Understanding Transatlantic Relations:

Realist and Constructivist Approaches

By

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Identities are the basis of interests.

-Wendt, *Anarchy is what States Make of It*
Abstract

The end of the Cold War resulted in an uncertain world where relations between former allies, the United States and Europe, had to be redefined. Many scholars from different trends of the international relations theory have analyzed the patterns of relations between the two sides of the Atlantic. While realists, especially the neorealist school of international relations emphasize the nature of the world system, constructivists suggest that other independent variables, such as perceptions and constructed identities play major role in shaping transatlantic relations. In this thesis I derive specific hypotheses from the both perspectives and test them on three cases: major foreign policy changes under George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush administrations. I argue in the thesis that major foreign policy shifts with regards to transatlantic relations were determined most importantly by non-systemic changes in the world. This claim undermines realist arguments which are primarily focused on the nature of the world system, and calls for alternative explanations. I suggest that constructivism, particularly the Wendt’s framework, is more suitable in explaining transatlantic relations.
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Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the last decade of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century ended the bipolar world system and the United States became the only remaining superpower in the world. The new international system changed the nature of relations among big powers. As many scholars argue (for example, Peterson, 2006; Gordon and Shapiro, 2004) not only American-Russian relations were redefined, but also relations between major allies and partners – the United States and Europe – underwent important changes.

Despite forming the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990 and the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995, which formally established an equal partnership between the US and the EU, the two parties drifted apart as a result of a number of unilateral moves. These uncoordinated moves were reflected in such important issues as the break-down of Yugoslavia or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And naturally, the major disagreement on foreign policy, as experts point out, was the US unilateral involvement in Iraq in 2003 (Gordon and Shapiro, 2004). However, as theorists from different schools of international relations have stressed, important divergences in the interests of the US and the European states were obvious already after the end of the Cold War (Kagan 2004; Peterson 2006). The tensions were especially felt after developing what is considered to be the EU’s most important foreign policy project, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which appeared alarming for several American politicians. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressed the fear for the famous “three Ds,” associated with the new European policy: the US government was particularly
hoping that the ESDP would not “duplicate,” “decouple,” and “discriminate” against NATO and its member-states (Howorth, 2004: 222).

Representatives of various trends of political realism in international relations explain these divergences between the United States and Europe by the fact that the world system has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. For many scholars the world has become unipolar dominated by the hegemony of the US (see, for example, Kristol and Kagan, 1996). In the unipolar world, as realists expect, relatively less powerful states form alliances to counter the hegemony of the superpower. Thus, for example, the formation of the European Union Security and Defense Policy is seen as a response to unipolarity (Posen: 2006; Hyde-Price: 2006).

In present days, when there are so many international relations theories which deliver different and often radically opposite explanations, it is important to realize which theoretical framework is most suitable for accounting current complex security issues, such as transatlantic relations.

In my thesis I will explore whether the systemic changes in the world, i.e. shift from the bipolar to the unipolar world system, is the primary determinant of the nature of transatlantic relations. I will argue that the realist account on the transformation of relationships between the United States and the European Union in the post-Cold War era is not sufficient. Rather, the dynamics of the EU-US relations can be better explained by the constructivist approach in international relations, which explains divergences between the EU and the US by
emphasizing differences in perceptions, goals, and social identities of Americans and Europeans.

The realist school of international relations allows us to develop several falsifiable hypotheses which suggest patterns of expected behavior. I review these realist hypotheses in the theoretical section. In order to falsify the realist hypotheses, I will analyze the EU-US relations since the end of the Cold War and see how each of the theoretical frameworks employed can provide explanations. I will employ the following cases: 1) The end of the Cold War and George H.W. Bush’s foreign policy; 2) Bill Clinton and the integration process in Europe; 3) George W. Bush and the peak of transatlantic tensions.

Thus, it is important to analyze how the foreign polices of respective presidents were shaped and transformed during their service in office. My purpose is to explore how non-systemic changes affected their perceptions, beliefs, set of values and own “strategic ideas,” and whether these changes were reflected in the relations between the US and the EU (Dueck, 2004). For this reason I analyze the transatlantic relations by looking at each administration that came into power in the US and subsequent relations with the EU. I should demonstrate that fundamental adjustments in American foreign policy were not due to changes in the world structure and power distribution. In fact, as we shall see, policies were heavily guided by perceptions, values, and beliefs. This observation strongly distorts the realist assumptions on world politics.

We have had the three American presidents since the end of the Cold War, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. Their foreign policies, particularly towards Europe,
were not predetermined. In fact, as I shall show, even though the Clinton and especially the George W. Bush administration came in office with different perceptions from what they actually adopted while in office. These adjustments in policies occurred even though no major changes in the world system and power redistribution occurred.

Historically, American foreign policy was based on four options: isolationism or a strategy of disengagement, realism or a balance of power, multilateralism or liberal internationalism, and unilateralism or a strategy of primacy (Dueck: 2004). Apart from the isolationist policies, a short period of the post-Cold War era witnessed all other three alternatives.

As it is widely accepted, the Cold War period is considered as the heyday of realism. Kissinger’s realism in foreign policy and détente was succeeded by Brzezinski’s realism and just at the end of the Cold War the State Department was headed by another prominent realist, James Baker. The fall of the bipolar world system for American decision makers meant that now the US had the opportunity to reduce its presence worldwide and defend only what realists would consider as the “national interest.”

The end of the bipolar system and the soviet threat, however, meant for realists to narrow scopes of their world-wide engagement. This became apparent during the conflicts in Yugoslavia when the United States showed no interest in on-going horrors which were taking place in Slovenia and Bosnia. At this point, it became apparent for Europeans that autonomous military capabilities were necessary in order to prevent such incidents to reoccur in Europe.
In the bipolar world system, strong presence in Europe was the American national interest because they wanted to prevent the Soviets from expanding eastwards. Thus, even if Europeans were not sufficiently devoting their resources and funds to military means, the US still preferred to be actively engaged in European affairs and to have active military presence there (Kagan, 2004). This obvious interest in being actively engaged in Europe, however, had to be redefined as the Cold War ended in 1991.

To test realist hypotheses on transatlantic relations seems plausible since according to realist assumptions identities and interests objectively exist. Thus, what causes changes in foreign policy is not who is in power and what experience and perceptions the administrations relies on, but rather what is the nature of the international system and what the power relations are. On the contrary, as constructivist Alexander Wendt argues, states just as human beings have many identities (1992: 397). The US is not driven just by fixed interests; rather it acts according to what particular identity is emphasized. In the analysis of the cases of the transatlantic relations during different administrations it will be possible to infer whether realist hypotheses did hold and whether the constructivist approach can provide us with better insights.

If I demonstrate that the foreign policy transformations have occurred due to non-systemic changes in the world system, then it will be a proof that realist hypotheses are not plausible to explain the transatlantic relations. On the contrary, if structural changes are primary determinants of behavioral patterns of the US and the EU, and there is a continuity in transatlantic relations since the Cold War, then it will mean that the realist arguments provide us with rigid insights on transatlantic relations.
My research will follow the practice which is most widely used in the field, i.e. I will use discourse and document analysis as my main methodological tool. In particular, I will analyze such documents as the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, the European Security Strategy, and numerous EU-US agreements, which relate to and are important for the study of transatlantic relationships. In addition, I will critically review the secondary sources, in which the leading scholars of the field suggest their analysis of EU-US relations.

Concepts and Definitions

Before proceeding to the theoretical part and analysis of the thesis, I need to define several concepts and assumptions which I am using in my work. Conceptualization is necessary to avoid misunderstandings and limit the scope of the research. Thus in this section, I will define what I mean by concepts of foreign policy change and the EU.

