take place non-synchronously over time. Any static variables, as cultural differences of history of minority-majority relations, cannot
explain these fluctuations in mobilization. Furthermore, external resources, such as political opportunity structures cannot explain why the Croats and Slovenes would mobilize at different times. This outcome supports the hypothesis that their mobilization is a function of their internal mobilization resources.

4.1 1945 – 1955: State Treaty Negotiations

During the State Treaty Negotiations, support from the common kin state, the Yugoslav government, certainly constituted a political opportunity structure for the two minorities to achieve their political goals. This opportunity structure was not appropriated by both minorities. The Slovene minority mobilised first for the annexation by Yugoslavia and then for the inclusion of minority rights in the State Treaty of Vienna. Despite its ideological divisions, all representatives of the minority were eager to obtain protection from the Austrian government and perceived Yugoslavia as their kin state and supporter in these claims.

In the Croat case, the HKD tried to mobilise for the safeguarding of the minority rights as well. However, after the Yugoslav claims regarding a people’s exchange the Croat minority was totally alienated by their kin state and publicly distanced itself from the Yugoslav government. The Socialist Croats reacted even more strongly and proclaimed that they did not need any minority rights.

In this period, the fact that the Slovenes had a unified political leadership with regard to minority rights made appropriation of the external institutional opportunity structure possible. By contrast, as a consequence of the division in the internal elite structure of the Croats, the Yugoslav support was only welcomed by the conservatives but caused the Socialist group to adopt a pro-German, assimilationist stance. Therefore, it was not the lack of external political opportunity structure, but the divided Croat elite which made effective
mobilization for minority rights impossible. This difference in the internal mobilization resources explains the difference of mobilization between 1945 and 1955. In this context, it is important to note that the fact that the Slovenes had established an organized resistance movement against the Nazi regime was certainly an extremely important mobilizing factor that forged the Slovene into a politically active group.\footnote{Sturm, „Emanzipation und Folklore,“ 347.}

4.2 1955 – late 1960s: Period of Integration and Assimilation

The period between 1955 and 1960 was a period of political integration and assimilation for both minorities. The external political opportunity structure of the occupation period disappeared as the Yugoslav government lost its influence over Austrian decision-making. Furthermore, as the negotiations of the Slovenes with federal chancellor Raab showed, the Austrian government was not inclined to implement the provisions laid down in Art. 7.

In this period, the assimilationist pressures on minorities were strong, as a consequence of economic modernization and the lack of adequate schooling. Again, the fact that the Croat elites were divided on the issue of minority rights hindered any mobilization around this issue. By contrast, Slovenes could at least achieve the establishment of a Secondary School in Klagenfurt, even if the bilingual primary school was endangered. This very fact had implications for the increase in the size of the minority elite – whereas the Slovenes showed a very positive development in this field, the Croats were disadvantaged.

Against the expectations of theories that minorities mobilize in periods when they are most threatened, the Slovene minority mobilized very little against the campaigns of the German-nationalist organisations against bilingual primary schools in the late 1950s. The mobilizational resources are able to explain this phenomenon. Even if the Slovenes had
greater internal resources than the Croats, in the form of a strong elite cohesion on minority issues, they lacked a political opportunity structure to mobilize. Therefore their mobilization against the attacks on bilingual primary education remained rather modest. Resource theory can also explain why the Croats did not mobilize against assimilation. Since their elites were not unified in their claims, they lacked internal resources for mobilization. Therefore, even though they were very well integrated in the political system of Burgenland, they did not perceive this as a political opportunity structure empowering them to demand language rights.

4.3 Late 1960s – 1980: Minority Rights Movement vs. Cleavages within the Minority

The late 1960s and 1970s were a period of major societal changes – the civil rights and human rights movements in the US as well as the related 1968s movement in Europe opened up new opportunities for minority mobilization. The discourse on civil rights empowered a new generation of minority rights activists to mobilize around minority rights. This discursive opportunity structure was accompanied by an institutional opportunity structure, as the Kreisky government in Austria began to liberalise Austria and was inclined to implement the provisions laid down in Art. 7. The Slovenes utilized these opportunity structures. They were able to do this because the secondary school for Carinthian Slovenes constituted an important locus for mobilization. Another important mobilizing factor was the opposition to the extension of minority rights by the German-nationalist organizations. Despite the drop in governmental support after the first implementation of bilingual street signs, which resulted in the Ortstafelsturm, the Slovenes continued to mobilize. The reason for this was that support by the majority population continued. They still had the impression that they could exercise enough pressure on the federal government to change its decisions. The Croat minority also tried to utilize these opportunity structures. However, there were two factors that hampered
this process. First, they lacked an intelligentsia which had been politicised in a common, Croatian school. Second, a politically influential Croat group of Socialist politicians fought against the tendencies of the HKD to implement minority rights. Consequently, the Croat community lacked the unified political elite which would have been able to utilize the existing political opportunity structures.