As my thesis aims to explore whether systemic or non-systemic factors play the primary role in transatlantic relations, it is necessary to conceptualize what is a foreign policy change. The issue of foreign policy change deserved some attention only in 1980’s. Prior to that, scholars of foreign policy studies had emphasized “continuous patterns of foreign policy, as opposed to restructuring in foreign policy over time” (Rosati, Sampson III, and Hagan, 1994: 5). Since then, however, the literature has benefited from many contributors.
The authors who address these issues do not agree on one single definition of what should be regarded as foreign policy change. Volsty and Schwarz, for example, define it “… as major, comprehensive change in the foreign policy orientation of a country as manifested through behavioral change in the foreign policy of a country as manifested through behavioral changes in a nation’s interactions with each other in world politics” (in Rosati, Sampson III, and Hagan (eds), 1994: 22). Kal Holsti takes a different approach and distinguishes “normal policy change” and “restructuring” by emphasizing the importance of the latter. In Holsti’s view, foreign policy restructuring is “… the dramatic, wholesale alteration of a nation’s pattern of external relations” (1983: ix). Herman suggests another classification of foreign policy change: program changes, i.e. changes in means of foreign policy; changes in goals; and changes in overall international orientation (1990). In defining the sources of foreign policy change, Herman outlines four factors: 1) leader driven changes; 2) changes caused by a bureaucratic advocacy; 3) changes inspired by domestic restructuring; and 4) changes influenced by external shocks (1990).

Thus, as we see, most authors define sources of foreign policy changes as non-systemic factors. Such an approach is against realist arguments according to which the world system is the primary determinant of the behavioral patterns of foreign policy. My definition of what accounts for foreign policy change is along the lines suggested by Herman. In my thesis, I define foreign policy change when the declared policies of a given administration readjust in regards of the key issues of foreign policy. In regards of the EU and the US such key issues can be relations between each other and their approach towards third countries, for example, Iraq.
It should be noted, however, that changing of the administration of the chief executive does not necessarily imply the transformation of a country’s foreign policy. It can be argued that there is a path of continuity when power is transformed from one president to another. Thus, I will not concentrate on the government change, but on other non-systemic issues which formed the beliefs and identities of each administration and inspired the changes in foreign policy.

For my research it is important to conceptualize the EU as an actor in world politics. In theories of international relations or in international law only states can qualify as basic units of analysis. However, there are some failed states that are unable to influence world politics, while the supranational EU is able to perform foreign policy tasks and play an important role in world affairs. Even though the EU has failed to adopt a common constitution, integration and cooperation on security and foreign policy issues becomes more and more apparent. Not all the scholars in international relations and European studies treat the EU as a single actor, but it is still more and more common to see in scientific works that the EU is regarded as an important actor in world politics (White, 2004: 45-48; and Rosamond: 2005, 464-466).

It is also important to realize how the EU actorness is seen from the perspective of decision making bodies. For example, the European Commission states the following:

The Union must increase its influence in world affairs, promote values such as peace and security, democracy and human rights, provide aid for the least developed countries, defend its social model and establish its presence on the world markets (Commission in Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 27).
Despite such ambitious statements and determination to act as a global actor in world affairs, however, it does not necessarily imply that the EU is actually an actor with all its attributes. In fact, the debate on whether we can consider the EU as an actor or not is still taking place in the literature. The difficulty of conceptualizing the EU lies also in its unique nature. Some regard it as a post-Westphalian entity. My aim is not to build an original argument on why we should treat the EU as an actor. Rather, I just employ such an approach for two reasons: 1) it is the most common approach in the literature; and 2) the EU does deliver important policy outcomes not only in humanitarian, economic, and environmental fields, but also in security and foreign policy issues. Moreover, the role of the EU is steadily growing, which, in my opinion, justifies using the term to describe the common policies of the EU.
Chapter 1 – Theoretical Approaches to Transatlantic Relations

As it has been noted, the two theoretical frameworks which I will use for my analysis are 1) Constructivism, particularly Wendt’s version of Constructivism; and 2) Realism, particularly Waltz’s neorealism. Neorealism, which is derived from and shares the core concepts of the Classical Realism, is the dominant International Relations theory for the moment. As Ole Wæver has noted, overwhelming majority of scientific pieces in IR journals represent the realist school (1998: 25-26). Constructivism, on the other hand, was introduced to the IR discipline only in 1989 by Nicholas Onuf’s book World of Our making. Although constructivist approach is relatively new to IR studies, it has already produced important works in the field. However, its focus has been the topics which were neglected by other IR schools, such as collective identity formation and culture (Sterling-Folker, 2006: 118).

In this chapter I will review and summarize what the two theories offer with regards to the EU-US relations. In later chapters I will employ empirical cases and see how each theory is able to explain the dynamics and nature of the EU-US relations. Understanding the process which is taking place across the Atlantic Ocean in a theoretical framework is crucial, since it will not only help to explain the past, but also provide us with better tools for policy implication. For clarification, I use the term “Realism” to refer to the Realist school of International Relations in general, while “neorealism” refers specifically to Waltz’s approach in this thesis. Where appropriate, the two concepts are used interchangeably.
1.1. Realism and Transatlantic Relations

As already mentioned, realism has been the most influential IR theory since the Second World War (Grieco in Doyle and Ikenberry, 1997: 163). The center of the whole realist scholarship is power and power relations. Morgenthau (1948) and Carr (1946) were among the founding fathers of modern classical realism. Kenneth Waltz enriched realism by focusing on the international system and transforming it into a more coherent theoretical framework, able to provide more vigorous and comprehensive explanations. Following I will outline the key assumptions of realism, analyze Waltz’s contribution to the theory, and lastly, present Realist/Neorealistic arguments in regards of the EU-US relations.

Thus, there are few key assumptions which are shared by realists. States are perceived as main actors in world politics. They operate in an anarchical world system and try to maximize their utility, which is defined as the national interest. Since the world system is anarchical and there is no higher controlling entity, states’ top priority is their security and survival. In pursuing their interests, states act as rational unitary actors. However, “one actor’s quest for security through power accumulation cannot but exacerbate the feelings of insecurity of another actor, who in turn, will respond by accumulating power” (Guzzini, 1998: 35). Thus, like tragedy of commons, creating security for one actor produces overall insecurity. This security dilemma is unsolvable for realists, since there is no organization which would take care of anarchy and states should rely on self-help. In such conditions “none is entitled to command, none is required to obey” (Waltz, 1979: 88).
In the unipolar world system states are expected to adopt one of the three possible strategies: bandwagoning, buckpassing, and balancing. Adoption of the first two strategies will lead to the unchecked power of hegemon. Thus, balancing is the best option for potential great powers to adopt, since they feel insecure simply because hegemon is too strong and can abuse other states. It is in the interest of great powers, realists would argue, to get rid of unipolarity and restore the balance of powers.

Waltz’s work was so important and resulted in such a vast debate in international relations theory that Guzzini interestingly noted that “… if Waltz’s Theory of International Politics had not existed, the discipline would have had invented it” (1998: 126). What is different about neorealism with regards to realism is that Waltz attempted to establish a scientific legitimacy for the theory. Waltz did so by drawing analogy with microeconomic theory and focus on systemic level or “the third image” rather than analyzing from the state or individual levels, as previous realists, such as Morgenthau did. Waltz defines the structure according to three parameters: 1) organizing principle, i.e. anarchy or hierarchy. While anarchy is characteristic of international system, hierarchy can be found within a state, not across states; 2) differentiated functions. States have roughly same characteristics and are expected to act in the same way under certain conditions. For this reason, in international system, unlike within a state, there cannot be a case for “division of labor;” 3) distribution of capabilities across the system. Hence, we have unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar world systems (Waltz, 1979: 79-101). Such characteristics of the world system and states number one priority to survive results in security dilemma or, in other words, Hobbesian “state of nature” which basically is the state of war of all against all. Thus, states try to ensure their security and are concentrated on relative gains.
Drawing to this theory, whereas classic realists were hard or impossible to test, Waltz claimed that his approach allowed to derive falsifiable hypothesis which could be tested on empirical examples. Thus, the condition of anarchy on a system level and a desire for survival on actor level infers two sets of expectations on system and actor levels. As Guzzini summarizes these expectations, “on the level of collective outcomes [i.e. system] … states will behave in a way which will tend to establish balances of power between them … At the state level, however, the theory expects particular state actions: states will compete and be socialized into similar action patterns by emulation the most successful one” (1998: 131). To visualize the abovementioned assumptions and expected actions, I drew a 2X2 table which cab be useful to understand the basic idea:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System Level</th>
<th>Actor Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anarchy</td>
<td>Survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of power</td>
<td>Imitation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, this model gives opportunity to test a number of cases and observe whether expectations and more specific hypotheses hold true or not. Following I discuss the authors who applied Neorealist framework to transatlantic relations. In the end of this section, I explicitly summarize these hypotheses, which will be tested later in empirical chapters.
In regards of the transatlantic relations, realists emphasize the unipolar character of the world system. Realists see unipolarity as the most unstable and least durable among alternative international systems. Hegemony of the US constrains the freedom and autonomy of other potential great powers. In realist perspective, the great powers are likely to form a coalition and balance the hegemon. Thus, the aim of the EU is to enhance its strength and autonomy and counter the US. Samuel Huntington, for example, argues that the formation of the EU is a clear indicator of anti-hegemonic sentiments in Europe (1999: 45).

The major topic which is favored by realists is the development of EU’s common security and foreign policies. The standard realist, particularly the structural realist view on transatlantic relations is elaborated by Posen, who argues that the EU is seeking the balance of power, even though the U.S. does not pose any direct threat to it (Posen, 2006: 149-186). The establishment of the ESDP, in Posen’s view, has two main reasons: preparing for the possibility of conflict with former ally, and military autonomy of the EU. The author believes that the liberal perspective cannot explain why it is necessary to establish separate military forces for the EU, taking into account that there is no direct threat and NATO provides sufficient security. Posen admits however, that the UK’s support for the ESDP project is “striking” and he fails, like other neorealists, to explain the causes of the UK’s behavior (Posen, 2006: 184).

Hyde-Price’s neorealist critique of liberalism is consistent with Posen’s work (2006: 217-234). The author concentrates on the evolution of the Security and Defense Policy. He outlines the two concepts which, in his opinion, resulted in development of the ESDP. These
are the global unipolarity of the United States and the regional multipolarity in Europe (Hyde-Price, 2006: 228). However, the author admits that structural or neorealism is not able to provide a comprehensive explanation of the ESDP, since not only systemic analysis, but also domestic factors need to be taken into consideration.

Other authors, such as Franz Oswald, argue, that although it is hard to detect the policy of balancing on EU’s part compared to the that of China or Russia, soft balancing is still taking place (2006: 146; see also Smith, 2005 and Layne, 2003). In Oswald’s view, speedy economic integration along with recent pursuance of EU’s security role are indicators of soft balancing. Moreover, this strategy of balancing is not due to American unilateralism, but rather to EU’s desire to emerge as a global power. Such developments in world politics, as Oswald suggests, will lead to the transformation of the international system into multipolarity (2006: 145).

To summarize the realist/neorealist hypotheses, they suggest that shift to the unipolar world system made the EU willing to balance the US by developing its autonomous military capabilities. The unipolar world system, in realist perspective, requires from the US to defend only its national interests abroad and abstain from engagement in strategically less important areas.

Although suggesting several useful hypotheses outlined above, the problem with realism is that there is little empirical evidence which would support the claims on balancing the US. In fact, as famous realist Stephen Walt admits, America is not viewed as a threat by Europeans (2001/2002: 117-152). Quite the contrary, the United States and the EU are the most
important allies for each other. Let alone the ideological similarities and common values, economic interdependence of the two side of the Atlantic Ocean is enormous (Cameron, 2005: 164-165). Seth Jones summarizes the point by a correct, in my opinion, observation: “[w]hile the effect of a European security institution may be the creation of an international actor that is … a competitor of the United States, there is little evidence that the cause of it is a function of fear of the United States” (2003: 154).

1.2. Constructivism and Transatlantic Relations

As noted earlier, constructivism is a new theory to international relations and, consequently, has not yet developed comprehensive explanations on various important issues of world politics. Nevertheless, it has a potential to analyze issues from different perspectives and produce different insights, which would be unattainable by using only rationalist approaches.

It is difficult to define constructivism since the current scholarship has hard times to locate the boundaries of this approach (Zehfuss, 2002:2-6). There is no unified constructivist approach to international relations theory. Partly, this is because constructivism was only introduced to international relations theory in 1989 by Nocholas Onuf’s work, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. There are opposing understandings among constructivist scholars on epistemological and methodological matters. Onuf and Kratochwil, for example, favor a radical approach and argue that constructivism requires a different epistemology from those that are similar to models employed in natural
One the other hand, Wendt and Katzenstein suggest a relatively moderate approach or the so-called “soft constructivism,” and argue that positivist models are not only possible but even desirable (Wendt, 1999; also Houghton, 2007: 27).

There are some assumptions, however, which are generally shared by major constructivists. In this section I will outline these assumptions. It should be noted also that I will employ Wendt’s approach or what Zehfuss calls “limited constructivism,” the basic assumption of such an approach is that when “… constructivist analysis starts, some reality has already been made and is taken as given. Constructivist work stresses the significance of meaning but assumes the existence of an *a priori* reality” (2002:10). Such an approach excludes radical constructivism and places the theory in a middle-ground position between what is called rationalist and relativist theories.

David Houghton summarizes key assumptions of constructivist approaches in his article and I will follow his outline in this paper. The first assumption is the distinction between “brute” and “social” facts. While the former type of facts objectively exist, the latter ones are constructed by us. Money is the most popular example of “social” fact. We value money not because of its objective worth, but because the meaning we attach to it (Houghton, 2007: 28).

The second assumption derives from the previous one. Since we have a distinction between “brute” and “social” facts, it is logical that the “natural” world is quite different from the “social world.” The implication of this assumption is that we tend to judge subjectively and our understandings might change. Houghton gives an example of theories which can turn into
self-fulfilling prophecies, since every individual can be biased when explaining certain events. Houghton also emphasizes the importance of the agency-structure debate in constructivism. While radical constructivists put more emphasis on agency, the approach promoted by Alexander Wendt assigns roughly equal significance to both agency and structure. Wendt’s definition of constructivism is the following:

Constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that makes the following core claims: (1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (2) the key structures in the state system are intersubjective, rather than material; and (3) state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics (1994: 385).

Wendt’s constructivism emphasizes the importance of identity construction. The Waltzian explanation that an anarchical system determines the actions of states is not sufficient to explain why states happen to perceive other states as rivals or friends (1992; 1999). For example, when Russia and the United States stopped perceiving each other as enemies, their identities were reconstructed, which allowed them to change the patterns of behavior. For identities to change it is not necessary for the whole world system to transform. Identities and perceptions can be formed through events and past experiences. These experiences form what Dueck calls “strategic ideas” (2004: 522). He summarizes the importance of ideas: “… ideas have a role in the making of grand strategy because they help specify national interests amidst conditions of uncertainty” (Dueck, 2004: 523).

In my opinion, constructivism has superior explanatory power when the issue concerns processes of European integration. This strength of explaining the EU developments derives from the two underlying assumptions of constructivism, that knowledge and social reality are
socially constructed (Guzzini, 2000: 149). As Wendt argues, because identities and interests are constructed by intersubjective practice, we should not take the way international politics is conducted for granted (Wendt, 1992: 183). Constructivists see political actions “in terms of meaningful, rather than purely instrumental, action” (Kratochwil, 1993: 54). Thus, from the constructivist point of view, divergences between the EU-US and their respective policies are due to differences in goals and social identities of Americans and Europeans. Only these social identities give meanings to national, or supranational in EU’s case, interests. Thus, states are not only acting according to their physical capabilities, as realists would suggest, but also on the basis of normative understandings (Katzenstein, 1996). As Koslowski and Kratochwil put it, “fundamental change of the international system occurs when actors, through their practices, change the rules and norms constitutive of international interaction.” (1994: 216). The rules of the game of transatlantic relations are constantly changing and the power capabilities, in this sense, have only secondary importance.