4.4 1980s – 1990s: Demobilization vs. Ethnic Renaissance

In the 1980s and 1990s, the two minorities adopted divergent strategies. In the case of the Croats, this was the era of ethnic renaissance. After the retirement of Fritz Robak, the Croat politicians in the Socialist party changed their assimilationist stance. For the first time since 1945, the minority was unified in its efforts to achieve their constitutionally guaranteed language rights. Even though divisions remained, they were not as strong and there was no group in the minority that actively fought for assimilation. The fact that the Slovenes successfully pushed for various minority rights, further empowered the Croat minority, as they could always refer to the concessions the Slovene had already obtained.

In the case of Slovenes demobilization happened because the opportunity structure opened by the Socialist government in the 1970s had disappeared – the political parties tried to compromise on minority issues. Due to the difficulties in implementing bilingual street signs in Carinthia, the political parties were more reluctant to give further concessions to the Slovene compared to the Croats. Another important aspect is that the opposition from the majority government was no longer there – thus an important mobilizing factor disappeared. Consequently, the Slovene organizations began to pursue differing political strategies.
4.5 Mid-1990s – to 2003

In the period of the mid-1990s to 2003, minority-mobilization evolved in opposite directions. A new institutional opportunity structure opened with the general tendency of the constitutional court to make minority-friendly decisions. In the case of the Slovenes, this opportunity structure was recognized and used. Initially, the very fact that opposition by the provincial government was so fierce against the decision of the constitutional court functioned to unify the minority organisations. In the face of opposition by the majority government their internal differences seemed to be less important and various initiatives were launched. However, in 2003, new divisions within the Slovene minority emerged, and its position was weakened. Whether the mobilization will be successful or whether a new period of demobilization will set in, depends on the capability of the minority to overcome its internal divisions.

In the Croat case, a trend towards demobilization started when they joined the Advisory Council for Ethnic Groups. Since then, their relations with the federal government are institutionalised. Their extra-parliamentary support, never as strong as in the Slovene case, disappeared as well. Furthermore, internal divisions within the minority broke out again. According to the long-term president of the HKD, Mag. Zlatka Gieler, the Croat community “lacks” the unifying factor of majority opposition.164

---

164 Interview with Zlatka Gieler.
CONCLUSION

Resource theory, which focuses on the external and internal resources of the minority, can account for fluctuations in minority mobilization where the other theories fall short. Economic theories developed by Sniderman, Fishman and Laitin argue that material benefits for minority members explain why language claims are made in the first place. However, they do not explain why the minority periodically mobilized and demobilized for these claims. In the selected cases mobilization was most intense at a time when the minorities had already caught up in the modernization process.

The results of this analysis also proves primordialist theories wrong that claim minority mobilization is a function of variables such as linguistic and cultural differences between the majority and the minority. Cultural differences are qualities which tend to change slowly over time, they do not shift quickly enough to account for rapid fluctuations in minority mobilization over time. Primordial theories such as Rustow’s, Deutsch’s or Laponce’s theories can not account for sudden changes from mobilization to demobilization and vice versa.

Similarly, Schöpflin’s theory is refuted by the very fact that in the 1950s and 1960s, when assimilation pressures on the Croat and Slovene minorities was greatest, neither mobilized for language rights. For years the Croat minority had fewer minority rights than the Slovenes and was therefore more exposed to assimilationist pressures due to the lack of bilingual schools, administration and media. Despite this, minority mobilization was much weaker than in the Slovene case. Also, in the period from mid-1990s to the present, the

168 Schöpflin, Nations, 72.
Slovene minority again mobilized for language claims, even though the minority obtained greater minority protections in the course of the last fifty years and assimilation pressures are comparably weak.

The hypothesis that the history of majority-minority relations in Carinthia and Burgenland determines whether or not the minority mobilizes cannot account for the fact that the minorities do not consistently pursue the same strategy. In both cases, minorities alternated between demobilization and mobilization. Thus, this hypothesis cannot explain the changes in minority behaviour over time. However, this theory contains an interesting aspect. It is true that opposition by the majority against minority claims can constitute a mobilizing and unifying factor for the minority. Thus, the history of resistance against Southern Slavic troops in 1920 formed a rallying point around which an anti-Slovene movement in Carinthia mobilized. The existence of anti-Slovene organisations such as the “Kärntner Heimatbund”, the “Kärntner Abwehrkämpferbund” and the integration of their ideology in the politics of the Austrian Freedom Party, certainly unified the Carinthian Slovene organisation despite considerable ideological differences.

Identical shifts of minority mobilization in the Slovenes and the Croats cases can be explained by a theory that argues that external mobilization resources, such as discursive or institutional opportunity structures are drivers of mobilization. In the selected cases mobilization did not happen simultaneously. The opportunity structures that opened for the minorities were: the support by the Yugoslav government during the period of the state treaty negotiations (1945-55), the civil and human rights movement in the late 1960s – 1970s, and the pro-minority decisions of the constitutional court.