What contributed to the development of the security dimension in the EU is the internationalization of a European identity. Step by step integration starting from the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community, and then enhanced by the establishment of the European Community and the European Union led to change in the interests, identity, and perceptions of Europeans. As Seth Jones puts it:

Competing “national interests” – German vs. French vs. Italian, for instance – was transformed into a regional European interests and identity. This process was largely constitutive; change occurred because European states internalized a new identity and set of interests (2003: 151).
Consequently, constructivists make the argument that intensified interaction has shifted the security perceptions on a regional level. European states stopped to perceive each other as threats. Instead, due to established common values and norms they started to view security of their neighbors as their own security (Wendt, 1999: 305).

Ole Wæver, another prominent international relations theorist, also emphasizes the importance of European integration process (1998). He somehow dismisses the importance of the US role and NATO and argues that the EU is the most important security player on the continent. In author’s view, the reason why the EU is not able to construct viable military forces derives from the way Europeans perceive threat, which is radically different from that of the US. Ole Wæver contends that … “European publics see the past – not Russian troops, Balkan nationalism, or Islamic fundamentalism – as the main threat to their well-being” (Wæver, 1998: 56). Thus, in author’s view, the way to overcome Europe’s challenges is through the process of active integration, and this process should not be compromised for the sake of enhancing or strengthening NATO or American influence in Europe (Wæver, 1998: 54-60). This account, in my opinion, is largely misleading from today’s perspective. All three threats mentioned by Wæver today deserve much more attention today than the problem of Europe’s troubled past: the Balkan problem proved to be much more serious for Europe than the author thought and the 1999 intervention in Yugoslavia was overwhelminly carried out by American and NATO forces, thus emphasizing the military weakness of the EU; Russian threat is especially alarming for the East European members of the EU, and the problem of energy security and Russia’s manipulative energy policies highly concern Europeans; and finally, the threat of Islamic fundamentalism has shattered the European continent after the terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, Madrid, and London. Moreover, the famous
“Cartoon Wars” inspired by Danish reporters and mass protest actions in France in 2006 showed that the problem of relations with Muslims is far from being insignificant in Europe.

In regards of the transatlantic relations, the key constructivist argument would be that American and European identities have developed in slightly different ways. As a result, Americans and Europeans have different perceptions of threat and risk, and consequently, sometimes choose different foreign policy options (Weidenfeld, 2006). A good illustration of such an argument is post-9/11 foreign policies of the US and the EU. While the US decided to act unilaterally and aggressively, the EU remained relatively more cautious.

Famous neoconservative writer, Robert Kagan also builds his argument on constructivism. In his seminal book, Of Paradise and Power, which is one of the most important and influential book in the field, Kagan contends that differences in beliefs of American and European societies cause different outcomes and policies for the two. Particularly, he assigns Martian, i.e. war-prone characteristics to the US, while the EU is more oriented on non-military solutions to problems, and therefore is a Venus type of actor in world politics (Kagan, 2004). Kagan’s interesting account on transatlantic division is very pessimistic and pictures a grave future for the possible cooperation. His account, however, is very simplified and neglects foreign policy shifts and different approaches of the post Cold War president administrations of the US. Moreover, Kagan pictures EU’s identity due to only its military power, neglecting other important variables for constructivists such as established practices, norms, values, and identity.
Thus, as it is clear, constructivists suggest employing more variables rather than just the nature of the international system in explaining transatlantic relations. The key concept for Wendt’s “soft” version of constructivism, as it was shown above, is identity formation. The importance of the nature of the system is not denied by constructivists. However, as Wendt famously noted, “anarchy is what states make of it.” This statement implies that the reality is socially constructed by agents and it is not unchangeable. Although it might be true that the international system is anarchic in nature, it is so because of perceptions of actors in world politics. If agents changed their perceptions, then the anarchical nature of the system could be overcome too. The hypothesis which I derive from the constructivist approach is that the transatlantic relations largely depended on the identity and perceptions of Europeans and Americans and, subsequently, their ruling elites. Some non-systemic changes in world politics, which would not be important for realists, changed the perceptions of the US and the EU and resulted in the transformation of the foreign policy agenda.
Chapter 2 – George H.W. Bush’s Foreign Policy and Europe

2.1. The Overview of the Key Facts

The period of presidency of Bush senior is the shortest one among all three post-Cold War presidents of the US. Despite the fact that George H.W. Bush was elected only for one term, he was the only US president who ruled the country under both bipolar and unipolar world systems. The Cold War legacy of the realist approach seems to have influenced the US foreign policy after the collapse of the Soviet Union. One clear indicator of such a realist approach is that the US defended its interests by force during the first Gulf War and ensured the safety of the oil resources. However, the US did not intervene in wars in Yugoslavia and allowed peaceful citizens to die and ethnic cleansing to happen.

When George H.W. Bush came into power in November 1988, his basic commitment was to maintain stability in the world and not to inspire or promote quick changes in the existing world system. As James McCormick notes, “... President Bush’s initial foreign policy impulse leaned toward maintaining continuity with the recent past, rather than seeking change” (1992: 214). For an experienced diplomat and a government official, George H.W. Bush, guiding principles were obvious: anti-communism and commitment to traditional allies, especially in Europe. Bush’s relations with Europe were especially fruitful before the end of the Cold War. He managed to ensure Europe’s support in a military campaign against Iraq in 1991. Traditionally problematic ally, France for example, contributed 10,000 ground troops
to this initiative (Friedman, *Discovery Times*). Moreover, Bush strongly supported unification of Germany and the integration process in Europe (Cameron, 2005). His initial policies and views towards the political future of Europe were basically presented in his 1989 May address in Mainz, West Germany: “A Europe Whole and Free: Remarks to the Citizens in Mainz.” There Bush emphasized the importance of “whole” and “free” Europe and put forward his proposals on future of the continent. It is interesting that he was concerned with possible military strength of Europe and urged to reduce arms in the “… most heavily armed continent in the world.” The effective means for arms control, in Bush’s view, was “unity and strength” (speech in Mainz, 1989).

The Bush Administration’s attitude towards a unified Europe is also reflected in the National Security Strategy of 1991. The importance of NATO and its role in preserving peace and security in Europe is emphasized in this security strategy. Even though the Soviet Union was already close to finally collapse and did not pose any direct military threat to the Western alliance, keeping and enhancing NATO was seen as “the indispensable foundation of transatlantic cooperation.” The policy of strengthening NATO was pursued by the US, even though it was acknowledged that traditional Soviet threats ceased to exist (NSS, II, 1991). While realists basically failed to explain why a security institution retained its role and even was enlarged later, constructivists were enable to deliver persuasive explanations in regards of NATO. As it is not my aim to discuss realist and constructivist arguments in regards of NATO here, I will put it aside (for constructivist account see Williams, 2007).
In addition to expressing strong support towards the integration process, the National Security Strategy also stresses the importance of security and military burden-sharing by Europeans. It is written in the security strategy that:

[The United States will work] … to encompass European desires for a distinct security identity within the Alliance and [the United States] will encourage greater European responsibility for Europe's defense. While European governments will naturally take the lead in developing their own institutions, these efforts will enjoy our full support as long as they strengthen the Alliance (NSS, II, 1992).

It is very interesting that together with promotion of forming and enhancing European identity, the National Security Strategy touches the issue of ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia. However, as it seems, the United States did not identify these conflicts as direct threats to its security and expected Europe to take the large share of responsibility of preserving peace in its peripheries. This reflects shift from the traditional post World War II commitment of the US with regards to Europe to ensure its security by all means, including military intervention.

Such a seemingly coherent approach, however, was quickly abandoned. The speedy dissolution of the Soviet Union left the US without a clearly defined role. If it was obvious during the Cold War that the main objective was to counter the Soviet threat, elimination of such a threat left the US without guiding principles and a coherent foreign policy doctrine. As President Bush has admitted himself, he did not expect the Soviet Union to collapse so quickly and the Cold War to end dramatically (Cameron, 2005: 14-17). Thus, the end of the bipolar world system shook the direction of American foreign policy. McCormick summarizes effect of changes in foreign policy:

The redistribution of power capabilities and the world system changed the role of Europe in the American foreign policy agenda, as realists would have expected. As the most influential members of the cabinet of the Bush administration consisted of realist thinkers, such as National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Chairman of the Join Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, and Secretaries of State James Baker and Lawrence Eagleburger, it is understandable that the American foreign policy was strongly dominated by realist considerations. American decision makers of the period were largely thinking in terms of balance of power.

Concerning Europe, as James Baker has famously noted, the US “did not have a dog in that fight,” this in policy terms meant that the US was abstaining from intervention and prevention of the Yugoslav Wars. Such a realist approach required the US to defend only its vital interests, such as the oil in the Persian Gulf. Europe had lost its strategic importance for which the US once was willing to sacrifice its own troops and resources. Since there was no Soviet expansion threatening the West, then subsequently there was no need to be engaged in all parts of the world and play the role of “world sheriff.” A weakened Russia did not require to be balanced anymore.

The undetermined role of the US and the incapability of the European states made the Europeans start thinking about developing their own autonomous and credible European forces. European cooperation after World War II made the European Community
economically strong and prosperous, but as the conflicts emerged in former Yugoslavia, it became apparent for the political elite that stronger political and security abilities were needed. As Donnelly and Haseler put it in a Federal Trust Report, Europe can no longer be “an economic giant” and “a political dwarf” (2006: 19).

This reconsideration of Europe’s new role and identity led to the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) signed in Maastricht, 7 February 1992. This treaty emphasized the need for enhanced cooperation not only in the economic field, but also on political and security issues. For this reason, the so called pillar structure was created which consisted of: 1) European Communities, dealing with mainly economic issues; 2) Common Foreign and Security Policy, dealing with foreign policy and security issues; and 3) Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters, dealing with mainly legal and law-making issues.

2.2. Realist Explanations

As it is clear, the transatlantic relations of the beginning of the post-Cold War era can be well explained by realist arguments. Although there is not enough evidence to argue that Europe started to develop its autonomy in order to counter the hegemony of the US, at least one hypothesis holds true: actors of world politics do not engage everywhere in the world, they only defend their national interests. Thus, realists would predict American involvement in liberation of Kuwait and reluctance towards wars in former Yugoslavia. Also, although there was a dramatic foreign policy change in the Bush administration, it was fully expected and
explained by realists. Realists do not deny the possibility of a policy change, especially if it is
caused by changing the world system and changing the power distribution.

Moreover, the acceleration of the integration process in Europe, starting from the Maastricht
Treaty of 1992, is also explained by the realists by arguing that Europe sought for a greater
autonomy, which later would develop in a clearly balancing strategy. These predictions,
however, turned to be wrong or lacked enough empirical proof, as later years and
developments have shown.

2.3. Constructivist Explanations

Constructivists also have their explanations for this period of time. The key foreign policy
decision makers in the George H.W. Bush administration were heavily influenced by their
experience of the Cold War. Their identities were not fully adapted to the post-Cold War
reality. Since the collapse of the bipolar system in such a short time was not expected, the US
could not quickly adjust to new realities, redefine its identity and find an adequate role in the
world. This, in turn, caused the absence of the “vision thing” after the collapse of the Soviet
Union. It was not clear, in Wendt’s terms, what was the primary identity of the US: was it
“the leader of the free world,” “the imperial power,” “the first among the equals,” or anything
else?

On the other hand, Europe had approximately 45 years experience of cooperation and the
factor of force was highly neglected on this continent. Its security culture, derived from the
experience of World War Two, views war as a highly negative means of policy, the result of which was the suffrage of all sides (Coker in Ilgen, 2006: 59-72). This historically derived identity was apparent during the crises in former Yugoslavia, where Europe failed to ensure peace without American support. However, the Maastricht Treaty can be seen as an attempt to adjust to new security environment and correspondingly change the identity by acknowledging the need for military power.
Chapter 3 – Bill Clinton and the Process of Integration in Europe

3.1. The Overview of the Key Facts

When coming into power, Clinton inherited the legacy of no coherent foreign policy approach of the Bush administration. Although George H.W. Bush was a good “problem-solver” politician, he was not able to produce guiding principles for the US in the new world order, and lacked what he termed the “vision thing” (Cameron, 2005; Hyland, 1999). When coming into power, former state governor of Arkansas, Clinton was an inexperienced politician in foreign policy issues. However, he had solid experience and knowledge in domestic politics and his 1992 election campaign was built on the argument that domestic economics matters more than foreign policy. The proposed huge cuts in defense budget during his electoral campaign indicate Clinton’s modest foreign policy ambitions. By the year of 1997 he was planning to decrease the defense budget by about one-third of the 1992 level (Hyland, 1999: 16).

Unlike Bush’s policy to appoint former top foreign policy decision makers as the cabinet members, Clinton’s team consisted mostly of “the second echelon” figures of the Carter Administration: former deputy secretary of state, Warren Christopher was appointed as a secretary of state; former chief of policy planning in the State Department, Anthony Lake was appointed as a national security advisor. Other key foreign policy decision makers of the
Clinton administration, such as the ambassador to the United Nation, Madeleine Albright and secretary of defense, William Perry also served as second-ranking officials under the carter administration. This foreign policy team had a somehow dovish reputation in a society and Clinton himself too was not in favor of using force unless the threats were too serious. Undersecretary of state, Peter Tarnoff, went even further and declared that “[w]e simply don’t have the leverage, we don’t have the influence, we don’t have the inclination to use military” (see Hyland, 1999: 25). Not only the administration pursued such a hesitant and reluctant policy, but it was also widely supported by the public who was against military engagement in the world, where primary interests of the nation were not directly threatened.

Readjustments in the declared foreign policy did not occur even when Yugoslavia fell apart in the beginning of 1990s, although the US has declared that new separated states would not be recognized. Active foreign policy was not adopted even when the European allies, France, Britain, and Russia acted against the will of the US and rejected its plans to resolve conflicts in former Yugoslavia (Hyland, 1999). Moreover, the US was criticized for not deploying its troops on the fields. None of these problems provokes the Clinton administration to shift to more active engagement in world affairs. Major policy readjustment, however, did occur without major systemic changes in the world. The turning point came in 1995, when massive killings occurred in Srebrenica, Bosnia. As Hyland describes it, “Srebrenica was the catalyst of a 180 degree turn in President Clinton’s attitude and policies” (1999: 39). Clinton realized that reluctance and hesitance cost failed foreign policy. The killings in Srebrenica not only caused changes in the perceptions of the Clinton administration, but it also changed views of regular citizens of the US. As Hyland notes, “public opinion was outraged” in the US (1999: 39). Such developments persuaded Clinton to pursue more active politics and send troops to
intervene in Bosnia. The result of active engagement and seizing the leadership role was NATO bombings in Serbia and eventual cease-fire in 1999.

The shift of foreign policy towards more active involvement in world affairs is also reflected in the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement of 1996 year. As the title suggests itself, the Clinton administration reconsidered initial reluctant approaches and sought for greater engagement in world politics. This document devotes much more space to the security issues in Europe than the previous security strategy of the Bush administration. The developments in the Balkans receive substantial attention and it is implicitly acknowledged that passive approach has resulted in a dramatic failure in the foreign policy.