As outlined in my analysis, in all these periods, the Slovene minority was unified in their goal to achieve minority rights by an provincial government that pursued assimilationist policies. By contrast, the Croats were divided in those who perceived these opportunities and
those who worked for assimilation. Here, McAdam et al.’s qualification of the importance of opportunity structures comes into play. They assert that it is not enough that there is a political opportunity structure; it also has to be perceived as an opportunity. In the Croat case, the existing political opportunity structure was not utilized because of the deep cleavages among its elites and their organisations. Resource theory provides the most satisfactory account of minority claim making in the selected cases and explains the differences between them. External resources, such as political opportunity structures, cannot fully explain why the Croats and the Slovenes would mobilize at different times. This outcome supports the hypothesis that internal mobilization resources play an equally important role in minority mobilization. Only in those cases where there are political opportunity structures and internal mobilization resources to utilize them, mobilization happens.

The advantage of this approach is that in contrast to the economic or primordialist theories, resources theory constitutes a dynamic model to explain minority mobilization. Therefore it is possible to predict when mobilization happens and it can account for the shifts in mobilization over time. The reason why certain minorities are mobilized whereas others are not are strongly related to the existence of a discursive or institutional political opportunity structure and the internal resources – such as elite cohesion, mobilizing structures – the minority has. Since these factors are always subject to change, the capacity of a minority to mobilize and the intensity of mobilization changes. Minority mobilization is not a function of assimilationist policies in the first place, but a function of the existing internal and external mobilizational resources, which empower them to defend their interests. Therefore the paradoxical situation might arise that minorities mobilize for language rights even at times when they enjoy more rights than ever before.

169 McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, 43.
GLOSSARY

List of Acronyms

ZSO Zveza Slovenskih Organizacij [Central Association of Slovene Organizations]
NSKS Narodni Svet Koroških Slovencev [Council of the Carinthian Slovenes]
SKS Skupnost koroških Slovencev in Slovenk [Community of Carinthian Slovenes]
KEL Koroška enotna lista [Carthian Unity List]
HKD Hrvatsko kulturno društvo [Croatian Cultural Association]
HKDC Hrvatski Kulturni i Dokumentarni Centar [Croatian Cultural and Documentation Centre]
KUGA Kulturna Zadruga [Cultural Association]
HAK Hrvatski Akademski Klub [Croatian Academic Club]

List of Interview Partners

Dr. Marjan Sturm President of the Zveza Slovenskih Organizacij [Central Association of Slovene Organizations]
Mag. Vladimir Smrtnik President of the Koroška enotna lista [Carthian Unity List]
Dr. Rudolf Vouk Representative of the Narodni Svet Koroških Slovencev [Council of the Carinthian Slovenes]
Martin Ivancics Head of the Hrvatski Kulturni i Dokumentarni Centar [Croatian Cultural and Documentation Centre] and chairman of the Advisory Council for Croats
Mag. Zlatka Gieler President of the Hrvatsko kulturno društvo [Croatian Cultural Association] from 1988 to 2006

All interviews were conducted in April and May 2007.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Memorandum der Kärntner Slowenen an die britische Militärregierung (Memorandum of Carinthian Slovenes to the British military government), 27.6.1945 – Documents on the Carinthian Question, ed. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the FPRY (Beograd 1948) 81 ff.

Memorandum der Kärntner Slowenen an die Bundesregierung der Republik Österreich (Memorandum of the Carinthian Slovenes to the Federal Government of the Republic of Austria), 11.10. 1955.

Memorandum von 51 Priestern an die Außenministerkonferenz (Memorandum of 51 Slovene priests of Carinthia to the Council of Foreign Ministers), Celovec/Klagenfurt, 3.2.1947 – Documents on the Carinthian Question, 128-131.

Secondary Sources


Bauböck, Rainer; Gerhard Baumgartner; Bernhard Perchinig; Karin Pinter. ...und raus bist du! Ethnische Minderheiten in der Politik. Wien: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, 1988.


Illedits, Stefan. „Die Situation der kroatischen Volksgruppe im Burgenland zur Jahrtausendwende. Darstellung der sozioökonomischen Situation der burgenländischen Kroaten, sowie das Wirken politischer Akteure im Zusammenhang mit der ethnischen Minderheit.“ Masterthesis, University of Vienna, 2002.


Sturm, Marian. „Kärntner Slowenen zwischen Emanzipation und Folklore.“ In ...und raus bist du! Ethnische Minderheiten in der Politik. ed. Bauböck, Rainer; Gerhard Baumgartner; Bernhard Perchinig; Karin Pinter, 344-353. Wien: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, 1988.