The US saw NATO as a security guarantor in Europe, and therefore supported its strengthening. In order to avoid the mistakes made during the Bosnian crisis, the US sought for more multilateral and coordinated approach and favored granting the NATO membership to former Warsaw Block states. Enlargement was portrayed as one of the interest of the US:

> Enlarging the Alliance will promote our interests by reducing the risk of instability or conflict in Europe’s eastern half -- the region where two world wars and the Cold War began. It will help assure that no part of Europe will revert to a zone of great power competition or a sphere of influence. It will build confidence and give new democracies a powerful incentive to consolidate their reforms. And each potential member will be judged according to the strength of its democratic institutions and its capacity to contribute to the goals of the Alliance (NSS 1996: III).
In addition, enlargement of NATO was an effective tool to spread American influence in the Easter Europe, where countries still perceived Russia as a threat to their security. As the members of the EU were not yet ready to “... dilute their own political and economic institutions by expanding to the east,” the only viable option to help states of Eastern Europe to remain “outside the Russian” orbit could be only achieved through NATO. In the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, the US also highly supported the integration process with Europe and urged for more intense economic cooperation.

The second National Security Strategy of the Clinton administration which was adopted in 1998 goes much in line with the previous security strategy, emphasizing the role of NATO in European security and supporting the integration process in the EU. Moreover, the security strategy not only overviews the situation in Balkans, but also devotes separate sections to other regions as the Baltic States, Newly Independent States (NIS), and Northern Ireland. Such attention to regional European affairs is a good indicator of the US desire to be enhance its foreign involvement.

Thus, from the reluctant foreign policy Clinton embraced what is characterized as the strategy of liberal internationalism. Liberal internationalists, as Dueck argues, favor active engagement of the US in world affairs (2004: 216). They portray “a strong set of multilateral institutions” rather than military might as their foreign policy tool. The primary focus of Clinton’s administration was not the issue of strategic balancing, but enhancement of American economic strength. In addition, promotion of democracy and human rights also topped the American foreign policy agenda (Dueck, 2004: 216).
In promotion of multilateralism, liberal values, and democracy, the Clinton administration saw the EU as a perfect partner to cooperate with. Clinton was in favor of deepening the EU-US relations, which led to formation of the New Transatlantic Agenda and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership in 1995 (Everts, 2001: 7). It is clearly stated and recognized in the separate chapter of the New Transatlantic Agenda that there is need for “building bridges across the Atlantic” (NTA, IV). However, it is important to note that the whole document is emphasizing the importance of economic and business ties rather than security and defense issues. There is a very little space devoted to global challenges. The section “Responding to Global Challenges” is substantially smaller than the other three sections.

Clinton’s multilateral approach was also highly appreciated by his European partners. For example, Chris Patten, the EU Commissioner for External Relations, said at the EU-US summit in December of 2000: “Europe will miss Bill Clinton. He has been a good friend to this continent. From Kosovo to Belfast, millions of people have cause to be thankful for the contribution he has made” (James, 2000). Steven Everts goes even further and states that “politically, ideologically and even culturally, Clinton and his advisors were natural allies of the political elites in Europe” (2001: 3).

Despite Clinton’s close relations towards European states, the war in Kosovo which started in 1996 once again emphasized the need for effective military forces in the EU. Not only Europeans were dependent on the will of the American president to intervene in conflicts, but even in case of American intervention they had to follow rules set by the United States. The United States contribution to military operations was immense and the European allies were literally forced to accept American conditions. Even though European views on means how to
conduct operations were often substantially different, they could not pursue their autonomous policies (Kagan, 2004).

Such conditions led France and the United Kingdom to reach the consensus with regards to Europe’s security, even though these militarily most significant members of the EU had completely opposing views. While the “Atlanticist” United Kingdom was in favor of creation of strong European military forces under the NATO framework, the “Gaullist” France envisioned Europe’s future security more autonomous from the United States. As, Howorth puts it, “Britain had to cross European Rubicon” (2004: 220). This radical foreign policy shift in Tony Blair’s foreign policy was possible due to factors: 1) desire of the US to strengthen NATO through enhancing common European military capabilities; 2) developments in Balkans. Unlike the British, the French always favored redrawing balance within the transatlantic alliance. Despite such fundamental differences in ideas on European security structure, the two leaders of the countries, Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac agreed to discuss the security issues of Europe at St. Malo. This bilateral agreement laid the ground to what later became the European Security and Defense policy. The agreement contained a formulation which satisfied both sides. As Howorth summarizes, “‘European Autonomy’ would underpin the ‘vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance’. The first element satisfied the French; the second satisfied the British” (2004: 222).

Clinton supported the integration process in Europe and saw it as a possibility of burden sharing by the EU. Increased military capabilities, in Clinton’s view, would allow the United States to withdraw some attention from Europe and, at the same time, increase NATO’s strength. Thus, despite some worries expressed, the United States did support the ESDP on
condition that it would mean strengthening NATO. However, St. Malo agreement came as a surprise to foreign policy decision makers in the US. Howorth notes: “When Madeleine Albright and the Washington defense community woke up on the morning of 5 September [the next day of St. Malo conference], they were shocked by the St. Malo text” (2004: 222)

However, divergent views on these issues within the key members of the EU substantially hindered the process of further development of the project. Despite reaching initial consensus, the UK and France were not able to develop a more or less coherent policy towards the United States.

3.2. Realist Explanations

From the realist perspective, the limited international engagement from the American side is understandable and explainable. Having no direct rival in the world, the US could afford to focus on its domestic politics and use force only where the vital national interests are at stake. Unlike George H.W. Bush, Clinton had a clear “vision thing,” which was focused on domestic politics. The unmatched military strength of the US gave opportunity to the country to decrease the military expenditures and concentrate on economic growth, which in turn would strengthen the US in the long run. The change of such an attitude towards foreign policy should have been only due to systemic changes in the world system, such as a major redistribution of power. However, the prospects of the emergence of a new rival at the world stage or the dramatic decline of the US seemed unrealistic at least in the short and medium run. What caused the changes in US foreign policy, was an event in Srebrenica, which deeply
affected perceptions on what should be the role of the global power. This, non-systemic event inspired more active engagement from the US, but it was due to moral, rather than purely material reasons.

Initiation and development of the ESDP to a certain degree is seen as an apparent case of balancing on the EU’s side. For realists, even though this project might not seem credible for the moment, it can develop into a serious military asset for the EU and balance the military dominance of the United States. However, the most important motive for the EU to initiate the ESDP was the ongoing crises in the Balkans and the need for constructing militarily stronger Europe, which would be able to prevent wars on its territory. Because of different perceptions between the key member states on what should be the threats and what should be the future of Europe. But as it turned out, the EU was not yet ready to transform from a civilian actor into a powerful military actor.

In sum, as we see, the realist account was not sufficient to understand foreign policy changes in the US foreign policy, though it delivered good explanations on Clinton’s initial policies towards Europe. The formation of the ESDP is more difficult to analyze, since only few years have passed from its creation and its exact role is not yet clear. However, it should be noted that neorealist claims that states would imitate and seek to restore balance of power seems to be irrelevant in this case. The ESDP did not cause the EU to develop American like defense and security capabilities, neither there were any signs indicating that the EU would emerge as a balancing power for the US.
3.3. Constructivist Explanations

Unlike realists and their primary focus on power, the constructivist focus on identity, values, and perceptions seems to be more useful while assessing the foreign policy development of the discussed period. It was killings in Srebrenica that changed Americans’ view on their role in the world and inspired for active engagement in world affairs, not an emergence of new global powers or other systemic changes. The developments in former Yugoslavia caused the US to emphasize its identity as a moral power, which has to prevent human rights abuses in the world.

Also, the constructivist argument suggests that the European security was restructured due to realizing its new role in world politics. While in Cold War years, facing the common enemy, Europeans felt comfortable being under American protection, the post-Cold War reality made them realize that more autonomy was needed. The accelerated integration process resulted in an attempt to develop military capabilities, which could be employed not only in Europe, but in other parts of the world. Operations in Congo demonstrate the possibility of power projection capabilities of the EU. However, the EU is in still formation of its identity and it is not clear whether it will establish itself as a strong security player in world politics or remain as a largely normative power.

The importance of relations with Europe for the US and the emphasis on multilateral relations is also reflected in security strategies adopted by the Clinton administration. Unlike security strategies of previous or later administrations, Clinton’s security strategies devoted large
sections on these matters. It is interesting, that all of these strategies were adopted after the major shift in US foreign policy occurred in 1995, which I have discussed above. Thus, it can be argued here, that these emphases on multilateralism and active involvement in world politics were at least partly due to mass killings in Srebrenica and other developments in the former Yugoslavia, the periphery of the EU.
Chapter 4 – George W. Bush’s Foreign Policy and the Peak of Transatlantic Tensions

4.1. The Overview of the Key Facts

Like Clinton, George W. Bush was also a former state governor and had more experience in domestic politics than in world affairs. His lack of knowledge of world politics was several times criticized in the media. The most well-known story is the interview with the WHDH-TV journalist, Andy Hiller, when he was unable to name three out of four leaders in four hot spots in the world, Chechnya, Pakistan, and India (BBC, 1999). However, to compensate his low level of acquaintance with world affairs, Bush appointed solid and highly experienced foreign policy team of former top decision makers and experts. Secretary of state, Colin Powell for example, served as a National Security Advisor and as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during Reagan and George H.W. Bush administration; his successor, Condoleezza Rice was a prominent professor of international relations at Stanford University; Vice President Robert Cheney and Secretaries of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates were also highly experienced top-ranking government officials under different administrations. Unlike Clinton’s overall dovish foreign policy team, however, Bush’s cabinet mainly consisted of hard line realist politicians and theoreticians.

Unlike Clinton, Bush was far less favored in Europe. In addressing differences between the US and the EU, Steven Everts notes that “[t]ransition from bill Clinton to George W. Bush is
likely to accentuate … differences. Politically, ideologically and even culturally, Clinton and his advisors were natural allies of the political elites in Europe” (2001: 3). Bush’s way of doing politics and treating allies were substantially different from that of the Clinton administration.

When coming into office, it did not come as a surprise that the Bush administration actually adopted a realist approach in foreign policy. The United States did not push for human rights and democracy in China or Russia and did not favor multilateral approach. During his electoral campaign, Bush criticized Clinton for seeking higher cooperation with these countries and accused him for the policy of “Appeasement,” instead Bush promised to be tougher when it comes to strategic interests of the US and urged to call China a “strategic competitor” rather than “strategic partner” (Daalder and Lindsay, 2005).

Bush’s initial policy was focused on defending only its core, narrowly defined national interests and concentrating on domestic polices. Before coming into power, Bush often criticized Clinton on these grounds accusing him in deployment of troops in places which do not fell under American national interest, such as Somalia and Haiti. Instead, he suggested that the US “… should not send … [its] troops to stop ethnic cleansing and genocide in national outside our strategic interest” (Pham, 2006).

Bush administration’s determination not to rely on multilateral institutions were clearly indicated by refusal to ratify the Kyoto protocols and not supporting the establishment of the International Criminal Court for war criminals. Thus, in the Bush administration refused to seize active leadership role in the world and preferred to pursue more pragmatic, realist

The terrorist attacks of September 11, however, did change perceptions and policies of the American nation and its decision makers. It shattered not only the US, but also the whole world. Bush declared at the press conference with Prime Minister Tony Blair that “[a]fter September the 11th the doctrine of containment just does not hold any water, as far as I’m concerned” (Whitehouse, 2003). 9/11 attacks inspired the radical shift in Bush’s perceptions and foreign policy goals.

The terrorist attack provided an opportunity to neoconservatives to push forward their approaches towards foreign policy of the US. As Rauch notes:

[u]nless you live at the bottom of a well, you’ve probably noticed that 9/11 and Iraq have had a transforming effect on the American right. The shot formulation is that so-called neoconservatism has triumphed (2003: 1607).

Prominent neoconservative also do not deny that post 9/11 foreign policy of the Bush administration was changed and adopted more internationalist approach, which characterizes the neocons. “Bush transformed himself from a realist following in his father’s footsteps to an internationalist touting America’s ideals” (Kaplan and Kristol, 2003: 72).

The foreign policy agenda of the “neocons,” which is nicely articulated and summarized in the 1996 article of Kristol and Kagan, envisions the United States as an active promoter of its values worldwide. The “neocons” are less tolerant towards what they perceive as threats and
suggest “democratizing” the “rogue states.” The idea of forceful democratization is good for the United States for one crucial reason, that the newly democratized society will be inward-looking whether it fails or succeeds. If democratization succeeds, then obviously there will be less threats to the United States, and if the democratization process fails, then the whole region will have to divert their attention to this failed state and the US will be again more secure since potential hostile forces will have focus their resources in the region. Thus shifting attention away from the US (lecture notes, 2007). The patterns of such an approach towards foreign policy could be identified in Iraq.

The reason why the neocons, despite relative weakness in terms of resources, (Williams, 2007: 92-115) were successful in persuading foreign policy of the United States lies in their approach towards culture, values, and identity. Williams provides explanation of this achievement:

> Neoconservatism has been able to fashion a powerful identity and to adopt a representational strategy whereby an elite can claim to speak for authentic, ordinary Americans, and to reach out to other disparate groups fighting the culture wars by casting themselves as allies in the same cultural struggle. (2007: 119)

According to Debra Merskin, after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, American political elite started to construct images of enemy, portraying the Arabs and Muslims as terrorists. The post 9/11 rhetoric, as the author notes, is full of such radical categorizations such as “them” versus “us” and “evil” versus “good” (Merskin, 2005: 376-379).

Such a radical rhetoric is also present in the most important foreign policy document, the National Security Strategy of the United States which was adopted by the Bush
administration in 2002. John Gaddis outlines the three main goals of the first security strategy of the Bush administration: 1) defending peace by fighting with terrorists and tyrants; 2) preserving peace by building good relations with other key powers of the world; and 3) extending peace by promoting democracy and freedom everywhere in the world (2002: 50).

To achieve these seemingly traditional and obvious goals, the NSS 2002 concentrates on power derived from its “unparalleled military strength.” The means outlined in the strategy consist of a preemptive war; unilateral action; and focusing on the “coalition of the willing” rather than traditional alliances and institutions such as NATO.

Thus, if in the both security strategies of the Clinton administration a substantial part of the document was devoted to transatlantic relations and specific hot spots in Europe were addressed, Bush preferred not to emphasize the role of traditional allies in his foreign policy and rather rely on dynamic “coalition of the willing” which would be much easier to construct and lead to the war. Such an approach was basically caused by ongoing debates on the possibility to invade Iraq. The security strategy clearly indicated that intervention in Iraq was a viable foreign policy option for the US.

Such an approach was not happily met in Europe, especially in France and in Germany. As Jolyon Howorth notes, European reactions were predictable:

… multilateralism was preferred to unilateralism, pragmatism to ideology, root cases prioritized over symptoms, diplomacy over military force, the long-term over the short-term, the known over the unknown, caution preferred to risk (in Dannreuther and Peterson, 2006: 30).
The second National Security Strategy which was issued by the Bush administration in 2006 is in lines of the previous strategy. The goals are not changed and the same type of rhetoric is used. The power is still in focus of the strategy and the past four years, since the previous security strategy, are positively assessed.

In 2003, the EU also adopted a common security strategy for the first time in its existence. Although it is obvious that the ESS and NSS are fundamentally different in nature since the former reflects consensus on security issues and perceptions of EU’s member states, the latter represents the most comprehensive foreign policy document of a unitary and the most powerful state, it is interesting to note some differences which derive from American and European identities. For example, while the NSS emphasizes threats such as terrorism and rogue states with a possibility of obtaining the weapons of mass destruction, the ESS concentrates on weapons of mass destruction as such, along with other threats. Steven Everts notes that the differences in perceptions when Europeans and American deal with foreign policy:

When Europeans debate foreign policy, they tend to focus on “challenges”, whereas Americans look at “threats”. European concerns are challenges such as ethnic conflict, migration, organized crime, poverty and environmental degradation. Americans … tend to debate foreign threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and “rogues states” Buzzwords in the European debate are “global governance”, “projecting stability” and managing globalization.” By contrast, American stock phrases are “burden-sharing”, “American national interests” and “US leadership” (Everts, 2001: 3)
The beginning of the post 9/11 period was marked by solidarity by European allies. Invasion of Afghanistan was a predictable step and supported by the international community. The further developments in American foreign policy, however, caused the most vivid transatlantic tension in history. France and Germany were radically opposing the United States plan to invade Iraq. However, it did not hinder the United States to act unilaterally. Nevertheless, it was a period when economic relations between the two continents marked its highest result, $ 850 billion in mutual investment and trade (Cameron, 2005: 165).

Meanwhile, some signs of revitalization of the ESDP became apparent. The EU increased the number of military and humanitarian operations in various regions of the world. Moreover, The European forces were able to substitute American forces in Bosnia, deploying over 6,000 military personnel in the field. This, in my opinion, can be seen as the turning point in European history. Although the European forces did not have to engage in war and mainly performed peacekeeping operations, it is important that joint European forces managed to implement the project successfully. It is also important that the success of the Althea operation very much depended on cooperation with NATO. It was NATO’s facilities which were used by Europeans on the field.

It should be noted however, that the nature of European forces fundamentally differs from the American one. Defense expenditure in Europe is still very much lower than that of the US. Its developed military capabilities do more the “dish washing” jobs, while the US is concentrated on “making the dinner.” The above mentioned perceptions of the EU on multilateralism, the rule of law, and human rights is a good explanation why the EU failed to produces American type brute force. As Kagan suggests, due to these differences in
American and European identities, there can be achieved the division of labor between the US and the EU.

Current developments on the European continent are also quite interesting. Despite the fact that American and European publics perceptions on war and security are more and more diverging (see Transatlantic Trends), it is interesting that in elections of the two most important supposedly anti-American states, Germany and France, Atlanticist governments came into power, Merkel and Sarkozy. Although these politicians are for a stronger Europe, they also favor stronger ties with the US.

4.2. Realist Explanations

Thus, as we see, realists account fails to explain the transatlantic relations of the discussed period. Changes of American foreign policy were not the result of the changed world system. In fact, the distribution of power after the terrorist attacks was very much the same as it was before 9/11. However, the collapse of the World Trade Center shattered the identity of regular Americans, which laid ground to adopt a mainly Neoconservative approach towards the foreign policy. The War in Iraq is probably the most clear example that the American foreign policy underwent major changes after the 9/11 attacks. For realists, such an active international involvement without national interests at stake is not a policy option.

Similarly, the shift towards development of common European forces is also not well explained by realists. Realist hypothesis that the EU would develop military capabilities to
match the American strength proved to be incorrect so far. The ESDP project was not even able to achieve its headline goals and turned to be symbolic coalition rather than effective military mechanism. Moreover, the defense spending in Europe is still much lower than in the US and there are no signs that it will rise substantially in near future.

In regards of the deepening divergent views on war between the US and the key members of the EU realists suggests that France and Germany attempted to balance the US. However, I would argue both France and Germany were opposing due to perceptions rather than material interests. The war in Iraq did not give the US any strategic advantage. Quite the contrary, it became more vulnerable and overstretched. Europeans were opposing means of removing the Saddam Hussein regime Iraq, since there was no clear evidence of threat.

4.3. Constructivist Explanations

The impact of 9/11 terrorist attacks, as already mentioned, was ideational rather than material. Collapse of the World Trade Center resulted in emphasizing importance of the terrorist threat. The cognitive maps of Americans and citizens of other states in the world were shocked and this changed identity required adequate reactions to terrorists. Thus, the foreign policy change of the US was caused by the external shock, described by Herman, not the systemic change (1990).

The paralysis of the ESDP can also be explained by constructivist argument. There is no direct external military threat in European’s perceptions and after 50 years of intensive
cooperation it is hard to think on “hard” security matters. Thus, for the moment Europe
remained as a predominantly normative power. It has not found its distinct and active security
role in the world. However, some non-systemic changes, as we already see, might completely
change the European identity and cause active engagement in world affairs.

Another instance of application of constructivist approach is the particular language used in
the National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006 and the European Security Strategy of
2003. While Americans talk about the global leadership and put great emphasis on
democratization of the world and the threats derived from terrorism, Europeans are more
cautious and less ambitious, reflecting the dominant “strategic ideas” of the US and the EU.
Conclusion

I have examined the usefulness of the realist and constructivist approaches for understanding transatlantic relations after the Cold War. Although a Neorealist approach provides a useful starting point for analysis, it is unable to account for general patterns of relations between the US and the EU. Instead, the constructivist approach with a focus on the role of identity formation turned out to be more useful in assessing the patterns of cooperation and competition between the two sides of the Atlantic.

I have tested neorealist and constructivist arguments on three cases: George H.W. Bush’s foreign policy and Europe; Clinton and the process of integration in Europe; and George W. Bush and the peak of transatlantic relations. Although my approach was more oriented on the US, I did not hold the EU as a constant variable and took into account dynamics of integration and policy-making on this continent. My task was to examine whether in the above three cases major foreign policy changes have occurred and if yes, what the major determinants of such changes, systemic factors or non-systemic ones were. After the key facts in regards of all three cases, I have assessed them separately through constructivist and realist approaches.

As we have seen, relations between the US and the EU have changed several times after the end of the Cold War. The changes in relations were not dependent primarily on power distribution and the nature of the world system, as realists would suggest. In fact, these changes have been determined by the perceptions and beliefs of Americans and Europeans.
and their ruling elites. These perceptions and beliefs were sometimes reconsidered due to events such as the wars in former Yugoslavia or terrorist attacks. As Wendt argues, “… states may have multiple identities … [and] … the commitment to and the salience of particular identities vary” (1992: 398). Thus whichever identity of Europe and the US was salient at a given moment, was a determinant of patterns of relations.

Thus, although the realist approach might sometimes provide useful explanations, it has rarely worked as a rigorous tool to understand post-Cold War transatlantic relations. In fact, it often failed to deliver adequate explanations on why readjustments in American foreign policy have occurred and why the EU failed to transform into a credible global security player which would balance the American power one day.

On the other hand, constructivism, and especially Wendt’s framework with its focus on identity formation provide us with better explanations in this regards. The difficulty, however, is that it is always hard to detect what exactly constitutes identity and perceptions in a given case. One indicator of identity shift is the language adopted in official rhetoric. For example, one can claim that the EU is still not ready to be transformed into a full blown military power is obvious by the fact that Europeans prefer to use the term “challenges” while Americans talk about “threats” (Everts, 2001: 2).

Thus, constructivism certainly has potential to establish itself as a rigorous theoretical framework through which we would be able to understand and analyze issues of world politics. Because this approach is relatively new in theories of international relations, it still needs to be studied and enhanced by more empirical examples.
In regards of the policy implications, the findings suggest that the future of transatlantic relations can be beneficial and cooperative for both sides. Unlike realists, who were claiming that “the world is going to miss the Cold War days” (Mearsheimer, 1990), the constructivist approach is more optimistic in this regards and implies that the future depends on the identities and perceptions of the main actors of the world. In other words, the future in is our hands.
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